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General Introduction
In Milan Kundera's The Unbearable Lightness of Being the author reflects on
the idea of eternal return and concludes that the normal, transitory nature of
things constitutes a mitigating circumstance. We cannot condemn things that
are ephemeral, in transit. In the sunset of dissolution everything is illuminated
by the aura of nostalgia, even the guillotine. Kundera concludes that our
attitude toward things past reveals the profound moral perversity of a world
that rests essentially on the nonexistence of return, for in this world every-
thing is pardoned in advance and therefore everything cynically permitted.
Kundera's analysis reflects a basically Western understanding of time as a
linear process that admits of no exact repetitions (Gale, 1968). Time is thought
of as an arrow rather than a boomerang. However, even accepting the
noncircular nature of time and the nonexistence of exact return that follows
from it, most people would disagree with the pessimistic conclusion that,
consequently, everything is permitted. Scientists, in particular, have always
had problems with the idea that "anything goes" (Feyerabend, 1975, 1978)
and have formulated all sorts of methodological rules for decision making.
Paradoxically, they have advanced the possibility of return or replication as
the test of reliability or validity of statements and decisions.
It seems then that we are faced with an unsolvable problem: Accepting the
transient nature of things leads to the impossibility of exact replications and,
therefore, to the impossibility of establishing the reliability (or, accepting
Kundera's argument, the morality) of decisions and results. This would lead to
the relativistic position that the adequacy or morality of conclusions cannot
be adequately judged by persons living in another historical period. Similar
arguments have been advanced with respect to the concept of culture
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(Kohlberg, 1981). Many investigators would be unwilling to accept such a
relativistic position. An obvious way out is, of course, to simply assume that
time is irrelevant for the subject of study and this is, indeed, an assumption
often made in the natural and social sciences. This assumption may be
warranted for the natural sciences—after all, the nature of nuclear particles
does not seem to be dependent on the historical period in which they are
studied—but it is very problematic for the social sciences and humanities.
There, a more adequate way out of the problem might be to accept the basic
developmental and transhistorical (Larsen, 1990) nature of things and to
study them exactly in the process of development (Valsiner, 1987, 1989).
CULTURAL BASIS FOR THE NEED OF REPLICATION
The idea that decisions or results should be repeatable is, of course, very
generally accepted in our culture. Convicts bring an appeal against the
judgment in the hope that another court and another jury will come to a
different decision. When the judgment remains the same our belief in the
justness of the decision is strengthened. Apparently, we conclude, the judg-
ment was not merely based on the personal opinions of this specific court and
this specific jury. To some extent it is instructive to compare the scientific
enterprise with a lawsuit: Like scientists, judges and juries will try to weigh the
evidence in a detached way and come to objectively valid and reliable—that
is, repeatable—conclusions.
The basic grounds for bringing an appeal have to do with human fallibility.
Judges and juries may make mistakes in interpreting the evidence. There are
many reasons this could be so. They might fail to look at certain aspects of the
material, selectively forget parts of it, be prejudiced against the defendant,
make methodological mistakes, and so forth (Wagenaar, 1989). Virtually the
same factors play a role in scientific reasoning and below some of them will be
mentioned.
In several well-documented cases it is clear that the outcomes of classic
scientific investigations were erroneous because of sloppy methodological
procedures or even fraudulent behavior. One example is that of the well-
known psychological experiment on conditioned emotional reactions re-
ported by Watson and Rayner (1920). The authors' experiment was an
attempt to condition an emotional reaction to a specific stimulus, and then to
see whether that emotion would reappear in the presence of other similar
stimuli and persist through time. Their one and only subject was a little boy
named Albert. As a baseline, Watson and Rayner established that Little Albert
showed no fear when confronted with such stimuli as a white rat, a dog, a
monkey, and burning newspapers. They then struck a steel bar behind Little
Albert each time the child touched a white rat. Not surprisingly, their subject
_
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did not like this and after several repetitions he became fearful of the rat. The
experimenters then established that this fear generalized to other similar
stimuli such as a fur coat, a rabbit, and Watson's hair. They concluded that the
emotional response did generalize to similar stimuli and that the effect
persisted for a longer period than a month. Unfortunately, later researchers
(Harris, 1979; Hilgard & Marquis, 1940) were unable to replicate Watson's
findings, and it has been pointed out (Cornwell & Hobbs, 1976; Paul &
Blumenthal, 1989; Prytula, Oster, & Davis, 1977; Samelson, 1980) that Wat-
son's study was methodologically flawed. Among other things, Watson and
Rayner had to "freshen" the conditioned reaction after 10 days, because
Albert's fear of the rat began to fade. Also, emotional reactions typically did
not occur unless the experimenters removed Albert's thumb from his mouth
(Paul & Blumenthal, 1989).
Another (in)famous case is that of Sir Cyril Hurt's intelligence research. It
has now been well documented (Gould, 1981; Hearnshaw, 1979; Kamin,
1974; Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984) that the evidence for Burl's claim that
IQ is genetically determined was nonexistent. The collapse of Burl's claims
within the scientific community began when attention was drawn to some
numerical implausibilities in his published papers. In three consecutive
studies of separated identical twins with differing sample size (n = 21 ; n = 30;
n = 53) Burt found a IQ correlation of .771. The IQ correlations for other
relatives also remained identical to the third decimal place in these studies.
This wholly unlikely result was first observed by Kamin (1974) and led him
and other researchers to make a careful study of Butt's alleged experiments.
It is now established beyond reasonable doubt that Burl's idée fixe of the
innateness of intelligence led him lo fake his results. The irony of this case of
scientific fraud will be dear: Fellow researchers started doubting Burl's data
for Ihe very reason lhal he reported slricl replicability of results in three
consecutive investigations.
These examples of classic experimental findings may not be typical for the
whole field of psychology, but they do show that at least several of them do
not stand up to careful scrutiny (see also Chapter 3). They also demonstrate
that important research findings may serve a sociological, ideological, and
even psychological function for the persons concerned. This circumstance—
whether it is seen as a factor contaminating research outcomes that can be
avoided or as an inevitable aspect of doing scientific research—may clearly
hinder or prevent the replication of results. This leads us to the factors that
might actually make replication of research outcomes difficult.
DIFFERENT KINDS OF REPLICATION
Let us first remark that researchers may strive for replication studies that
copy the experimental conditions of the original study as faithfully as possible
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or for studies in which one or more of the experimental conditions are
deliberately changed. In the first case we may speak of strict, precise,
(virtually) exact, or carbon-copy replications. It is clear that strict replications
can never exactly copy the original study, if only for the reason mentioned by
Kundera. In the second case we may speak of conceptual, imprecise, or
inexact replications. It has been remarked by various researchers that the
two types of replication studies serve a different goal: Strict replications
bolster confidence in the original data by confirming their reliability (Amir &
Sharon, 1990; Hendrick, 1990; Rosenthal, 1990); conceptual replications yield
novelty by showing that the original results can be found under other
circumstances and, thus, demonstrate their external validity or generalizabil-
ity. Recently researchers have suggested implementing strict and conceptual
replications in the design of the original study as a matter of routine. A
"multitrait-multimethod" model, in which different potentially important
factors are systematically varied, is proposed (Hendrick, 1990; Rosenthal,
1990).
In order to see what is exactly meant by exact or conceptual replications it
is useful to distinguish several of the factors that may actually influence the
possibility of replicating research outcomes. Hendrick (1990; see also Amir &
Sharon, 1990, for a similar list) has listed the following classes of factors that
affect the total research reality:
1. Subject characteristics. Such variables as age, sex, and so on may
vary from study to study and affect the results of a given research
project. It is well known, for example, that most textbook findings
rest on research carried out under the population of American
middle-class students and that, consequently, the story they tell may
be highly biased. Replication of the research results in different
samples may be problematic.
2. Specific research histories of subjects. The prior treatment of
subjects may affect performance in a current study. This factor is
crucial under the current practice of doing empirical research where
most psychology students are asked to participate in research more
than once and may develop all sorts of expectations concerning the
desired research outcome. Generally speaking this factor may under-
mine the common assumption of stability of the phenomenon under
study;
3. Social-historical-cultural context No doubt, psychology is a
highly ethnocentric affair (Valsiner, 1989) and the fact that subjects in
different cultures and historical periods will react differently to the
"same" stimuli makes psychology's findings as presented in text-
books of limited value.
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4. General physical «6111112 of the research. This class includes such
factors as lighting, ventilation, acoustics, and so on, that may affect
the mood of subjects.
5. Control agent. The person running an experiment interacts with
the subjects in a unique way that may affect the behavior of subjects.
In addition he or she may have certain expectations as to the
outcomes. Rosenthal (1966) has convincingly shown how these ex-
perimenter effects may play a contaminating role.
6. Specific task variables. This class refers to specific minute material
circumstances such as the nature of research booklets, the style of
typing, and so on. They are generally assumed to be theoretically
irrelevant, but this remains to be seen (Hendrick, 1990).
7. Primary information focus. This refers to the set of instructions
given to the subject that should guarantee that the subjects construe
the research reality as intended by the experimenter. In practice, of
course, subjects may define or structure the situation in a way that is
guided by personal, cultural, and historical factors.
8. Modes of data reduction and presentation. Different means of
analyzing and presenting the data will lead to different conclusions as
to what the data show. Recently advanced methods, such as meta-
analysis, may to a limited extent be helpful in reducing this source of
variation.
This list of factors that may vary across empirical investigations once again
shows that strict replication is impossible in principle. For even in the
improbable case that the same researcher would carry out the same study
with the same material and the same subjects in the same circumstances,
factors such as the subject characteristics and the sociocultural-historical
context might have changed in a relevant way. Really strict replication is not
even possible in the case where one would arbitrarily divide the sample in
two equal parts and then compare the results of the analysis computed for
each half separately. Apart from the fact that such a borderline case of
"split-half replicability" stretches our understanding of the notion of replica-
bility rather too far, it is dear that the subjects' characteristics or their
research history would differ in potentially relevant ways. It is clear, then,
that the idea of strict replication should be thought of as a regulative idea and
that strict and conceptual replications do not form a dichotomy. However,
these two extremes on the similarity continuum do serve a somewhat dif-
ferent goal and it is significant, for instance, that Rosenthal (1990)—arguing in
favor of conceptual replication—has recently suggested that a replication of
an experiment that obtains similar results is maximally convincing if it is
maximally seperated from the first experiment along such dimensions as
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time, personal attributes of the experimenters, experimenters' degree of
personal contact with each other, and so forth.
REPUCABILITY AND PUBUSHABILITY
It would seem that the fact that very few replication studies are published in
social scientific journals partly reflects an understanding of replication that is
biased toward strict replication. As these replication studies do not yield
novelty, but rather check the reliability of the original results, they are less
valued in a community where (limited) originality is highly valued. Rather
surprisingly, in natural scientific journals the number of replication studies
published is much higher (Bornstein, 1990b). We surmise, however—relying
on the sociological literature on this issue (Chapter 3)—that these are almost
exclusively conceptual replications. That social scientific journals discourage
replication studies has been observed more than once (e.g., Bornstein, 1990a;
Mahoney, 1985). There is now growing empirical evidence for this sugges-
tion. First, the number of replication studies published in social scientific
journals has been found to be consistently low in several studies. In fact, in
none of the studies does the percentage of published replication experiments
reached 1% of the sample size (Bozarth & Roberts, 1972; Greenwald, 1975;
Reid, Soley, & Wimmer, 1981). This, of course, may reflect the fact that
researchers simply do not conduct replication studies regardless of editorial
policies. But this seems to us an improbable explanation of the low publica-
tion numbers. First, informal observation suggests that many students are
required to carry out a replication study as part of their training, or "rite of
passage." This would imply that many more replication studies are actually
carried out than is generally thought and reflected by the publication num-
bers. The fact that The Journal of Social Behavior and Personality (also
published as the Handbook of Replication Research in the Behavioral and
Social Sciences) recently gathered some 50 replication studies by sending out
notices to academic departments indeed suggests that there may be quite a
few replications available (Neuliep & Crandall, 1990). We surmise, therefore,
that despite discouraging editorial policies replication studies are still carried
out on a regular basis. Recently, Neuliep and Crandall (1990) found strong
evidence in favor of the hypothesis of editorial bias. The authors mailed a
questionnaire concerning the issue of replication to a sample of editors. The
great majority of editors (72%) found replications less important than studies
that demonstrate a new effect. Rather surprisingly, a majority of the editors
felt that the burden of proof lies with the replicator when a replication study
fails to replicate an earlier finding. This assumed asymmetry of responsibili-
ties clearly favors the publication of new results and discourages replication
studies.
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If leading journals discourage replication studies and researchers continue
doing them then a "file drawer problem" will inevitably develop. It would
imply that the studies published in the social sciences are a biased sample of
the studies that are actually carried out. For if journals discourage the
publication of nonsignificant results—and replication studies that fail to rep-
licate earlier findings are often of the nonsignificant type—then the file
drawers in the laboratory will be gradually filled with studies showing
nonsignificant results. This would mean that journals are simply filled with
studies showing Type 1 errors. Rosenthal (1990) has recently suggested some
quantitative measures to cope with this problem.
Several researchers have suggested that the exclusive concentration on
significance scores is in itself misleading. Moreover, researchers tend to think
of the success of a replication study in a dichotomous fashion (e.g., Jegerski,
1990; Rosenthal, 1990). Rosenthal (1990) has argued that it is far more
informative to concentrate on the effect size as the relevant summary statistic
of studies. In comparing original study and replication the focus should be on
effect size and the evaluation of whether the replication has been successful
should be made in a continuous fashion. Rosenthal (1990) has suggested
several metrics of the success of replication. These technical recommenda-
tions all rest on the assumption that the variables and outcomes of different
studies can indeed be meaningfully compared. Some of the contributions in
this book seem to cast doubt on this assumption (see Chapters 1 and 2,
respectively). It seems that, although such metrics may be very useful, the
researcher comparing the results of various studies—as in meta-analysis—
cannot avoid conceptual issues; nor can he or she avoid many difficult
decisions that cannot be based on purely qualitative grounds (see also
Chapter 6).
Earlier we saw that published replication studies are far more frequent in
natural scientific journals than in social scientific ones. Does this circumstance
perhaps reflect some fundamental differences between the natural and social
sciences? One thing that has been suggested (Chapter 6) is that the description
of materials and procedures can be more accurate in the natural sciences as
they developed a generally accepted vocabulary. As a result replicators in the
natural sciences would have less difficulty replicating the original results.
Although it remains to be seen whether the situation in the natural sciences is
indeed much better—such objective factors as lack of space and the wish to
conceal novel procedures may lead researchers to be rather brief in the
description of their material and procedures—it is true that social studies are
often difficult to replicate on the sole basis of the description found in the
journal publication. Amir and Sharon (1990), who carried out six replication
studies in social psychology, report that "in most cases the information
published in the articles was not sufficient for an adequate replication. At
times, even additional information, directly supplied by the original re-
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searcher, was not detailed enough to ensure a precise replication." Likewise,
Van Uzendoorn (Chapter 3) observes that the use of some research tech-
niques—such as the adult attachment interview—requires sometimes exten-
sive training under the supervision of the original experimenter. One won-
ders what in the light of these circumstances one is to make of Rosenthal's
claim that replications are less convincing the more the original experiment is
similar to the replication along such dimensions as experimenters' degree of
personal contact with each other, and so forth (see earlier).
Another factor that may make replication studies more difficult in the
social sciences is the lack of a standardized vocabulary. As Lytton (Chapter 6)
points out, a mother giving a young child help with a cognitive task can be
viewed as showing support or warmth, but she can also be thought of as
intrusive. Such different interpretations and labels of behavior are guided by
the researcher's cultural and historical context.
Rather than giving an exhaustive list of all the factors that might make
studies in the social sciences more difficult to replicate than those in the
natural sciences we refer back to the classes of potentially relevant variables
given before (Hendrick, 1990). It is clear that such classes as subject charac-
teristics, specific research histories of subjects, social-historical context, spe-
cific task variables, and primary information focus do not play a role in the
natural sciences. Part of these differences are perhaps best expressed by
saying that, whereas natural scientists work on the assumption of the unifor-
mity of nature, social scientists also and inevitably have to face the variety of
culture. Cross-cultural psychology and anthropology has made us aware of
the fact that universals in human nature and culture are hard to find. This is
also true for social sciences that are generally thought to be more objective
than psychology, such as medicine. The views of what constitutes a disease
and what are its possible cures vary immensely even across Western cultures
(Payer, 1990). Neither do we easily find behaviors nor cultural constructs that
are not subject to historical change.
We may conclude, then, that there are objective factors that make exact and
conceptual replications less feasible in the social sciences. It is, therefore, part
of the goal of this book to indicate the goals, usefulness, but also the boundaries
of replication in the social sciences—boundaries that are determined by the
fundamental developmental nature of human phenomena and that were de-
scribed by Kundera in his reflection on the nonexistence of return.
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PARTI
The Notion of
Replicability: Historical
and Theoretical Issues
The philosophy of science is replete with methodological precepts that were
ostensibly distilled from actual scientific practice. Analyzing the work of
successful natural scientists, philosophers of science have formulated rules
that supposedly brook no appeal. However, it has become clear that it is
exceedingly easy to garner indubitable specimens of successful—even fa-
mous—investigations in various strands of science that explicitly violate the
methodological canon of philosophers. The quirks and vagaries of actual
scientific practice apparently ensure a picture that is incomparably richer
than simple methodological rules would suggest. This is not to gainsay that
human curiosity is somehow rule bound, or that more and less fruitful
approaches in scientific research exist. But we do surmise that the latitudes of
scientific practice are broader than is commonly thought and that many a
methodological precept has to be thought over and tested against actual
scientific practice in the type of sociological research that several of the first
chapters of this section refer to.
One of the most well-known rules of scientific methodology states that
researchers should endeavor after repeatable or replicatie experiments and
results. The first chapters of this book deal with questions concerning the
nature and function of replication. What do we mean by the word replication'?
Can different forms of replication be distinguished? Does successful replica-
tion of experimental results yield an argument in favor of their truth? Do
replication studies actually occur with any frequency in scientific practice? Is
replication theoretically possible and fruitful? These are some of the questions
of the theory of replication that the first chapters address.
Before we give a succinct overview of the content of these chapters and
11
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their interrelatedness we do well to distinguish between various uses of the
word replication as they occur in these first chapters. By replication we may
mean the replication of the setup or experimental conditions of an investiga-
tion. Such a type of replication is made possible by providing as detailed as
feasible a description of the circumstances under which the original experi-
ment took place, the role of the experimenter, the exact text of the instruction
or questions, and so on. This use of the word replication is probably the most
prevalent. One may also speak of replicating the results of the original
experiment found either with an identical experimental setup or a different
one. In this sense of the word replication comes dose to concepts like
confirmation or corroboration. Finally, one may argue that the conclusions—
the interpretations of experimental results or research outcomes—to which
an investigation leads replicate conclusions reached earlier. Thus, to give a
perverse example, it is possible to invent an experimental setup that makes
subjects nervous (e.g., playing very loud music while asking the subjects to
perform some extremely boring tasks). The details of this experimental
setup—if properly described—can be copied (replicated) with reasonable
success. Likewise, in a second study one can hope to replicate the original
experimental results, say, that male subjects are generally more nervous than
female ones, with the same setup, or another one. Thus, another researcher
might copy the original experimental setup or, for example, ask subjects to
give a public talk and find similar or different results. Finally, when different
or virtually identical setups have led to different or virtually identical results
the scientific community will tend to (disagree about the interpretation of
these results. It might be argued, for example, that stress in the first experi-
mental setup is caused by underlying mechanisms that are very different
from those operative in the second experimental setup. Quantitatively iden-
tical experimental results may hide very different underlying mechanisms,
and researchers consequently might argue that—theoretically speaking—the
two experiments cannot be meaningfully compared and that, therefore, the
results of the second study in no way replicate the results of the first. This
somewhat far-fetched example brings out some of the problems (another
problem might be whether one type of "nervous" behavior—e.g., picking
one's clothes—confirms or replicates another type of behavior—e.g., exces-
sive sweating, or outbursts of anger) of conceptualizing replication and may
help to understand part of the discussion in the following chapters.
In Chapter 1, Danziger and Shermer defend a historical view of the
phenomenon of replication in psychology arguing that there are no univer-
sally valid and ahistorical rules about what constitutes proper replication.
Whereas the founder of psychology Wundt, for example, meant by replica-
tion the observation of identical phenomena under identical circumstances,
for the Wurzbürgians it meant the observation of common features under
different circumstances. Whereas Baldwin selected naive adults, or children
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as subjects, Titchener worked with well-trained, normal adults. What one
defines as the proper subject matter of psychology determines one's concept
of replication. The authors describe the shift from replication with respect to
individual subject properties to population properties and the distinction
between true and accidental variation that went with it. In the modern view
replication has come to mean the reproducibility of particular statistical
patterns among the scores of a group of individuals. Danziger and Shermer
conclude their chapter by observing that, despite the disagreements as to the
nature of true replications between different schools in psychology, there is
still unanimous agreement among the schools about two fundamental as-
sumptions. First, it is generally thought possible to eliminate history, that is,
what psychology studies are thought to be processes and functions not subject
to historical change. Second, it is assumed that the methods of investigation
are independent from whatever they were supposed to investigate.
It is exactly these assumptions that Kloos challenges in Chapter 2 on
restudy in anthropological research. By its very nature anthropology has to
do with the "soft" aspects of human culture that tend to vary much more than
the "hard" quasiphysiological properties that some psychologists claim to
investigate. That is, while some psychologists might identify with the anato-
mist who opens one or two bodies and then sees no need of further replicating
his experiment (see Chapter 1 for this example), this is unacceptable for
anthropologists who have learned that societies tend to be in a continual flux
and that the instrument itself (that is, the investigator) is necessarily a
co-constructor of the cultural reality he encounters. No two interviewers will
sketch the same picture of a person and neither will the same person give the
same answers when interviewed in different periods of his life. Likewise, no
two anthropologists will give the same account of a society as no two
anthropologists will investigate the same (aspect of the) society for the
reasons mentioned. The sex of the anatomist will not determine the results of
an obduction, whereas the sex of the anthropologist may be crucial. These
circumstances have forced anthropologists—perhaps more so than psychol-
ogists—to appreciate the fact that the knower in anthropology is changing his
subject matter by his knowing activities. Thus, anthropological research has
led to a more dialectical view of what it is to gather knowledge about a
phenomenon. Accepting this situation as an unavoidable fact Kloos argues
that understanding is best furthered by the reflective analysis of contrasting
accounts of one and the "same" society (as exact or even approximate
replications are impossible anyhow). He suggests even to make the most of
the situation and promote different views by asking researchers with dif-
ferent theoretical perspectives to give their views of a society in order to learn
from the contrasts.
Drawing on the growing sociological literature about the practice of repli-
cation in actual scientific research Van Uzendoorn in Chapter 3 proposes a
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process model of replication studies. In this view virtually exact replications
are rare in the natural sciences and are only resorted to when systematic
variation of experimental setups or less costly variants of replication studies
do not yield the theoretically expected results. The author proposes a hierar-
chical model in which different forms of replication studies all find their place.
Van Uzendoorn's emphasis on the role of the scientific forum in judging the
value of deliberate variations of experimental setups and attempts at exact
replication is somewhat reminiscent of Kloos's view. Both authors seem to
encourage nonexact replications (in Kloos's case preferably nonexact repli-
cations by researchers with a different theoretical outlook) whose results will
be evaluated by the scientific community. The difference seems to be that
Van Uzendoorn finds a limited role for virtually exact replication studies as a
last resort, whereas Kloos thinks that these are impossible in principle and
useless as he sees great value in contrasting views. At the background of both
views, however, there seems to be the fundamental conviction that we learn
by extending our cognitive schémas and not by literally repeating them.
Simple isomorphic copies of research designs seem indeed logically impos-
sible and theoretically of little value. Instead, in their search for knowledge,
both researchers and children seem to follow the epistemological pattern of
nonisomorphic imitation or varied replication first described by Baldwin and
Piaget (see Valsiner & van der Veer, 1988; van der Veer & Valsiner, 1988).
In Chapter 4, Miedema and Biesta address the thorny problem of whether
successful replication of research findings demonstrates simply reliability or
repeatibility of results, or whether it proves their ontological truth. Drawing
on the same literature as Van Uzendoorn they first claim that exact replica-
tion is the exception rather than the rule. The topic of scientific debate seems
not so much to be the reliability or repeatibility of results, but the validity or
acceptability of the conclusions (research outcomes) seen against the ac-
cepted background knowledge. Even in the rare case of virtually exact
replication, different researchers may disagree about the outcomes of this
replication and consensus must be reached through a process of negotiation.
Lake Kloos, the authors emphasize the value of the scientific discussion about
replication results and deny that replication can contribute to our knowledge
of some independently given reality. Rather, with Dewey they view knowl-
edge as a transactional process in which knowledge is the result of specific
actions upon the objective environment and their feedback effects upon the
subject. Knowledge, then, is a relationship that exists between the mutually
dependent subject and object. This conclusion brings us nicely back to
Danziger and Shermer's conclusion that the attempt to separate the condi-
tions and the products of psychological research was never successful as
knowledge is a relationship with an object and not a thing in itself.
These first theoretical chapters then will enrich our notion of the function,
nature, and possibility of replication. A thicket of different interpretations of
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what consitutes replication exists, and different research schools and disci-
plines adhere to different notions of replication. It seems impossible to
conflate these various notions into one simple model. Although researchers
agree with laymen that it is always useful to ask for a second opinion, they
typically disagree about the way this should be done.
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The Varieties of Replication:
A Historical Introduction
Kurt Danziger and P. Shermer
Department of Psychology
York University
Ontario, Canada
Generally, similarity, and with it repetition, always presuppose the adoption of
a point of view, some similarities or repetitions will strike us if we are interested
in one problem, and others if we are interested in another problem. But if
similarity and repetition presuppose the adoption of a point of view, or an
interest, or an expectation, it is logically necessary that points of view, or
interests, or expectations, are logically prior, as well as temporally (or causally
or psychologically) prior, to repetition. (Popper, 1959, pp. 421-422)
Although the requirement of replicability is undoubtedly a prominent part
of the lore of science, it can be given an unambiguous and self-evident
meaning only as long as we adopt a suitably restricted perspective. As soon as
we go beyond the conventions that have come to prevail in a particular
scientific community, we discover a variety of conceptions of what replica-
tion means in practice and why it is considered important. We also find a
corresponding variety of actual practices that have been considered to satisfy
the requirement of replicability at different times and in different scientific
communities. An examination of this variety can provide valuable insights
into the fundamental "points of view" or "interests" (to use Popper's terms)
that are taken for granted in everyday scientific practice but that underlie its
basic direction.
It is a curious paradox of scientific practice that, although everyone pays lip
service to the ideal of replication, "no one ever repeats an experiment"
(Hacking, 1983). That is not only because of the ancient problem of stepping
in the same river twice, but also because experimenters, as Hacking and
others have noted, are not passive observers of nature but creators of
phenomena, and in particular, phenomena that are characterized by regu-
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larity and stability. Successful replication helps to demonstrate the feasibility
of this enterprise in specific cases. But replication can only play this role if
there is agreement on the nature of the phenomena in question. Otherwise,
one would not know whether to classify the phenomena created in the first
and in the second experiment as "similar." Agreement on the nature of the
phenomena, however, includes agreement on the relevance and significance
of a multitude of factors that are associated with their creation. As no two
experiments can ever be identical, an acceptable replication will be one
characterized by an acceptable degree of similarity in the conditions under
which phenomena are created. Obviously, what is acceptable to a particular
group of investigators at one time may not be acceptable to another group of
investigators at a different time.
Thus, there are no abstract and universally valid rules about what consti-
tutes a proper replication. Such rules never have more than a local and
historically limited significance. As scientists change their views about the
nature of the phenomena they are dealing with, so their standards for
acceptable replication change too. In well established fields there may be
long periods of basic agreement about the nature of the phenomena, and then
there may be little or no need for discussion about what represents a
replication and what does not. But in newly emerging fields, like modern
psychology in its earlier days, or in fields where scientists with different points
of view try to cooperate, the question of what constitutes an adequate
replication becomes part and parcel of the debate about what one is or should
be studying. There is an inescapable social-historical context to the issue of
replication. In recent times sociologists of science have been able to investi-
gate the kind of "negotiation" that surrounds claims to have achieved a valid
replication (Collins, 1985) as well as the social resolution of such negotiations.
In following the history of conflicting interpretations of the meaning of
replication in a field like psychology we are precluded from using the interview
method of the sociologist, but we have a wealth of published material to draw
on. Some of this material appeared in the course of public discussion about
what it meant to replicate findings in psychology. In other cases new concepts
of replication simply made their appearance as a by-product of new points of
view about the nature of the phenomena that psychology ought to be inter-
ested in. We first consider the major alternative conceptions that arose during
the earlier history of modern psychology and then trace the emergence of
conceptions that eventually came to dominate the discipline.
FIRST CONTROVERSY: WUNDT VS. THE WÜRZBURG SCHOOL
We have to begin with Wundt, not only because his views towered over the
discipline in its earliest formative years, but also because they were the
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product of systematic reflection about the nature of scientific method (Wundt,
1883). From the first years of his psychological laboratory Wundt took it for
granted that replication was an essential part of scientific method. But for him
replication meant the repetition of identical observations under identical
conditions. Astronomical observation seems to have functioned as an exem-
plar. One has to repeat observations because they are subject to random
sources of error that must be allowed for in order to arrive at an estimate of
the "true" value one is interested in. Psychophysical threshold determina-
tions illustrate this procedure.
Wundt's conception of what constituted a genuine repetition of an obser-
vation was extremely restrictive. This eventually brought him into conflict
with a new generation of experimentalists who saw a much expanded role for
introspection in the production of psychological phenomena. The most im-
portant representatives of the new trend were to be found in the Würzburg
School; although others, notably Titchener, had a similarly optimistic view of
the possibilities of introspective analysis (Danziger, 1980). In the Würzburg
experiments introspective evidence was used to establish the nature of
thought processes as well as volitional processes. That was anathema to
Wundt, and he did not hesitate to condemn these "pseudo-experiments," as
he called them (Wundt, 1907). Part of the ensuing controversy revolved
around the nature of replication in psychology and provides a telling illustra-
tion of how different conceptions of replication are associated with different
conceptions of the subject matter.
One of the main reasons Wundt rejected the findings of the systematic
introspectionists was that they were not based on repeated observations
under identical conditions. In psychophysical and perception experiments
one could repeatedly present the same stimulus to the same experimental
subject and obtain a distribution of responses that allowed for the elimination
of random errors of observation. In the introspective observation of thought
processes this was not possible, partly because of the temporally extended,
flowing nature of these processes and partly because any attempt at repeti-
tion would be nullified by the appearance of memory effects. Accordingly,
Wundt considered the scope of experimental psychology to be limited to
phenomena that involved a close and immediate tie of subjective events to
external stimuli, or at least to manifest external expressions. In practice, this
virtually restricted the field to the study of sensation and perception, imme-
diate memory, reaction times and the physiological expression of emotion.
Subjective processes beyond these areas were not amenable to experimental
investigation—they could not be transformed into the kinds of phenomena
that natural science dealt with. Such processes would have to be studied
indirectly, by examining their products, for example, language and myth,
with methods borrowed from the Geisteswissenschaften, the human sciences.
The introspectionists whom Wundt attacked had a much more liberal view
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of what constituted an experimentally established psychological phenome-
non. Unlike Wundt, they were prepared to accept as data the content of
retrospective introspective reports on conscious states that lacked any direct
tie to stimulus events or overt responses. The stimulus settings that they used
were in the nature of complex tasks (for a good English language account, see
Humphrey, 1950), and not the measurable physical stimuli that Wundt pre-
ferred to work with. The phenomena they investigated were defined as
thought processes rather than perceptual events. As long as one accepted the
phenomena created in the Würzburg laboratory (and elsewhere) as legitimate
objects of scientific investigation one could be content with a relatively loose
n't between an experiment and its repetition and still feel one had achieved
replication. Those whom Wundt criticized did not accept his criticism that
their experiments were not replicable (Bühler, 1908). A number of subjects
could be presented with a series of problem situations and certain common
features in their introspective reports could be observed. Wundt's very
narrow criteria of similarity were simply inappropriate for replicating obser-
vations on thought processes, a fact he seemed to recognize when he
declared such investigations out of bounds for experimental psychology.
THE BALDWIN-TITCHENER CONTROVERSY
The Wundt-Bühler confrontation represents one of the first striking illustra-
tions of the interdependence of conceptions of replication and definitions of
legitimate objects of investigation in the history of psychology. But there
were some fundamental beliefs about the proper subject matter of experi-
mental psychology that Wundt and the Würzburgers shared. For instance,
they all accepted that the subject matter to be investigated by psychology was
mental events, even though they differed about the kinds of mental events
that were legitimate candidates for such investigation. They also agreed that
the mental events that were of primary interest to psychology were those
commonly encountered in "normal," adult minds, not those in the minds of
children, of disturbed people, or of "primitives." This was a legacy of aca-
demic psychology's historical tie to philosophy and the still strong belief, in its
early European days, that it could justify its existence by its contribution to
the solution of general philosophical problems. Opposed to this there was a
growing tendency to legitimize psychological research by its potential con-
tribution to practical problems. Those kinds of problems, however, presented
themselves as the problems of particular subsections of humanity, not of
humanity in general. If one wanted to contribute to an understanding of such
relatively local problems one would have to adopt a different definition of the
subject matter of psychology and hence a different conception of replication.
The first historical manifestation of this issue occurred very early, though it
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took several decades for all the implications to become apparent. In 1895/96,
E. B. Titchener and James Mark Baldwin, both soon to become major figures
in the new science of psychology, engaged in a sharp controversy about the
explanation of differences in reaction times (Baldwin, 1895, 1896; Titchener,
1895,1896). As the controversy developed, a question of great interest for our
topic of replication began to assume fundamental significance; it was the
question of the selection of research subjects.
As we have noted, early laboratory psychology took the general features of
conscious processes as its subject matter. That meant that its experimental
subjects functioned in a dual role. On the one hand, their conscious processes
provided the objects of research, but on the other hand, the same experi-
mental subjects also functioned as the observers of these objects. The selec-
tion of such subjects therefore had to be undertaken in terms of two criteria.
First of all, because attention was focused on the general features of conscious
processes, one had to eliminate individuals in whom the relevant processes
might be affected by mental or physical deficits or even by special kinds of
background experience. Secondly, one had to select individuals whose ob-
servations could be relied on. Just as some individuals had no aptitude for
making accurate observations of physical events, so there were some who
had no aptitude for making accurate observations of mental events. These
would have to be eliminated from the category of potential experimental
subjects. Moreover, like other scientific observers, psychological observers
would have to have some practice before their observations could be relied
on. So naive, unpracticed individuals were not suitable as experimental
subjects.
Once one had selected one's subjects on these criteria each individual
going through the same experimental routine represented a replication of the
experiment. The situation was in some ways analogous to the common
practice in physiological experimentation or anatomical dissection. There
too, if one was not a pathologist or embrvologist, one's attention would be
focused on general features to be found in normal, adult organisms. One
would therefore eliminate diseased animals or those with detectable malfor-
mations and abnormalities. Because some abnormalities might not be readily
apparent, and because of the chance that one's first animal might happen to
be an abnormal specimen, one would do well to repeat one's dissection or
physiological investigation on a few animals. But if one obtained consistent
results in a few cases one would not consider it necessary to multiply the
number of one's specimens unduly. In an analogous way experiments on the
general features of conscious processes were usually conducted on a mere
handful of subjects, though these had of course been selected on the criteria
already mentioned. The investigators who engaged in this practice clearly
regarded each additional subject exposed to constant experimental proce-
dures as a replication of the original experiment. Sometimes such replications
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were in fact dispensed with and the published experimental results were
limited to a single subject (e.g., Menner, 1885).
Among the phenomena that Wundt and some of his students had demon-
strated by the use of such procedures was the sensory motor difference. In
reaction time experiments there appeared to be a general tendency for
response times to be relatively longer when subjects focused their attention
on the sensory input than when they concentrated on the motor component.
Working in North America, Baldwin failed to replicate this result, some of his
subjects showing a longer response time when they concentrated on the
motor side, others showing the longer sensory reaction times that had been
reported from Wundt's laboratory.
Titchener, having recently obtained his doctorate under Wundt's supervi-
sion, proceeded to criticize what he clearly regarded as Baldwin's sloppy
methods. Baldwin had used naive subjects with no experience of making
psychological observations. Of course, their reports were scientifically worth-
less. Baldwin's study did not constitute an acceptable replication of the work
carried out in Germany.
But Baldwin launched a counterattack in which he questioned the legiti-
macy of the subject selection procedures that were standard practice in
Wundt's laboratory. If one could eliminate potential subjects until one had a
group that gave consistent results one was begging the question of whether
the phenomena were truly generalizable to the normal adult mind as such.
Baldwin was inclined to think that sensory motor differences in reaction times
were traceable to typological differences among individuals. Persons with a
constitutional preference for motor imagery and memory would have shorter
motor reaction times and persons with a constitutional preference for visual
or auditory imagery and memory would have shorter sensory reaction times
if those sensory modalities were used in the experiment.
What is important about this controversy is not the question of who had the
right explanation for sensory motor differences in reaction times. In fact,
Angell and Moore (1896) soon showed that there might be some truth in both
the universalisée and the typological explanation. What the controversy
reveals about the role of replication in different kinds of scientific practice is
far more significant.
As more recent commentators (Böhme, 1977; Krantz, 1969; Schultz, 1970)
have noted, the Baldwin-Titchener controversy is still interesting because
the issues of scientific practice that it raised are so fundamental. It was the first
direct clash of two entirely different conceptions of research in the history of
psychology. One way of characterizing this difference is in terms of the
models of proper research used by the two sides. For Wundt and Titchener
the model was clearly derived from the experimental sciences, especially
physics and physiology. In those sciences experimentation involved the
creation of artificial conditions, nowhere to be found in the world outside the
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laboratory. It also involved a high degree of idealization that isolated certain
features in a purity that was foreign to the world of everyday phenomena.
There was a price to be paid for the extension of that kind of experimentation
to psychology. As we have seen, it entailed severe restrictions on the scope of
experimental psychology, with virtually all practical or everyday psycholog-
ical questions lying well outside that scope. It is hardly surprising that most
psychologists were not prepared to pay this price, especially as the advan-
tages of Wundtian scientific asceticism proved to be somewhat elusive.
The alternative was to begin with the everyday world, to work with
psychological material that was hopelessly "impure," contaminated by count-
less disturbing factors of limited general interest. That meant working with
naive experimental subjects and even with children or with psychological
deviant adults. Baldwin was clearly moving in this direction, though others
were later to go much further. It was a way of doing psychology that had
more in common with field studies—the kind that had been lent enormous
prestige by the work of Darwin—than it had with physical experimentation.
It is clear that the question of replication had to take different forms in these
divergent styles of scientific practice. For the physics-oriented style the
criterion of valid replication primarily involved questions of experimental
control. Had potentially contaminating factors been controlled as well or
better than in the original study, so that the phenomenon of interest could
emerge in desired purity? Obviously, Baldwin's studies, with their naive
subjects, must fail this test and could not be accepted by members of Wundt's
experimental community as a replication of their own work.
Conversely, Baldwin rejected the work of the Wundtians, but his reasons
were different. He intimated that they had created their empirical phenom-
enon by a process of subject selection and therefore had misinterpreted its
nature. Indeed, if one's research practice is modeled on the collection of
samples from the given, everyday world, rather than on the isolation of pure
systems, one has to assign great importance to the process of selection.
Effective replication then depends crucially on the comparability of selected
samples. Would all samples of naive subjects anywhere be comparable to the
sample that Baldwin happened to chance upon in his study? If not, what
exactly is the significance of his results? To raise such questions is to run
ahead of historical developments. But the kind of research practice of which
Baldwin's study represents an early example would eventually have to come
to grips with such issues. Its ability to do so, however, depended on develop-
ments in another quarter.
THE GALTONIAN TURN
Although 19th-century physical science was providing ever more impressive
demonstrations of how one could lay bare the hidden nature of things by
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studying them under highly controlled laboratory conditions, an altogether
different method of achieving the same purpose was being tried out in the
nascent social sciences. That method ultimately came down to the simple
expedient of counting heads.
The emergence of modern societies with a rationalized industry, agricul-
ture, and military system had been accompanied by great improvements in
the efficiency of techniques of administration that were highly dependent on
precise and extensive record keeping. That meant that much more complete
statistical information was now available on a range of human behavior that
included marriage, divorce, and various categories of crime, like suicide and
homicide. When such data were examined, it emerged that the rates and
fluctuations of these social acts were remarkably regular and varied with
identifiable factors (Porter, 1986; Quetelet, 1969). It seemed that the catego-
rizing and counting of individuals could lead to the determination of factors in
human conduct that might remain hidden if one only studied individuals.
However, the analysis of social statistics had little or no direct influence on
psychology because its findings were generally attributed to an "average
individual," rather than to real persons. In contemplating the distribution of
individuals on a parameter the social statisticians focused on the mean value
and effectively treated deviations from the mean as "error." That made sense
in terms of their special interest in general social trends; it made no sense to
Francis Gallon who was obsessively interested in the inherent differences
among people (Fancher, 1984). He thought that such differences, rather than
environmental factors, were responsible for existing social distinctions and
for social progress. Quite consistently, he advocated a eugenic program of
improving the human condition by selective breeding rather than by social
reform. From this perspective, what was interesting about human statistics
were not the averages but rather the distribution of individuals (Cowan,
1972). So far from treating this distribution as "error," he made it the main
focus of interest. By means of an analysis of interindividual differences he
demonstrated, to his own satisfaction, that social achievement was indeed a
matter of heredity.
Gallon's statistical analysis of individual differences provided the founda-
tion for a new type of psychological investigation thai was utterly different
from the laboratory psychology pioneered by Wundt and his followers. II led
directly to the invention of the technique of mental testing as well as to the
development of relevant statistical techniques of data analysis by the bio-
metric school of Karl Pearson and others (MacKenzie, 1981). Although most
of the important early figures in these developments were, like Gallon,
motivated by eugenicisl concerns, a second consideration gradually became
more significant for the psychologists. The statistical analysis of interindi-
vidual differences offered the possibility of founding a scientific psychology
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on the collection of measures from a relatively large number of naive subjects
rather than on the intensive study of a very few practiced subjects under
restrictive laboratory conditions. This answered to a widespread desire,
especially among American psychologists, that psychology should provide
data of immediate relevance to practical social concerns. The new approach
also sanctioned the use of "quick and dirty" methods of data collection, like
questionnaires, and made it possible to replace cumbersome laboratory
controls with statistical controls.
The issue of replication now presented itself in a different form. In the
traditional laboratory approach one attempted to replicate findings on indi-
vidual psychological or physiological exemplars. This could no longer be the
aim, because it was precisely the differences between these individual exem-
plars that had now become the essential data base. What one now had to ask
was not whether a particular pattern of results was stable from one individual
to another, but whether a particular pattern of interindividual differences
remained stable from one occasion to another. The direct object of investiga-
tion was a statistical distribution, a "collective object" as Fechner (1897) called
it, not the parameters of an individual mind or person.
It should be noted that in redefining the question of replication the new
approach also sidestepped it. For in constructing a distribution of individual
differences the assumption is made that the points on this distribution ail
represent measures of the same thing, that is, that the responses obtained
from different individuals are truly comparable, that there is a continuous
underlying variable. But it may be that responses near one end of a distribu-
tion are psychologically different from responses near the other end or near
the middle, that the underlying processes are qualitatively different. The
comparability of individual measures is achieved by fiat, by giving everyone
the same tasks, by forcing responses into a standard pattern, and by avoiding
any inquiry into how the responses were arrived at. If the traditional labora-
tory psychology was too glib in assuming the generalizability of its findings,
the statistical approach to individual differences was equally glib in its
assumption of a continuous variation of psychological functions across indi-
viduals.
Nevertheless, Gallon's example led to early attempts at developing mental
tests (Cattell, 1890) for grading and selecting individuals. The key statistical
tool that Gallon had developed for the analysis of interindividual differences
of performance measures was based on the technique of correlation. Once
Pearson had refined and codified this technique in the form of the correlation
coefficient, its large-scale adoption by psychologists interested in individual
differences was only a matter of time.
The first major figure in the development of correlational techniques for
specifically psychological purposes was Charles Spearman at University Col-
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lege, London. Strongly influenced by Galton (Spearman, 1930), whose eugen-
icist concerns he shared (Norton, 1979), Spearman developed a methodology
in which the technique of correlation played a crucial role.
Quite early in his work Spearman had to come to terms with the fact that if
one correlated two sets of psychological measurements on one occasion and
then repeated the exercise on another occasion one would be most unlikely
to get the same result. Typically, statistical coefficients were subject to wide
variation, too much variation for the taste of many whose model of science
was based on the ideal of highly controlled laboratory experimentation. In
the face of such skepticism psychometricians like Spearman attempted to
make a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable degrees of varia-
tion. Obviously, any scientific coefficient would have some unreliability, no
matter how slight. The problem was to distinguish this kind of unreliability
from the gross and more serious kind. For that one needed a statistical
measure of unreliability.
In his development of such a measure Spearman (1904, 1907,1910) distin-
guished between two sources of "fallacy" or of variation in the value of the
obtained correlation. One source was the "accidental deviations" of the
observed correlation:
For, though the correlation between two series of data is an absolute mathe-
matical fact, yet its whole real value lies in our being able to assume a likelihood
of further cases taking a similar direction; we want to consider our result as a
truly representative sample. Any one at all accustomed to original investigation
must be aware how frequently phenomena will group themselves in such a
manner as to convincingly suggest the existence of some law—when more
prolonged experiment reveals that the observed uniformity was due to pure
hazard and has no tendency whatever to fur ther repeat itself. (Spearman, 1904,
p. 75)
Spearman proposed that an observed correlation possessed an "evidential
value" in proportion to the likelihood that repeated investigations would
yield similar correlation values. But he did not suggest how to estimate this
likelihood directly. Instead, Spearman defined "evidential value" negatively.
Following the practice of the biométrie school, he estimated the probability of
obtaining the observed correlation by chance alone. This value is defined by
the ratio of the observed correlation to its probable error. The greater the
value of this ratio, the smaller is the probability of obtaining the observed
correlation by "pure hazard," and the greater its "evidential value."
The second source of error in the value of an observed correlation was due
to "systematic deviations." These were the constant, noncompensating vari-
ations, either increasing or decreasing the value of an observed correlation
from its "true value." Usually, a "systematic deviation" would be due to the
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presence of biasing factors considered irrelevant to the question being asked
in the investigation.
In effect, Spearman assumed, without much justification, that the reality
underlying his empirical findings conformed to a particular statistical model.
This could provide an excuse for various manipulations of the data to push
them more into line with theoretical preconceptions. Even when this resulted
in correlation coefficients above one, Spearman does not seem to have
questioned his fundamental assumptions (Fane her, 1985).
The question of reconciling theoretical preconceptions with empirically
gathered data was in fact crucial during the emergence of the statistical
reliability concept in psychology. Later on, purely pragmatic considerations
regarding predictability came to assume more importance, but the early
importance of unquestioned theoretical assumptions is striking.
In psychology the statistical reliability concept received explicit treatment
almost exclusively within the context of mental testing. In their early days
such tests were developed for the express purpose of providing empirical
evidence for the existence of unchanging mental abilities for which there
existed stable individual differences of degree. Empirically obtained scores
on psychological tests, however, never showed anything like the stability that
the theory of unchanging individual traits seemed to demand. The notion of
test reliability was a first attempt to deal with this discrepancy. It was based on
the idea that an actual test score was only a more or less reliable estimate of
an underlying "true" score. As the domain to be dealt with was in fact one of
interindividual differences in scores one would then make a fundamental
distinction between "true variance" and "error variance." The reliability of
individual difference measures would be a function of the proportion of true
variance.
The estimation of this ratio required an application of the principle of
replication. If the qualities assessed by mental tests were truly inert one could
establish reliability by repeated administration of the same test to the same
group of individuals. This would enable one to estimate unsystematic errors
that fluctuated from one occasion to another. But, of course, the qualities of
interest are far from inert. People become familiar with the test and their
reaction to it changes. So one had to work with "equivalent" or "parallel"
forms of the same test. The criterion of similarity was however statistical—the
correlation of performance measures on the different forms—and not psycho-
logical. High statistical reliabilities might be due to various kinds of psycho-
logical factors, including relatively constant differences in motivation, expe-
rience, and/or ability. However, in the early days of mental testing there was
a strong tendency to jump to psychological conclusions on the basis of highly
ambiguous statistical data.
Moreover, estimates of reliability, being based on sets of variances, were
highly sensitive to changes in these sets. For instance, increasing the heter-
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ogeneity of the population from which performance data were obtained
would produce higher reliability coefficients, a fact sometimes exploited by
producers and marketers of tests. Different kinds of comparison (e.g., re-
testing on the same or on "alternate" forms of the test, or comparing two
halves of the same test) would also lead to different reliability estimates. In
general, the kind of replicability that is expressed in the concept of statistical
reliability is no less tied to highly specific conditions than is replicability of
laboratory experiments.
It took several decades for this insight to become widely accepted. Espe-
cially during the period before World War 11 there was a strong tendency to
believe that the establishment of statistical reliabilities could somehow sub-
stitute for the rigors of experimental replication and the uncertainties of
psychological theorizing. In a historically important contribution, Thurstone
summed up the situation in 1931:
In this country the reliability formulae have become a sort of fetish rather than
a tool. It is almost as though "busy-work" becomes science as soon as it can be
made to sprout correlation coefficients. Test investigators seem frequently to be
more concerned that all their figures have probable error attachments than that
their studies be motivated with ideas or hypotheses to be examined. (Thurstone,
1931, p. 2)
A NEW KIND OF EXPERIMENTATION
Thurstone was looking back on a period during which much psychological
research was either based on correlational methods or else continued in the
classical pattern of measuring the responses of individual subjects under
highly controlled conditions. However, a third type of research practice, one
that combined elements of both the classical Wundtian and the Galtonian
approach, was definitely on the rise and was soon to provide the dominant
model for psychological research. In this type of research one compared
group data, but the groups in question had been subjected to different
experimental conditions. The question to be answered was whether this
difference in conditions could reasonably be held responsible for any ob-
served difference in group performance measures.
Although psychologists were relatively late in appreciating the advantages
of comparative experimentation, its use in practical situations that excluded
the possibility of laboratory controls can be traced as far back as the 18th
century. At that time the rationalization of agriculture was being enthusiasti-
cally pursued in England and Holland. In order to maximize yields, men like
Arthur Young (Cochran, 1976) began to experiment with systematic field
trials that attempted to study the effect of various factors, like soil and
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location. No satisfactory method of evaluating the results of such experiments
was, however, available.
Comparative experimentation was not unknown in 19th-century medicine
(Lilienfeld, 1982). Here, as in the agricultural setting, one tried to experiment
under conditions of great ignorance about the nature of the processes respon-
sible for the effects one was interested in. Moreover, the possibilities for
isolating and controlling relevant factors were extremely limited. Neverthe-
less, by replicating observations on sets of individuals exposed to different
conditions very useful practical information could sometimes be extracted.
The early users of comparative experimentation wanted their experiments
to provide a rational basis for decisions concerning alternate courses of
practical action in complex situations. They were interested in the overall
relative effectiveness of various practical measures and therefore conducted
their experiments in the settings to which their conclusions were to be
applied. But these were settings in which adequate experimental control was
impossible. Research in such conditions faced difficulties in differentiating the
effects of relevant and interesting factors from haphazard and uncontrollable
factors.
Comparative experimentation was devised to deal with constraints on
experimental control through a process of systematic replication (Sidman,
1960). In comparative experimentation the experimenter attempts to carry
out a set of experiments (replications) under the "same" conditions. Within
such a set, each experiment is considered to differ from the others in a
"systematic" way and in an "accidental" way. Ideally, systematic differences
are defined as those due to the factors of interest to the experimenter,
whereas all other differences are accidental. For example, the results of one
experiment, in a set of two, would be assumed to have been produced by a
combination of accidental factors (such as variations in soil fertility and
climate) plus a systematic factor (say, the traditional method of seeding). The
results of the other experiment in the set would be assumed to have been
produced by a similar combination of accidental factors (soil and climate) plus
another systematic factor (the new method of seeding). In this way, when the
two experiments (replications) are compared, the effect of the accidental
factors on the difference between the results of the two experiments is
minimized, although the effect of the systematic factors on this difference is
maximized. However, because it cannot be assumed that the accidental
factors have exactly the same effect in the two experiments, they are still
likely to have an effect on the difference between the results of the two
experiments. Therefore, the experimenter still has the problem of deciding
whether the obtained difference in results is large enough to be attributed to
the effect of systematic factors over and above the effect of the accidental
factors. Statistical tests were eventually proposed as a solution to this prob-
lem. They relied on hypothetical distributions of statistical constants obtained
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in the idealized conditions of infinite repeated sampling under identical
conditions.
In line with earlier developments in other fields, it was an eminently
practical motive that prompted the extension of comparative experimenta-
tion to education, from which it quickly spread to psychology. The pioneer in
this field was a London school inspector, W. H. Winch (Boring, 1954; Rusk,
1932; Solomon, 1949), who was a member of a group of progressive educators
interested in developing a more rational educational practice (Hearnshaw,
1964). 'The believer in experimental pedagogy," wrote Winch (1914, p. vu),
"holds that, until an educational proposal has been submitted to definite tests
under rigorously scientific conditions in the schools themselves, there can be
no adequate ground for recommending it for general adoption." In his own
research, which was always conducted in a classroom, Winch phrased his
experimental problems in terms of the practical questions faced by a school
administrator or a classroom teacher, though he saw these questions as
implying more general psychological issues.
Winch first used comparative experiments in investigations of transfer of
training in memory, a notion that provided a rationale for some then preva-
lent teaching methods. In these studies Winch (1908,191 Oa. 19 lOb) wanted to
show that "special practice" in memory would lead to improvement in
"productive imagination," as indicated by story writing. Winch divided a
group of school children from the same class into two "equivalent groups" on
the basis of preliminary tests in "productive imagination." Then, he adminis-
tered "special practice" in memory to one of the groups, while the other
group, the control group, had undergone "natural growth" only. This in-
volved the performance of some "neutral" task, such as, simple arithmetic
problems. With this exception all students were to be treated the same way by
their teacher. Winch then compared the performances of the two equivalent
groups on another test of "productive imagination." In order to carry out the
comparison, Winch calculated the percent difference for the average scores
of the two groups as a whole.
When Winch introduced what is now called the control group design he
was aware that it was a methodological innovation in educational psycholog-
ical research (Winch, 1911). Although his design was accepted, his way of
making inferences from the data was criticized. An early criticism came from
Spearman's student, W. G. Sleight (1911), who pointed out that differences in
improvement between the practice and control groups were small enough to
have been produced by chance alone, and that Winch did not account for this
possibility. In his own investigations Sleight followed the Winch design, but
tried to show that the obtained difference was not likely due to chance by
calculating the ratio of the obtained difference to its probable error. If this
ratio was greater than 3, it was considered to indicate a statistical difference
described as "significant," "reliable," "certain," or "true." It was held to
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indicate the presence of a systematic factor over and above any accidental
factors producing a group difference. The operation of this systematic factor
was presumably linked to the difference in experimental conditions. The
index used by Sleight became commonly known as the "Critical Ratio" during
the 1920s (Walker, 1929).
STATISTICS TAKES OVER
The statistical procedures developed by Karl Pearson and adopted by
Spearman and other mental testers required that large sample sizes be used in
their investigations. A large sample size made it possible to use the well-
known characteristics of the normal probability curve when estimating the
significance of an obtained statistic. Thus, the probability values needed for
testing the reliability of an obtained correlation, or the significance of the
critical ratio of an obtained difference between two means were defined in
terms of areas under the normal probability curve, assuming a normal
sampling distribution. In comparative experimentation, however, the sample
sizes were often quite small. Under this condition, the sampling distribution of
the statistical constants deviated greatly from the expectations based on a
normal distribution. This made the normal distribution useless for a whole
range of practical problems. A new set of hypothetical sampling distributions
had to be discovered for these types of problems.
The first such distribution was proposed by W. D. Gösset, working on
problems of quality control at the Guinness brewery. In 1908, he published his
results under the pseudonym "Student." Despite its practical importance, the
value of his contribution was not generally recognized beyond the Guinness
brewery. As late as September 1922, Gösset wrote R. A. Fisher: "1 am sendin j
you a copy of Student's Tables as you are the only man that's ever likely to use
them" (Cochran, 1976, p. 13). Indeed, it was not until Fisher generalized
Gosset's results that his work received wide application.
Ronald A. Fisher was a mathematician who first started working in statis-
tics in order to resolve the conflict between Mendelian experimental geneti-
cists and Biometricians (Mackenzie, 1981). In 1919, he was asked to join the
Rothamstead Experimental Station to examine about 70 years' worth of
results from agricultural field experiments in order to "see whether he could
elicit from it further information" (Box, 1978, p. 96). In the context of this
work he developed the analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure and his
interest in the design of experiments.
However, Fisher did not see ANOVA as merely a solution to local problems
in agricultural field experimentation. Rather, he saw it as part of a general
solution to the philosophical problem of describing the nature of inductive
inference from any experiment, whether of the field or the laboratory
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variety. Fisher's Statistical Methods for Research Workers (1928), first pub-
lished in 1925, differs strikingly from other contemporary statistical text-
books in the emphasis placed on methods of statistical inference and on
small-sample problems typical of experimental research. Commenting on the
notion of statistical inference, Fisher explicated an assumption implicit in the
first applications of the "Normal Law of Error" to the reliability of experi-
ments. In Fisher's (1928) words:
Just as a single observation may be regarded as an individual, and its repetition
as generating a population, so the entire result of an extensive experiment may
be regarded as but one of a population of such experiments. The salutary habit
of repeating important experiments, or of carrying out original observations in
replicate, shows a tacit appreciation of the fact that the object of our study is not
the individual result, but the population of possibilities of which we do our best
to make our experiments representative. The calculation of means and prob-
able errors shows a deliberate attempt to learn something about that popula-
tion, (p. 3)
Once experimentation is conceptualized as a sampling process, then, in
Fisher's words, "statistical procedure and experimental design are only two
different aspects of the same whole" (Fisher, 1935/1966, p. 3).
In the 1930s, Fisher's ideas on statistics and experimental design gained a
wide following among North American agricultural researchers and statisti-
cians. Between 1924 and 1937, Fisher made extended visits to the United
States and Canada (Box, 1978). In psychology, during this time comparative
experimentation became a major alternative to the laboratory experiments
modeled on experimentation in physiology. At the same time there was a
growing trend to use the "critical ratio" as the criterion of the value of the
obtained results. "Statistical significance," indicated by the critical ratio, was
becoming the arbiter of what Spearman had called the "evidential value" of
an experiment. Fisher's Analysis of Variance was introduced into psychology
in the mid 1930s. Its first applications were in educational psychology,
parapsychology, and occasionally in animal psychology. After World War II,
AN OVA was applied widely to experimentation in all areas of psychology
(Lovie, 1979; Rucci & Tweney, 1980).
One fundamental consequence of this development was the implicit incor-
poration in the methods of psychology of Fisher's belief that the design of
experiments should be governed by statistical considerations (Gigerenzer &
Murray, 1987). But if, as Fisher says, an entire experiment must be considered
one of a population of such experiments, the question of the nature of this
population becomes rather important. Unfortunately, it is easier to give a
statistical than a psychological answer to this question, a fact that constituted
an ever-present temptation to substitute statistical for psychological solutions
to research questions.
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CONCLUSIONS
Although all psychologists who thought of their subject as a science agreed
that replicability constituted an essential feature of their work, they found it
much more difficult to agree on the criteria of acceptable replication and on
the role played by replication in their research practice. For Wundt and
Titchener successful replication necessarily depended on laboratory control
of the conditions that made it possible to obtain accurate reports on simple
conscious experience. That view of replication was a consequence of the way
they had defined the subject matter of psychology. As soon as others ceased
to accept that definition they found themselves turning to alternative concep-
tions of replication. A broader conception of the kind of experience that could
form the legitimate subject matter of experimental psychology led to a
corresponding loosening in conceptions of acceptable replication on the part
of the Würzburg experimenters. Once the subject matter shifted from con-
scious experiences to the responses of different kinds of people, as it did in
Baldwin's experiments, the question of the selection of subjects could no
longer be ignored in discussions of replication.
Spearman stood at the beginning of a long tradition of psychological
investigation which defined its task as the estimation of the "real value" of
stable patterns of interindividual differences in performance on set tasks.
Replication, therefore, involved the reproducibility of particular statistical
patterns among the scores of a group of individuals. An analogous emphasis
on repeatable statistical patterns was characteristic of the turn to compara-
tive experimentation, though here the question was one of establishing a
reliable link between such patterns and specific experimental interventions.
It is dear that throughout the history of modern psychology investigators
have defined and redefined the issue of replication in terms of their assump-
tions about their subject matter and the basic research goals that they
adopted. General discussions of the topic have no absolute significance but
always need to be interpreted in the light of the prevailing historical context.
This does not mean that when psychologists adopted diverging views on
the subject of replication they necessarily differed on every conceivable
point. In fact, their profound disagreements did not preclude tacit agreement
on certain shared assumptions. We briefly mention two of these. In the first
place, there appears to have been a pervasive tacit agreement to eliminate
history from psychology. Whatever the changes that were imposed on the
definition of the subject matter of psychological investigation, one thing did
not change, namely, the belief that what psychologists studied were pro-
cesses and functions not subject to historical change. In other words, the
things that were posited as the objects of psychological research were con-
ceived to be analogous to the objects of research in the natural sciences and
not at all like the objects of historical research. Given this basic assumption
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the notion of replicating psychological experiments appeared to be unproble-
matic in principle, though there was still plenty of room for disagreement on
what this meant in practice. If the things one experimented on were stable
and unchanging—individual abilities and specific environmental effects, for
example—one could expect investigations to be repeatable and findings to be
replicable.
The one major figure for whom this assumption appeared to be problem-
atical was Wundt. He accepted its reasonableness for certain areas of psycho-
logical investigation, notably sensation and perception, but rejected it as
implausible for other areas. So Wundt projected two psychologies, only one of
which could be experimental. Subsequent generations of psychologists, how-
ever, seem to have taken it for granted that ahistoricity was a basic property
of any phenomena that psychologists might choose to investigate. Among
other things, this conviction made it appear perfectly reasonable to adopt the
Fisherian model of the infinitely repeatable experiment as a basic paradigm
for all psychological research. One unfortunate by-product of the heavy
institutionalization of a single methodological paradigm (Gigerenzer, 1987}
was that it precluded systematic examination of the relative appropriateness
of its assumptions for different areas of psychological research.
A second widespread preconception concerned the independence of
methods of investigation from whatever they were supposed to investigate.
In the historical discussions that are relevant to the topic of replication it is
possible to discern a somewhat ghostlike figure that seems to preside over the
proceedings. The ghost is that of a completely method-independent absolute
knowledge that everyone seemed to believe in although no one had ever
actually encountered it. Belief in this ghost was clearly implied in all those
contributions that advocated some set of methodological principles that was
to maximize objective knowledge irrespective of the nature of the object one
wanted to know. However, as we have seen, methodological priorities
always depended on the kind of knowledge that was desired. Contrary to the
illusions of many investigators, the attempt to separate the conditions and the
products of psychological research was never successful. That is hardly
surprising, for knowledge is after all a relationship with an object and not a
thing in itself.
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CHAPTER 2
Replication, Restudy, And The
Nature Of Anthropological
Fieldwork*
Peter Kloos
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
INTRODUCTION
In March 1989, two physicists, Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann, an-
nounced that they had produced surplus energy through nuclear fusion using
a simple, table-top apparatus. Within a few weeks, scores of scientists
throughout the world were trying to replicate their experiment. Everywhere,
the results were inconclusive but then, not all the details of the Pons/
Fleischmann experiment had been made available immediately.
Here, we have a straightforward example of an alleged important dis-
covery in physics inducing other scholars to test the conclusions drawn from
empirical research by independently replicating the experiment. Although in
actual practice replication may occur less often than physics textbooks might
suggest (see Broad & Wade, 1982), replication and replicability are regarded
as essential elements of research in the natural sciences.
In anthropology, both the ideal and the practice of replication are very
different. When Malinowski published his Argonauts of the Western Pacific in
1922—a work widely acknowledged as the first modern ethnographic study-
no one rushed to the Trobriand Islands to see whether that impressive
interinsular network of barter called kuia really existed. When Mead (1928)
published her views on the cultural background to adolescent Sturm und
Drang six years later, no one traveled to Samoa to find out whether adoles-
cence really was such a peaceful phase in the life cycle of the Samoans. And
when in 1940, Evans-Pritchard published his seminal explanation of how
*! am indebted to ZeUa Carrière for improving my use of a language not my own.
37
38 KLOOS
200,000 quick-tempered Nuer managed to live together without daily blood
shed, even though they lacked centralized legal and political institutions, his
readers believed what he wrote and refrained from going to the South Sudan
to look for themselves.
In cultural anthropology, replication is definitely not a basic ingredient of
research practice. It hardly features in textbooks on methods of ethnographic
research. In fact, it is often argued that replication in anthropological field-
work is not possible at all. Still, anthropological field workers do use the term
"restudy"—which seems to come close to replication.
In writing this chapter I first clarify the anthropologist's apparent aversion
to replication which, at first sight, seems such a self-evident scientific opera-
tion. Secondly, I review the various ways in which anthropologists deal with
differences in fieldwork results where these emerge as a consequence of a
restudy. To be sure, anthropological research is not restricted to field re-
search. However, I still focus on problems of fieldwork because this form of
research dominates the profession and thus later, I briefly sketch the devel-
opment and nature of fieldwork. I then turn to problems of replication as far
as anthropological fieldwork is concerned. The phenomenon called "restudy"
and the anthropologist's interpretation of differences in fieldwork results are
also discussed in this chapter. Concrete cases of ethnographic discrepancies
are briefly described as well. In the final section, I return to the basic question:
Is replication possible in anthropological fieldwork and, if not, what does this
mean for the status of anthropology?
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELDWORK:
DEVELOPMENT AND NATURE
Although fieldwork is now by far the most conspicuous form of research in
anthropology, this has not always been so. Anthropology as a discipline
originated from an awareness of cultural differences among various societies.
Within the Western tradition this awareness, as well as the need to deal with
cultural differences, can be traced back at least to ancient Greek writers such
as Herodotus. Although he is often claimed by historians as their primeval
ancestor, anthropologists have as good a claim to this intellectual line of
descent as historians have (see de Waal Malefijt, 1974). In his writings,
Herodotus described more than 50 different peoples and their cultures, some
of them in great detail as in the case of the Scythians. He also asked questions
that are basic to anthropology as it is known today such as: Why do people in
different societies behave differently?
Awareness of cultural differences as a necessary condition for anthro-
pology to exist implies that the development of the discipline is directly
related to intercultural contacts. When geographic horizons shrank during
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the European Middle Ages, interest in foreign cultures dwindled. However,
the age of discovery, especially the first transoceanic voyages to other
continents, brought the problem of cultural differences among human soci-
eties forcefully back to the forefront of European thought. The so-called
"discovery" of the Americas posed special problems. Here, European thought
was confronted with people whose existence was hitherto completely un-
known: Even the Bible and the ancient Greek writers make no mention of a
continent in the Western hemisphere, let alone of the multifarious cultures
that existed there. Travelers of many kinds, discoverers, conquistadores,
missionaries, and later colonial administrators reporting on strange customs
all found avid readers in Western Europe. From the 16th century onward
countless writers, like historians, philosophers, and also novel writers, com-
mented on the problems of different ways of life (see Slotkin, 1965), even
though very few of them should be called "anthropologists."
Anthropology as a more or less circumscribed discipline came into being in
the early 19th century with the establishment of Ethnological Societies in
Paris (1839) and in London (1843). These societies were created to promote
greater knowledge of cultures in other continents (see Stocking, 1983).
Knowledge of differing cultures was of practical significance, particularly for
colonial powers such as the Netherlands. Dutch colonial administrators real-
ized very early on that the administration of the Netherlands East Indies
required knowledge of the cultures and languages of its peoples. Toward the
end of the 19th century, anthropology was given academic recognition
through the establishment of university Chairs. Professor P.J. Veth was
appointed to the first Chair of Anthropology in the Netherlands in 1877; in
England, E. B. Tylor was first appointed lecturer in "Ethnology" in 1883 and
was made a professor later on.
Although many of those who began to call themselves anthropologists or
ethnologists had been abroad, their scientific work was largely based on
information supplied by discoverers, conquistadores, sailors, traders, mis-
sionaries, and colonial administrators. At that time, anthropologists were not
accustomed to gathering their own data to formulate their theories, hence,
the term "armchair" anthropology applied to this kind of scientific work.
These armchair anthropologists were, of course, aware of the unreliability
and the limitations of the data they had at their disposal. They tried to
improve the quality of the data by drawing up lists of questions designed to
systematically cover the subjects that attracted their interests (see, for an
early example, Degérando's Considérations sur les méthodes à suivre dans
l'observation des Peuples Sauvages, published as early as 1800).
Pressure to improve the quality of ethnographic data finally led to a
methodological revolution in the first quarter of the 20th century (see Kuper,
1983). Thanks to the British Anthropological Society, trained observers were
sent to other continents to collect ethnographic data. Trained observers
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quickly became anthropologically trained observers. A key figure eventually
emerged in the person of Bronislaw Malinowski who, during World War 1,
lived for more than a year among the Melanesian Trobrianders.
Of Polish descent, Malinowski studied anthropology in England, went to
Melanesia, learned the local language, and carried out research by partici-
pating as much as he could in whatever was taking place. Although the
designation "participant observation" did not yet exist, it covers exactly what
he did.
Back in London, Malinowski wrote a detailed account of what he had
witnessed. He received an appointment at the London School of Economies
and, being a gifted teacher, he convinced his pupils that they should carry out
research in the way he said he had done. Within a few years, the distinction
between the armchair anthropologist based at home and the data collector
who ventured abroad disappeared. Henceforth, every anthropologist was
expected to do fieldwork. It has even been stated that no one who has not
done fieldwork could be regarded as an anthropologist. This indicates that
fieldwork acquired a meaning beyond what it is basically about: the anthro-
pologist's way of collecting, or rather of constructing, theoretically relevant
data.
Without going into details, the Malinowskian revolution had a number of
consequences that have to be mentioned. In the first place, modern fieldwork
gave rise to a new kind of ethnography. Although there are many examples
of valuable ethnographic accounts written, for example, by missionaries who
often spent many years among those whose cultures they describe, the
modern anthropological account combines theoretical relevance with rich
and thorough descriptive coverage. A prolonged stay among the people, a
learning of the language, and a relying on direct observation rather than on
answers to questions all resulted in a wealth of information regarding a
particular society and culture in its totality and in its individuality. The rise of
fieldwork strengthened a holistic approach that was, to some extent, already
present in armchair anthropology. The new approach brought many com-
pletely new phenomena to the attention of anthropologists. It also offered
fresh insights into phenomena that were already known but poorly under-
stood. For example, although the 19th-century American anthropologist
Lewis H. Morgan may be credited for having established kinship studies, it
was the modern approach that brought to light the manifold functions and
complexities of kinship systems. Although 19th-century evolutionary anthro-
pologists had written about political behavior, it was modern fieldwork that
brought an understanding of the mechanisms of social control in societies
lacking central political institutions. And although religious ideas and be-
havior had always attracted much attention, it was fieldwork in the style of
Malinowski that showed what religion in its multifaceted forms meant in
small-scale societies.
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Given this exciting growth of detailed knowledge about other societies and
cultures as well as the very small number of qualified anthropologists, it is no
surprise that fieldworkers did not really consider going to societies that had
already been studied. They preferred hunting grounds of their own: a society
that was hardly known at all, a blank spot on the ethnographic map.
In the second place—and this only strengthens the aversion to replicating
older research—fieldwork is not just a method of acquiring scientific data. It
quickly became what is called in anthropology a rite de passage. It was the
fieldwork experience as such, with all its hardships, which transformed the
academically trained student of anthropology into an anthropologist in the
true sense of the word. In a rite de passage the novice as a rule does not really
know what is going to happen—it is something to be experienced, not
something to be expounded beforehand. A rite de passage is a way toward a
new and higher status and to a higher form of knowledge. In anthropology,
this meant that the first generation of students sent into the field by such
people as Malinowski in England and Boas in the United States received little
advice on how to do field work. It was a swim-or-sink approach. Margaret
Mead, a student of Boas, once wrote:
There was, in fact, no hou: in our education. What we learned was what to look
for. Years later, Camilla Wedgewood, on her first field trip to Manam Island,
reflected on this point when she wrote her first letter back: "How anyone knows
who is anybody's mother's brother, only God and Malinowski know." (Mead,
1972, p. 151)
When Beals, about to go off to the field, asked a distinguished British
anthropologist what the secret of successful fieldwork was, he received this
answer: "Never accept free housing and always carry a supply of marmalade"
(Beals, 1970, p. 38).
The specific function of fieldwork in an anthropologist's career again puts a
premium on finding a place where no one has carried out research before.
Anthropologists going into the field are interested in finding something new
and exotic rather than in finding support for something already known.
Marvin Harris, referring to this tendency, once wrote:
I remember well my own chagrin at having chosen to do fieldwork among the
Bathonga, a patrilineal group in Southern Mozambique, when with a little more
foresight I could have convinced the Ford Foundation to let me go to a more
exotic and hence professionally more rewarding matrilineal culture slightly to
the north. (1977, p. 82; emphasis added)
The status of the anthropologist and his or her authority in the profession is
closely connected with the uniqueness of the fieldwork experience (see
Mead's autobiography, 1972). Again, this attitude does not favor replication.
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In the third place, there are elements of commitment and power involved.
Fieldwork can be an almost traumatic experience. Because it implies living in
a foreign culture—and to some extent, also living a foreign culture—field-
workers often develop a very intense relationship with the people they study.
This was especially true during the early years of modern f ieldwork when two
or three years of work in the field were often followed by a lifetime of writing
on the society and culture studied. The relationship between fieldworker and
society can, to some extent, be described in terms of ownership and of
exclusive rights to carry out research, thus excluding other scholars. Paul
Radin drew attention to this peculiar, though understandable, behavior as
early as 1933. Such "claims" to exclusive rights also seem to be recognized by
fellow anthropologists, especially when the first person to have carried out
field work in a particular society holds an important position. The expression
"my village," which is often heard, provoked Brown (1981) to introduce the
term My Tribe-syndrome for this behavior. Again, once a community has
been investigated, recognition of certain rights both by the investigator
him- or herself and by his or her colleagues tends to prevent replication.
This explanation of the absence of replications in anthropology is partly
historical and partly sociological. It has nothing to do with methodological or
epistemologica! considerations. It is to these considerations that I shall now
turn.
IS REPLICATION IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELDWORK
POSSIBLE?
The question now under consideration is not so much why replication of
anthropological field research is so rarely undertaken, but why many anthro-
pologists seem to believe that replication in the true sense of the term is not
really possible.
Replication in scientific research is directly related to one of the basic
features of knowledge: reliability. Reliability defines the consistency between
two or more scientific statements supposed to describe reality. Because
reality can never be known other than through statements about reality,
reliability is usually defined in an instrumental manner. The reliability of a
statement about empirical reality increases in proportion to the number of
independent observations that have led to the same statement. When we do
not believe the outcome of an observation—for example when we have
reason to believe that it may be unreliable—we repeat or replicate the
observation. In its simplest form: If we do not trust the outcome of an
arithmetical operation, we do it a second time. If the result is the same, the
outcome of the two operations taken together is more reliable than either of
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them taken separately. There can never be 100% reliability: Observations
and measurements are reputable, but then again so are errors.
Replication as a way to more reliable knowledge is based on a number of
assumptions, and I mention two of them. In the first place, it is assumed that
empirical reality has not changed during the time that has elapsed between
the first and the second observation or, to put it differently, that the same
reality is being observed. Secondly, it is assumed that the way in which reality
is measured is the same for the various observations. In physics experiments
in which reality itself can be controlled and the same instruments can be used,
these conditions can indeed be met.
In nonexperimental sciences where reality cannot be controlled, a problem
arises: Differences between observations, that have been made with the same
instrument may, at least logically, be attributed to changes in reality that have
taken place during the time that has elapsed between the two observations.
As long as one can make the measurements with the same instrument, or with
instruments that can be calibrated, this is a logically acceptable conclusion.
In anthropological research however, the object, namely sociocultura!
reality, is not only beyond our control; we may also safely assume that it is
continually changing. Moreover, we have to work with an instrument that
cannot be calibrated and whose working is only partially known: The human
individual. Powdermaker succinctly summarized this basic feature of anthro-
pological fieldwork as follows: "The anthropologist is a human instrument
studying other human beings and their societies" (Powdermaker, 1967, p. 19).
Given these fundamental uncertainties, one has to conclude that replica-
tion as carried out in experimental situations with instruments that can be
controlled, or as carried out in natural situations but executed with instru-
ments that can be controlled, is impossible in anthropology. In fact, as far as
I know, there is only one study that makes that claim to some extent, namely
Holmes's study of Samoa (Holmes 1957; cf. Holmes 1987).
Samoa was the subject of a famous study by Margaret Mead who went to
this Polynesian island in 1925 to study adolescence. One of the intellectual
issues of the 1920s was the so-called Nature-Nurture controversy. Was human
behavior basically determined by ultimately genetic, biological factors or was
behavior culturally determined, that is, learned? Mead's teacher, Franz Boas,
was a staunch supporter of the idea that it was culture, not biology, that
molded human behavior. A strategic phenomenon in this controversy was
the problem of stress in adolescents. Thus, Boas wanted his gifted pupil to
study adolescence
to test out, on the one hand, the extent to which the troubles of adolescence
(...) depended upon the attitudes of a particular culture, and on the other hand,
the extent to which they were inherent in the adolescent stage of psychobio-
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logical development with all its discrepancies, uneven growth, and new im-
pulses. (Mead, 1972, p. 137)
Mead's Coming of Age in Samoa is sufficiently known for me to refrain from
repeating the details of her research. It is enough to remind ourselves of her
conclusion which was that among Samoan girls, there is no question of the
state of mind in Western society called "Sturm und Drang," the implication
being that this psychological state is related to culture and is not the outcome
of adolescent psychobiological changes.
In 1954, the American anthropologist Holmes went to Samoa. He went to
the village were Mead had carried out her research, worked with many of her
informants and "systematically investigated and evaluated every word that
Mead wrote in Coming of Age in Samoa (1928), Social Organization ofManua
(1930) and several articles" (Holmes, 1983, p. 929).
Although every fieldworker comments on the reliability of data that is
already available, Holmes' seems to be the first attempt to systematically
verify an earlier study in anthropology. Can it be regarded as replication in
the strict methodological sense of the term? 1 think not, even though Holmes
comes quite close to it. There are two flaws in Holmes' replication. In the first
place, his restudy took place 29 years after Mead's original research. This
period, which includes the Pacific war, did not leave Samoa untouched.
Logically, the differences which Holmes noted between Mead's work and his
own may be due to changes within the society. Secondly, one should realize
that as a young woman, Mead could enter into a relationship with Samoan
girls in a way that was impossible for Hohnes who was a man. This simply
means that the research instrument used by Holmes was basically different
from the one used by Mead. Because human beings always differ from one
another in terms of age, sex, personality, and cultural background, replica-
tion in the strict sense is simply not possible in anthropological fieldwork.
Holmes himself uses the term "restudy" for his research in Samoa, not the
term "replication." What, then, is a restudy?
RESTUDIES IN ANTHROPOLOGY
The first scholar to use the term restudy was probably Oscar Lewis when he
called a book based on his Mexican fieldwork Life in a Mexican Village:
Tepoztlan Restarted (1951). Tepoztlan is a village in the Mexican state of
Morelos. Robert Redfield carried out research in Tepoztlan in 1926 and 1927.
His book, Tepoztlan. A Mexican Village (1930), is one of the first studies of
what later came to be known as a "peasant society." Tepoztlan became
famous only after Oscar Lewis's research there in 1943. A historian by
training, Lewis later turned to anthropology. He first carried out fieldwork
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among the Blackfoot Indians in the United States. In 1943 he went to Mexico
to assist in aid programs aimed at Mexican Indian communities. It is in this
context he began to do research in Tepozllàn because the earlier work by
Redfield offered Lewis a baseline from which to measure and analyze change
(Lewis, 1951, p. xiii). Yet, while working in Tepoztlän, Lewis became con-
vinced that the picture that Redfield had painted was strongly biased. Red-
field has described a harmonious community of people who worked collec-
tively rather than individually. Lewis stressed individuality and distrust in
interpersonal relations as well as conflict.
This was not the first case in anthropology in which two h'eldworkers
arrived at radically different pictures of the same community. In 1937, for
example, the Chinese student Li An-Che had published an account of the Zufii
Indians in which he stressed elements of Zuni thought and behavior that were
very different from Ruth Benedict's rendering of Zuni culture and personality
in her well-known Patterns of Culture (1934). The difference between the Zuni
controversy and the Tepoztlän controversy is that Redfield and Lewis en-
tered into a discussion about the backgrounds to these differences in percep-
tion of reality.
Today "restudy" is an acknowledged term in anthropological jargon.
However, it is not at all clear what it stands for. Of course it means what is
literally says, that is, the study of a society and culture already studied, but it
also has a special connotation. It often refers to those studies in which the
second researcher arrives at a quite different picture of the "same" society. As
we have already seen, conscious efforts to systematically evaluate earlier
studies are rare in anthropology since fieldworkers prefer to have their "own"
society. In the case of a restudy, however, a fieldworker turns to a society or
even a community that has already been studied. Does this mean that field
work practice has changed? What motivates a fieldworker to carry out a
restudy?
Looking at studies of the same society in which the second researcher
reached more or less different results, there seem to be two categories. In the
first place, there is the restudy that deliberately wishes to use an earlier study
as a point of departure to analyze processes of change. What occasionally
happens during the restudy is that the second fieldworker takes issue with the
way in which the earlier situation has been portrayed. Lewis's restudy of
Tepoztlän falls into this category. Secondly, there is the restudy which looks
into hitherto neglected aspects of a society and, while taking a second look,
takes issue with the previous study's characterization of that society. Li
An-Che's study of Zuni belongs to this category.
All this points to a change in fieldwork practices. Two circumstances should
be mentioned. The first is that while the number of professional anthropolo-
gists has risen enormously, the number of societies not yet studied has gone
down. Apart from a few Amerindian groups in South America and perhaps a
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handful New Guinean societies, there are no truly blank spots on the ethno-
graphic map. Furthermore, the absolute number of different societies and
cultures has also gone down. Due to rapid social change, especially since
World War II, as well as to ethnocide and even genocide, many societies and
cultures have disappeared. It is no longer possible for fieldworkers to find a
society of their own; they simply have to work on a society that has already
been the object of much research.
The second change is a change in perspective. The emphasis of the first
generation of h'eldworkers was on the uniqueness of sociocultural systems
found on the spot. They were impressed by the complexity of sociocultural
systems and the interdependence of sociocultural elements. Contrary to a
previous, strongly evolutionary approaches, they tried to explain a sociocul-
tural system not in terms of its history but in terms of how it functions here
and now.
The historical perspective was reintroduced mainly during the 1960s,
although there are earlier examples as is evidenced by the work of Oscar
Lewis. Older accounts, often written by the first generation of anthropolog-
ical fieldworkers, acquired a new meaning: They offered the possibility of
analyzing change. After all, one of the problems of studying long-term
processes confronting fieldworkers is the paucity or even the absence of
reliable historical data.
In a few cases, fieldworkers went back to the place where they themselves
had carried out research before World War II (see Firth, 1936, 1959). In
other cases, pupils of first-generation fieldworkers went back to the com-
munity where their teachers had pioneering work (see, for instance, Adams,
1972; Gillin, 1936). In still other cases, fieldworkers revisit the peoples about
whom interesting studies have been written (see Stearman, 1987; Holmberg,
1950).
In many cases, consistency between earlier and later research dominates.
In a few notorious cases, however, the points of view are so radically different
that the restudy gave rise to a controversy over the question of who was right
and who was wrong. The first clear case of such a controversy to reach the
anthropological journals was probably that of the Zufli which pitched Ruth
Benedict against Li-An Che. The latest is the Mead-Freeman controversy
regarding Samoa. How can we explain the differences between fieldworkers
describing the same society and culture? By and large, there are four possi-
bilities (see Heider, 1988). The differences may be due to:
1. Cultural variation within one society
2. Variation in time
3. Errors of observation or analysis
4. Differences in research perspective
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A combination of these factors is, of course, also possible. In the next
section, I elaborate on these four possibilities.
WHY FIELDWORKERS DISAGREE
Cultural Variadon Within One Society
One explanation of disagreement between two fieldworkers lies in intraso-
cietal variation. Although they appear to have carried out research in the
"same" society," what they actually describe are different versions of the
same society. However, this explanation covers only a minority of the
ethnographic controversies. In many cases of restudy, research is carried out
in exactly the same community (in Samoa, Holmes even used the same
informants as Mead!). This choice is usually a deliberate one because the
objective of the research is to study changes that have taken place since the
first fieldworker made his or her observation. Still, there is sometimes room
for doubt. In 1976, there was a debate concerning the degree of nomadism
among the Brazilian Nambikwara, a society that had been studied by Lévi-
Strauss in 1938. Certain characteristics of their society and culture became a
key elements of his ideas regarding dualism and binary opposition (see
Lévi-Strauss, 1955). His portrayal of the Nambikwara was challenged by later
fieldworkers such as Aspelin (1976), who argued that the Nambikwara were
sedentary. However, there is a possibility that Lévi-Strauss worked with an
atypical, marginal subgroup of the Nambikwara who really were nomadic
(see Kloos, t988a, pp. 73-82).
Variation In Time
Disagreement between fieldworkers can also be attributed to variations in
time following from either cyclical changes or from structural change. The
second fieldworker is usually quite aware of structural change; indeed, that is
what he or she is trying to study. However, there are also changes of a cyclical
nature. The disagreement between Mead (1949) and Fortune (1939) regarding
the warlike habits of the New Guinea Arapesh seems to be related to such a
cyclical change. One should appreciate the fact that the structure of many
societies is related to cyclical processes requiring up to 30 or 40 years. This
holds true, for example, for those New Guinean societies in which herds of
pigs are slowly built up to be collectively slaughtered. Patterns of life before
and after these events differ markedly.
Again, reviewing the ethnographic controversies as an explanation of
disagreement, time variations do not play an important role.
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Error» of Observation or Analysis
Fieldworkers do, of course, make mistakes and this would be the easiest way
to dispense with ethnographic disagreements. The question of who is wrong
and who is right arises especially where widely differing images of the "same"
society have been put forward. When in 1983, Freeman challenged almost
every statement made by Mead regarding Samoa, the one important question
seemed to be whose Samoa was the right one. In a number of cases of
ethnographic controversy there is a fairly simple answer. When Redfield
painted his rosy picture of Tepoztlän and failed to heed more than 100 cases
of crime reported to the police during his sojourn there, it is reasonable to call
this an error. In the majority of cases, errors are not that simple to define.
Instead, one has to conclude that the differences are due to differences in
research perspective.
Differences in Research Perspective
Sociocultural systems of even small-scale, preindustrial and preliterate soci-
eties are complex. Although the ambition of anthropology, and of early
anthropological fieldworkers in particular, is to apprehend a society and its
culture in its totality, no fieldworker is really able to cover this complex
totality. Research invariably means looking at reality from a specific point of
view. This also implies selection. By far the majority of ethnographic discrep-
ancies are due to differences in research perspective. Several categories can
be distinguished. In the first place, one should remember that in anthropolog-
ical field work, the dominant instrument is a human individual. Human
individuals differ in their outlook in terms of age, gender, and personality, and
these differences affect their observations. In the second place, one should
take into account that ethnographic facts are already constructs in which the
theoretical orientations of the fieldworker are as important as the actual
reality. Third, one should realize that behind more or less explicit theoretical
orientations, more implicit cultural assumptions held by the fieldworker color
his or her observations. In the fourth place, we should not forget the more or
less explicit political objectives of the scholar.
To illustrate how these four possible explanations cover specific ethno-
graphic discrepancies, I now turn to three concrete cases.
THREE ETHOGRAPHIC DISCREPANCIES
The Pueblo Zuni
In 1934, Ruth Benedict published her Patterns of Culture. It is probably one of
the most widely read anthropological studies. The main theme of her book is
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the ruling motivation of a culture. In this work, she contrasts the sober, highly
disciplined Zufti Indians with the exuberant Kwakiutl of the American north-
west coast as well as with the Indians of the Plains.
A few years later a young Chinese scholar, Li An-Che, spent three months
with the Zufli. He saw many things of which Benedict had not taken note:
Emotionally charged prayers, marital trouble, and conflict. Where Benedict
had seen a highly integrated culture based on such values as equanimity,
modesty, and cooperation, Li An-Che saw hidden tensions, suspicion, and
ambition.
Because Benedict and Li An-Che had carried out their research in the same
pueblo, cultural variation as an explanation of these differences can be ruled
out. Because there were only a few years between the two periods of
research, change as an explanation can also be ruled out.
Was one of them simply wrong? It is interesting to see that the discrepancy
between the two representations of Zufii is not restricted to the work of
Benedict and Li An-Che. Observers of Zufli (and to some extent also of the
closely related Hopi) seem to stress either overt harmony or hidden tension.
The discrepancy disappears when one realizes that scholars look at Zufli
society and culture from different perspectives. The Zufli live in a harsh
environment (present-day Arizona). They are cultivators who have to rely on
irrigation and on an unreliable rainfall. Benedict described the values of the
cultural program which the Zufli developed to cope with their environment;
Li An-Che described the costs that have to be paid by individuals in order to
fit into a rigid program that, nevertheless, makes it possible for them to
survive. Put that way, it becomes clear that the two perspectives cannot be
regarded as mutually exclusive. This means that on their own terms Benedict
and U An-Che were both right—they only failed to be explicit about the
limitations of their statements regarding Zufli culture (see Bennett, 1946).
Tepoztttn
At first sight, the Tepoztlàn discrepancy seems to be of the same kind as the
Zufli one. As already said, Redfield presented this Mexican village as rela-
tively homogeneous, isolated, and functioning smoothly. According to him
people were content and well-adjusted. Lewis on the other hand, observed
the underlying individualism, the lack of cooperation and a "pervading
quality of fear, envy, and distrust in inter-personal relations" (Lewis, 1951, p.
429).
Discussing the discrepancies, Redfield stressed the complementarity of the
two accounts. He saw in contrasting accounts of a community a means to
better understanding and pleaded in favor of the deliberate construction of
complementary descriptions (Redfield, 1960, pp. 132-133). He argued that
the difference in the case of Tepoztlàn was due to a "hidden question": 'The
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hidden question behind my book is "What do these people enjoy?" The
hidden question behind Dr. Lewis' book is, "What do these people suffe:
from?" (Redfield, 1960, p. 136).
Lewis also seemed to believe that they had studied the same village and
that the differences were due to a difference in perspective. Lewis, in partic-
ular, did not want to present a "neutral" picture of the village. Politically more
committed than Redfield, he wrote:
It seems to me that concern with what people suffer from is much more
important than the study of enjoyment because it is more productive of insights
about the human condition, about the dynamics of conflict and the forces for
change.... To stress the enjoyment in peasant life [as Redfield did] is to argue
for its preservation. (Lewis, 1961, p. 179)
But did they really describe the same village, albeit from a different
perspective and tor a different purpose? There is serious doubt here. Redfield
arrived in Tepoztlân just after the atrocities of the revolution. Life in Te-
poztlân slowly returned to "normal." Between Redfield's stay there in
1926-27 and Lewis's fieldwork in 1943-44, Tepoztlân's population rose
rapidly. Lewis pays attention to the growth in population but gives little heed
to its possible consequences. Several of the differences between Redfield and
Lewis can be explained in terms of population growth (disappearance of
communal land and communal labour, growing antagonism between land-
owners and landless people, distrust in interpersonal relations). I think Coy is
largely right when he said,
that both accounts were legitimate in the context of the situation ruling at the
two periods of time . . . at some time between 1929 and 1935 economic and
demographic changes in Tepoztlân favored the expression of different behav-
iour patterns from that of the exhausted survivors of the revolution. (Coy, 1971,
p. 56)
There is little doubt that Redfield misrepresented Tepoztlân to some extent
but Lewis's account is biased too. Yet, the differences between the two
accounts are also due to changes taking place during the intervening period
of 17 years.
The Trobriand Islanders
One of the first modern ethnographic accounts is Malinowski's Argonauts of
the Western Pacific (1922). This book was followed by several others and by
many articles, totaling some 2,500 pages covering all aspects of the life of the
inhabitants of a small Melanesien island. Malinowski described production
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and trade, kinship and marriage, magic and religion, and so on and so forth,
in great detail. How true was his account of Trobriand society?
In 1971, more than 50 years after Malinowski, the American anthropologist
Annette Weiner carried out field work in a village only a few miles away from
where her famous predecessor had lived. Weiner went to the Trobriand
Island to study the influence of tourism on Trobriand art. However, on the
very first day of her stay, a number of women took her to a large ceremony
in which only women participated, and from that moment she knew "that
women were engaged in something of importance that apparently had
escaped Malinowski's observations. The women's mortuary ceremony was a
Pandora's box; it opened up the whole question of relationship between men
and women" (Weiner, 1976, p. 8).
What emerged from this Pandora's box goes far beyond the limits of this
article. Women occupy a strategic position in this society. Trobriand descent
is matrilineal, which means that inheritance and succession to political office
go from a man to his sister's son. However, Malinowski did not pay attention
to women's mortuary ceremonies although there are one or two passing
references to them in his publications.
Malinowski saw Trobriand society predominantly in terms of males. This
bias was his own and it was probably connected to his 19th-century, Central
European background (see Ellen, Gellner, Kubica, & Mucna, 1988). His bias
can hardly be explained in Trobriand terms: Although men did not partici-
pate in women's ceremonies, they were keenly aware of their significance.
Whereas Malinowski, as a man, could hardly participate in these ceremonies,
Weiner, as a woman, could not avoid them—and the result was that she
presented an entirely different picture of the relationship between men and
women, between husband and wife, brother and sister, and so on.
The difference between Malinowski's and Weiner's account of Trobriand
society cannot be explained in terms of subcultural variation or of social
change. It is the difference between the field workers and the awareness of the
existence of a male bias in anthropology that is responsible for the contrast.
REPUCABILITY AND THE NATURE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE
To assess the different views arrived at by two or more anthropological
fieldworkers two preliminary remarks should be made: one about the nature
of the object of study, or perhaps rather about the anthropological approach
to sociocultural reality, the other regarding epistemological assumptions.
Since the rise of science in its modern form, the dominant goal of scientific
research has been the formulation of general statements or scientific laws.
Such a way of approaching reality owes much to the awareness that know!-
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edge in this form can be readily used to influence and possibly even control
hitherto uncontrolled processes. Philosophers like Bacon (Nouum Organon,
1620, Aphorisms II and IV) and Descartes (Discours de la méthode, 1637, Part
6) were instrumental in forcefully expressing this new approach to knowledge.
This led to a scientific practice in which isolating critical variables and quan-
tifying them became key strategies. Among the various forms of empirical
research, the laboratory experiment stands out as the apogee of this approach.
There is a long distance between the laboratory experiment and anthro-
pological field research for at least two reasons. First of all, in field work the
degree of control, crucial for an experiment, is almost zero. Second, anthro-
pological fieldworkers rarely seek to determine whether or not there is a
relationship between two variables only. Fieldworkers usually deal with a
sociocultural system in its comprehensive complexity and therefore have to
handle large numbers of variables simultaneously. Even if these variables
could be isolated and measured (which is impossible in practice), their sum
total is regarded as less than what sociocultural life is supposed to be; in other
words the idea of holism is very strong in anthropology (cf. Peacock, 1986).
This brings me to my second point. One of the current debates in anthro-
pology concerns the nature of knowledge. A rather firmly entrenched posi-
tivist tradition is now being vigorously challenged by a constructivist point of
view (see Kloos, 1988b).
Few, if any, anthropologists would subscribe to the extreme view that
knowledge is part of an independent reality and thus has an existence apart
from the observers. Knowledge consists of statements about reality. These
statements are obviously made by observers: Without observers there would
be no knowledge in a form that we would acknowledge. In this sense, all
knowledge is constructed. Yet according to many anthropologists, their
statements do refer to an objective reality. Although the statements do not
exist in reality, what they stand for does. A corollary of this assumption is that
in the last analysis, only one of various rival statements can be true.
The alternative view is that reality does not dictate what is true or not. It
only responds to our way of asking questions, in the natural sciences no less
than in the social sciences (cf. Heisenberg, 1969, p. 57). Some answers
correspond to what was expected, others have to be rejected. According to
this view knowledge is inevitably a product of a reality having an existence of
its own, and a particular method. Methods of observation cannot be seen as
epistemologically neutral tools but as tools partly responsible for the ways in
which our perception of reality is cast.
This places the traditional concept of reliability in a different perspective.
According to received wisdom, observation and measurement may be con-
taminated by accidental elements, tainting the results (any textbook on
research methods in the social sciences abounds with examples that illustrate
this idea). Reliable methods are supposed to be free from these accidental
elements. Yet to what extent can we speak of "contamination"? Could it be
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that at least some of these so-called "accidental elements" refer not to
accidents at all but to highly relevant parts of both method and reality? If so,
removing them would result in a biased portrayal of reality. If it is true that the
anthropologist is a human instrument studying other human beings (Powder-
maker, 1967, p. 19), these so-called "accidental elements" should be utilized
rather than removed. This step, however, makes replication problematic
because fieldworkers differ very much from one another in terms of historical
and sociocultural background assumptions, scientific convictions, gender,
age, let alone more individual idiosyncracies.
If the insights of a fieldworker cannot really be recreated, why should we
listen to him or her anyway? How far can we trust that what he or she reports
corresponds to the sociocultural reality he or she purports to portray?
There seem to be at least three solutions to this problem. The first is to trace
back our steps in an effort to recast the fieldworker into a neutral tool by
eradicating, or at least repressing, individual and collective idiosyncracies. In
my judgment this would lead us up a blind alley because it removes from our
research the very essence of our being human.
The second solution is to accept an almost solipsist position that discards
the traditional notion of science altogether. Description becomes autobiogra-
phy. Leach came close to that position when he wrote: "the data which derive
from fieldwork are subjective not objective. I am saying that every anthropo-
logical observer... will see something that no other such observer can
recognize, namely a kind of harmonious projection of the observer's own
personality" (Leach, 1984, p. 22).
Leach went on arguing that anthropological texts can be read in two
different ways. They can be read as texts that are interesting in themselves,
full of hidden meanings, but without assuming that "what is discussed in the
text corresponds to any kind of reality" (p. 22). Or they can be read "with the
set purpose of discovering projections of the author's personality, of finding a
record of how he or she reacted to what was going on" (p. 22).
This implies, Leach added, that we should pay much closer attention to the
personal background of the authors of anthropological works. Although
Leach referred to texts about the history of anthropology, the same applies to
ethnographic texts.
The third solution to the problem of credibility follows from Leach's
remark. It consists of a fieldworker supplying his or her reader with the
information necessary to follow and assess the process by which the results
were obtained. Basically the idea is plain enough: A fieldworker should make
clear what his or her basic assumptions are, what the empirical basis of his or
her statements is, what procedures have been used, what choices have been
made, what the limitations are, and so on. In this way, the conclusions
reached can be made credible even though the procedures are not really
replicable (cf. Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 228ff).
Sensible though such a solution may sound, it is not feasible. Even in a
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relatively simple case like the Pons/Fleischmann experiment alluded to at
the beginning of this chapter, there was so much confusion around the exact
nature of the experiment that replication proved to be extremely difficult. In
anthropological research where the main research instrument is a human
individual, any description of its relevant characteristics would require an
independent study of the researcher but, for obvious reasons, this approach is
self-defeating.
Paradoxically, the way out should not be sought in replication in the strict
sense of the term—that is, in a kind of research in which every effort is made
to eradicate all differences except the relevant variables and to eradicate the
idiosy ncracies of the f ieldworker. As already argued, neither is possible with-
out eliminating what is the very nature of anthropological research. The only
alternative is to accept the complexity of sociocu I tural life and to acknowledge
the essential contribution of the idiosyncratic approach to our understanding
of it. The nature of these idiosyncracies and their consequences can only be
assessed where reports by at least two different fieldworkers are available.
When our knowledge of socioculturel reality is based on the work of a single
scholar, apart from such formal criteria as internal consistency, there is no way
to judge the credibility of his or her report. It is precisely cases of contrasting
and even conflicting representations of the same society and culture that offer
the possibility of improving our understanding of the essentials of social life in
a particular place and at a particular time. However, to be content with the idea
that the mere existence of different accounts automatically adds to our un-
derstanding, as Redfield seems to have been in the case of Tepozuan (see
earlier), underestimates the potential contribution of conflicting descriptions.
They should be studied, not merely accepted. They should even be deliber-
ately created by sending scholars holding very différent views to study the
same society at the same time.
I agree with Bennett's contention, written almost 50 years ago, that the
problem of conflicting interpretations of the same reality cannot be solved by
simply collecting more facts and making more interpretations. Obviously, "a
reflexive analysis of the meanings of the respective interpretations" (Bennett,
1946, p. 374) is needed to avoid the trap of Western dualistic thought
according to which only one several conflicting points of view can be true.
The real challenge lies in coming to terms with these contrasting and con-
flicting interpretations in the context of empirical research.
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CHAPTERS
A Process Model Of
Replication Studies: On The
Relation Between Different
Types Of Replication*
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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we argue that the "received view" of replication as the exact or
algorithmic repetition of an original study has become obsolete. Exact repe-
tition only appears to be a boundary case of a series of more or less "varied"
replications, that is, replications that systematically vary one or more param-
eters of the original study to see whether its outcome remains stable or
changes in a predictable way. Only in case of failure to produce any predicted
outcome through a series of varied replications does the suspicion of an
irreproducible effect arise, and therefore the need for a more or less exact
replication. From this "constructivistic" perspective it is to be expected that
exact replications are rather rare, although methodologically replicability is
considered to be one of the most important cornerstones of science. The
production of so-called "objective knowledge" (Popper, 1980) would be
dependent on the intersubjectivity of observations in accordance with the
hypothesis, intersubjectivity of observations means that observational re-
ports would only be taken seriously if they could in principle be reproduced
by any competent researcher. A theory would only be considered falsified in
case of a replicable observation contradicting one of the implications of that
'This chapter was partly written during a stay at the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development, Bethesda, MD, as a senior Fulbright fellow. Preparation of this chapter was
supported in part by the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research (NWO) through a
Pioneer grant. The author would like to thank Michael Lamb for his constructive criticism on an
earlier version of this chapter.
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theory (Popper, 1980). We argue here that the central idea of replicability
should not be interpreted literally, that is, as the necessity of exact replica-
tions. Only if we take a more constructivistic perspective does it become
possible to notice replication studies being carried out as part and parcel of
everyday research. To emphasize its central role in methodology as well as in
research practice, we present a process model of replication in which dif-
ferent kinds of replication efforts are systematically interrelated. Against the
background of this process model of replication it becomes clear that re-
search programs allow for continuous replications of their data and results,
although isolated studies may remain unreplicated.
LACK OF EXACT REPLICATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT
It seems as if a tremendous lack of replication studies exists in the natural
sciences as well as in the behavioral and social sciences. A few examples may
illustrate this point for the behavioral and social sciences. The famous Harlow
(1958) experiments with primates raised by an "iron" mother or by a "cloth"
mother never have been exactly replicated, although their impact on the
theory of primary attachments in animals and in humans have been substan-
tial (Paul & Blumenthal, 1989). According to L.L. Ainsworth (1984) we even
should doubt the possibility of replicating the experiments because their
design has been described with too little detail. Maybe more influential still is
J.B. Watson's conditioning experiment with Little Albert. This experiment
showing the force of conditioning in human learning has never been repli-
cated, neither by Watson himself nor by his numerous students and followers.
Nevertheless there is some reason to believe that the experiment's exact
replicability should be doubted. Its design and procedures have been de-
scribed in a superficial way, and with sometimes contradicting details. Fur-
thermore, the experiment with Albert was preceded by many failures to show
that opérant conditioning played a major role in human learning (Samelson,
Î980).
Sometimes very influential studies are replicated after a long period of
time. Examples are: Burl's twin studies on the heredity of intelligence, Mead's
Samoa study focusing on the cultural context of adolescence (see Chapter 2),
and Efron's media-sociological study on the political biases in television news
about the candidates in an American presidential election campaign. On the
basis of a detailed and scrutinous (secondary) analysis of Burt's data set,
Kamin (1974) concluded that Burt had at least partially faked his data and had
invented imaginary subjects and experimenters. Freeman (1983) showed that
Mead probably had not t.ilcen into account all relevant and available infor-
mation, and had sketched a somewhat unidimensional and optimistic picture
of an idyllic tropical island. Stevenson and his colleagues (Stevenson, Eisin-
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ger, Feinberg, & Kotok, 1973) reanalyzed part of Efron's raw data after coding
these data with a more detailed and reliable coding system. They concluded
that Efron's theory could be falsified by her own data.
These replications seemed to disconfirm at least partially the original
studies, but they could not restrict their influence. On the contrary, the
replication studies provoked sometimes heated discussions about the merits
of replication (Holmes, 1983; Kloos, 1988), about the meaning and possibility
of "real" replications, and about their impact on scientific discourse (Collins,
1985).
It would seem, then, that replication studies do not seriously influence
discourse about the value of certain theories and their underlying data, and
that the request for more replications remained unanswered. Caplow (1982)
found that about 1% of the sociological studies is replicated. Shaver and
Norton (1980) observed that replications are nearly absent in educational
research: They found that only 14% of 151 research projects reported on in
the American Educational Research Journal could be considered replica-
tions. Bahr and his colleagues (Bahr, Caplow, & Chad wick, 1983) traced 300
replications (half of which are from psychology) in the Social Science Citation
Index over a period of almost 10 years (1973-1981), looking for the concept of
replication or its equivalents in the title of the papers. Studies that refer
explicitly to the concept of replication may be often considered exact repli-
cations. It seems, therefore, that only a small amount of behavioral and social
research is being exactly replicated, and that even very influential studies
remain unreplicated in the strict sense. Furthermore, if a study has been
replicated, and results diverge from the original outcome, more discussion
about the merits of the replication and its aut hor(s) seems to be provoked than
about the original study and the theory by which it was originated. On the one
hand, replications are being considered the cornerstones of modern science,
but on the other hand they seem to be carried out seldomly and they seem to
have little impact. How can this paradox be explained? We think that a naive
definition of replication as exact repetition of a single original study is the
reason replications remain unnoticed.
REPLICATIONS IN THEORY: ALGORITHMIC REPLICATIONS
Many researchers think that studies can be replicated in an exact way
(Collins, 1985). These so-called exact or algorithmic replications would be
carried out strictly according to the technical rules of the original author(s); an
identical outcome should consequently be attained (Collins, 1975). From a
methodological perspective, however, such replications cannot exist, simply
because technical guidelines will always leave room for minor variations, and
because spatiotemporal parameters will have changed anyway (Musgrave,
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1975). Whether the same outcome will be produced will, therefore, depend
on the robustness of the original results in the presence of minor variations in
the research design, and of spatiotemporal variations. A replication will be
called an exact replication if it is essentially similar to the original study.
Every comparison, however, is being made from a certain perspective (Pop-
per, 1980, p. 421). As we have said, replications necessarily change the design
of the original study, but on the basis of available background knowledge it
will be assumed that the changing parameters will not have any influence on
the outcome. For example, in a replication of a study on the conditioning of
emotions, spatial parameters are being considered irrelevant; that is, the
conditioning study may be carried out in different parts of the world and is
nevertheless supposed to yield the same kind of results.
Our background knowledge, however, is not infallible, and can be consid-
ered "true" only for the time being (Popper, 1980). If the original study and its
replication show divergent results, differing parameters constitute possible
alternative hypotheses to interpret the divergencies. With respect to cultural-
anthropological research, for example, Kloos (Chapter 2) composed a list of
important parameters: Replications usually are being carried out in another
social group, historically in another society, from a different cultural and
personal background of the researcher, and often also from a different
theoretical perspective. Differences between Mead's (1961) and Freeman's
(1983) study, for example, may be explained by the differences in social group
in which both researchers carried out their observations and interviews,
differences in historical period (before and after the second World War), and
differences in theoretical perspective (cultural determinism versus sociobiol-
ogy). Last but not least, it certainly made a difference whether a woman or a
man carried out interviews on sexual issues (Chapter 2).
If little knowledge about a certain domain exists, and if therefore our
background knowledge is still minimal, alternative hypotheses about the
causes or reasons for divergent replication results will be mushrooming. In
uncharted territory small differences in age of subjects, in apparatus, in
physical environment, in psychological atmosphere, and in the experiment-
er's personality may imply cumulative differences in outcome (Smith, 1970).
For example, research on attachment relationships between a caregiver and
an infant is usually based upon the Strange Situation procedure (Ainsworth,
Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). This procedure consists of a series of infant's
separations from and reunions with the caregiver in a strange environment,
as well as a confrontation with an unknown person who tries to interact with
the infant. This procedure is often used in research on the effects of infant day
care and other practically relevant issues, but it is not clear to what extent
variations in playroom, play material, personality, and sex of experimenter
and "stranger," and the order in which the procedure is carried out during a.
measurement session influence coding results. In the influential Bielefeld
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study (Grossmann & Grossmann, 1990), the large playroom with the life-sized
play material may be hypothesized to be one of the causes of the infants'
seemingly avoidant behavior to the parent when they enter the room after
being away for 3 minutes (Sagi, Van Uzendoom, & Koren, 1989). It also has
been suggested that the overrepresentation of resistantly attached infants in
Israeli kibbutzim may partly be explained by the stressful sociability test that
preceded the Strange Situation (Sagi et al., 1989). Because a strong back-
ground theory about essential ingredients of the Strange Situation is lacking,
many alternative hypotheses are possible in case of diverging attachment
classification distributions.
In sum, strictly seen it is impossible to copy an original study in the strict
sense of the word; necessarily some potentially relevant parameters will
inevitably change, and our background knowledge determines whether
these changes are essential or not. The stronger our background knowledge
is, that is, the more frequently confirmed or at least not falsified this knowl-
edge is, the more exact our replications may be considered to be. If back-
ground knowledge implies that spatiotemporal parameters are irrelevant in
producing a certain effect or outcome, the experiment can more easily be
replicated: In this case, we do not have to control for evasive spatiotemporal
variables, as these variables cannot influence our evaluation of the identity of
the original and the replication study.
THE PRACTICE OF REPLICATION:
A CONSTRUCnVISTIC VIEW
The constructivistic view on replication studies is based on sociological
research in scientific laboratories. Through participant observation in emi-
nent laboratories, and through in-depth interviews with leading scientists, a
description of the practice of replication has been developed that contradicts
"received views" of the replication process. Research on "gravitational radi-
ation" (Collins, 1975), on the construction of the "ETA laser" (Collins, 1985),
and on conditioning of "planarian worms" (Travis, 1981), for example, has
been the object of sociological studies. The results of these studies can be
summarized as follows: First, interviews show that exact replications do
occur only very infrequently in the natural sciences, and they constitute a
low-status activity (Mulkay, 1986). Researchers are much more inclined to
change some parameters of the original experiment systematically, so as to
be able to discover new applications, and they are much less inclined to make
a "carbon copy" of the study. The outcome of the original study is accepted—
until the contrary has been proven. A falsification appears to be taken into
consideration only if an outcome repeatedly cannot be established, although
the variations on the original theme seem to be minor. Exact or algorithmic
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replications should be considered a boundary case of "varied" replication.
Starting with rather large variations of the design of an important study,
researchers first try to add something new to the original outcome, for
example by showing that the same effect can be produced in some other
species or with another chemical substance. If such larger variations do not
yield the expected results, more refined variations are being practiced, until
some doubt about the validity of the original study arises. In the end, "exact"
replication is applied to (dis-)confirm the doubts, and to check the assump-
tions of the varied replications. In sum, these social studies imply that many
scientists feel that exact replications may be carried out, but usually are
irrelevant for scientific progress.
Participant observations in laboratories also show that exact replications
are seldom carried out, and that every replication is subject to a negotiation
process on the relevance of changed parameters for diverging results (Collins,
1985). In other words, replications are not accepted without discussion about
the relevance of changed parameters for the production of (unexpected
results. The so-called "enculturation model" is assumed to be a more ade-
quate description of replication than the algorithmic model. The encultura-
tion model emphasizes the process of socialization of the researchers who
implicitly learn to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant parameters.
Complicated measurement procedures are not considered to be replicable by
just reading a pertinent paper. Because of lack of space, in published papers
essential details about the procedures are being left out; sometimes the
researcher intentionally gives a global description to defend him- or herself
against premature and incompetent replication, or to prevent colleagues
from producing new facts before he or she finds time to "discover" them.
Researchers who want to apply the procedure are urged to contact their
colleague for further information, and maybe even for training through
which unreported presuppositions and details are being transferred. Until
such enculturation has taken place, a researcher who cannot replicate a
certain result may expect to be accused of being not competent enough to
carry out the experiment (Travis, 1981).
In the case of attachment theory, the same enculturation process appears
to exist for procedures like the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1978), and
the Adult Attachment Interview (Main & Goldwyn, in press). A training of
several weeks in one of the American research centers is considered neces-
sary for the reliable and valid coding of the observations or interviews, and
therefore for a plausible and persuasive contribution to the international
discourse on attachment. When central theses of attachment theory are in
danger of being falsified by "untrained" researchers, this "incompetence" and
lack of enculturation will be explicitly used against the "dissident" (see, for an
example, Waters, 1983). On the one hand, such arguments appear to belong
to the category of ad hominem arguments (Fogelin, 1987), that should be
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forbidden in rational scientific discourse; on the other hand, however, some
measurement procedures can be so complicated that an intensive training
indeed is necessary to get insight into essential elements, to be able not only
to code the material reliably, but also in agreement with the investigators
who constructed the procedure. Sometimes it is hard to know which proce-
dural variations indeed are relevant and which are irrelevant, unless the
"novice" is being instructed in personal training sessions with the construc-
tors. Background knowledge cannot always be made explicit as Popper
(1980) assumed. We should leave room for "tacit knowledge" (Polyani, 1973)
that can be crucial for the adequate application of complicated measures, not
only in the domain of the natural sciences but also in that of the behavioral
sciences.
Accepting that background knowledge always remains fallible, and partly
implicit, and that, therefore, the application of measurement procedures is
subject to an enculturation process the effectiveness of which can be doubted,
the possibility of a so-called "experimenter regression" has to be considered.
This paradox means that replication logically can not be the ultimate test of a
statement's truth. Replication is a matter of trained application of measure-
ment procedures that cannot be described algorithmically. Therefore, the
application of the procedures always can be criticized, and, in fact, a further
test would be necessary to see whether the quality of the replication meets
the accepted standards or not. But this test would also be based on a
complicated measurement procedure, and would therefore again be subject
to criticism. The "experimenter" regression could be stopped if the final
decision about the adequateness of a measure's application would be taken by
the investigator who constructed the measure. Such a short circuit, however,
would imply methodological solipsism: Every researcher would in the end
have the right to decide about the truth value of his or her own propositions.
Constructivists, however, locate the decision on a social level: The scientific
forum—or at least its most powerful part—is supposed to finally decide about
the validity of the replication. Collins (1985) and Travis (1981) describe this
process of consensus construction as a rhetorical discourse resulting in a
paradigm shift or continuation (Kühn, 1962). Replications are social construc-
tions; they are the final product of a discourse on what is considered adequate
and relevant in a certain domain of research.
THE PARADOX OF REPLICATION AS NEGOTIATION
The constructivistic argumentation for replications as the result of negotia-
tions is elegant. According to constructivists, participant observation studies
in different domains of natural science have shown that replications can
seldom be carried out algorithmically, and that replication results are consid-
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ered "true" only after intensive debate about relevant parameters. This view
on replication appears to demystify the idea of exact replications in the
natural sciences, and in this respect seems to close the gap between the social
and the natural sciences. If we apply the constructivistic sociology of science
on its own methods and results, however, a paradox seems to be implied
(Mulkay, 1984). Through several replications it was established that replica-
tion studies constitute contingent social constructions, and can never be
considered as unproblematic validations of knowledge claims. The same
holds true for constructivistic replication studies: In these cases, too, rhetorics
are being used to make clear that several different replications did only differ
in irrelevant aspects, and, therefore, should be seen as real replications.
Metastudies should not be exempted from the constructivistic interpretation
of replication. And if every researcher—or better still, every forum of re-
searchers—would construe his or its own interpretation of reality and, there-
fore, his or its own idea of replication, why should we take the constructivistic
view more seriously than the view of the researchers in the field?
Although constructivism criticized the concept of exact replication, and
showed the relativity of replication outcome, this theory of science did not
succeed in rejecting replication as a regulatory criterion for science. Replica-
tions can always be heavily discussed because of changing parameters ex-
plaining divergent results, but replication studies remain a very strong motive
for the spiral of ever more detailed discussions about knowledge claims, and
the studies that constitute their foundation. For example, the constructivist
Collins (1985) still concludes that "Replicability ... is the Supreme Court of
the scientific system." The simplistic view on replication as the ultimate
criterion for the validity of the original study, however, should be replaced by
the idea that all results of scientific research, and, therefore, also the replica-
tion results, can only get their impact on scientific developments through the
medium of discourse. Replications may lead to refinements of original results,
or to their rejection, but only as a result of debates in the scientific forum. A
study that fails to replicate the original results, or that succeeds in replicating
them, cannot determine the outcome of the scientific discourse. The possi-
bility of replication, however, appears to be a condition sine qua non if a study
is to be taken seriously in the discourse. That is, every research project should
in principle be replicable; U this is not the case, the study should not be taken
into account by the forum (Popper, 1980). Whether a study will in fact be
replicated is a different question. Only if a series of varied replications does
not succeed in producing new "facts," researchers feel urged to replicate the
original as exactly as possible. And in that case, it would still be difficult to
know whether an exact replication is being carried out: Replications never
completely succeed in controlling all potentially relevant parameters (for
example, spatiotemporal parameters). Therefore, the exactness of the repli-
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cation is the result of competent researchers discussing the replication against
the background of available knowledge in the field.
A PROCESS MODEL FOR REPLICATION
Replications can be classified in several different ways. Lykken (1968) for
example introduced the concepts of "literal replication," "operational repli-
cation," and "constructive replicadon," and they constitute a continuum
along which ever more parameters are being varied. La Sorte (1972) devel-
oped a somewhat more extensive classification that also includes research on
the validity of measures and longitudinal research (repeated measurements).
Bahr et al. (1983) present the most systematic and complete classification.
They differentiate four important parameters that may vary in replication
studies—time, place, method, and sample—and they show that combinations
of these parameters result in 16 different kinds of replication. These types of
replication can be placed on a continuum from constant parameters (the
exact replication) to completely different parameters. They found that about
27% of 300 replications could be classified in the category: constant sample
and method, but different time and place. About 21% could be classified as
keeping the sample characteristics constant, and changing all the other
parameters. These two types of replication, therefore, include about half of
the replication studies.
Such classifications do not take into account two important types of repli-
cation—that is, secondary analysis and meta-analysis. Secondary analysis is a
kind of replication in which all parameters except the researcher and the
method of data analysis are kept constant. Secondary analysis starts with the
data as collected in a certain way in a certain sample. The replication of Hurt's
studies by Kamin (1974) in fact can be considered a secondary analysis, in
which only Burl's statistics were tested against probability. If such a sec-
ondary analysis is carried out with minimal methodical and theoretical
variations, and nevertheless leads to divergent results, it can be considered
one of the most powerful falsifications through replication. Secondary anal-
ysis also is one of the most inexpensive and efficient types of replication,
because it is based on existing data sets. One of the main barriers to secondary
replication is, however, the accessibility of the original data sets. Wolins
(1962) reported that 24% of 37 authors were willing to make their data sets
available. Twenty-one researchers claimed that their data sets were lost.
Craig and Reesen (1973) found that 38% of 53 researchers were unwilling to
make their raw data available for secondary analysis (see also Miedema,
1986).
The results of the secondary analyses are sometimes rather disappointing.
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Results do not always appear to be replicable, because the first researcher
used other methods that now sometimes seem outdated (Bryant & Wortman,
1978). We would like to state, therefore, that secondary analysis should have
the status of an intermediate type of research situated between the original
study and its actual replication. If secondary analysis of the existing data set
already leads to falsification of the results, further replication including data
collection should be considered an intolerable waste of time and money (see
Figure 3.1).
Secondary analysis can be subclassih'ed in two categories. First, secondary
analysis may include recocting of the original raw data. Stevenson et al.
(1973), for example, did recode part of the Efron's material on media reports
of a presidential campaign. We propose to call this type of replication the
"complete secondary analysis," because two phases of processing the raw
data are involved: the coding and analyzing of the data. In many studies in the
behavioral sciences data are recorded on video- or audiotape; such raw data
always can be used for a complete secondary analysis, at least during the time
that the recordings still have a reasonable quality. Second, secondary analysis
may be restricted to coded data; in this case, we propose to use the concept of
"restricted secondary analysis." In this type of secondary analysis the coding
system is not changed but only the methods of analyzing the data, to see
whether the original results survive statistical criticism or the application of
refined methods of statistical analysis (see, for example, Cronbach & Webb's
[1975] unsuccessful reanalysis of a classical Aptitude-Treatment Interaction
study).
If the restricted or complete type of secondary analysis shows convergent
results, replications should be carried out in which new data under different
conditions are being collected (see Figure 3.1). From the start, the original
study will be "trusted" so much that rather significant variations in the design
will be applied. Larger variations may lead to more interesting discoveries in
addition to the original study, but they will be followed by smaller variations
if more global replications fail to produce new "facts." This process of varied
replications seems to be inherent to modern science, and to be especially
characteristic for the phase of "normal" science (Kühn, 1962). This type of
replication is not algor it hmically carried out, but it is tried, on the contrary, to
determine the robustness of the original results for spatiotemporal and other
variations, and possibly to refine the original results with additional hypoth-
eses. If even modest variations fail to reproduce the results, a more or less
exact replication is needed (see Figure 3.1).
We consider meta-analyses to be replications because these analyses test
the replicability of the original study in a series of varied replications. Until
recently, the integration of the results of a great number of empirical studies
on a certain domain seemed exclusively to be a matter of qualitative analysis
in which the reviewer structures his material intuitively, and reaches a global
A PROCESS MODEL OF REPLICATION STUDIES 67
conclusion. In the last decade a trend toward formalizing this qualitative
process by means of meta-analyses can be observed (Glass, McGaw, & Smith,
1981; Chapter 6). Through meta-analysis a combined effect size for different
studies may be computed that gives a more precise and replicable description
of the outcome of a series of related studies (Rosenthal, 1991). Furthermore, a
meta-analysis can trace the effects of systematic variations in design on the
outcome of a series of studies, thereby locating the spatiotemporal bound-
aries of replicability.
In attachment theory, for example, several instructive examples of such
meta-analyses can be found. Goldsmith and Alansky (1987) showed through
meta-analysis that the average effect size for the relation between maternal
responsiveness and infants' attachment classification appeared to be much
smaller in a series of replications (with more or less strong variations in
methods and samples) than Ainsworth and her colleagues (1978) had found in
their original study. Although this meta-analysis was based on studies that
were very divergent in quality of design and instrument, its outcome should
be taken into account as a warning not to foreclose the discussion about the
central theme of attachment and responsiveness. Van Uzendoorn and Kroo-
nenberg (1988) were able to show through meta-analysis that cross-cultural
differences of attachment classification distributions were smaller than the
intracultural differences. Before this meta-analysis it was assumed that distri-
butions were culture-specific, just on the basis of a few samples from Ger-
many, Japan, and Israel. McCartney and Phillips (1988) showed that the
average effect size for the relation between type of care (day care or "home-
care") and quality of attachment, specifically avoidance to the caregiver, was
very small, although a few isolated studies seemed to have proven a negative
effect of day care on attachment. The authors also fruitfully used the varia-
tions in replication studies to analyze their influence on the relation between
type of care and attachment. They showed that neither sex of experimenter
nor sex and age of infant were related to the effect size, but that it did matter
whether the coders were blind to the infants' membership of type of care. If
the coders were not blind to group membership, effect sizes were relatively
higher and pointed toward a negative influence of day care on attachment
quality (McCartney & Phillips, 1988, p. 167). In this way, varied replications
can be combined to get insight into the overall effect size as well as into the
influences of the variations on the relations studied.
As is shown by Lytton (Chapter 6), however, meta-analyses require many
decisions to be taken in several different parts of the study. These decisions
may or may not be made explicit, and other meta-analysts may or may not
reach the same conclusions based upon the same "raw data" but departing
from different presuppositions and decision rules. For example, in a meta-
analysis on parental punishment strategies the exact definition of this con-
struct should be given, and the researcher should decide what measures are
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considered to be valid operationalizations of this construct. Different meta-
analysts may propose different definitions and measures, and therefore select
different (sub-)samples of pertinent studies, yielding different effect sizes
(Chapter 6). Therefore, meta-analyses should also be replicated, and through
variations in decision rules, it should be tested how robust mela-analytic
outcomes in fact are. Only after intensive discourse on implicit and explicit
decision rules—against the background of available knowledge (temporarily)
considered true—the scientific forum may decide on one or the other out-
come, and consider this result as (provisional) part of true background
knowledge (see Figure 3.1).
CONCLUSIONS
Although many researchers and philosophers of science think that replica-
tions represent an important cornerstone of science, much confusion exists as
to what we should consider replication studies to be, and what kinds of
replication efforts can be distinguished. In this chapter, we tried to show that
replications should not be narrowed down to the rather small category of
exact or algorithmic replications. Usually replications consist of variations
upon the theme of the original study, and the scientific discourse focuses upon
the question in what sense it may theoretically be supposed that varied
primary analysis
secondary analysis
complete/restricted
varied replications
exact replications
meta-analysis
replications of
meta-analysis
Figure 3.1. A process model of different types oi replications.
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replications produce results converging with those of the original study. In a
broader interpretation of replication, we should not only consider the partial
or complete repetition of the original study through secondary analysis or
through collecting new data as "real" replication, but also meta-analysis of a
series of related studies. Through meta-analysis it can be tested what varia-
tions in relevant parameters influence the results, and whether the outcome
of the original study indeed can be considered to be replicated—not in an
isolated replication study, but in a series of varied replications. In our process
model of replication, the relations between the different kinds of replication
studies have been shown, and the discursive context of replications has been
emphasized. Replicability is a necessary condition for every study that is
intended to have an impact on the scientific discourse, but an exact replica-
tion is only a boundary case indicating that varied replications did not yield
fruitful discussions about the theory to which the original study contributed.
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INTRODUCTION
There has to be replication! If we take the statements of scientists and
met hodologists there can be no doubt of the need for us to be able to replicate
original research. In the discussions, however, one distinguishes several
connotations accorded replicability (cf. Lykken, 1968; Mulkay & Gilbert,
1986; Chapter 3). Complete replicability of research f'perfect replication";
"exact replication") was, and is still seen as, the ideal situation, because it
provides the strongest guarantee for the reliability of research results. How-
ever, there is a lot of doubt as to whether one can speak of an exact
replication, in the narrow sense of the word, outside of the laboratory setting.
In trying to find a solution for this problem the concept of replication has been
broadened in terms of varied replications (cf. Chapter 6). This means that
almost always one or more parameters, such as time, place, method, and
sample will be varied. It is Hunt's opinion that if replicating experiments are
to be "powerful tests" they should differ from the original experiments in one
or more aspects (Hunt, 1975). In the contemporary discussions about inquiry,
replicability continues to be a regulative criterion for scientific research,
notwithstanding the change from perfect replication to varied replication.
Replicability is used in the discussions as a methodological criterion. How-
ever, it is not clear whether replicability is only a methodological criterion,
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that is, that the demand for replicability only means that the genesis of the
research results be made traceable for other researchers or that it is a
methodological criterion with epistemological pretensions or presuppositions,
that is, replicability is a guarantee that the research effects tell us something
about reality and that they are "true" in the sense of the correspondence
theory of truth. In this chapter we first want to examine which of the two
criteria distinguished above forms the basis for the notion of replicability
actually used in the ongoing scientific debate. On the basis of recent literature
we argue that notwithstanding the Kuhnian turn in the philosophy of science
(cf. Kühn, 1970), epistemological arguments still play a decisive role in
legitimizing the results of research in terms of replicability. Given the funda-
mental critique of logical empiricism it is a generally accepted idea that the
process of acquiring knowledge is not simply a naive realistic mirroring of
reality. This critique, however, has not yet led to a rejection of the "subject-
object" scheme which underlies logical empiricism. Philosophers of science—
with Popper to the fore—have placed method as a neutral link between
reality and knower, between subject and object. In this view method becomes
the argumentative cornerstone for scientific discourse. The naive mirror view
based on the idea that "all individuals in principle have the same observation
apparatus at their disposal" (Kunneman, 1986, p. 21) is merely substituted for
a more "sophisticated" variant of what is still basically the same mirror view.
The connotations accorded such methodological criteria, reliability, and
validity, for instance, are still closely connected with this classical dual
"subject-object" scheme.
To develop our critique, we first refer to the changes in content that have
taken place in the conceptualization of the notion of replicability and the use
of replication in scientific practice. Then we will clarify how the epistemolog-
ical scheme outlined earlier is still present as a hidden factor in the method-
ological descriptions of replicability. In our subsequent contribution we argue
that the methodological interpretation of the demand for replicability as
formulated in constructivism is a tenable one. Nevertheless, in respect to
epistemology, the presupposition of the dual "subject-object" scheme still
plays a decisive role in constructivism. On the basis of the work of John
Dewey, we put forward some suggestions for solving this problem and for
constructing a more consistent view on the relation between epistemology
and methodology.
VARIETIES OF REPLICATION
Conceptualizations of Replication
Traditionally the canon of replicability is central to (natural) science. The
results of research are based on observations and—so it is held—it is crucial
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that the observations, which are the basis of the scientific statement being
made, are in principle repeatable by anyone (cf. Heisenberg, 1975, cited in
Mulkay & Gilbert, 1986).
A lot of lip service is paid to this widespread idea, but it is remarkable that
there is hardly any theoretical reflection on this concept of replication in
standard textbooks. Draaisma (1989) points out that if one tries to locate the
concept of replication in Nagels's The Structure of Science (1961) (the codex
and canon of the traditional philosophy of science) one does so in vain. There
is also no entry in the Philosopher's Index. De Groot's (1961) methodological
handbook for the behavioral sciences is an exception, however. In his
Methodology, the matter of replication (in research) is mentioned in five
places, according to the index. For De Groot replication has to do with
repeating an earlier study in exactly the same way, but with the introduction
of fresh samples and new experimenters. Replication means repeated tests of
the same hypothesis on fresh samples. The guideline given is that "the reader
must be put in possession of all the relevant facts about the experimental
design, the data processing, and the outcomes so that, should he be so
inclined, he can replicate the investigation (De Groot, pp. 167, 168). Because
of "practical reasons (space in journals, readability, and the like)" (p. 168), this
rule will sometimes have to be relaxed, but the more detailed data and the
original materials must, according to De Groot, remain available for some
time for study by others who wish to replicate the study.
In Popper (1972a) we find the view that in order to generate objective,
valid, justifiable, and scientific knowledge, such knowledge in principle must
be testable by anyone. Testability is an aspect of the more general idea of
intersubjective criticism: Rational control by means of critical discussion.
Popper is only prepared to talk about testing our observations where it is
possible that "certain events recur in accordance with rules or regularities, as
is the case with repeatable experiments" (Popper, 1972, p. 45). If an empirical
scientific statement is presented in such a way that the experimental arrange-
ments are described and can be tested by any competent researcher (anyone
who has learned the relevant technique), then scientific observations are
testable and repeatable. And a theory is only falsified if a reproducible effect
is discovered that can be seen as a refutation of the theory.
On the question as to how often an effect in reality must be reproduced
before it can be called a reproducible effect or discovery, Poppers answer is:
In some cases not even once.... If I assert that there is a family of white ravens
in the New York zoo, then I assert something which can be tested in principle.
If somebody wishes to test it and is informed, upon arrival, that the family has
died, or that it has never been heard of, it is left to him to accept or reject my
falsifying basic statement. As a rule, he will have means for forming an opinion
by examining witness, documents, etc.; that is to say, by appealing to other
intersubjectively testable and reproducible facts. (Popper, 1972, p. 87)
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Thus, for Popper the idea of an arbitrary reproducible physical effect (Popper,
1972, p. 203) is closely connected with the idea of intersubjectivity.
In the above sketched algorithmic view on replication Popper is pointing to
a complicating factor:
All repetitions which we experience are approximate repetitions;... for any
given finite group or set of things, however variously they may be chosen, we
can, with a little ingenuity, find always points of view such that all the things
belonging to that set are similar (or partially equal) if considered from one of
these points of view; which means that anything can be said to be a repetition of
anything, if only we adopt the appropriate point of view. This shows how naive
it is to look upon repetition as something ultimate, or given. (Popper, 1972, pp.
420, 422)1
Replication in Practice
When we read the latest literature on replication in anthropology, sociology,
and the sociology of science, it becomes clear that the normative and ideal
view of replication is not actually found in the practice of scientific research.
Scientists do not carefully criticize each others' research outcomes by repli-
cating the original experiment.
Mulkay and Gilbert (1986), philosophers of science, have shown on the
basis of interviews with biochemists that in the business of science the
"official view of replication," that is, "exact replication," "close copying," or
"routine copy" is not everyday practice. A thorough analysis of the complex,
diverse, and flexible interpretative work usually done by scientific re-
searchers yields a different picture from the "official" view on replication.
Usually replication is seen in practice as "doing something different which
(leads) to the same scientific conclusion" (Mulkay & Gilbert, 1986, p. 26).
Experiments are seen as either supporting or weakening a general problem
solution or proposition under discussion in the scientific community.2 Such a
proposition is "taken to be a more general statement than that inherent in the
observation furnished by any particular experimental set-up.. . . (I)t can be
verified, validated or replicated in various different ways" (Mulkay & Gilbert,
1986, p. 26).
When replication is used in this sense, the most adequate metaphor is
Peirce's cable metaphor (1955, p. 229). Along the lines of several experi-
mental paths outcomes are generated which can throw light on a problematic
proposition. If in the scientific discourse these several outcomes can be as
'Collins rightly calk this "the Popper problem" (Collins, 1985, p. 30).
2ln the words of Hunt: The hypothesis must be tested, not the experiments (Hunt, 1975, pp.
588, 590). "In fact, the best replication may be one which only replicates the hypothesis, since it
is the strongest test of the hypothesis' generalizability" (Hunt, 1975, p. 589).
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intimately connected as the fibers of a cable, then the argumentative force of
a proposition becomes stronger. Mulkay and Gilbert characterize this way of
acting in research as "replication through experimental variation" (1986, p.
27). A number of research techniques and research designs are deployed to
test a conclusion, or to confirm it. The conclusions of earlier research function
as starting points for new original experiments and analysis. Only in those
cases where there is doubt about the tenability of conclusions from earlier
research is there a likelihood that the research on which those conclusions
are based will be replicated as exactly as possible. But as long as this is not the
case, it is assumed that the results of the original research can, in principle, be
replicated. The possibility of exact replication is a presupposition which is
seldom effected. "Even in accounts of cases where there is marked scientific
disagreement, speakers do not usually question the reproducibility of each
other's observations. Rather, they query the scientific meaning of the other's
experimental regularities; and questions of scientific meaning, they maintain,
are best settled, not by means of simple repetition, but through the strategy of
experimental variation" (p. 30). Only in those situations in which the results of
original research "come to be defined as increasingly problematic, (then)
exact replication comes to seem more appropriate" (p. 34).
From Reliability to Validity
When the need to replicate conclusions is so strongly emphasized, it is not
surprising that one starts using the term validation instead of reliability. In the
practice of replication it is not the repeatability of the results which is at stake
but the validity of the conclusions.3 Experiments take place along an argu-
mentative continuum in which primarily the validity of the conclusions is the
subject under discussion. The most important as well as the most prevalent
contribution to such a discussion is the strategy of the varied replication. In
such a discussion original research outcomes have the status of "facts": It is
assumed that they are repeatable and that there is no need to put this to the
test. Only when strong doubts arise does "exact replication" appear on the
stage of the validity discussion. "Close experimental copying, then, is treated
( . . . ) as a strategy to be used very occasionally in order to try to find out how
doubtful findings are being produced" (p. 34).
EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS
One conclusion then is very clear: Reflection and prescription in the philos-
ophy of science do not correspond to actual research practices. In research
3See also Chapter 6, in which Van Uzendoorn discusses the validation of knowledge claims.
Popper, as we have seen above, also talks about the validity of generated scientific knowledge
(Cf. Hunt, 1975, p. 587).
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practice it is not the results of research that have primacy, but the conclusions
that can be drawn from these "research outcomes." The pivotal question now
is: What is the value of the repeatability of the results of research in relation
to the conclusions that are built on these research outcomes? To put it
differently: Does the repetition (or repeatability in principle) function as an
argument for the "reality value" (the truth) of the conclusions in the (theore-
tical) discourse between scientists?
To be able to answer this question we must examine what the epistemo-
logical presuppositions are that form the basis of how philosophers of science
perceive the relation between research outcomes, conclusions, and the re-
ality content of these conclusions. First we analyze the standard view with
regard to the status of research results, including Popper's version, and then
we take a look at the ideas that have been developed more recently.
The Standard View and Popper's Variant
The clearest and most outspoken view on the relation between epistemology
and methodology is the orthodox or standard view. Epistemology and metho-
dology are seen as being seamlessly connected. In this view epistemology is
fundamental in the sense that, on the basis of a separation between subject
(the knower) and object (the existing reality independent of the knowing
subject), and taking the fallible knowledge apparatus of the knowing subject
into account, the purpose is to capture reality as accurately as possible. If the
research outcomes are reproducible then the claim to truth of the conclusions
is stronger, that is, the objectivity of the conclusions is better substantiated.
Methodological repeatability of the same process—and on the basis of that,
also the same effects—renders increased certainty, which strengthens the
claim to truth. As certainty increases, the implication is that independent
reality has actually been captured as a result of the research process. Repli-
cation in this view "automatically" constitutes the argument for the validity of
knowledge.
Popper makes a sophisticated variant out of this orthodox view. He still
accepts the classical connection of methodology and epistemology but at the
same time adds a communicative component to it and stresses the impor-
tance of the critical discussion between scientists. He points to the decisive
role of common background knowledge in empirical testing procedures. In
contrast with monological verificationism, Popper draws attention to inter-
subjective testability and intersubjective criticism. The process of testing
empirical statements has no "natural" final end: One can always derive new
consequences (new conjectural and testable statements) from the statements
to be tested and so ad infinitum (see Kunneman, 1986, p. 21). In Popper's own
words: "(I)ntersubjective testability always implies that, from the statements
which are to be tested, other testable statements can be deduced. Thus, if the
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basic statements in their turn are to be intersubjectively testable, there can be
no ultimate statements in science" (Popper, 1972a, p. 47).
Specifically one of the characteristic features of empirical testing proce-
dures is their finiteness. A stop is put to a procedure such as Popper describes
when the scientific community decides to provisionally accept certain, easily
testable basic statements as truth. Because of the introduction of this idea of
"unproblematic background knowledge" (Popper, 1978, p. 390), the theories
that are tentatively accepted as truth and that form the empirical basis of
scientific action and decisions about the empirical falsification of theories and
hypotheses, have become communicative (see Kunneman, 1986).
Replication in the sense of "repeatable effect," however, remains for
Popper the ultimate methodological criterion for judging the value of re-
search. He never reversed his view. This is not surprising when we take a look
at his later work and especially at Objective Knowledge, in which Popper
(1972b) develops an evolutionary epistemology. Scientific knowledge has to
do with a reality that is autonomous to the knowing subject. When we look at
his ideas about theories of truth, it turns out that he is an adherent of Tarski's
correspondence theory of truth. In trying to give a further underpinning to
that theory of truth he introduces his concept of the three worlds in Objective
Knowledge. World-1 is the reality of material processes and things, the
physical world; world-2 is the domain of the psychic reality of experience and
thought, of language and understanding; and world-3 finally is knowledge
without a knowing subject, the domain of objective knowledge, objective
thought. In his theory of the three worlds Popper separates the communica-
tive processes in the scientific community and the existing beliefs (world-2),
from the problems, problem solutions, conjectures and refutations, and from
the growth of objective knowledge, in short, from the cognitive validity of the
beliefs (world-3).
The purpose of this separation is that it can prevent the having of ideas and
views by a specific group of scientists from being identified with the validity of
these ideas and views. This immunizes the truth and the falseness of theories
against a r elati vistic equalization of the valued and the valid. An ontological and
epistemological reserve is created, named world-3, in which objectivity and
validity can continue to exist unthreatened and in which the growth of knowl-
edge is not contaminated by social influences and communicative processes.
(Kunneman, 1986, p. 23)
Methodological decisions, so it turns out, are located in world-2 which is why
the gap between world-2 and world-3 cannot be bridged. From the perspec-
tive of the validity of scientific knowledge, the methodological recommenda-
tions are kept up in the air. With regard to the criterion of falsifiability, in
world-2 we are no longer able, from a methodological perspective, to say
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anything about the correspondences between statements or between knowl-
edge and reality, in terms of the truth content of these statements (see also the
conceptual problems with Popper's concept "verisimilitude," Popper, 1978).
This means that Popper, in spite of having introduced the communicative
component, nevertheless takes as his point of departure a rigorous separation
between subject and object. In the end he ties his ideas on replication to the
object-world outside of us. This being the case, we can say that his view is
indeed a variant of the standard view. For him too, replication guarantees the
truth of our knowledge.
In summary both positions start with an epistemology that presumes a
rigorous separation between subject and object. In the process of acquiring
knowledge this gap has to be bridged. Given this epistemology, replication
(and actual replicability) is seen as a methodological criterion that ensures the
gap is bridged as adequately as possible.
Kühn
If we consider Popper's methodological remarks—given the separation of
world-2 and world-3—outside of his epistemological view, what we are left
with is a concept that stresses both intersubjective criticism of the results of
research and the demand for optimal communicability (cf. Glastra van Loon,
1980).
It is precisely this direction that the post-Popperians, led by Kühn, have
taken. The evaluation and the validity of a statement is, according to them,
one process. Now the object of research, as well as the subject, has been made
"communicative fluid" as Kunneman so beautifully puts it (Kunneman, 1986).
There is no independent criterion by which we can judge whether theories
adequately mirror reality. Stress is laid either on the social and communica-
tive processes (Popper's world-2), on the paradigmatical (Kühn, 1970), or on
disciplinary (Toulmin, 1972) empirical testing procedures. The implication is
that epistemology is no longer a directive for methodology. Instead of a
methodology in which one starts with a certain, realistic, and dual epistemo-
logy, the sociology of knowledge functions as the "source of information" for
methodological discussions. Constructivism (see hereafter) is the most radical
elaboration of this development to date.
A central idea in Kuhn's theory of paradigms is that theories are not
immediately abandoned as soon as outcomes of empirical experiments are at
odds with the effects one would have expected on the basis of the theory. For
Kühn, empirical tests are of minor importance when success or failure of
theories is at stake. Rather, one tries to reinterpret the outcomes of earlier
research. According to Popper, replication should get a more or less algo-
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rithmic connotation (replication as exact replication)4 in the (hypothetical but
never actual) case of a successful linking between world-2 and world-3.
Kuhn's view on the other hand, is more in line with the above-mentioned
experimental variation which makes possible a communicative process of
interpretation and reinterpretation. In the scientific discussion, according to
Kühn, one should focus on the conclusions, that is, the effects of research.
Such discussions can never be settled by pointing to an objectively given
reality.
The important shift that takes place with Kühn is that epistemology is no
longer fundamental for methodology. We might even say that this is a case of
"methodology without epistemology." This means that the value of replica-
tion is no longer epislemologically warranted; it has to be determined in the
scientific discussion. As we shall see, this becomes even more preeminent in
constructivism.
Constructivism
Completely in line with Kuhn's theory of paradigms (in which methodological
criteria are not absolutely fixed but are the result of the discourse of paradig-
matically bound communities), discursive and argumentative processes are
also central in the work of constructivists like Collins, Knorr, Latour, &
Woolgar. According to the constructivists, replications of original research
must always be seen as the outcome of a process of negotiation. The negoti-
ations entered into by scientists deal with the conclusions, and the results, as
claims not as evidence. That is why science as a process of negotiation is in
principle a never-ending event, with no fixed Archimedean point.
The main characteristic of constructivism is its complete reversal of the
usual perspective. This is made clear for example by Tibbets (1988) when he
discusses the status of ontology in constructivism.
(F)or realists ontological assumptions constitute a sine qua non for under-
standing scientists' empirical and theoretical activities and apart from such a
realist ontology such activities would make no sense at all. For constructivists,
on the other hand, the issue is not the respective merits of one ontological
'We pass over Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programs (cf. Lakatos, 1978),
because the problem of the relationship between ontology and methodology that is found in
Popper, comes up even stronger with Lakatos. His evaluation of the history of the natural
sciences and his reference to the basic value judgments of scientists form the basis for his
arguments for the increasing verisimilitude of theories and increasing "grip" on the structure of
reality. Lakatos only gives us the philosophical postulate of an independently given reality, but
he cannot articulate a substantial relationship between methodology and ontology (cf. Kunne-
man, 1986).
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framework over another but inquirers' discourse, accounts, cognitive construc-
tions and praxis, (p. 128)
The constructivist "reversal" is also nicely illustrated in Latour and Wool-
gar's (1979) well-known book Laboratory Life. In this book, which is partly
based on Latour's two years of empirical, cultural-anthropological research in
the Salk Institute, the authors state that: "The difference between object and
subject or the difference between facts and artefacts should not be the starting
point of the study of scientific activity; rather, it is through practical opera-
tions that a statement can be transformed into an object or a fact into an
artefact" (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 236). In science there is no passive
description and representation of an autonomous, already existent reality
(Facts, Nature), but "reality (is) the consequence of the settlement of a dispute
rather than its cause" (p. 236). Facts are not found, but scientists strive to
produce them. So the "reality effect" of facts is constructed. "Reality cannot
be used to explain why a statement becomes a fact, since it is only after it has
become a fact that the effect of reality is obtained" (p. 180). This is the reason
then why Latour and Woolgar do not talk about reality, but prefer to speak of
stabilizing a scientific fact as a statement, a proposition. When in the research
process a fact stabilizes, a bifurcation takes place: "On the one hand, it is a set
of words which represents a statement about an object. On the other hand, it
corresponds to an object in itself which takes on a life of its own" (p. 176).
Latour and Woolgar do not deny that in this process researchers are manip-
ulating matter, but the acceptance of a statement about this matter as a
scientific fact is based on the constructed consensus.
Latour and Woolgar also point to the "agonistic field" (p. 237) in which
these constructions are located. As much as possible scientists try to get rid of
"modalities which qualify a given statement" ( . . . ) . "An advantage of the
notion of agonistic is that it both incorporates many characteristics of social
conflict (such as disputes, forces, and alliance) and explains phenomena
hitherto described in epistemological terms (such as proof, fact, and validity)"
(p. 237). Negotiations about what constitutes a demonstration or a replication
in a certain setting, or what makes a good "biological assay," are not in any
way different from the discussions between politicians, judges, and lawyers.
The psychological or personal evaluations of the various parties are never the
sole issue at stake. The central focus is always on the force of the argument
("the solidity of the argument").
According to Latour and Woolgar construction and the notion of agonistic
are not undermining the power of scientific facts; one should avoid a relativ-
istic interpretation and use of these concepts. For this reason Latour and
Woolgar point to the process of materialization or reification. As soon as a
statement stabilizes in the agonistic field, it becomes part of the implicit, the
"tacit" skills or the material equipment of other laboratories. It is reintro-
_i
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duced in the form of a machine, inscription, plan, skill, routine, presupposi-
tion, deduction, program, and so on. In sum: "The result of the construction of
a fact is that it appears unconstructed by anyone" (p. 240).''
Collins's work concurs nicely with the views held by Latour and Woolgar.
However, Collins goes much further in elaborating the concept of replication
(Collins 1985; see also Collins, 1975, 1981). He tries to reverse the discussion
about replication in showing that replicability is not an axiomatical term with
which to start a discussion, but that replication too must be seen as the
outcome of process of negotiation.
The actual replicability of a phenomenon is only a cause of its being seen as
replicable in the same way as the colour of emeralds is the cause of their
greenness. Rather the belief in the replicability of a new concept or discovery
comes hand in hand with the entrenching of the corresponding new elements in
the conceptual/institutional network. This network is the fabric of scientific life.
Replicability... turns out to be as much a philosophical and sociological puzzle
as the problem of induction rather than a simple and straightforward test of
certain knowledge. It is crucial to separate the simple idea of replicability from
the complexities of its practical accomplishment. (Collins, 1985, p. 19)6
According to Collins, the notion "isomorphic copy," that is, repeating an
experiment "similar in every knowable, and readily achievable, significant
respect" (Collins, 1985, p. 170), is problematic because of the conceptual
problems that are connected with the term "the same" (see Collins, 1985, pp.
38,170; see also Popper's remarks on this topic earlier). For this reason Collins
argues for what he refers to as the enculturation model of replication. What is
considered as a "working" (and therefore in the discussion a decisive) experi-
ment is, according to Collins, the outcome of a process of negotiation between
researchers who form a "community of skills." Implicit statements about the
nature of the discovered effect in the experiment can also play a role in such
a process of negotiation.
A fine example of Collins' enculturation thesis of replication is given by
Draaisma in his reconstruction of the socalled "Benveniste-affair" (Draaisma,
5Latour and Woolgar add: 'The result of rhetorical persuasion in the agonistic field is that
participants are convinced that they have not been convinced; the result of materialization a
that people can swear that material considerations are only minor components of the thought
process; the result of the investment of credibility, is that participants can claim that economics
and beliefs are in no way related to the solidity of science; as to circumstances, they simply vanish
from accounts, being left to political analysis than to an appreciation of the hard and solid world
of facts!" (p. 230).
'"(Mïost published results cannot be easily re-generated, or validated—a fact which may be
surprising to the outsider. Hence what is selected will not depend on the evaluation of a product
in itself; instead, it depends on whether a result Hts into the framework of a current undertaking
and works out successfully in instrumental manipulation" (Knorr, 1977, p. 689).
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1989). In 1988, according to Draaisma, Benveniste et al. published an article
in Nature which contained the empirically corroborated statement (so he said)
that even in an extreme dilution an allergen keeps its biological efficacy de-
spite the fact that, theoretically speaking, the dilution no longer contains any
molecule of the original substance. Although not explicitly stated, one of the
main premises of homeopathy was here at stake. In describing the way in
which a research group established by Nature carried out a "replication on the
spot," Draaisma shows that although such a type of replication succeeds in
circumventing some of the difficulties of replicating research, the research
process is best typified as a negotiation process, even with respect to the
research outcomes (as distinguished from the more general research conclu-
sions).
Having the same people who carried out the "first" study carry out the
replication in Benveniste's own laboratory did away with the problem of
giving an exhaustive enumeration of instructions. Because of the fact that the
same laboratory was used, and the same materials, techniques, and instru-
ments as in the "first" study, differences between the "first" and the "second"
study could not be ascribed to these factors. Before carrying out the research,
consensus was reached on the precise way of carrying out the experiments—
and this was of special importance—on the meaning of possible outcomes, so
that the experiments themselves, when carried out, would be decisive (cf.
Draaisma, 1989, p, 102).
Because the classical ontology is not sound (white or black crows do not
exist, only crows that are taken to be black or white, which means that the
central question is what is taken as black and what is taken as white) this variety
of replication (on the same spot and with the same experimenters, etc.) shows
that in the end, even in the case of an exact replication, decisions have to made
by negotiation. The process of negotiation has to establish what counts and
what does not count as a satisfactory—and in the end—a decisive experiment.
Even a case of "replication on the spot," carried out by the original
experimenters and with a preestablished consensus on procedures and the
meaning of the conceivable results, does not necessarily guarantee agree-
ment, is shown by Draaisma in a reconstruction of an "on the spot replication"
instigated by Scientific American in 1923, of research on the power of psychic
mediums. Although everything was done to rule out possible disagreement in
advance, the editor of Scientific American, Bird, and the famous magician
Houdini could not come to a unanimous conclusion. From this we may
conclude that disciplined "on the spot replication" increases the possibility of
reaching consensus but does not guarantee it (cf. Draaisma, 1989, p. 104).
A "Realistic" Problem
With constructivism we have again a case of "methodology without episte-
mology." We even might call the constructivist position a radicalization
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of the Kuhnian ideas, because arguments against a traditional epistemological
interpretation of the process of gathering scientific knowledge are given
much more explicitly. One of the main arguments is that we cannot use
"reality" as an object that can be relied on and referred to by the knowing
subject because "reality" is considered to be the outcome of the "settlement of
a dispute" and cannot, therefore, be used to settle the dispute while it lasts. A
similar view is held on replication: Belief in the replicability of research
outcomes must be established step by step, it cannot be used as an irrefutable
axiom.
Seen from a methodological perspective, constructivism fits actual scien-
tific research practice very well in which—as we have seen—disputes about
research outcomes and their significance for research conclusions take a
central place. We have also seen that in scientific practice experiments never
speak for themselves, nor do they automatically lead to specific conclusions.
This "fit" is no wonder, seeing as the origin of constructivism lies in empirical
research of scientific practice. However, the main characteristic of construc-
tivism is—in our opinion—also its main problem. Because constructivism is
"methodology without epistemology," it leaves the scientist empty-handed
with respect to the epistemological significance of his research outcomes and
the conclusions reached on the basis of them. It is no wonder, then, that
constructivism is often criticized for its idealistic tendencies and implications.
Not only critics are aware of this danger; constructivists themselves do
their utmost to avoid such an interpretation of their position. For example,
Latour and Woolgar are careful to stress that they do not deny that experi-
menters manipulate matter. And although they state on the one hand that
reality is the outcome of a process of negotiation, they add at once: "We do
not wish to say that facts do not exist nor that there is no such thing as reality.
In this simple sense our position is not relativist. Our point is that out-
there-ness is the consequence of scientific work rather than its cause (Latour
& Woolgar, 1979, pp. 180-182). According to Latour and Woolgar science
does not aim at constructing "reality" but at stabilizing statements (cf. Latour
& Woolgar. 1979, p. 180). This means that the set of stabilized statements "fills
up," as it were, the constructivist concept of "Reality."
It must be noted that in their defense of their position Latour and Woolgar
use the concept "reality" in two different ways: a constructivist one ("reality"
as the outcome of a process of negotiation) and a "realistic" one ("reality as
such," about which we are informed that its existence is not denied). When
they speak about "reality" or "matter" in a constructivist sense, they do not
refer to some existence outside of us, but to the set of statements, the
collection of facts about which, at this moment, consensus has been reached.
Of course this set of statements can be used to test other statements. But
it must not be forgotten that this is not a confrontation of a statement
with "reality-outside-of-us," but with "reality-as-viewed-at-this-moment-with-
respect-to-the-present-state-of-our-knowledge."
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In fact, the defense strategy that Latour and Woolgar use is a disguised form
of subject-object dualism; Latour and Woolgar ward off their critics by
referring to the existence of "facts" and the existence of "such a thing as
reality." In spite of the constructivist declaration of intent to provide an
adequate way of talking about "materiality," the remark cited above shows
that, when the problem is discussed, Latour and Woolgar fall back on a rather
unreflective use of dualistic epistemology in which the relationship between
"facts" and "such a thing as reality" on the one side and the constructivist
concept of "reality" on the other remains unclear.
This means that for the moment constructivism brings the discussion only
one step further. Although it gives an account of replication that is more in
agreement with scientific practice, it does not succeed in doing away totally
and radically with the epistemological presuppositions of either the received
view or Popper. To be able to take this second step we are in need of a more
adequate view of the concept of "reality"; that is, a view without dualistic
epistemological presuppositions. Only then might we be able to give an
answer along constructivist lines on our "pivotal question" about the
epistemic status of replication.
THREE FORMS OF REALISM
In recent times the philosophy of science has seen renewed attention paid to
questions about the "reality" of (scientific) knowledge. Such different philos-
ophers as Van Fraassen, Salmon, and Harre have all tried to develop a more
adequate realistic position than "standard" realism (cf. Radder, 1988). In this
section we briefly discuss two forms of this "new" realism—Van Fraassen's
constructive empiricism and Radder's referential realism—in order to see
whether their ideas can further our discussion. Then we introduce John
Dewey's transactional realism.
Constructive Empiricism
Van Fraassen tries to solve the problem of realism by making a distinction
between knowledge claims that refer to observables and knowledge claims
that refer to nonobservables. His suggestion is that only the first are relevant
for the relation between knowledge (science) and reality. Apart from the fact
that Van Fraassen tries to found the validity of knowledge on something
outside knowledge (the epistemic status of which remains unclear), the main
problem is why we should restrict the epistemic (and the realistic) significance
of scientific knowledge only to what is observable. Why, we can ask, is
observation with the naked eye better and more real than observation with,
for example, a contact lens? (cf. Radder, 1989). Furthermore, we have seen
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that even what is observable does not always (or maybe: never) speak for
itself. Even on the elementary level of research results the significance of the
results has to be established by negotiation.
Referential Realism
With Radder we find a more sophisticated position, called referential realism.
Contrary to the usual practice, Radder does not lay stress on theory but on
experiment. Based on the distinction made by Habermas between objectivity
(the objectivity of experiences only guarantees the identity of the objects of
experience in the manifold of possible interpretations) and truth (the truth or
falsity of statements is dependent on a consensus on the validity of interpre-
tations and theories; a consensus that has to be reached anew in every case;
(cf. Habermas, 1973, 1982), Radder wants to maintain the idea of knowledge
as referring to a human-independent reality, but at the same time he rejects
both the idea that theories depict such a reality and the idea that subsequent
theories do this job either more accurately or adequately. For this Radder
proposes the following criterion of reference: "The descriptive terms occur-
ring in the theoretical description of an experimental situation refer to
elements of a domain in human-independent reality, if the material realiza-
tion of this experimental situation is possible in a reproducible manner"
(Radder, 1988, p. 102).
Radder's main stress is on the "material realization" of experiments. In
order to guarantee that a material realization can be effected independently
of specific theories (and solve the problem of incommensurability), Radder
introduces the layperson. If two competing theoreticians succeed in in-
structing laypersons, in everyday terms, to carry out an experiment (i.e., can
accomplish a material realization of the experiment), both theoreticians have
a commensurable starting point for their theoretical descriptions and expla-
nations. When it has been shown that such experiments are repeatable, we
can be certain, according to Radder, that the terms in both theoretical
descriptions refer to independent existing entities in a certain domain. The
material realization, however, does not say anything about the adequacy of
the description of those entities. This means, according to Radder, that "we
can say of terms in scientific propositions that they refer to elements in a
human-independent reality, but not that these propositions describe reality as
it is 'in itself (approximately or not). Thus this kind of realism implies
reference, but not correspondence, picturing, reflection, representation or
something like that" (Radder, 1988, p. 102). If, from the perspective of two
competing theories, reference has been established, we can also conclude
that co-reference has been established. The theoretical terms in both theories
refer to a reality which is independent both of theories and of men.
The advantages of Radder's referential realism are found in his suggestions
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for solving both the problems of incommensurability and co-reference. But
because of the fact that Radder bases his criterion of reference on replicability
and actual replication, bis ideas cannot make a contribution to our present
discussion. In Radder's referential realism replication is used as a primitive
term, which serves as an argument for reference, while earlier we stressed
the fact that a replication is not the beginning of a scientific discussion but the
outcome of it. This means that questions about the status of replication and
replicability cannot be answered by Radder's realism.
Apart from the formal point that Radder's realism does not forward our
present discussion, his rather uncritical use of the concepts of "replication"
and "replicability" also indicates that other more substantial problems might
be encountered with his referential realism.
Transaction^ Realism
The same cannot be said of John Dewey's transactional realism (Sleeper,
1986), because he does not make use of a dualistic epistemology. It was
precisely this—as we have seen—that was the main problem for construc-
tivism, as a consequence of which the reproach of idealism could only be
defended by a form of "standard realism." In our opinion Dewey's transac-
tional realism points a way out of this epistemological dilemma. It provides us
with a different line of approach, one in which a more adequate interpretation
of the concept "materiality," and the concept "reality," comes within reach.
We will not present Dewey as having all the answers to the methodological
and epistemological problems of the replication debate. But we will argue
that Dewey's ideas can help supplement the methodological ideas of con-
structivism with a consistent epistemological position so that a better relation
between methodology and epistemology can be established.
The most important characteristic of Dewey's epistemology is that from the
outset he does not postulate any dualisms, and especially not the dualism of a
knowing mind over and against "the world." Instead, Dewey starts by
stressing the continuity of man and nature and expresses the view that
knowing is a process that takes place inside nature. He characterizes his
monistic, "transactional" approach as a procedure "in which is asserted the
right to see together, extensionally and durationally, much that is talked
about conventionally as if it were composed of irreconcilable separates"
(Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 69). In separating subject and object, mind and
matter, and by viewing knowledge as a process which takes place outside of
nature, the dualist arrives inevitably at such problems as "how it is possible to
know at all; how an outer world can effect an inner mind" and "how the acts
of mind can reach out and lay hold of objects defined in antithesis to them"
(Dewey, 1958, p. 10). From a transactional perspective the question is not
how subject and object can reach each other in the process of knowing, but
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"how and why the whole is distinguished into subject and object, nature and
mental operations" (Dewey, 1958, p. 9).
Dewey elucidates this process by introducing a combination of three
concepts: "transaction," "experience," and "knowledge." The concept of
"experience" is used for those transactions, those transactional processes, in
which there is a living organism which is bound to its environment in a double
way (cf. Dewey, 1980a, p. 7). "The organism acts in accordance with its own
structure, simple or complex, upon its surroundings. As a consequence the
changes produced in the environment react upon the organism and its
activities. The living creature undergoes, suffers, the consequences of its
behavior. This close connection between doing and suffering or undergoing
forms what we call experience" (Dewey, 1948, p. 86). According to Dewey we
can speak of knowledge if the relationships between "doing and undergoing,"
between actions and the consequences of the actions, are formulated by
means of symbols (cf. Dewey, 1939, p. 532). This means that "knowing is not
the act of an outside spectator but of a participator inside the natural and
social scene ... the true object of knowledge resides in the consequences of
directed action" (Dewey, 1980b, p. 196). What, we must now ask, is the exact
status of this object?
According to Dewey, objects must not be seen as "being in a way marked
out by nature always and for all beings" (Dewey, 1975a, p. 78). Also our
perception of objects is not the beginning of our knowledge but the provi-
sional outcome of it. Objects-as-known are not independent of the process of
knowing. For Dewey this means that it is absurd to have the intention of
saying something about "the nature of things" before, and apart from,
"experimental operations," "inquiry," "directed action" (cf. Dewey, 1939, p.
546). This also means that the "objects as they are for us" change with the
development of our judgments and theories. Contrary to what is said in some
realistic positions, progress, change, and development of our knowledge are
not processes in which new judgments, new predicates are affixed to an
already existing object. The object of knowledge is no "antecedent being,"
"antecedent reality," or "antecedent existence" with "antecedent proper-
ties." It is precisely at this point, Dewey holds, that in spite of their opposite
points of view "objective idealism and sensational empiricism" meet each
other by presuming that
reflective thought... has its test in antecedent reality as that is disclosed in
some nonreflective immediate knowledge. Its validity depends upon the possi-
bility of checking its conclusions with the terms of such prior immediate
knowledge.... The basic premiss is also shared by realists. The essence of their
position is that reflective inquiry is valid as it terminates in apprehension of that
which already exists. (Dewey, 1980b, pp. 109, 110)
According to Dewey it is also not adequate to presume that with every change
in our knowledge a new object, totally independent of the old, comes into
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being (cf. Dewey, 1975b). In contrast to these ideas, Dewey holds that "the
object of knowledge is eventual, that is, it is an outcome of directed experi-
mental operations, instead of something in sufficient existence before the act
of knowing" Pewey, 1980b, 171). The object of knowledge is the conse-
quence of acting experimentally. That this does not imply an idealistic
position is made clear in the following remark: "When we are trying to make
out the nature of a confused and unfamiliar object, we perform various acts
with a view to establishing a new relationship to it, such as will bring to light
new qualities that will aid in understanding it" (Dewey, 1980b, p. 87). The
establishment of such a new relationship is, of course, not intended as a
relationship between an independently existing object and an independently
existing subject. The new relationship is the outcome of a transactional
process of action. The object, or more precisely, the concept "object" that is
the result of this process, is not viewed by Dewey in terms of institution (i.e.,
idealism) or predication (i.e., realism) but in terms of reconstruction.
The main advantage of Dewey's position in regard to constructivism is that
it provides us with an epistemological account of the way in which we might
see knowledge as the outcome of our "transaction," our "manipulations," an
account which avoids the danger of falling back on idealism. By placing
knowing "back" into nature, by viewing it as a process that takes place within
nature and not as something outside of it, Dewey succeeds in maintaining (or
from the perspective of the history of philosophy: reestablishing) the bond
between knowledge and reality.
Although Dewey provides us with an epistemological account, this does
not mean that a methodology can be based on this epistemology. An impor-
tant consequence of Dewey's position is that there is no longer any difference
between epistemology and methodology. From a transactional perspective
we do not need a separate method to bridge the epistemological gap between
subject and object. Methodology is knowing-in-action; the one is inseparable
from the other, and neither has primacy. From a Deweyan perspective we
must see method, "logical form," as something originating in processes of
knowing, of inquiry (cf. Dewey, 1938). We can never start with an episte-
mology and build our methodology on it; we can only improve our method-
ology step by step in the very processes of knowing and of inquiry. This, as we
have seen, is in perfect agreement with constructivism.
CONCLUSIONS
The question that has to be answered now is whether the concepts of
"replication" and "replicability" can still be used in scientific and philoso-
phical discourse in the light of the developments in the philosophy of science
sketched earlier—and if so, how?
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In the introduction we made a distinction between a "methodological" and
an "epistemological" interpretation of the demand for replicability. Our first
conclusion is that, in the light of the foregoing discussion, the methodological
interpretation of the demand for replicability is still worthwhile. Both the
interviews of Mulkay and Gilbert and the research carried out by Latour and
Woolgar show that in scientific practice discussion about the research results
is the most important and most fundamental activity. However, in order to
conduct such a discussion meaningfully, it is of utmost importance that the
genesis of both the research results and the research conclusions is— in
principle— retraceable for fellow researchers. The reconstruction of the
"Benveniste-affair" makes clear that even when this demand has been ful-
filled, nothing has been said about the argumentative force of the research
outcome, which also has to be established argumentatively— a process in
which varied replication can play a significant role.
As we have seen, replicability can also be taken as a sign that the research
results tell us something about "Reality." Here it is often argued that if it is
possible to repeat an experiment with the same outcome, truth— viewed as a
correspondence with "Reality"— has been attained. This "ontological" inter-
pretation of replicability can be found both in the "received view" and with
Popper, albeit in the last instance in a methodological "disguise."
It is exactly at this point that constructivism reverses the case. Here
"World" and "Reality" do not function as something given, but as the out-
come of a process of negotiation. What counts as "real" or as "replication" or
as "replicable" is not the starting point of the negotiation but the eventual
outcome. "(R)eality fis) the consequence of the settlement of a dispute, rather
than its cause" (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 236). Following Collins we can
make the same statement about replication. This construct! vistic approach is
an improvement on the traditional point of view. First it is in better agree-
ment with scientific practice; secondly it seems to do away with a naive
"mirroring" epistemology. The main problem, however, was that construc-
tivism presented us with a "methodology without epistemology." By focusing
exclusively on the methodological aspects of scientific practice, constructiv-
ists were no longer able to say anything about the epistemic status of the
conclusions of science and the role of replication in the discussion. By means
of Dewey's transactional realism it becomes possible to take out the episte-
mological "sting" still remaining in the methodological "flesh" of construc-
tivism.
The main significance of Dewey's perspective for the discussion about
replication is, in our opinion, what one might call his "situalization" of
knowledge. From a Deweyan perspective we can speak of knowledge when
the relations between actions and the consequences of these actions are
formulated by means of symbols. By determining the consequences of spe-
cific actions, those actions acquire significance. This leads to a situation in
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which specific actions start to refer to events in the future. The consequences
of actions function "as necessary tests of the validity of propositions, provided
these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to resolve the
specific problem evoking the operations" (Dewey, 1938, p. iv). However,
knowledge of the relationship between actions and their consequences is not
simply given, but must be realized anew in every case. We have a succession
of "inquiries" with no beginning and no ending. The outcome of one process
of inquiry, called "warranted assertibility" (Dewey, 1938), is introduced in the
next "inquiry" and has to prove its relevance for the problem at hand in that
process of inquiry. This means that knowledge, or warranted assertibility—
viewed as the outcome of one process of inquiry—is strictly situational,
strictly bound to that specific situation. Viewed against the background of
Dewey's monistic transactional realism, this implies that although the "war-
ranted assertibility" acquired in one situation is strictly bound to that situa-
tion, it does have an epistemic significance. It does tell us something about the
relationship between our actions and the consequences of those actions in
that situation. Whether the same action will have the same result in another
situation cannot be said with total certainty; it has to be established anew
each time.
From a methodological perspective, one of the main tasks of replication is
to test the "robustness" of the original result for time-space and other varia-
tions (chapter 3). This can always be done with two different objectives: to
establish a certain relationship with a menindependent reality, or to see if the
results reached so far can also be used in other situations. In the last option we
meet the aspect of generality of transactional knowledge. Here one goes
further than the strictly individual, strictly situational. and strictly unique
character of the research results reached; the question then posed is what is
the meaning of this knowledge, this "warranted assertibility" for other situa-
tions? Is there still a relationship between specific actions and specific conse-
quences in other situations? Methodologically seen, the strategy of "varied
replication" can inform us about the usefulness of these actions in terms of
antecedent and consequence. The strategy of "on the spot replication" seems
to be the most adequate way of establishing the relationship between ante-
cedent and consequence as strictly as possible.
This leads to our second conclusion. Besides the "methodological" inter-
pretation of replication, we can, on the basis of a combined perspective of
constructivism and transactional realism, uphold the view that the "episte-
mological" interpretation of replication also makes sense. This is not because
actual replication gives us absolute certainty about "reality outside of us," but
because the "warranted assertibility," the "knowledge" acquired in one
specific situation might be found useful in another. This, however, is not an
automatism, but has to be established anew for every case.
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PART II
The Methods Of
Replication
Explicit replications indeed appear to be very rare in the social and behav-
ioral sciences. Siegfried (Chapter 7) found 277 replication studies, published in
the major psychological journals during 1983 to 1988. In experimental and
clinical psychology, about 10 replications per year may be expected, whereas
in child psychology this rate drops to about 5 per year (Siegfried, Chapter 7).
In Part II of this volume, three chapters deal with the issue of replication in a
different but interrelated way.
Siegfried stresses the epistemological differences between the natural and
social/behavioral sciences. He doubts whether we should strive for more
replications. In the natural sciences, experiments conducted 300 years ago
still can be replicated easily. But social reality is constantly in flux, people
change their behavior and attitudes because of historical events, or because
of the influence of research results. The "same" experiment never can use
exactly the same subjects and instruments, and a changing reality may be the
reason many of the replication studies yield disappointing and diverging
results. Siegfried emphasizes the complexity of the replication issue, and
uncovers the ambivalent status of replication in the social and behavioral
sciences.
Fiske (Chapter 5) also stresses the differences in methodological and epis-
temological status of the natural and behavioral sciences, but his approach
aims at a concrete and feasible solution for the replication problem. De-
parting from the famous theory of the multitrait-multimethod matrix, Fiske
shows us how several different kinds of method effects exist that preclude
exact replication of research results. Method effects come into existence
when (a) the conceptualization of the construct implies different observa-
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tional categories compared to the measure used to operationalize the con-
struct, (b) when subjects react to the intrusive aspects of measures which are
irrelevant for the operationalization of the construct, and (c) when measuring
operations have impact on the person generating the measurements. Fiske
formulates several useful guidelines to enhance the probability of reproduc-
ible results, related to the influence of method effects. A clear-cut definition of
basic concepts can prevent implicit shifts between different measures aiming
at operationalizing the same concept. In accordance with the idea of a
multitrait-multimethod matrix, Fiske also emphasizes the necessity of a
built-in replication in every single study: Researchers should use at least two
different measures for the same concept to check the stability of the outcome.
And last but not least: Method effects can be diminished in using unobtrusive
procedures which prevent subjects from reacting to being studied.
Fiske considers meta-analysis to be a major methodological innovation to
trace problems in replication of research results. Because different character-
istics, or methods, of replication studies can be considered as variables
influencing their outcome, meta-analysis may uncover systematic variations
in results depending on the way in which the original studies where con-
ducted. Lytton (Chapter 6), however, shows that meta-analysis has to be
considered as a study that is not by definition replicable itself. In describing
his meta-analysis of sex effects in parents' socialization practices, Lytton
shows how many decisions have to be taken in conducting a meta-analysis.
For example, an important problem to be solved is how to decide what studies
will be included in a meta-analysis: Some studies using the same concepts
may operationalize those concepts extremely differently, and inclusion in the
same meta-analysis may not seem feasible. A series of studies using different
concepts, however, may in fact be focusing on the same phenomenon, and
therefore be considered valuable replications. Lytton acts like a participant
observer doing meta-analysis, and uncovers hidden assumptions and implicit
decisions. His report of the pitfalls of meta-analysis makes clear that is indeed
an important tool in discovering replicable results. But meta-analysis should
not be an exception to the rule that all research must be replicated. The
meta-analysis cannot act as the final judge in scientific discourse. Meta-
analysis is just a starting point for another round of replications aiming at
testing the robustness of the original meta-analytic results (see Chapter 3).
Nevertheless, meta-analysis may represent the best evidence we have on a
topic at a certain point in time, provided that it has been carefully done and
allows—at least in principle—for replication of all steps conducted.
The three chapters show different solutions to the problem of replication:
Fiske points out that the multitrait-multimethod matrix can be conceived as
a replicability index; Lytton concentrates on quantitative meta-analysis as a
tool to test the replicability of separate studies on the same topic; and
Siegfried emphasizes the need for conceptual clarity and theoretical analysis
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in paving the way for replication studies. The three authors, however, have
the same stance toward their own approach: They do only suggest that their
approach is one way of clarifying the issue of replicability, and they are all
convinced that other perspectives are valuable as well. In this respect, the
three chapters supplement each other in making clear that there is no single
solution to the problem of replicability: Different approaches should be used,
and if convergence is being reached, we may be convinced that this outcome
reflects the most recent state of the art in a specific domain.
I
CHAPTERS
Do Our Methods Work for or
Against Us?*
Donald W. Fiske
Department of Psychology
University of Chicago
Forty to fifty years ago, psychological research in the United States was
dominated by the study of rats learning mazes. The topic seemed very
promising: Psychologists could work experimentally and objectively on the
important problem of how responses are learned, how behavior is changed.
But then something happened and the amount of research on rats decreased
rapidly. One colleague thinks it was because the research failed to generate
any new perspectives or stimulating questions. I believe that psychologists
began to realize that findings holding for rats in mazes did not necessarily
hold for other learning conditions and for other mammals, such as human
beings. In particular, knowledge about rats learning in mazes did not help us
to understand children learning in school or at home. As Beach (1950) pointed
out, psychology in this country was moving toward a science of rat learning,
not a general science of behavior.
One interpretation of this historical episode is that the wrong method had
been chosen—using method in a broad sense. If psychologists wanted to
understand how children learn, they should not have done their research on
rats. Psychology, however, had not yet realized that psychological findings
are usually specific to the particular method used to generate them (Fiske,
1986). Changes in the subjects (or at least in the subject population), in the
context, in the stimuli, in the instructions, in the observers, or in the way in
which the data are generated—almost any change—is likely to alter the
•1 «in indebted to Alan P. Fiske, Barbara P. Puke. Susan T. Fiske. Louis Fogg, Kathryn F.
Mason, and three anonymous reviewers for their incisive comments on an earlier draft of this
chapter.
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findings to some degree. As a consequence, most findings cannot be repli-
cated exactly, and certainly not with the precision typical of research in the
natural sciences. And if we cannot closely replicate our findings, we cannot
generalize them with much confidence.
In a very wise article, Jerome Kagan (1988, p. 619) wrote: "The meaning of
psychological terms, like the meaning of all scientific concepts, is affected by
the source of the evidence. If the mechanisms mediating the observations
generated by one procedure are different from the mechanisms operating in
another procedure, one should not use the same conceptual term to summa-
rize both corpora" or sets of evidence. If two procedures generate different
data and different findings, it seems safe to conclude that the mechanisms are
different in the two cases. But what are these mechanisms? We know very
little about the processes going on when we measure behavior in psycholog-
ical research. To illustrate his point, Kagan discusses procedures for assessing
recognition memory and also measures for aggression: Is aggression as
inferred from a child's striking a toy clown the same aggression as that
inferred from peer nomination techniques? (See also Kagan, 1989, chap. 1.)
Providing another example, Gottman (1977) points out that two entirely
different literatures on social isolation have been generated, one based on
low frequencies of interaction with peers and the other using low level of peer
acceptance, as derived from sociometrie measures. He reports that there is no
relationship between the interaction and the sociometrie measures. Similarly,
Parker and Asher (1987) note that, in studying children with difficulties in
peer relationships, findings from studies using sociometrie measures of peer
acceptance may not generalize to children identified by assessments of social
behavior (see also Hymel & Rubin, 1985).
Developmental psychologists recognize the significant effects associated
with perspective: People in different roles see children differently. In their
review of informant agreement on behavioral and emotional problems,
Achenbach, McConaughy, and Howell (1987) report a mean correlation of .60
between pairs of informants with similar relationships to the child (e.g., two
parents or two teachers), but a mean of only .28 between pairs with different
relationships (e.g., a parent and a teacher). Pairs involving an informant and
the self show slightly less agreement (.22). They note that, even within one
perspective, different informants are likely to have different effects on a child,
and hence more than one informant should, if possible, be used for each
perspective. The need for avoiding just a single source and a single procedure
in the assessment of childhood pyschopathology is recognized by West and
Prinz (1987) who report in their review on parental alcoholism and child
psychopathology that half the studies used only one source or perspective
(e.g., teacher) and more than half did the assessment by only one procedure
(e.g., an interview). The significance of differences in perspective is illustrated
by the research of Cowan, Pederson, Babigian, Izzo, and Trost (1973), who
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found that peer judgments predicted later mental health problems while an
array of other measures had no statistically significant results.
The problem of method effects is pandemic, critical, and general in psy-
chology. Psychologists are only beginning to recognize how large and wide-
spread the problem is. Although such awareness constitutes a big step
forward, it does not solve the problem. Method effects are certainly still with
us. For example, the papers at a recent conference on decision making
(Hogarth, 1990) are hill of reported method effects, under such labels as
question framing effects and response mode bias. Method effects are clearly
present in research in developmental psychology (see Bank, Dishion, Skin-
ner, & Patterson, 1990; Kagan, 1988). Have you seen any instances of
multitrait- multimethod matrices that approximated the ideal, that is, showed
evidence of only minimal effects from methods? Thirty years after the
Campbell-Fiske paper (1959), the problem of method effects is still unre-
solved. Will soft psychology be held back indefinitely by this problem? (Cf.
Fiske, 1986, pp. 72-77.)
But just what are method effects? The next major sections will discuss that
term and the conceptual and empirical identification of such effects. The last
part of this chapter examines what can be done by developmental and other
researchers who take the problem of method effects seriously. The important
role of judgment is indicated throughout the chapter. All researchers have to
identify and deal with whatever method effects they judge to be present in the
data from their own investigations.
But before looking at method effects more closely, we need to consider the
implicit philosophy underlying their conceptualization and the kinds of phe-
nomena studied by psychologists. In physical science, there are phenomena
that can be measured by several discrete methods with essentially perfect
agreement among the obtained measurements. Replication is exact. In con-
trast, many of the phenomena of interest to soft psychology (e.g., much of
personality, social psychology, and developmental psychology) are largely
the interpretations of physical events or the products of the cognitive pro-
cessing of experiences. Such phenomena are judgments, judgments that
depend on and vary with the judge, and also depend heavily on the particular
circumstances in which each judgment is made.
So from a philosophical viewpoint, I believe that there is a physical reality
out there, a reality for which we can construct conceptual pictures, bodies of
theory that enable us to achieve an understanding of that reality. Insofar as
you and I and most educated people can comprehend contemporary physical
theory, we accept it, we agree on it.
In the domain of human behavior and experience, there are many phe-
nomena with a physical aspect (including biochemical and physiological
processes within the category of physical): for example, nonverbal behavior
in face-to-face interactions, asymmetry in cerebral functioning, consistent re
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sponses after variable-interval reinforcement. These areas seem fairly free of
method effects; measurements here do not seem to be dependent on infer-
ence and judgment. I think our understanding of phenomena in these areas
will continue to improve over time.
There are also phenomena that are personal, that occur within the person:
private experiences and feelings, cognitive interpretations of these experi-
ences, judgments about the behavior of others. Each of us has such experi-
ences and cognitions, and we assume that others also have them. There have
been a multitude of ways of construing them, ranging from variables derived
from everyday language to the esoteric terminology of each psychoanalytic
group. We have a plethora of constructs and will probably continue to have
them. Rarely is a construct completely discarded; new constructs are pro-
posed every day. These new terms—and the old ones—may enrich our
experience, but do they further our scientific understanding of these inter-
pretive phenomena? It is in this part of psychology, in trying to measure
constructs pertaining to these phenomena, that method effects seem so
strong and so crippling.
Cronbach (1975, p. 126) concluded that "though enduring systematic the-
ories about man in society are not likely to be achieved, systematic inquiry
can realistically hope to make two contributions. One reasonable aspiration is
to assess local events accurately, to improve short-run control The other
reasonable aspiration is to develop explanatory concepts, concepts that will
help people use their heads" (cf. Cronbach, 1982, 1986). Although Cronbach
may well be right about the prospects for understanding "man in society," I
am still optimistic about other sets of psychological phenomena. We can
refine some of our present approaches to studying processes within the
human organism—not only neurological and physiological processes but also
cognitive ones, and we can find new, even more fruitful approaches. Taken
together, they should help us to achieve a better scientific understanding of
human behavior.
THE DEFINITION OF A METHOD EFFECT
A method effect is a systematic contribution to a set of measurements that is
confounding, intrusive, and not wanted. The source of the contribution is
identified as the process of measuring or some part of it. Not included here are
random error or error of measurement—that is, the residual variation after all
possible sources of systematic variance have been specified. Thus, a method
effect appears whenever we identify some systematic variance that is irrele-
vant to our purposes in making the measurements.
But what is relevant variance? That is up to the researcher to decide. For
example, someone studying self-presentation in children might use children's
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self-reports—perhaps their ratings of themselves. That investigator might
well decide that such self-ratings are entirely appropriate to the purposes of
the research. The fact that, in a study of self-presentation, children might
exaggerate positive attributes could be construed as part of the phenomena
being investigated, rather than as a potential defect in the technique. For that
investigator, the use of peer ratings, and perhaps even the use of clinician
assessments, would seem inappropriate because the peers' perceptions—and
even the clinicians'—might be biased by their personal perceptions of the
child based on their idiosyncratic interactions with that target person. That is,
ratings by peers or clinicians might be seen as showing method effects in this
case. In contrast, someone studying the social acceptance or rejection of
children by their peers might well believe that peer evaluations were the
method of choice (cf. Gottman, 1977) and that self-reports were not appro-
priate because they would introduce a method effect. Most of us would find
acceptable the judgments of these investigators.
Note that these two investigators might well put the same labels on the
variables they were measuring: perhaps "friendliness," "sensitivity to oth-
ers," or "leadership." But their use of the same labels would not mean that
they were studying the same constructs. "Friendliness as attributed to one-
self" is not equivalent to "friendliness as perceived by one's peers."
It is up to each investigator to define each construct that he or she is trying
to measure and to specify the conceptualization in adequate detail. Enough
elaboration must be provided to permit others to judge how well the investi-
gator's measuring procedures for that construct fit the conceptualization and
to what extent these procedures generate method effects. For example, a
single procedure may be condemned for getting at only part of the behavior
specified as relevant to the construct. Or a procedure may be of a kind that is
known to be susceptible to response sets. Although the conceptualization of a
variable is up to the researcher, it is also the responsibility of that researcher
to communicate that comprehensive definition to others. Similarly, although
a researcher is free to choose among available methods, readers of that
researcher's report are entitled to judge whether or not the chosen method is
likely to generate method effects. The type of method effect produced by
poor linkages between a construct and a measuring operation is widespread
in psychological research. But even the careful and comprehensive specifica-
tion of constructs, as in the definitions of needs by Murray (1938), may not
prevent people from creating individualistic measures. As a result, even
though derived from the same specifications and having the same labels for
the constructs, several techniques developed to assess Murray's needs are
clearly not measuring the same variables (Fiske, 1973).
Issues about specifying method effects thus raise questions about our
concepts: Should they be abstract and general or concrete and constrained? If
they are too open, they may be too loose, uncritically allowing a wide range
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of procedures to be employed in investigations of them. If they are defined
narrowly and if certain measuring operations are stated as required, then we
are in danger of approaching the absurd extreme form of operational defini-
tion in which each particular operation must have its own concept. Note that
there are problems of replication at both extremes. With broad concepts and
diverse measuring operations, measurements will not be replicated and
findings will often not be reproduced. At the other extreme, any replication of
measurements and reproducibility of findings would be within such tight
limits that we would not be able to reach the generalizations we seek.
Measurements for broad, loosely defined concepts are quite likely to be
confounded with method effects, but it is often difficult to pin them down. At
the other extreme, a concept that is defined precisely as that which the
measuring operation measures can be assessed without any concern for
method effects—there can be none, by definition. For concepts falling be-
tween these extremes, we regularly have problems with method effects.
In psychology, we obviously need concepts at several levels of abstraction,
including a fairly concrete level, and we need careful specification of the
relationships between the concepts. What we ultimately want is good repro-
ducibility of conclusions. To attain that, we need close replication of measure-
ments, something we can hope to achieve only if our conceptual framework
includes some simple and explicit low-level concepts (cf. Fiske, 1986).
In principle, then, a researcher can assert that no method effects are
present in his or her research since each concept is defined strictly in
operational terms, as that which its measuring procedure measures. In prac-
tice, however, some degree of construct-method incongruence seems almost
inescapable in psychological research. (Recall the earlier discussion of aggres-
sion and social isolation.) In addition to such incongruences, there are many
other sources and kinds of method effects.
Kinds of Method Effects. Although method effects are widespread, they
are often elusive because they appear in many forms, guises, or disguises.
Some exist because people react not only to whatever stimuli they encounter
in a given context but also to the fact that they are being measured. Most
specifications of our concepts do not say whether the subjects should know or
not know that they are being measured. (Test anxiety and evaluation appre-
hension are two exceptions.)
Then there is a whole set of effects associated with the dataproducer, the
person providing the responses from which numerical data are obtained.
That person may be either the subject to whom the data will be attached or an
observer. In either role, that person reacts to the instructions given for
responding, to the investigator running the research, to the content of the
measuring instrument or record form (both the stems and the response
format), and finally, in the case of the observer, to the target person whose
DO OUR METHODS WORK FOR OR AGAINST US? 103
behavior is being assessed. Thus, there are three main types of method
effects: (a) There are those associated with lack of congruence between the
behavior from which data are extracted and the behavior described or
implied in the conceptualization of the construct at which the measuring
procedure is aimed, (b) Other method effects are associated with the intrusive
consequences of imposing measuring operations on people, (c) Finally, some
effects are associated with the impact of the measuring operations themselves
on the person generating the measurements. (For a more extended discus-
sion, see Fiske [1987] in which the problem is approached in somewhat
different terms.)
At least for correlational and observational psychologists, part of the
problem may be that, when we think about and conceptualize behavior, we
tend to focus on behavior as it appears in the natural world, as if it were not
affected by being observed and measured. We have enough trouble pinning
down exactly what behavioral tendencies we are studying without adding the
complication of what such behavior would look like under the constraining
conditions of a measuring situation. Experimental psychologists may not face
this difficulty: They may think about the behavior that occurs in their
restricted context and what a planned manipulation will do to it.
There is another interesting difference. Throughout this chapter, we are
assuming that the correlational psychologist trying to assess a given concept
hopes that any change in method, made for convenience or economy, will not
seriously affect the measurement of that concept. In contrast, the experimen-
talist manipulates some aspect of the situation intentionally, expecting that
change to alter the measurements. In this approach, the dependent variable is
measured in two or more contexts, and when two experimentalists try to
employ the same manipulation, their two versions of it may differ—for
example, in the tone of voice in which an instruction is given. The correla-
tional psychologist may see the experimentalist as generating and measuring
some effects due to method or procedure. Meanwhile the latter may view the
correlational psychologist as naively expecting congruence between mea-
surements made under different conditions.
Those considerations bring out an apparent conflict between two norms or
ideals. In experimental psychology, the investigator is expected to describe
his or her procedures so that, at least in principle, another investigator could
replicate them and see if the first set of results could be reproduced. But I
would argue that it is not desirable for an investigator who is explicating a
conceptualization or a construct to delineate every minute detail of the
measuring procedure for that construct: As noted earlier, we do not want
each construct to refer only to a very particular and specific measuring
operation. The conflict, however, is more apparent than real. We certainly
want to have more than one method for measuring each of our concepts so
that we can try to determine whether each method is contributing systematic
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irrelevant variance. We also need to know the procedural details for each
published study so that we can decide how much light the findings shed on the
nature of and the interrelationships among the several concepts involved.
IDENTIFYING METHOD EFFECTS
Up to this point, we have been talking about method effects as two psychol-
ogists might discuss them over beer. We have said they exist, we have more
or less defined them, and we have said that they are common and wide-
spread. But suppose someone who has been listening interrupts and objects:
"All this talk is fine, but now show me a method effect and tell me how big it
is!" What should we do? Order three more beers?
To get at these effects, we would like to make a comparison, to say that, in
this set of measurements, there is no method effect but in that set of measure-
ments, there is such an effect. However, if one believes that method effects
are universal or nearly so, then one can get no baseline data, no comparison
data free from these effects. One can only say that the method effect here
looks larger than the method effect there.
Let's go back to the original paper on multitrait-multimethod matrices
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959). What it emphasized was the relatively high corre-
lations between measures made by the same method, in the monomethod
blocks, in contrast to the lower values for corresponding correlations in the
heteromethod blocks: When two traits or other properties are measured by
the same method, the correlation between them is bound to be higher than
the correlation when the two are measured by different methods. We stressed
the desirability of using methods that are as different as possible because it
was obvious even 30 years ago that two methods could have many features in
common, thus producing much the same method effects. For example, two
self-report measures might differ only in response format, with one having
the alternatives "Yes" and "No" while the other had "Yes," "?" and "No" so
the subject could express uncertainty or avoid making a commitment.
The position 1 take here is simply that the identification and the size
estimation of a method effect is a judgment, an appraisal of the evidence.
Since the Campbell and Fiske paper was published, many techniques have
been proposed for analyzing multitrait-multimethod matrices (see Marsh,
1988; Schmitt & Stults, 1986; Wothke, 1984). These are usually aimed at
identifying method factors or method effects and assessing them. Each of
these proposals seems to have important limitations. I agree with the conclu-
sion of the review by Marsh (1988, p. 580): "There is currently no well-
developed, generally accepted approach to the analysis of MTMM data." Does
this suggest that the trait-method unit (the particular procedure as applied to
the measurement of a given construct) identified in the original paper is an
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organic whole that cannot be dissected? Is a trait measured by method X
different from the "same" trait when measured by method Y? Is method Z
different when used to measure trait A and when used to measure trait B?
One can examine a multitrait-multimethod matrix as a set of results. In that
case, some statistical description may be useful for presenting or interpreting
the findings. One can also look at such a matrix to see what might be
improved in the next piece of research using those traits and those methods.
Especially for that purpose, I continue to believe that a great deal of informa-
tion can be obtained just by a thorough visual examination of the matrix. One
can usually see which traits or attributes are not being measured well by the
given methods and can judge whether the fault is in the methods or in the
construal of the attributes. Similarly, one can judge whether each method is
doing its task well or whether it is not discriminating among the attributes or
is yielding much the same information as another method, but in less reliable
form. At the very least, such an inspection of the matrix will provide a basis
for interpreting the results of any analytic procedures that nave been applied.
At this point, let us go back one step and ask "What is a method?" A method
is a set of conditions in which behavior is observed and measured. But
describing such a situation in full is about as difficult as defining a trait, an
attitude, or a value. We can identify and specify many features of a measuring
situation or method, but these are the external, objective aspects. We cannot
describe the internal states of the people being measured, and we cannot
even be sure what meanings they ascribe to such objective features of the
situation as the stimuli or items and the instructions. Although some method
effects from these sources may be inescapable, steps can usually be taken to
minimize them.
A method is a complex entity. Some aspects of it are obviously relevant to
measuring the variable being studied. Other aspects of it may be producing
intrusive method effects. Suppose we believe that a method effect is present
in some array of measurements: Can we identify the aspect or aspects of the
method that have generated that effect? Usually, we cannot just compare two
forms of a method, one with and one without a particular feature, to deter-
mine whether that feature has a predicted effect. What we have to do is to
compare the method with that feature and the method with a different feature
in its place, to see if the two features have different effects. For example, there
have to be instructions to the data producer. We can compare two different
sets of instructions but we cannot compare a set of instructions with no
instructions.
Some method effects seem dearcut. For example, a recent review of
cerebral lateralization asked whether cerebral specialization increases with
age (Hahn, 1987). The author concludes that five experimental paradigms (or
methods for studying the problem) agree that linguistic functions are local-
ized in the left hemisphere from birth on. In contrast, for functions lateralized
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in the right hemisphere, the results vary with the task: Some tasks show no
change over development, others do show changes. Here, then, is an instance
where results and conclusions vary with task or general method. Hahn also
notes that the observed asymmetries are readily affected by variations within
a given experimental paradigm, such as in the way that stimuli are presented,
and are also affected by such psychological factors as reporting biases.
Method effects are also reported in a review of sex differences in group
performance (Wood, 1987). When working either individually or in groups,
men have been found to outperform women—in tasks or settings that favor
men's interests and abilities over women's. This conclusion is hardly surpris-
ing. It is introduced here as yet another area in which the method—the task
and the setting—affects findings.
Wood's review is also pertinent because she employed meta-analysis, a
major methodological development that can help us investigate method
effects. Meta-analysis is a systematic quantitative type of literature review.
Unlike the typical qualitative review, a meta-analysis ordinarily lists all the
studies reviewed and gives the criteria used to select them. This makes it
possible for the reader to decide whether the reviewer's judgments were
appropriate. The results from the several studies are converted into a
common index and then summarized in various groupings. It is as though a
researcher published all the raw data and then indicated the statistical
analyses performed and the results obtained. Everything is explicit so that the
reader can follow the reviewer's argument closely.
The steps in a meta-analysis parallel those in a research study. A general
question is formulated and pertinent empirical data are compiled and
weighed. Then more qualified questions are posed and the data are re-
grouped to answer them. The obvious difference between a research study
and a meta-analysis is in our confidence in findings. We cannot place great
faith in the findings of any one piece of research, taken by itself. But if several
investigations study the same question and come up with essentially the same
answer, the replications can give us a high level of confidence in that answer.
If the replication is poor, that is, if the several answers show much variation,
then the reviewer must examine the published papers to find the source of
that variation, or devise a new empirical study to identify that source.
Meta-analysis is a tool, not a cure-all. It provides answers, but the value of the
answers depends on how insightful the reviewer's questions were.
Meta-analysis is important because it is the first comprehensive and sys-
tematic procedure for putting together empirical findings. We have a large
body of methodological techniques for planning and executing single re-
search studies but until now, we have had no systematic technique for
integrating the findings from several such studies. Such integration is at least
as important as the research itself (cf. Chapter 6).
Meta-analysis is a valuable tool for comparing and assessing method
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effects. When a number of studies have been done on the same topic, it is
possible to categorize them by method and see how the type of method
relates to the outcome. To illustrate, the authors of the classic monograph on
The Benefits of Psychotherapy (Smith, Glass, & Miller, 1980) classify outcome
measures according to the degree of reactivity, a variable including the
extent to which the client or the therapist could react to the measuring
procedure, thus influencing the data. They found that Grade Point Average,
physiological measures of stress such as the Galvanic Skin Response, and
blind ratings of adjustment (in which the rater did not know whether or not
the subject had had therapy) had the lowest effect sizes. (Effect size is a
standardized index of the effect of a treatment. It has the advantage that it can
summarize results from studies using diverse statistics to report their results.)
Slightly larger effect sizes came from results using the MMPI. Much larger
effect sizes were obtained from client self-reports to the therapist. The largest
effects, twice the size of the GPA and GSR values, were found for outcome
measures where the therapist rated client behavior produced in the presence
of the therapist. The obtained benefits look larger if you ask the therapist than
if you ask the registrar's office or a disinterested coder.
It is worth noting that the original multitrait-multimethod paper (Campbell
& Fiske, 1959) was concerned with the validation of measures of individual
differences. All of its examples were of that type. Since then, it has become
quite evident that the concept of method effects applies much more gener-
ally: It is pertinent to all designs in psychological research. Method effects are
associated with aspects of measuring procedures, not with any one type of
research design (cf. Fiske, 1982). Comparisons between different types of
psychotherapy may yield results that vary with the method used to assess
outcomes. Similarly, studies of sex differences in group performance com-
pare sex groups, not individuals, but the results are biased if the task favors
one sex.
Returning to the problem of identifying method effects, there is a compli-
cation. The apparent size of a net method effect depends upon a variety of
facts. For example, differences between self reports and peer ratings may
vary with the type of trait or disposition being assessed and with each data
producer's perception of the confidentiality that will be given to his or her
ratings. In general, we can expect self ratings to be more favorable than peer
ratings and to differ more from peer ratings than do outside observer judg-
ments. We cannot, however, predict what will be found in any particular
study. Also, along with fairly general kinds of method effects, there are
specific or local types that the careful investigator must watch for. In survey
research, for example, there can be effects associated with the institution or
agency conducting the survey and with the year in which it was carried out
(Turner, 1984).
The problem of context effects, another kind of method effect, has for years
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plagued research using questionnaires or surveys. The content preceding a
given question can affect the answer (Turner & Krauss, 1978). A thorough
analysis of the problem and the literature has led Tourangeau and Rasinski
(1988) to conclude that context effects can enter at each of the four stages in
answering an attitude question: interpreting the question, retrieving relevant
beliefs, rendering a judgment, and reporting an answer. They indicate the
variables affecting each stage and the effects of each variable. They conclude
that context effects are often unstable, perhaps because of the complexity of
the processes involved.
More generally, we need to know a lot more about the diverse kinds of
variability in responding. Messick (1989) notes that different people perform
the same task in different ways and that the same person may perform
differently across items or on different occasions. He argues that we should
analyze the process going on when a person takes a test. Although a lot has
been done on that problem (e.g., Kuncel & Fiske, 1974), a lot more needs to be
done. Reiss (1986, p. 52) points out that "all methods for inquiry into nature
are governed by the substantive laws of nature at the same time that these
methods are the means for discovering and testing these laws." Because we
do not know all the substantive laws applicable to behaving in the measuring
situation, we must go out and develop our own minitheories for what goes on
during psychological measuring (Fiske, 1988). At present, because we have
available more assumptions than facts, "the conclusions drawn about a
phenomenon are heavily dependent upon the assumptions that underlie the
procedure used to investigate it" (Wyer & Srull, 1988, p. 145).
Better understanding of the psychological processes during measuring
should enable us to improve the replicability of our measurements. The
apparent circularity here (better replicability makes it easier to understand)
can be taken as aspirai: An improvement in replicability makes it possible to
gain better understanding which in turn enables us to improve the replica-
bility of our measurements. Of course, we do have to have some replicability
as a starting point. Byrne and Holcomb (1962) had the courage to report on
their experience in trying to develop a measure of repressing and sensitizing
defences. After obtaining disappointing results in cross-validation efforts,
they went back to check on the internal consistency of their measure. It was
.00! A similar result is said to have occurred during World War II when
graduates of bombardier training were tested on two different days. The
accuracy of their bomb drops had no stability. Obviously the concept of
bombardier accuracy had to be rethought in terms of the total context and the
involvement of the rest of the flight crew.
Replicability of measurements contributes to convergence among studies
and replication of findings. But can we minimize method effects and thus get
more replication of findings over different methods?
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DEALING WITH METHOD EFFECTS
It is clear that method effects are present in psychological research. Now what
can we researchers do about them? First, we can try to identify when these
effects are more serious or more likely. But even that matter needs to be
broken down by type of effect. Let us start with stimulus questions. Turner
(1984) proposes that nonsampling effects are likely to be found when survey
questions are ambiguous, when their concepts are amorphous, when the
referents are vague, when the response categories are arbitrary and impre-
cise, and when the content has little importance to the everyday lives of the
respondents. Some of these can be seen as properties of other poor measuring
procedures. And they may remind some of you of the conditions under which
response sets are more likely to operate: "When the task is ambiguous, when
the response alternatives are vague or general, and when S is unable to give
an exact answer that he can verify. To oversimplify a little, [response sets]
enter when S is in doubt about what response to make" (Fiske, 1971, p. 215).
We might speculate that method effects are more likely to enter when
investigators set up conditions that generate the behavioral processes that
are measured: In other words, when we devise an artificial task for our
subjects—a test, an inventory, an experimental challenge of some kind. In
contrast, such effects are less likely when we unobtrusively observe an
ongoing behavioral process that is independent of the measuring. This pro-
posal does not deny that much valuable research is done in the laboratory
under contrived conditions. Further, it is also true that unobtrusive observers
can produce method effects unless they are thoroughly trained and are
making simple judgments rather than inferences about the behavior (cf.
Fiske, 1978, chap. 5).
Also relevant is the source of the concept that we are trying to measure, We
often study concepts that come from everyday perceiving and attributing,
and we are likely to be fully convinced that that concept, that attribute, exists
out there ready to be measured. Problems with method effects seem more
probable with measures of such concepts, perhaps because we are inclined to
accept any plausible measuring techniques for them. In contrast, method
effects may be less serious when concepts are developed from data, and
especially when they refer to data obtained by explicit measuring opera-
tions—in other words, when we are working from the bottom up rather than
the top down. We need some such low-level concepts on which to base our
scientific work. They are also valuable in providing new perspectives, new
ways of looking at and thinking about the phenomena we are trying to
understand.
Preference is a familiar concept that illustrates this point. It is obvious, isn't
it, that people have preferences and make choices? But Tversky. Sattath, and
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Slovic (1988) raise the question whether, in choice theory and decision
analysis, we can assume that there are preferences, pure and simple. Prefer-
ences are not invariant over alternative descriptions of options nor are they
invariant over procedures for eliciting them. In some cases, preferences may
be "actually constructed in the elicitation process" (Tversky et al., 1988, p.
371). Much of the writing about method effects has, like this chapter, been
primarily descriptive or hortatory. Both the paper by Tversky et al. and that
by Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) go further: They take steps toward
explanation, toward conceptualizations of the problem. The concept studied
by Tversky and his associates, preference, is not trivial: It is basic not only to
choice theory and decision making but also to studies of values and to
economic theory. In addition, in psychological measurement, we commonly
ask subjects to express a preference or choice. If each such decision is affected
by the description of the options and by the way we elicit responses, the
implications of the conclusions drawn by Tversky et al. may be much wider
than they imply.
Tversky and his colleagues point out that "the assumption of procedure
invariance [the same preference order emerging from presumably compa-
rable procedures for eliciting pretences] is likely to hold when people have
well articulated preferences and beliefs" (Tversky et al., 1988, p. 371). This
view seems consistent with that expressed by Ericcson and Simon (1984)
regarding the conditions under which verbal reports may safely be used as
data: when subjects know in advance the kind of information they will be
asked to report (so that they can know to what to attend), when the task is one
that they can carry out, and when what is to be reported can be reported
immediately (not after an intervening period of time).
To summarize, method effects are less likely to occur and are less serious
when the person producing the data—the subject or an observer—is given a
clear task that is easily carried out. To this we can add that the dataproducer
should be motivated and not threatened. Such conditions generate replicable
data. Such data seem necessary, but not sufficient, for obtaining procedure
invariance and moving toward the generalizability of results from the given
task to the target construct.
At this point, let me offer a highly speculative and probably highly contro-
versial proposition. Some parts of psychology have made more substantive
progress than others. Those parts that have progressed farthest are those
where method effects are smaller, less serious, or less likely—are less of a
problem. In those parts, the task given the dataproducer is clearly defined and
fairly easy. I cannot prove that proposition empirically: To do so would
require obtaining judgments about the relative progress that has been made
by different areas of psychology and about the relative freedom from method
effects within such areas. Even if I did that study, most psychologists would
decide the validity of that proposition on the basis of their personal appraisals.
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A case in point: Gerald Patterson's research Program. Although
you may disagree with that speculation, I trust you will agree that the
problem of method effects must be faced squarely. It is in our way and it is
holding us back. One research program that has undertaken to deal with
method effects is Gerald Patterson's studies of children and family processes
at the Oregon Social Learning Center. The Center's work on construct-
indicator relationships in this substantive area is summarized in Capaldi and
Patterson (1989). A recent paper from that Center (Bank et al., 1990) describes
the course of their efforts and shows their healthy blend of pragmatism and
idealism.
They start with the belief that all assessment procedures introduce some
degree of bias or distortion into the data they generate. They then show a
willingness to explore a wide range of tactics for dealing with the problem. On
the basis of empirical evidence as well as conceptual arguments, they are fully
convinced that they cannot measure any of their constructs adequately by a
single procedure; as a consequence, they have tried different combinations of
scores from varied measuring procedures. One conceptually sound strategy
was to find, for each construct, two nonoverlapping indicators (where the
methods and the data producers were different) and combine their scores.
The difficulty is that, with more than three or four constructs, one quickly
runs out of measuring procedures.
Notable about the attack by Patterson's group on the method problem is
their willingness to consider giving up earlier beliefs. For example, they
recognized that the method variance problem was not always a matter of
poor measurement; sometimes, it is a matter of the construct and the diffi-
culty in defining it. Thus, they concluded that their construct of Family Stress
was best indexed by simply counting the number of risks to which the family
was subjected. This simple method was conceptually satisfactory because the
alternative—considering Family Stress as a trait—was not acceptable in the
face of the low intercorrelations among measures of it.
In their work, the matter of the data producer's perspective is central: A
mother, a father, and a teacher typically see a child somewhat differently. To
bring out that component, they introduce the concept of agent and distin-
guish between effects associated with agent and those from other aspects of
method, such as the instrument used.
One of their final points deserves thoughtful attention. They note that,
although the mother's view of her child may disagree with the views of the
father, the teacher, or the peer, it is nevertheless a significant causal factor
taken by itself. It may be of overriding importance for a family. More
generally, divergences between measurements from different perspectives
may indicate that, for both theoretical and applied purposes, more than one
concept is necessary. There may or may not be any true core common to the
several views.
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There is a paradox about method effects. On the one hand, we readily
accept evidence that, in self-reports, subjects may portray themselves in
overly favorable terms. Similarly, we are not surprised to learn that substi-
tuting "welfare" for "aid to the needy" changes the endorsement rate for
some survey questions. Such dispositions in responding seem quite natural. It
seems just common sense that people should behave that way; we might do so
ourselves if we were the respondents. So we have some psychological
understanding of the origins of method effects.
On the other hand, we continue to use our old familiar methods in our own
research. We have had experience with them. Typically, other researchers
are also using them. It would cost a lot of time and effort to revise them or
replace them. And any alternative ways of measuring our favorite concepts
may have their own method effects. Is it surprising that people prefer to talk
about their findings rather than look at the potential method effects in their
data? It would be disturbing to investigate the possibility that one's findings
are due to a method effect and that one's results cannot be replicated by a
quite different method.
SUMMARY
The following didactic exposition summarizes this chapter in terms of advice
to the psychological researcher. It is not new advice. Much of it is in the
indoctrination we received in our graduate training. But this advice is not
closely followed. My colleague Louis Fogg and I have been studying the
critical comments that reviewers make about manuscripts submitted to
editors of journals published by the American Psychological Association
(Fiske & Fogg, 1990). It is evident that authors of many papers have not
followed that standard advice, so it bears repeating:
1. Define each of your basic concepts fully. Expand each conceptualization
to specify where it can be observed and how it is best measured—that is, what
perspective should yield measurements conforming to the specifications for
the variable and having minimal bias (cf. Fiske, 1987).
2. For each dependent variable, and for each independent variable where
appropriate, find at least two measuring procedures that seem to have
minimal method effects and that are as different as possible with respect to
the samples of behavior used, the format, and the person producing the data.
Keep in mind, however, the caution noted by Kagan (1988) and by Bank et al.
(1990): If the two procedures yield quite different results, consider whether
the data should be construed as reflecting one construct or two distinct ones.
3. Wherever feasible, use unobtrusive procedures so that the person
whose behavior is being studied does not react to being studied.
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4. Accept the fallibility or bias present in the products of each method.
Carry out the basic analyses on the array of data from each procedure
separately and then try to integrate the sets of findings. Aspire to replicating
the findings across these procedures. If this approach yields unsatisfactory
outcomes, consider pooling the data from your separate measures of each
construct. Try to have a sensible a priori rationale for each such pooling.
5. In interpreting your findings, consider whether general, replicable
method effects seem to be or could be present in each of your methods. Also
look for specific, local effects that might have been generated by the partic-
ular conditions under which the study was conducted. It is obviously advan-
tageous to identify potential effects before the study is carried out so that they
can be minimized. In any case, the post hoc review is needed.
6. Before stating each conclusion, think through and explain the boundary
conditions within which you believe it holds. (Is the only universal law that
there are no universal laws?)
Throughout all your planning, your objective is to try to maximize reli-
ability (reproducibility) of the measurements from each procedure and the
replicability of results from one measuring procedure to another. When you
can reproduce your measurements and replicate your findings, you know or
will soon discover what psychological processes are going on in your re-
search.
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CHAPTER 6
Replication and Meta-Analysis:
the Story of a Meta-Analysis of
Parents' Socialization
Practices*
Hugh Lytton
Department of Educational Psychology
University of Calgary
Alberta, Canada
The truism that all progress in knowledge must be founded on earlier work
and knowledge, that it must be cumulative, has been obvious to the natural
sciences for a long time. The cumulative nature of science is perhaps most
apparent in what Kühn (1962) has called "normal science" which assumes the
task of putting flesh and bones on a new "paradigm" or model, created by a
prior revolutionary reconceptualization of an area.
Cumulation is not a glamorous activity, but it is an essential one and, I would
suggest, it is no less useful and necessary in the social than in the natural
sciences. Links to past research reduce the temptation to "reinvent the wheel"
and deepen and enrich the meaning of a novel research project. Moreover, it
is only through such links that we can measure any little progress we make and
define the bounds of consensus that has been reached in a given area.
We should distinguish two aspects of cumulation in science: elaboration
and aggregation. Elaboration involves solving new puzzles that build on a
prior revolutionary breakthrough and a new perspective. However, we are
more concerned with its second aspect, namely, the aggregation, synthesis,
and corroboration of existing knowledge, essential to both natural and social
sciences in their normal phase. This can occur in three different ways:
1. Replication of a past study, when the essentials of a previous study
are repeated; often variations of some parameters are systematically
introduced and noted.
'The financial assistance of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
and of the University of Calgary for the research project discussed in this chapter is gratefully
acknowledged.
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2. Aggregation of actual data from several samples, so as to produce a
larger database, something that is often called "secondary analysis."
3. Integration of existing studies in a given area by means of a review.
Reviews may be in narrative form, or they may be quantitative
integrations of research findings, called "meta-analyses."
The following sections discuss these three types of research cumulation
briefly.
REPLICATION
Students in the natural sciences are indoctrinated in the need for replication
which for them is a matter of scientih'c necessity. A student will perform
standard laboratory experiments, the results of which he will compare with a
standard result. He will thus test his own experimental procedures and
materials against a benchmark and learn to remedy his shortcomings; these
experiences will be part of his formation as a scientist. However, no such
standard experiences are available for a social science student.
As van Uzendoorn (Chapter 3) points out, replicability is a fundamental
requisite of science and any claim for a new relationship or law will normally
be subjected to a test of replicabitity at some stage, before it can pass into the
realm of accepted knowledge. However, most research in the natural sci-
ences will not be exact replication, but will build on past research by varying
certain parameters, of materials, instruments, or procedures in order to test
the limits of an accepted scientific law. The accumulation of replicable
findings is necessary not only for the establishment of generalized laws by
induction, but also to ensure that the deductive testing of hypotheses pro-
duces dependable, replicable results. The natural sciences have been able to
make relatively rapid progress precisely because they have developed pro-
grams of research that have been cumulative in the sense of replication as
welt as elaboration. Thereby they have extended the bounds of dependable
knowledge.
In view of the probabilistic nature of findings in the social sciences,
replication is at least as necessary in this domain as in the natural sciences.
But for a variety of reasons it is upheld more in principle than in practice and
this is certainly the case in the area of child rearing or socialization practices.
The absence of replication is partly due to its being considered a nonoriginal,
boring, low-level task, and to the wish of every psychologist to create a new
theory, or at least a new test, or a new observation or experimental method,
rooted in the specific goals of the research.
It is, of course, true that, as Yarrow, Campbell, and Burton (1968) and van
Uzendoorn (Chapter 3) point out, exact replication is difficult, if not impossi-
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ble, to accomplish. But partial replication—say, of one instrument among
several—also has its uses and in the social sciences, as in the natural sciences,
replication can take the form of an endeavor to duplicate the essentials of a
study, with systematic variations of some parameters ("varied replication").
Indeed, as part of the broader research enterprise such experimental varia-
tions are desirable, for we must be interested in various parameters that affect
the limits within which some established relationship holds. If parents so-
cialize 3-year-old children to be helpful by precept and example, do they do so
with 12-year-olds? And what is the effect on 3-year-olds and on 12-year-olds?
However, in the social sciences there are certain obstacles in the way of
replication that are absent in the natural sciences. For instance, in chemistry
materials and procedures are precisely described with generally accepted
vocabulary and can be duplicated within a small area of doubt. In parent-
child research we generally lack such standard vocabulary and standard
procedures. Hence, replications become more problematic, because it is
difficult to know whether constructs and research procedures have been
consistently employed across different studies.
Yarrow et al. (1968) discuss this problem under the title 'The label and the
measure." One form of the problem arises when the same conceptual label is
applied to different measures, because two investigators interpret the con-
cept differently: one example is the way "control" was defined and measured
by the researchers at the Fels Institute (Baldwin, Kalhorn, & Breese, 1949) and
by Baumrind (1971).
The converse problem also is not infrequent: The same actions may be
subsumed under differing conceptual labels. Thus, a mother giving a young
child spontaneous help with a cognitive task can be viewed as showing
support or warmth, but she can also be thought of as exhibiting "anxious
intrusion". Research projects that use such diverging interpretations of the
same concrete behavior are difficult to equate.
Conceptual tones in replication. Just because these difficulties make
data imprecise and relationships unreliable and difficult to interpret, replica-
tion of existing findings that provides continuity of constructs and measures
seems essential. It should perhaps start with attempting to replicate the
operationalization of some constructs, for example, of the "authoritative"
childrearing constellation, and of the child's socially responsible behavior.
Only when these constructs have been shown to be reliably and repeatedly
measurable would their interrelationship become a target for replication. The
function of such replication would be to determine the generality, as well as
the bounds of the generality, of "classic" relationships.
Yarrow et al. (l 968), perturbed by what they saw as the lack of consistency
in previous research on the relations between presumed parent antecedents
and child behavioral consequences, carried out a study which repeated prior
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work for example, that by Sears, Maccoby, and Levin (1957). They also built
in replications of their own measures, in that they repeated questions from
their interview for mother in a questionnaire for mother, and also used similar
questions for teachers. The criterion characteristics on which they focused
were the child's dependence, aggression, and conscience.
These researchers were not reassured by their findings. From their work
and their comparison with earlier research in this area Yarrow et al. (1968)
draw very pessimistic conclusions: They doubt that sound evidence really
exists to support commonly held hypotheses concerning the factors crucial to
conscience formation, or to the development of dependence or aggression.
However, the authors somewhat understate the consistency they themselves
found, for example, for the effects of parental warmth. Other writers, who
reviewed a rather broader range of research in the same area by means of
narrative reviews, have found a more dependable consensus on a number of
factors, such as warmth and power assertion, which generally seem to have
positive and negative effects, respectively, on internalized standards (Grusec
& Lytton, 1988; Hoffman, 1970; Maccoby & Martin, 1983).
We owe an example of replication across four different samples, studied by
the same authors, using the same measurement instrument (naturalistic
observation), to Clarke-Stewart, VanderStoep, and Killian (1979). This re-
search also was concerned with mother-child interactions and their interre-
lations in a variety of areas. Out of 58 significant correlations between all
mother and child variables, only 5 (9%) were significant in all four samples.
What marked out these replicated relations was the fact that they were more
often predictable from previous research, theory, or common sense than
were unreplicated relations; thus, mother's positive affect and play with the
child was highly correlated with the child's positive affect and play with
mother—hardly a surprising finding. It is also notable that these replicated
relations tended to be based on, composite measures or standardized tests.
Again, the degree of consistency was perhaps understated, since when the p
values for the four samples were combined to form a composite p, 58.6
percent of possible replications turned out to be significant.
One reason why some of the findings in Yarrow et al. (1968) and in
Clarke-Stewart et al. (1979) proved elusive and unreplicable may have been
the fact that the variables were represented by single-occasion measure-
ments. Epstein (1980) points out that a behavior observed on a single occa-
sion, whether in the laboratory or elsewhere, is likely to be so situationally
unique as to be incapable of generating reliable, repeatable results. One
solution for obtaining replicable findings is to aggregate behavior over
situations or occasions, stimuli or measures, thereby canceling out incidental,
uncontrollable factors. Epstein (1980) demonstrated the utility of aggregation
by showing that, when self-ratings, behavioral records, and physiological
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indicators were aggregated over 12 days (in the same study), the reliability
coefficients rose to nigh levels.
One instance of a clear and rigorous replication in the area of parent-child
relations, which also incorporated improved methodological and analytical
features, is the replication by Hubbard and van Uzendoorn (1987) of Bell and
Ainsworth's (1972) classical study of infant crying and maternal responsive-
ness. The results were contrary to Bell and Ainsworth's conclusions that
maternal unresponsiveness tends to increase subsequent crying by the infant.
Occasionally certain instruments or procedures become established and
attain popularity—often because of their ease of administration—and this
applies particularly to laboratory situations. While they remain fashionable
they elicit a whole host of varied replications, though the studies are often not
designed as replications. Ainsworth's Strange Situation is, no doubt, the most
prominent case in point and it receives attention in Chapter 3. Note that in
these studies the goal of replication is the classification of the child's attach-
ment status in varying populations, and so on; they are not, strictly speaking,
investigations of parent-child relations.
When we examine the study of the influence of parental attitudes or
behavior on children's development, we find replications to be extremely
rare. A recent review of parental childrearing attitude questionnaires con-
cluded: "it is only somewhat facetious to say that when investigators wanted
to sample attitudes, they developed a new instrument. Consequently, few
instruments have seen repeated use; replication studies are almost nonexist-
ent" (Holden & Edwards, 1989, p. 52).
The need for replication. Several factors underline the need for repli-
cation of socialization studies. First, significant findings from a single study,
for example, correlations between parental and child variables, must be
viewed with circumspection, as they may be due to chance factors, for
example, of subject selection, and their replicability should first be demon-
strated, as Clarke-Stewart (1979) has pointed out in connection with her own
experience.
Second, in addition to chance factors, personal preconceptions and atti-
tudes may influence the actual research process, as well as interpretation.
This danger is particularly acute when emotional reactions to a given issue
are strong, for example, regarding sex differences. Thus, Eagly and Carli
(1981) found in studies of influenceability and of decoding of nonverbal
communication that both men and women researchers portrayed their own
sex more favorably than did researchers of the opposite sex. I am not
suggesting that deliberate deception or suppression of data are occurring, but
rather that the data gathering and the analysis process may be affected by
subtle influences, of which the researcher is quite possibly unaware.
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Conflicting conclusions are often a matter of interpretation of the findings,
rather than of the actual findings themselves, and interpretations are power-
fully influenced by the writer's theoretical preferences. Thus, Lewis (1981)
interpreted the effects of "authoritative" parenting as supporting attribution
theory, whereas Baumrind (1983) interpreted these effects as supporting
social learning theory. It is an inescapable fact that interpretations are not
value-free, and researchers' ideology and point of view will play a part in
them. A simple replication will not provide an easy remedy for this problem,
but even in these cases judicious replication of a study under conditions that
will throw light on the point at issue, will often be a guide to the sounder
interpretation of the original findings.
Moreover, lack of replication results in the overediting of data to achieve a
publishable paper, or even in the partial faking of data. Thus, lack of replica-
tion in social psychology means absence of essential social control which
exists in sciences where replication is routine (Campbell, 1986).
Secondary Analysis
Secondary analysis is the reanalysis of original data by means of better
statistical techniques or an enlarged sample. A kind of secondary analysis,
called "cluster analysis," which aggregates data across a set of studies, has
been proposed by Light and Smith (1971). It requires a set of studies that are
methodological replications and for which original data are available. If no
important differences in study outcomes are found, the data can be combined
in order to base conclusions on a larger sample size. Because original data are
rarely available, it is not surprising that this method has not been used often.
However, occasionally such methodological replications become available
by accident, though they can hardly be called systematic in that case. Thus
Bradley et al. (1989) brought together six independent investigations, in-
volving 11 researchers across North America, who had all investigated the
relationship between maternal environment and the child's development. It
so happened that all these projects used many of the same measures, in
particular a common observational measure of the home environment, the
"HOME." These accidental replications were then submitted to a combined
data analysis, that is a secondary analysis.
Meta-Analysig
The third and broadest way of cumulating evidence and rendering conclu-
sions more robust is a review of the existing literature in a given area. Such a
review has often taken on narrative form which, however, has several
defects. First, it is subjective in that there are no rules spelled out how to
resolve conflicts between studies. Reviewers will do this subjectively and may
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quite honestly disagree on the weight and importance to be attached to
different studies in the resolution of such conflicts in the overall conclusions.
The problem here—that of subjective, differential weighing up of evidence-
has its parallel in clinical prediction (cf. Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989). Also
reviewers may be attacked on the studies they have chosen to include or
exclude; while this problem also persists in quantitative integrations of
research, the rules for inclusion there are made explicit and cannot be
deviated from at a whim.
Second, the narrative review is scientifically unsound, if it bases conclu-
sions on "vote counts" or "box counts" of results pointing in one direction or
the other (e.g., characteristics present more with males or more with fe-
males), with the reviewer then basing his conclusions on the side that receives
most "votes." This procedure ignores sample size and effect size.
Third, the traditional review is also inefficient in extracting meaningful
information from the existing literature. When only a dozen or so studies
existed in any given area of research it was possible to summarize and make
sense of these in verbal form. The exponential growth of research in the
social sciences has meant that now there typically are hundreds of studies
available in a given area. It is more difficult to obtain an understanding of
general trends and mentally to juggle relationships in a large number of
studies by intuitive methods. Hence, a need has arisen for a method of
integrating these in a quantitative way that would parallel the quantitative
analyses of the primary studies. As Glass (1977) has put it: "The accumulated
findings o f . . . hundreds of studies should be regarded as complex data points,
no more comprehensible without the full use of statistical analysis than
hundreds of data points in a single study could be so casually understood" (p.
352).
In the methods of aggregation discussed under "Secondary Analysis," data
points for individuals are aggregated over several occasions, or measures, or
samples. If we aggregate study outcomes, that is, summary characteristics of
studies, say, a difference between groups or a relationship characterizing the
sample, we have a meta-analysis.
The more difficult the execution of exact replication is (as in parent-child
research—see earlier) and the more it is spurned by investigators, the more
important becomes meta-analysis in order to be able to bridge the differing
operationaltzations and provide a view on the generality of findings across
such differences. Quantitative techniques for research integration have been
available for decades, for example, as long ago as 1954 in a technical chapter
by Mosteller and Bush. But it was Glass and his colleagues who coined the
term "meta-analysis" and their work made the method more commonly
known and accessible (cf. Glass, 1977).
The integration of data from diverse studies is beset with difficulties,
whatever method one adopts. However, meta-analysis attempts to tackle
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these with quantitative procedures that are common in the social sciences.
Meta-analysis provides a basis for detecting regularities and trends in a set of
studies with conflicting results by looking for such possible trends in the data
systematically. Its procedures do not by themselves overcome all problems of
disagreement and conflict (see later), and they do not eliminate subjective
judgments by the reviewer. But, in contrast to verbal summaries, these
judgments are made explicit, their consequences can be assessed, and hence
replicabuity and public accountability may be assured. Since these proce-
dures also make a priori contrasts and regression analyses possible, general-
ized conclusions can be drawn from a bewildering array of studies with
appropriate qualifications arising from moderating factors, for example, the
differing ages of the children studied. Theoretical questions of importance, it
is hoped, can thereby be answered with greater clarity than by the traditional
verbal review. How far such hopes can be translated into reality will be
discussed below in relation to the story of our meta-analysis
We should note that meta-analysis does not replace careful experimental
replication which has its own value, noted earlier. But meta-analysis goes
beyond replication in that it integrates a diversity of approaches to the same
topic. One criticism of meta-analysis that is often voiced is that it tries to
integrate incommensurable studies, something that has been called the "ap-
ples and oranges problem." It is true, of course, that the results of different
studies to be integrated have to speak to the same issue, or address the same
topic. But what may be considered "same" is not at all clear and depends on
the purpose and perspective of the meta-analysis. Take the example pro-
posed by Glass (1977): Imagine the Secretary of Health and Welfare com-
paring 50 studies of alcoholism treatment, 50 studies of drug addiction
treatment, and 100 studies of the treatment of obesity. Though each of these
would form a separate meta-analysis, if the Secretary finds the results for the
first two to be negative, whereas the results for the last one are positive, he
may decide to fund only obesity treatment centers. From the Secretary's
point of view, the problem is public health, not alcoholism or drug addiction
or obesity separately.
No doubt, it has little meaning to combine studies of the effects of chemo-
therapy for cancer and of psychotherapy for anxiety. But suppose a re-
searcher wishes to compare the relative effectiveness of "talking psychother-
apy" and of behavior therapy: Studies on these topics might be submitted to
separate meta-anaiyses. But then, when the issue is the effectiveness of any
type of psychological therapy versus no treatment at all, the effects of the two
kinds of therapy would be considered jointly; it would have been at least
equally efficient to have submitted them to one meta-analysis, with "Type of
therapy" as a stratifying factor. So it is the problem under consideration that
determines which studies are sufficiently alike to form a common class to be
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combined for a meta-analysis. I discuss the problem of "lumping" in relation
to our meta-analysis later.
The fact that meta-analysis integrates diverse approaches to a problem—its
essential purpose—makes it more useful than replication for resolving con-
flicts between differing interpretations of existing findings and the trend they
may show. Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson (1982) note: "In many areas of
research, the need today is not additional empirical data, but some means of
making sense of the vast amounts of data that have accumulated" (p. 26). But
meta-analysis is, of course, not possible unless data on a given problem have
been accumulated: Meta-analysis feeds on replication, both exact and varied.
Take the question of the impact of environment on IQ scores. A glaring
example of how verbal reviews of a group of studies can lead reputable
scientists to diametrically opposite conclusions is the debate between Mun-
singer (1974,1978) and Kamin (1978). Munsinger (1974) examined a group of
adoption studies and concluded that environmental effects are small. Kamin
later reviewed the same set of studies and arrived at the opposite conclusion.
Personal beliefs are bound to enter into how reviewers resolve conflicting
findings and this will explain part of the disagreement. But further, both
reviewers accused each other of selectivity in reporting. Short of reading the
whole original literature themselves—which Kamin actually recommends—
readers are at a loss to know which conclusion to draw. If the authors had
used systematic procedures for summarizing this literature and examined the
disparities between studies in systematic ways by relating them to moder-
ating factors, this would have improved the situation, since the reader would
at least be able to relate the difference in conclusions to known aspects of the
reviews and draw his or her own conclusions from this.
Meta-Analysis of Differentia] Rearing of Boys and Girls
The question to what extent parents treat boys and girls differently in their
socialization practices is an important one since such differential socialization
may be at the root of some or all of the behavioral differences known to exist
between males and females. Indeed the theory that sex-typing is brought
about through "shaping" by parents is a widely held view. Maccoby and
Jacklin (1974), in their monumental work, The Psychology of Sex Differences,
have given a great deal of space and thought to a review of studies in this
domain, but they reviewed research in this area by counting the studies that
revealed sex-differentiated practices and those that did not (the "vote-
counting" method), and then characterized the set of studies qualitatively.
They concluded that parents do, indeed, reinforce sex-typed behavior, nar-
rowly defined, for example, they reward traditionally sex-typed play activi-
ties and toy choices. Apart from this, however, they came to the conclusion
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that "The reinforcement contingencies for the two sexes appear to be re-
markably similar" (p. 342).
This conclusion has been criticized, particularly by Block (e.g., 1976,1978)
in several extensive articles. Block argued that Maccoby and Jacklin under-
estimated the extent to which parents do apply differential socialization
practices to the two sexes and she attributed these, in her opinion miscon-
ceived, conclusions to various shortcomings of the Maccoby and Jacklin
review, for example, the fact that most of the studies they reviewed con-
cerned children less than 6 years old, and the fact that fathers' treatment was
reported and analyzed much less frequently than was mothers'. Maccoby and
Jacklin, in fact, themselves recognized these limitations of their review
which, however, are essentially limitations of the data base they had to work
with. Block also criticized the authors for giving the same weight in their
interpretation to each study, regardless of its quality or sample size. Further,
she disagreed with the authors' classification of studies under different ru-
brics. Her opinions, too, however, represent her own subjective judgments
and are also based on a qualitative inspection of the studies cited by Maccoby
and Jacklin, plus others; she did not attempt to provide a quantitative
integration of the domain.
These qualitative reviews agree that parents make differences between
boys and girls in some areas of socialization, but disagree in which areas
important differences occur or what the extent of the differential treatment is.
Their disagreements arise from finely shaded nuances of interpretation of
essentially the same studies.
In the last 15 years, a great many more investigations of sex-related
differential socialization have appeared. My colleague, David Romney, and I
therefore decided the time was ripe for carrying out an updated review of this
domain that would take into account the criticisms of the earlier review and
that would, in the spirit of the age, proceed by way of a quantitative
integration of research that could resolve some of the disputes engendered by
narrative reviews. Such a meta-analysis should have a certain conceptual
base: It would have to distinguish between different areas of socialization
(e.g., warmth, encouragement of achievement, encouragement of sex-typed
activities) and it would have to take account of various moderating factors,
particularly the child's age. As Block (1978) points out, a conceptual frame-
work of socialization behavior would require distinctions between different
ages, as parents will adapt their approach to the emerging capabilities and
needs of the growing child.
We expected the quantitative integration to answer clearly two questions:
1. In which areas of socialization do mothers and fathers (analyzed
separately when possible) treat sons and daughters differentially and
what is the extent of the differences they make?
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2. Are there any moderating (actors, for example, age of child or design
of study or year of publication, that affect the size of the difference?
The meta-analysis would not allow us to decide on the origins of any
differentia! practices found, but it seemed to us important to find out more
precisely in which areas, at which ages, and to what extent mother and/or
father treat their sons and daughters differentially. In areas where differential
treatment is found its implications can be discussed—and they are not always
straightforward. In areas where no differential treatment is found, parental
treatment can then be, at least tentatively, excluded as a cause of possible
existing differences between males and females (cf. Lytton & Romney, 1991).
THE STORY OF OUR META-ANALYSIS
I now tell the story of our meta-analysis, as it actually proceeded, and I do not
flinch from mentioning the difficulties, confusions, and false starts, the sub-
jective decisions we had to take on various research strategies and how these
decisions had to be changed in the light of circumstances.
The main steps to be executed in a meta-analysis are the following:
1. Identify and obtain relevant and usable studies.
2. Code study characteristics.
3. Extract one or more effect sizes from each study.
4. Calculate meta-analytic statistics.
Identifying and Obtaining Relevant and Usable Studies
With the help of a research assistant we searched a number of sources for
possibly relevant material. Relevant was defined as an article, book chapter,
or dissertation that examined the treatment of sons and daughters by mothers
and/or fathers and contained data on the level of this treatment for the two
sexes: say, amount of praise for sons and daughters. The minimum of
quantitative information that we could use for inclusion in the main analysis
was a p value for the difference between the treatment of the sexes.
We obtained items from Maccoby and Jacklin (1974), from a number of
reviews of the field, from my own reference lists, as well as from lists kindly
supplied by other researchers in the area. The main source of material was a
computer search of PsycLit for articles, and of Dissertation Abstracts for
dissertations, using relevant key words, directed essentially at the domains of
socialization and sex-related differences. Additionally, a manual search of
Psychological Abstracts was undertaken.
Several steps were involved in these searches: First, potential material was
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identified in Abstracts of studies, then the actual articles, book chapters, or
dissertations were inspected to see if they seemed to contain the essential
quantitative information, those that seemed to were xeroxed, and then a
second inspection narrowed the selection to those items that did, in fact,
contain usable quantitative information. The period covered was from 1950
to 1987 for articles and books, and 1980 to 1987 for dissertations. We looked
at least at the Abstracts, and often at the text, of about 1250 such items and
ended up with 172 usable studies with quantitative information from North
American and other Western countries, which translates into a hit rate of
about 14 percent. Occasionally an article that had analyzed parental treat-
ment of boys and girls separately concluded simply with the statement that
"no significant sex difference was found" for a given treatment. Twenty-eight
such articles were assigned to a separate "No p value" file and used only in a
secondary analysis (see later). The selection process was quite arduous and
took about five months.
Among the items we first picked up were studies that were not empirical in
nature, studies that found sex differences, but did not report any statistical
data on them, studies whose measures were not compatible with our catego-
rization scheme (see later), and studies that reported not level of parental
treatment, but correlations between parental treatment and child character-
istics: AU these had to be discarded.
Some subjective decisions inevitably enter into the selection of "relevant"
studies. For instance, one study, entitled "Why 'Mom is the greatest': A
content analysis of children's Mother's Day letters," found that in "Mother's
Day letters," solicited by the author, there was a sex difference in the
frequency with which mothers' modeling and teaching were mentioned.
Should this weak and circumstantial evidence be included? We decided not.
Sometimes, too, it is not easy to see whether the statistics provided in a study
are usable for a meta-analysis, because even statistics that are in an unpro-
mising form may often be converted to an effect size (cf. Rosenthal, 1984). In
all doubtful cases like these we consulted each other and reached a consen-
sual decision.
What did we miss? In view of all the supplementary searches that we
carried out I doubt that, within the specified periods, we missed more than a
handful of articles that might have contained quantitative data. On the other
hand, there may well be hundreds of studies out there that investigated some
topic other than sex-based differential socialization practices, but that in
passing looked at such differential treatment and then concluded with a bald
statement: "No significant differences due to sex of child were found." We
noted some of these, but we might well have missed many. If we had been
able to include all the nonsignificant effects, this would only have further
decreased our estimates of the average effect sizes of differential treatment
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which are already quite low (see later). Their omission is therefore not likely
to pose a serious threat to our conclusions.
It will be obvious that our search of English-language publications suffers
from linguistic parochialism and does not claim to have covered the literature
on socialization worldwide. Not only will there be many studies in French,
German, Dutch, Russian, and so on, that we did not touch, but the 17 studies
from "other Western countries" in English that we included may quite
possibly be unrepresentative of publications in their respective countries, for
example, Holland, France, Norway, Israel. We also finally had to discard six
studies from Third World countries, first identified, as a separate analysis
would have been needed and they formed too small a database for this.
Coding study characteristics
We coded various aspects that characterized a given study and that could
represent "moderator variables" which might explain variability in study
outcomes, on a coding form that went through several draft versions. Data
collection method was coded, ranging from indirect assessment of behavior-
report by child—to the most direct access to behavior—observation or exper-
iment. Source of study (journal, dissertation, etc.), social class or education
level of parents, age of children, birth order, ethnicity, year of publication,
sex of author, and sample size were all coded. Quality of the study was rated
by us on the basis of our judgment of the internal validity of the study's
procedures, for example, carefulness of data collection, including reliability
of measures, and appropriateness of operationalization of constructs. On all
these variables, which were later related to study outcomes as moderator
variables, we reached a high degree of interrater reliability. Country of the
study and sex of parent for whom measures were available were noted and
these determined which accumulation of studies the given study was assigned
to, as we analyzed separately for North America and other Western coun-
tries. We also analyzed separately for mothers and fathers, where possible, as
well as jointly.
The question of how to deal with several outcome variables in the same
study was a major problem in this research, as most studies of parental
socialization contain several indices of socialization practices, such as praise
and punishment, or demands and warmth, and each of these may be assessed
by several measures. Theory suggests that the differences in socialization
pressures between boys and girls may vary in different domains, and we
therefore adopted the principle that outcomes should be pooled only when
they represent the same construct (cf. Bangert-Drowns, 1986). Hence we
established separate categories for different socialization areas, namely:
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amount of interaction
encouragement of achievement
warmth, nurturance
encouragement of dependency
restrictiveness/low encouragement of independence
disciplinary strictness
discouragement of aggressiveness
encouragement of sex-typed activities
clarity of communication.
Several of these categories were also divided into subcategories, for exam-
ple, "disciplinary strictness" was divided into its physical and nonphysical
aspects. Each of these was submitted to a separate meta-analysis and there-
fore no more than one dependent variable appeared in any one analysis. But
if a study contained several measures of one socialization area such as
warmth or encouragement of sex-typed behavior, these were combined into
a composite and one effect size derived for the socialization area (see later for
further discussion of this procedure).
The classification of study variables into these socialization areas was no
doubt the most difficult and debatable aspect of coding study characteristics.
The categories were derived from a knowledge of the literature and from
inspection of relevant articles and books. The justification for this particular
categorization system is that it is rational and based on an informed view of
the literature. Of course, other experts in the area will disagree with specific
decisions, but then their categorizations may also be disputed, since no
universally agreed classification system of socialization practices exists.
Here, then, we have subjective decisions entering into the meta-analysis, but
the consumer of the meta-analysis has the protection of seeing the decisions
made explicit and public (something which was also done in the more
traditional, but careful review of Maccoby and Jacklin). Others are therefore
at liberty to repeat the meta-analysis, using their preferred categorizations.
Authors use diverse labels for the parental behavior that they observe or
record, and it was our task to fit these labels to our categories, each of which,
by the nature of a meta-analysis, had to be applicable to a number of studies.
Fiske (1986) thinks that the unrepeatability and lack of generalizability of
knowledge in much of social psychology is due to the difficulty of identifying
interchangeable categories of protocol (behavior) from one investigator to
another. The meta-analyst has to be convinced, of course, that the different
labels the primary investigators used are, in fact, interchangeable names for
what, on a theoretically reasonable basis, can be subsumed under one
category of behavior. If one or two authors develop a new perspective on
child-rearing practices and introduce a measure not used by others and that
cannot reasonably be fitted into any existing category, this measure—how-
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ever interesting and insightful—by definition is idiosyncratic and cannot be
used in the meta-analysis. Several instances of this occurred, for example
"complexity of language," or "flexibility in play," or "power," defined as
comprising ail possible methods of influence; such constructs had to be
excluded from the investigation.
Some categories, first established, had to be abandoned later, when we did
not find sufficient instances of them in the literature. Thus, "Responsiveness,"
first a separate category, was combined with "Warmth, Nurturance" for
analysis purposes.
The problem of excessive splitting or excessive lumping of constructs
besets many investigations. We tried to deal with it by establishing more
fine-grained socialization areas in the first place and analyzing these sepa-
rately, and then lumping several socialization areas together into meaningful
"Super" socialization areas and analyzing these as well. The "Super" social-
ization area of Disciplinary strictness, noted above, is an example. Both
individual and "Super" socialization areas were analyzed, in case a subarea
should exhibit a significant effect not apparent in the "Super" area. This did,
indeed, happen in one instance, but the small number of studies involved in
the individual socialization area throws doubt on the generalizability of the
finding.
Most measures could be fitted to one or other of our categories, but the
question which one a variable should be equated with was the debatable
point. We used the authors' own categorization, as indicated by their inter-
pretation of a variable, whenever possible, for example, noncontingent help-
giving for young children was included in "Encouragement of dependence,"
as the author (Rothbart, 1971) related it to dependence. But consistency of
classification was all-important to ensure homogeneity of meaning for each
category across studies, and this sometimes had to override authors' classifi-
cations.
However, we also had to be sensitive to the differing contexts in which
similarly labeled behavior occurred; thus helping with school work, as op-
posed to the help-giving for young children, noted earlier, was classified as
"Encouragement of achievement." When touching, holding, and rocking
were noted in a study in relation to efforts at arousing infants, it was coded as
"Stimulation of motor behavior," but when, in another study, holding was
interpreted as a manifestation of closeness it was coded as "Encouragement
of dependence." In some cases we could see grounds for classifying a given
childrearing behavior in more than one way, and then we based our decision
on the most common practice of classifying the behavior. One hard case was
demands for help in the house or for orderliness which we classified as
"Restrictiveness," in keeping with Maccoby and Jacklin (1974), though we
could understand the argument for counting this as "Encouragement of
mature behavior." A special trial analysis demonstrated that taking these
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items separately made practically no difference to the effect size, which was
minimal in any case, so they were kept in the category "Restrictiveness."
While the main responsibility for these classifications was mine, in some
doubtful cases a decision was arrived at in consultation with my co-
investigator. Independent classification of a subset of studies by the two of us
showed high agreement.
Extracting Effect Sizes from Each Study
In this step the meta-analyst is overwhelmed by as many different choices and
decisions as in allotting study variables to socialization areas. The decisions
made are often crucial to the outcome of the meta-analysis, without there
being any clear theoretical or logical rationale for the superiority of one
decision over another. 1 describe the choices that faced us and the decisions
we made.
An effect size is the ratio of the difference between the means of two groups
to the standard deviation, that is, the difference between the means in
standard score form. The first decision, then, was to determine which stan-
dard deviation to use. Glass (1977) recommends the use of the standard
deviation of the control group. However, in a comparison of the treatment of
boys versus girls there is no "control" group; both groups represent a normal
population and no difference in status exists between them. Hence, we
decided that the pooled standard deviation of the two groups was the more
appropriate statistic to use, as other authors also recommend. Hunter et al.
(1982) also point out that the pooled standard deviation has the advantage of
a smaller sampling error than the control-group standard deviation.
Some studies investigated the same domain and measured the same vari-
ables by different methods, for example, by behavior observation and by
interview about childrearing attitudes. Then the choice to be made is which
comparison is to be included in the meta-analysis, or whether they can be
combined to yield a single effect size, since only one effect size from each
domain in any study can be included. In one such case we chose to include the
data derived from behavior observation and exclude those from the inter-
view, as the former gave rise to more definable constructs that fitted into our
scheme of socialization areas. In another case we combined data from an
experiment and from home observation, as they dealt with the same social-
ization area, though they were reported as separate studies in the same
paper. Others might make different decisions on these matters.
That such decisions are not trivial in their impact on the outcome has been
shown by Matt (1989). He replicated part of Smith, Glass, and Miller's (1980)
meta-analysis of psychotherapy studies. Smith et al. (1980) had applied the
rule of omitting "conceptually redundant effect sizes" in a given study that is,
effect sizes for the same outcome type. Matt selected 25 of the original studies
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at random and three coders independently identified and calculated effect
sizes. Each of these trained coders identified more than twice as many effect
sizes per study as did Smith et al. (1980)—as Or win and Cordray (1985) had
done, too, in an earlier reanalysis of part of Smith et al.'s database. Moreover,
the average treatment effects of all effect sizes identified by Matt and his
colleagues were about half the magnitude of the smaller number of effect
sizes found by Smith et al. (1980). Thus, it seems that Smith et al. (1980), in
applying the conceptual redundancy rule, tended, whether consciously or
not, to omit smaller effect sizes. Applying other rules of omission, Matt (1989)
found, changed effect size estimates in different ways. It is clear, then, that the
average effect size found in a meta-analysis may depend heavily on judg-
ments about which comparisons to select.
As I explained earlier, when several measures of the same construct or
socialization area were present in any one study we averaged these. Hence,
no "redundant" effect sizes, strictly speaking, could occur in our meta-
analysis. Nevertheless, picking the appropriate measures for a given theoret-
ical construct involved judgment. The trial analysis of seven studies con-
taining a measure for "Encouragement of mature behavior," mentioned
earlier, showed that using a different decision rule from our original one
made no difference. In view of the relative nonsignih'cance of most effects in
this meta-analysis this conclusion most probably holds in other cases, too.
But, short of redoing the meta-analysis, we have no means of being sure.
It will be understood that means and standard deviations for comparison
groups (treatment of sons and daughters, in our case) are the basic grist for the
meta-analytic mill. However, many other statistics, such as t, F, x2 can be
converted to an effect size, following procedures set out by Rosenthal (1984),
Glass (1977) and Hedges and Olkin (1985). But it takes some thought to
ascertain whether a study's statistics are, in fact, usable. We decided, for
instance, after some reflection that even an unstandardized partial regression
coefficient, plus its standard error, would yield an effect size via /. In spite of
the wide variety of statistics that can be used for deriving effect sizes, many
articles, even by distinguished authors, do not contain sufficient information
for this purpose.
In some studies results are reported in the form of simple dichotomies, that
is, the proportions of boys and girls receiving a given treatment. Though the
information is cruder than metric information it is convertible to effect sizes,
too, and we did so by calculating the difference between the probability of
boys and the probability of girls receiving a certain treatment, divided by the
pooled standard deviation.
To give readers an idea of the complications involved in extracting and
calculating effect sizes, I present a table from Burton, Maccoby, and Allin-
smith (1961) which we used (Table 6.1). The Table presents the numbers of
boys and girls for whom mothers used certain approaches and techniques and
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Table 6.1. Child/earing and Child Behavior Related to Resistance to Temptation
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Note. Throughout this table the variable being considered was divided at the median.
•ps.05. *'pa.01.
From "Antecedents to Resistance to Temptation in Four-year-old Children," by R. V. Burton, E.
E. Maccoby, & W. Allinsmith, 1961, Chad Development, 32, 689-710. Reprinted by permission.
to whom they displayed certain attitudes. Note first that it is not stated in Table
6.1 or the surrounding text that the figures displayed here are numbers and not
percentages—we had to figure this out by calculations. Having decided that
these numbers were convertible to percentages since the total numbers of
boys and girls were known, and hence to effect sizes, we first had to identify
the measures corresponding to defined socialization areas (SA). These are
given in their numerical codes in the left-hand column. The first one (50)
represents our category of "Restrictiveness," which fits the study's variable
"concern with cleanliness," the second (61) reflects "Nonphysical disciplinary
strictness" and for this we had to average the four individual measures brack-
eted in Table 6.1, which we decided corresponded to the construct. The third
(62) was "Physical punishment," labeled as such in the Table. The fourth (100)
clearly corresponded to our category "Clarity of communication/reasoning,"
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and finally we interpreted "Frequency of Mother's playing with S just for her
own pleasure" as "Warmth" (30). To capture these last two categories we
utilized only the numbers for "High use" of a practice. The numbers that
entered into the meta-analysis are circled in the table.
Note also that the main purpose of the investigation was to relate these
techniques/attitudes to the children's resistance to temptation and therefore
the numbers are broken down by high and low resistance to temptation. The
Significance column on the right refers to this contrast. Since we were not
interested in this aspect, the first step in the extraction process was to add the
numbers for high and low resistance together for boys and girls separately.
These are shown in Table 6.2 in the columns "ActB" (Actual boys) and "ActG"
(Actual girls). Each line in this worksheet, entered into a microcomputer
spreadsheet program, represents one socialization area and shows the statis-
tics that went into the calculation of the chi-square, also displayed in the table.
(Many spreadsheets were much more complex still.) The chi-square for each
socialization area would at a later stage be converted to an effect size and
entered into a meta-analysis of that socialization area. These steps were
accomplished by means of a microcomputer program, adapted from Mullen
and Rosenthal (1985).
A few studies—not many—reported statistics for subgroups, such as dif-
ferent age groups or social class groups, and many reported statistics for
mothers and fathers separately. For any socialization area we computed
effect sizes separately for each group, but then also calculated an overall
effect size for the total sample.
We carried out various adjustments suggested by meta-analytic statisti-
cians, for example adjusting the error sum of squares in a multiway analysis of
variance to derive a univariate Flor the sex factor, or adjusting /for unequal
n 's. It should be realized that the differences in the outcomes produced by
such adjustments are typically very small and certainly much smaller than
those potentially generated by computational and transcription errors.
I noted earlier that many studies contained several measures of one
Table 6.2. Spreadsheet Calculations Preceding Computation of EHect Sizes
SA C S A E B P ActB PosB AaC POsC pi p2 if dir N
30
50
61
62
100
1 2 1
1 2 1
1 2 1
1 2 1
1 2 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
22
25
26
14
20
40
40
40
40
40
25
28
25
7
14
37
37
37
37
37
0.610
0.688
0.662
0.273
0.442
0.390 0.550
0.312 0.625
0.338 0.650
0.727 0.350
0.558 0.500
0.676
0.757
0.676
0.189
0.378
1.277
1.555
0.057
2.506
1.153
-1 77
-1 77
-1 77
+ 1 77
+ 1 77
Abbreviations: SA: Socialization area (see text); C: Country (North America); S: Social Class
(middle); A: Age (0-5 years); E: Ethnicity (Caucasian); B: Birth Order (not given); P: Parent Sex
(Mother); ActB: Actual number of boys: PosB: Possible (total) number of boys; ActG: Actual
number of girls; PosG: Possible (total) number of girls; p: Proportion of boys and girls; q = 1 - p;
pi : proportion of boys; p2: proportion of girls; x2:chi-square; dir: direction of effect (1 = boys >
girls; - 1 = girls > boys); N: number of boys and girls, weight of study.
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socialization area. These typically were averaged to form a composite effect
size for the socialization area. (In the example in Table 6.1 the n 's for
"Disciplinary strictness" could simply be added.) One problem that arose in
this connection and that, to my knowledge, is not mentioned in the meta-
analytic literature, is the fact that quite often a study provided statistics for
one measure of a given socialization area (even if it was only p < .05) and
proceeded to state for quite a number of other measures of the same social-
ization area that they showed no significant difference for sex, without giving
any further statistic. If one simply ignores the nonsignificant measures and
calculates an effect size from the (significant) statistic provided, one gives an
inflated impression of the real sex difference found in this study for this
socialization area. If, on the other hand, one interprets the insufficient
information as indicating precisely "no sex difference" and, therefore, counts
in a p of .5 for each of these measures in the pooled effect size for this
socialization area, one unduly minimizes the sex difference found. When the
direction of the difference was reported in such cases, we employed the
compromise procedure of taking the average between the significant p
reported (typically, .05) and a p of .5, that is, a p of .275, for each such
measure, and then including these p 's in the averaged effect size for the given
construct. When "no significant difference" was reported for an independent
socialization area as a whole, we used the procedure of assuming a p of .5,
that is, a difference of exactly zero, in a secondary analysis, as others have
done (cf. Eagly & Crowley, 1986).
As with the coding of socialization areas, we first adopted a fine-grained
approach also to the coding of study characteristics, knowing that h'ner
distinctions can later be collapsed. Thus we coded every country in which a
study was done separately and coded four age groups and four ethnicity
groups. Because of the immense task involved in analyzing about 375 com-
parisons from 172 studies, we later collapsed these categories to three groups
each before the analysis proper started and omitted ethnicity from the
analysis.
When one examines a series of studies carefully, as the meta-analyst has to
do in order to code the studies and extract appropriate effect sizes, one
inevitably uncovers a number of discrepancies, confusions and plain errors in
the studies. Such errors, we found, occurred in articles in highly reputable
journals, as well as in dissertations. Here are some of them.
Duplicate publication of the same data is something the meta-analyst has
be on guard against. However, one detects such duplication easily in sorting
studies by author. In one such case two separate papers addressed different
aspects of the same investigation, but both papers contained the same data for
differential treatment of the two sexes—but with differing df!
We sometimes had to reconcile the numbers of subjects given in the
description of the sample with the numbers listed in relevant Tables. They
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may have differed because an analysis was carried out only with a subset of
the total sample, but occasionally there was no such obvious reason for the
discrepancy. We chose the numbers in the Tables as a basis for our analysis.
More serious were discrepant statistics (means and variances) for the same
data in the same study. This happened either because the data in one table
had been regrouped and were receded, or presumably through simple care-
lessness. In such a case we had to make a choice between the Tables on some
rational basis. And lastly, at times when we recalculated some statistic (e.g.,
F), with the help of means and standard deviations also reported, we discov-
ered that the original statistic was incorrect and had to be corrected.
Calculating meta-analy tic statistics
The final outcome of a meta-analysis is the overall effect size, averaged across
all studies. In our case it was the overall effect size across all studies of each
construct, or socialization area, and we calculated these separately for studies
done in North America and in other Western countries (including not only
Western Europe, but also Australia).
We also computed separate effect sizes for mothers, fathers, and for
parents combined. The last category included studies which examined
mothers or fathers alone, as well as studies that reported on both parents,
either separately or undifferentiated by sex. Thus there were a number of
effect sizes and the one for "Parents Combined" represents the most inclusive
effect size in a given socialization area.
The meta-analyst faces the question of whether to report the plain average
effect size or whether to weight studies in some way. Each study could, for
instance, be weighted by the confidence the researcher has in its internal
validity or general trustworthiness, that is, by his assessment of its quality, or
it could be weighted by a weight that reflects the reliability of each study's
measures. But the most commonly used candidate as a weighting index is
sample size.
Because the sample sizes of the studies summarized by our analysis varied
considerably—from 11 to 2707—it seemed to us most important that this
factor should be reflected in a given study's contribution to the overall
average outcome. Some authors use the inverse of the variance of effect sizes,
which itself is heavily influenced by sample size, as the weighting factor.
However, we followed Hunter et al. (1982) in choosing the straightforward
sample size, that is, number of boys plus number of girls, as the appropriate
weight. The frequency-weighted average provides a more accurate reflection
of the overall effect across all studies than does the unweighted average, so
long as sample size is not correlated with the magnitude of the effect size (cf.
Hunter et al., 1982)—in our case, it was not. This practice, however, gives
considerable weight to very large studies and we therefore carried out
II
138 LYTTON
secondary analyses, omitting studies with sample sizes larger than 800, to see
if their exclusion changed the overall conclusion. (It did in some cases.)
One problem specific to a meta-analysis of parents' socialization practices
was that often both mothers' and fathers' practices toward boys and girls
were reported. This meant a doubling of responses for each child in the study
and was reflected in the degrees of freedom in the analysis tables. The weight
applied to the study effect size nevertheless normally was the number of boys
plus the number of girls.
For combining effect sizes from many studies and calculating an overall
average frequency-weighted effect size we adapted a computer program
(Program K), listed in Mullen and Rosenthal (1985), for use on the Macintosh
microcomputer. We followed Hunter et al. (1982) in partitioning the variance
into its systematic and unsystematic parts. Hunter et al. (1982) have pointed
out that the variance of effect sizes is composed of systematic variation in
population effect sizes and variation in sample effect sizes brought about by
sampling error. Sampling error across studies behaves like measurement
error across persons (cf. Hunter et al., 1982, p. 102). If there is systematic
heterogeneity in effect size among studies, it is useful to examine the studies
to see whether the variation is accounted for by differences due to "moder-
ator variables," say, age of subjects, or quality of study. However, if most of
the actual variance is due to unsystematic sampling error variance, it is not
justifiable to search for systematic causes of variation. Hence one first deter-
mines how much of the actual variance is accounted for by sampling error
variance. We did so by means of this program and found that sampling error
in no case exceeded 60% of the actual variance—hence, following Hunter et
al.'s (1982) and Peters, Hartke, and Pohlmann's (1985) guidelines, a search for
moderator variables was justified.
We first correlated the moderator variables with effect sizes across studies,
but soon realized that in a meta-analysis such as ours, in which there are many
negative effect sizes, these correlations are quite misleading. We had estab-
lished the convention that positive effect size would indicate a difference in
favor of boys (greater amount of X for boys), and negative effect size a differ-
ence in favor of girls. Therefore, a negative correlation, say with age, could
mean either (a) that with increasing age the positive effect size decreases, or
(b) that with age the negative effect size increases, or (c) that with age the
difference changes in direction from being in favor of boys to being in favor of
girls. Hence, possible moderator variables were analyzed in relation to effect
sizes by defining contrasts between groups for example age groups, to test for
linear or quadratic trends—an analogue of analysis of variance, designed for
meta-analytic investigations (cf. Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Rosenthal, 1984).
It will be clear by now that the whole process of extracting effect sizes and
calculating the various meta-analytic statistics is subject to numerous errors,
quite apart from the conscious assumptions and decisions that one makes in a
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necessarily somewhat arbitrary way. Threats to accuracy arise from a variety
of sources: errors of transcription, errors in calculating effect sizes (though
setting up computer programs for various algorithms for computing these
reduces mistakes to a minimum), errors in selecting the data from the study
and in determining the correct algorithm to apply, errors in establishing the
direction of effects and errors in combining subcomponents. It helps if the
meta-analyst is a little obsessional, as constant checking of work to guard
against these slips is essential. Orwin and Cordray (1985) have pointed out
that primary investigators vary considerably in the completeness, accuracy,
and clarity with which they report outcomes, as well as study characteristics,
such as reliabilities, numbers, and ages of subjects, and that such reporting
deficiencies will lead to uncertainty and error in the meta-analysis. It is all the
more important to be vigilant about and eliminate errors in the meta-analytic
calculations, as we otherwise superimpose these mistakes on the unknown
number of errors that will exist in the primary literature.
The process of meta-analysis by its nature is very time-consuming. What
takes time, above all, is reading the study, determining the applicable com-
parisons and outcome measures and deciding on an appropriate method for
calculating effect size. Dissertations are more time-demanding than journal
articles in this respect. The calculation of effect sizes is an equally protracted
task, especially if various subcomponents of a construct have to be averaged,
and if means or analysis of variance tables have to be recast in order to
extract the requisite standard deviations. The time factor will increase dra-
matically if, because of errors detected later, various analyses have to be
repeated. Including corrections and repeat analyses, the calculation of effect
sizes and of summary meta-analytic statistics for our study took over a year,
part of this full time.
Salient Findings
Our conceptual model posited that sex-related differential treatment of boys
and girls will vary for different areas of socialization. In fact, the only
socialization area in which a significant effect size emerged in North Amer-
ican studies was encouragement of sex-typed activities—see Table 6.3. The
question asked here was: To what extent do parents encourage convention-
ally sex-typed play or other activities in their children? For example, how
much more do they encourage boys than girls, say, to play with hammers and
expect them to shovel the sidewalk, and how much more do they encourage
girls than boys, say, to play with dolls and expect them to do housework? The
effect size here tells us the amount of the difference parents make between
boys and girls in this area, each time in the expected direction.
Although the effect sizes for mothers, fathers, and parents combined are
significant in this area their magnitudes range from about one-third to
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Table 6.3. Significant Eflect Sizes: Parents Combined (North American Studies)
Studies with Studies of Studies with
Socialization area known effect sizes N < 800 p = .5 added
Encourage sex-typed activities .43*(20) .S8'(19) .37'(23)
Studies from other Western Countries
Physical punishment -37*(4) .24*(5)
Encourage achievement -.28*(4) 15(3) -.19(6)
Figures in parentheses are number of studies included.
*p <.05
one-half of a standard deviation, that is they are rather modest. Because of its
inordinate weight, we eliminated one study with a sample size of over 1,800
in a further analysis. When this was done, the effect was still significant for
parents combined (Column 3 of Table 6.3), but no longer for mothers alone.
Further, when we added in the studies where we assumed a p of .5 (i.e., a zero
difference) in the absence of further information, the effect size still remained
significant (Column 4). Thus this effect was quite robust.
We had formulated hypotheses, based on theory and literature regarding
the effects of certain moderator variables: (a) differential treatment of boys
and girls (i.e., the effect size) would, in general, increase with age; (b) effect
sizes would be larger when data were obtained from observation or experi-
ment rather than from parent interview; (c) effect sizes would be larger in
published than in unpublished studies; and (d) they would be larger in older
than in more recently published studies. The outcomes for these hypotheses
for the socialization area "Encouragement of sex-typed activities" were as
follows: Only the second hypothesis received some slight support, in that the
effect size was larger for data obtained from observation or experiment, but
the contrast was nonsignificant. The first hypothesis was refuted: the effect
size was more than twice as large at the preschool age (.71) than at the
primary school age (.29), though this must be considered with reservations, as
the number of studies that included this socialization area for the primary
school age was only 2. The third hypothesis was not supported—rather there
was a tendency in the opposite direction: unpublished studies had a (nonsigni-
ficantly) higher effect size. The last hypothesis also received no support:
Studies published since 1973 had a (nonsignificantly) larger effect size than
studies published in 1973 or earlier, that is, the studies that were available to
Maccoby and Jacklin (1974). Higher quality studies (we had not formed any
hypothesis about quality) also produced somewhat higher effect sizes than
did lower quality studies. The outcomes for socialization areas overall were
very similar. However, it should be noted that no significant effect size
emerged for any subgroup (e.g., of high quality studies) where there was no
significance for the sample as a whole.
As Table 6.3 shows, in Western countries (other than North America) there
I
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was a significant difference for physical punishment which parents inflicted
more on boys than on girls. The result should be treated with some reserva-
tion, as the number of studies involved was small, though the significance
held up when studies for which we assumed a p of .5 were included.
The finding that in Western countries parents encouraged achievement
more in girls than in boys must be regarded as rather unreliable. It is based on
a very small number of studies and the difference in the female direction is
due to one study alone which contributed 877 subjects to the weighted effect
size and was in fact the only study of the four that showed a difference in the
female direction. Once this anomalous study is removed, the effect size points
in the direction of greater encouragement for boys, but it is nonsignificant
(the same result as was found in North American studies). The data of this
study—a dissertation—represented answers to a questionnaire, administered
to high school students in Great Britain, as well as in the United States (in
which the difference, though not so strong, was also in the female direction).
We also correlated some of the moderator study characteristics with each
other (for all socialization areas). Some interesting findings emerged: The num-
ber of female authors increased with recency of publication, female authors
tended to produce studies of higher quality than male authors, and the quality
of studies increased in more recent years, but quality decreased with larger
sample size. This last finding reflects the likelihood that carefulness of data
collection slips, and methods become coarser, when a researcher is faced with
a large sample. (For further details see Lytton and Romney, 1991.)
What are the main conclusions we can draw from the significant effect for
differential encouragement of sex-typed play and activities? The findings
corroborate Maccoby and Jacklin's (1974) conclusions that this is an area in
which parents do make differences between boys and girls. It must be borne
in mind, however, that such encouragement may build on the children's
already existing preferences, that is, it may be the children's genotype which
evokes differential responses (the "evocative genotype—environment effect:
cf. Scarr & McCartney, 1983). There is, indeed, some evidence that supports
such an interpretation: Two investigations (Caldera, Huston, & O'Brien, 1989;
Snow, Jacklin, & Maccoby, 1983) discovered that 12-to 18-month-old boys
and girls already differ in preferences for toys conventionally associated with
their sex, when the opportunity for playing with them is equalized. Parents
therefore may simply reinforce these preferences rather than create them.
For other socialization areas no evidence for significantly differential
treatment of the sexes emerged. Of course, one can never prove the null
hypothesis: it is impossible to assert that no sex-differentiated treatment in
these areas ever exists. We have not exhausted the universe of samples (a) of
non-English-language studies, (b) of possible childrearing variables, (c) of
future potential methods of measurements, and the studies summarized have
not exhausted the universe of possible subjects.
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However, given our relatively exhaustive search of the existing English-
language literature within the stated periods, and within the limitations of this
literature, we can, I believe, tentatively accept the null hypothesis of no
significant sex-differentiated treatment in the stated socialization areas (cf.
Greenwald, 1975; for further discussion, see later). This confirms Maccoby
and Jacklin's general conclusion that reinforcement is similar for the two
sexes. It suggests that the observed sex differences in cognitive or social
characteristics, for example in high mathematical or spatial ability, in non-
verbal behavior or in aggressiveness—the magnitude of which, in any case,
seems to have diminished in more recent studies—are not due to parents
directly reinforcing stereotypical behavior or abilities in their children.
What other explanations remain for the origins of existing sex differences?
First, there may, of course, be some subtle forms of parental treatment that
were not captured by our categories and which might conceivably show
some differences by sex. Children may also be influenced indirectly by
parental encouragement of differential types of play in boys versus girls, if
"masculine" play promotes the development of "masculine" attitudes and
abilities and vice versa for "feminine" play. Second, children will form
cognitive schémas of sex roles and sex membership and on this basis will see
same-sex parents, peers and others as models on whom they may pattern
their behavior. Third, peers are likely to act as powerful socializers of
sex-typed behavior in general, though they, too, like parents, may only
reinforce existing tendencies. Fourth, teachers may influence children in
stereotypical ways, but the evidence for their deliberately influencing chil-
dren's cognitive abilities in this manner is rather weak. In high school, for
instance, girls get better grades in algebra, though they do more poorly in
standardized tests, than boys—it does not look as if teachers discouraged girls
in this area (cf. Grusec & Lytton, 1988; Kimball, 1989).
Last, and above all, we can no longer close our eyes to the possibility of
biological predispositions playing a part. These would seem to provide a
plausible part-explanation for existing sex differences, supported by evidence
for some behaviors, such as, aggression (cf. Maccoby & Jacklin, 1980) or high
mathematical ability (cf. Benbow, 1988). Such biological factors are coming to
be recognized more and more in areas such as psychopathology. It must be
emphasized that these influences will always interact with, and be amplified
by, parents' and other societal, environmental forces. Bidirectional processes
are always likely to be operating.
INTERPRETATION, LIMITATIONS, AND CREDIBILITY OF A
META-ANALYSIS
The message of a meta-analysis cannot be read off mechanically, like an
electricity meter. Its meaning, applicability, and the qualifications that should
,
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be attached to it need interpretation. Generalizability of the conclusions
depends heavily on the criteria employed for sampling the literature and the
extent to which the stated goal of sampling was achieved, and also on the
variations of outcomes within and between studies. The practical applica-
bility of a meta-analysis will depend on considerations inherent in the topic
and in the theory and practice related to it. To arrive at a decision on these
questions readers will require some information about the nature of the
studies integrated, their methods of investigation and limitations. Some of this
information can be provided in quantitative form, for example age of sub-
jects, quality estimate of the study, or method of investigation, and such
variables will then be used as moderator variables. Other information may be
more impressionistic and will be combined with the quantitative information
in some rational way in the account of the meta-analysis to provide a basis for
interpreting the meta-anatytic findings. The qualifications relating to finding
of a significant effect in the female direction for encouragement of achieve-
ment in Western countries, which we discussed above, illustrate how aware-
ness of the nature of constituent studies may affect the interpretation of the
meta-analytic outcomes.
It is, of course, important for the meta-analyst to discuss the distinctions
within the set of studies he is synthesizing and to explore the differences in
effect size that variation in study characteristics produces. The burden of
Slavin's (1984) critique of meta-analytic studies in education is that typically
meta-analysts do not do this and he therefore deplores the present practice of
meta-analysis in some areas. He argues that "meta-analyses could be used to
compute effect sizes for well-defined subsets of studies felt by the reviewer (on
firm conceptual... grounds...) to be truly comparable" (p. 12). His case
against the oversimplistic interpretation of meta-analyses is a strong one.
Slavin (1984) criticizes Glass, Cahen, Smith, and Filby (1982) for claiming a
"remarkably strong" relationship between class size and pupil achievement,
and points out that this strong effect exists only if tutoring studies (one-on-one
relationships) are included in the "smaller classes," but that if one considers
studies that have examined reductions in normal class size, say, from 35 to 25,
the beneficial effects vanish. While his criticism of the strong overall conclu-
sion from the study is justified, he misses the point that Glass et al. themselves
provided him with the ammunition, since they broke down their results by
different class sizes and showed the minimal effect that reductions within the
normal range has. This precisely is the advantage of a well-conducted meta-
analysis.
A possible obstacle to the acceptance of a finding of essentially "no
significant effects" for a set of studies is the presence of great variability
among studies. If there is great variability in both the positive and negative
direction among studies this will produce a low average, or nonsignificant
effect size. But in this case the meta-analysis may simply reflect the state of
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research in the area and clearly reveal the stark truth, namely that no reliable
results in any direction are available.
However, some of the variability may be explainable by systematic varia-
tions among studies. If, after removing the random sampling error (as recom-
mended by Hunter et al., 1982), substantial variation in study outcomes
subsists one can explore this variability by partitioning the set of studies into
more homogeneous subsets, by means of moderator variables, such as age of
subjects, and so on, which may consistently show effect sizes in one direction
or the other. If these subgroups still do not yield reliable effects, then the
conclusion of "no significant effects" will become more firmly grounded.
A possible source of distortion is the appearance of deviant samples,
particularly within a small set of studies. The large-sample study that showed
a greater encouragement of achievement for girls and that tipped the scales in
this direction for the analysis of Western countries (discussed earlier) is a case
in point. Obviously, frequency weighting, although representing more accu-
rately the contribution of component studies to the overall average, has its
dangers. This was the reason why we carried out subsidiary analyses, ex-
cluding studies with the largest samples.
When results emerge that are counterintuitive and against theoretical
expectations the first step is always to check one's calculations and transcrip-
tions, in view of the everpresent possibility of human error. Thus, when on
first inspection we once noticed an effect size that was of a different order of
magnitude from our usual effect size estimates, we discovered that at some
stage one of its components had been multiplied by 10, something that is
easily done when one is dealing with quantities expressed only in decimals.
Although meta-anatysis was first thought of as a means of resolving dis-
crepancies between narrative reviews with their intuitive interpretations, it
has engendered controversies and conflicts of its own. To replicate a meta-
analysis is, no doubt, a salutary exercise even when a first meta-analysis has
been carried out sensitively and meticulously, in view of all the subjective
decisions involved in each study. A case in point is Matt's (1989) (and others')
replication of part of Smith et al.'s (1980) meta-analysis of studies of psycho-
therapy which I have already discussed.
It must be obvious that there are well and poorly executed meta-analyses,
just as there are good and poor primary studies—another reason why meta-
analyses need to be replicated, too. Conflicts and variation are not un-
common among such quantitative reviews, and hence it is important to
understand, explain, and qualify the differing outcomes (cf. Nurius & Yeaton,
1987). Aside from differing assumptions, carelessness may be the most potent
cause of discrepancies between meta-analyses.
Take the case of the review of three meta-analyses on the relation between
students' ratings of course/instructor and their achievement, reported by
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Abrami, Cohen, and D'Apollonia (1988). They comment on wide disagree-
ments on the individual correlation between these variables, the "validity
coefficient," extracted from a given primary study. They give as an example
the fact that reviewer A cites a correlation of .90 between grade and in-
structor rating, whereas reviewer B cites a correlation of .136 for the same
relation from the same primary study. As I was intrigued by this startling
discrepancy, which Abrami et al. (1988) do not explain, I read the primary
study involved and the pertinent meta-analyses. I found that Reviewer B's
figure of .136 was the correct correlation and he had also cited all other
relevant correlations correctly from the quoted source. Although Abrami et
al. attribute a cited correlation of .90 to Reviewer A, I could not find a
correlation from that primary study cited in any of Reviewer A's published
papers on the subject, though his doctoral dissertation—unavailable to me—
may have contained one.
Why would Reviewer A attribute a fictitious correlation of .90 to the
primary source, if indeed he did so? Such an error is particularly surprising in
this case, as the correlation simply had to be copied from the primary source;
it would be more understandable if effect sizes had to be calculated from a
variety of complex statistics for example from F-tests between different sets
of groups (not the contrast groups of interest). The fact is that the three quoted
reviews differed sharply on the overall validity of student ratings, with
Reviewer A concluding that there was strong support for their validity, as
evidenced by the relationship between ratings and student performance, and
Reviewer B concluding the opposite. Perhaps Reviewer A's misreading of the
correlation contributed to his enthusiasm for the validity of student ratings,
but he may also have misread it because it thus could confirm his enthu-
siasm—the careless error, at any rate, seems to have been in the direction of
his predilections.
The moral of the story is: Careless authors produce misleading meta-
analyses, and if meta-analyses of meta-analyses perpetuate these errors, and
cite them without further inquiry into the matter, they may well conclude that
disagreements on the actual values of study outcomes are large: Abrami et al.
(1988) report there is only 47% agreement among reviewers on effect sizes.
At least such meta-meta-analyses alert us to the possibility of discrepancies,
whatever they are due to. Perhaps editors have a part to play here and should
demand a demonstration of reliability for the calculation of effect sizes before
publication, or arrange for some spot-checking? It may well be that simple
clerical or calculation errors are responsible for many, and perhaps most,
discrepancies in findings in primary studies and in meta-analyses.
The interesting fact is that meta-analyses can be replicated more exactly
than primary studies can, since the meta-analysis' subjects, the studies, are
available in their original state for reanalysis, whereas the subjects of a
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primary study never are. Further, its assumptions and methods, having been
made explicit, can also be replicated precisely, or with stated modifications,
though many detailed decisions may still remain hidden.
One of the chief criticism leveled at meta-analysis has been that an average
effect size becomes meaningless if it is derived from a heterogeneous sample
of studies that differ in populations, settings, methods, or measures. (The
studies must address what at least the reviewer can conceptualize as a single
topic, and I discussed earlier the problem of defining what is or is not the
"same" topic.) However, as Nurius and Yeaton (1987) point out, this diversity
in populations and so on, is also one of the benefits of meta-analysis, if
properly used. The reviewer can then attempt to assess the difference in
outcome that these differences make, by using these factors (populations,
etc.) as stratifying, or moderator variables. If quality varies, the reviewer can
take this into account by assigning an appropriate rating.
It is true, the reviewer is restricted by the knowledge base we have, that is,
by the topics and constructs that primary researchers have chosen to study.
For instance, in our study of socialization practices we were interested in
determining whether a sex-related difference emerged for parents' use of
Baumrind's "authoritative" or "authoritarian" parenting styles. However, as
only one or two studies assessed sex differences for these complex configu-
rations of practices, the number was too small to base an effect size on,
though the component practices did appear in a number of investigations and
could be analyzed separately. The limitations of the existing literature are, of
course, also ever present with narrative reviews, but meta-analyses make the
problem more visible.
It is also true that the reviewer cannot remedy the flaws and limitations of
the primary literature, and if all the primary studies are weak, the meta-
analysis will be based on sand. If this is, indeed, the case, and provided the
meta-analysis has sampled the literature appropriately, the only conclusion
one can draw is that one does not, and cannot, know anything scientifically
about the given topic, since there is no other research to fall back upon.
Do we believe the findings of a meta-analysis, in particular one on sex
differences? Or do we hold Virginia Woolf s view: "At any rate, when a subject
is highly controversial—and any question about sex is that—one cannot hope
to tell the truth. One can only show how one came to hold the opinion one
does hold." (A Room of One's Own)? Social scientists in the 1980s, to the
contrary, would argue that "we now have tools of analysis that allow us to
approach the truth about sex differences much more closely than scholars
have approached it in the past" (Eagly, 1987, p. 759). As Virginia Woolf rightly
states, preconceptions are particularly strong in the area of sex differences.
But meta-analytic methods bring some objectivity to the reviewing process.
And, while subjective assumptions and decisions are inescapable, as 1 have
repeatedly pointed out, these are not clearly related to, or influenced by, the
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reviewer's predilections and the impact of such preconceptions is at least
considerably reduced by the open accountability and the statistical inference
rules of the meta-analysis. Provided the analysis has been carefully done and
the conclusions are based on the evidence, with appropriate qualifications
arising from the study characteristics, these conclusions represent the best
evidence we have on the topic at this time. In order to assert the contrary,
critics would have to show that another meta-analysis of the same, or perhaps
a broader, set of studies produces a contrary conclusion and explain why the
first meta-analysis was mistaken. Controversies may, however, still legiti-
mately arise about the broader implications of the findings of any meta-
analysis.
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The demand for replications in social sciences is widespread (American
Psychological Association, 1983; Bahr, Caplow, & Chadwick, 1983; Bulldock
ÄSvyantek, 1985; Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Duncan, 1969; Finifter, 1972;
Gasparikova-Krasnec & Ging, 1987; La Sorte, 1972; Smith, 1983; Stouffer,
Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949; White & Pesner, 1983). Many of
the authors call replication the core procedure of science. Science is proper, if
and only if findings are replicated. At the same time it is asserted that
replications in social sciences are very rare (Bahr et al., 1983; Denzin, 1970;
Rodrigues, 1982; Smith, 1970, 1983). Why is it that social scientists, knowing
that replication is crucial for scientific standards, do not replicate each others'
studies more often? Is it true that replications in research are very rare and, if
so, what are possible reasons for this? It is these questions that I address in this
chapter. First, I outline some differences of replications in natural and social
sciences and draw on an example of natural sciences together with examples
from psychotherapy research. A brief classification of replication procedures
will lead to a 5-year review of replications done in psychological research. In
a last section, an attempt is made to outline different procedures of enhancing
confidence in research findings in psychology, provided that replications are
difficult to perform.
My interest in replications goes back to a huge project of meta-analysis of
'Preparation of this chapter was financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation, Fellow-
ship nr. 83.454.0.87.
I thank my friend Jaan Valsiner, Department of Psychology at University of Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, for his constant help, suggestions, and critique of the manuscript.
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psychotherapy research in which 1 was involved (Siegfried, 1985b). In this
project the validity of an empirical study in its internal and external aspect
was of some importance. Many authors claimed as well that they were
replicating an earlier study. Often it was not easy to decide what criteria such
authors had in mind for making such statements. It seems that the term
replication roughly is used for repeating a study with different subjects and
similar procedures. However, whether the repeated study is indeed a valid
second "trial" of the first one is often doubtful. Often procedures are changed
quite drastically and still the claim is made that the study is a replication of an
earlier one. We began to investigate into the validity of replications, thereby
expressing the fact that a repeated study may be a valid or not valid
experimental trial in an assumed series of trials governed by the same
hypothesis and conducted with the same experimental apparatus. It is the
validity of replications that mainly distinguishes natural and social sciences.
REPLICATIONS IN NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
Many critics of my work disapprove of the position that data of natural and
social sciences are totally different. They claim that the scientific study of
psychology, for example, is no different from scientific investigations in any
of the natural sciences. Some admit that data are weaker and less certain in
social sciences. But cumulative evidence will, they maintain, lead to
strenghten a number of hypotheses to the point that they safely can be
regarded as laws of social sciences. However, this position is not valid if a
careful study of the validity of replications in natural and social sciences is
performed. 1 will show this with two examples.
Robert Boyle performed a series of replications of an experiment in 1662
which nicely serve to show the logic of replications in natural science
experiments. Eager to study the compressing force of the air trapped in a
J-shaped tube of glass, he conducted a series of experiments by adding
mercury to the longer leg of the tube. In this way he could study how much
mercury had to be added in order to reduce the volume of the trapped air
inside the dosed end of the tube. He realized that the amount of mercury
added did not correlate in a linear way with the amount of reduction of the
volume of the air. Rather, he found that "the greater the weight is that leans
upon the air, the more forcible is its endeavour of dilation and consequently
its power of resistance" (cited in Harre, 1981, p. 86).
The number of repeated experiments—in each trial the number of equal
spaces at the top of the tube that contained the same parcel of air was varied
systematically—led him to the formulation of his hypothesis.
Table 7.1 shows the important features of such experiments:
1. Repeated observations under the same conditions with the same appa-
ratus and the same procedure.
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Table 7.1. Boyle's natural science experiment on the resistance ol air
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A: The number of equal spaces in the shorter leg, that contained the same parcel of air
diversely extended.
B The height ol the mercurial cylinder in the longer leg, that compressed the air into those
dimensions.
C: The height of the mercurial cylinder, that counterbalanced the pressure of the atmosphere.
D: The aggregate of the two last columns B and C, exhibiting the pressure sustained by the
included air.
E: What that pressure should be according to the hypothesis, that supposes the pressures and
expansions to be in reciprocal proportion.
2. Each trial has to be a valid trial. The added mercury, example, must be
the systematically varied amount. If some of the mercury is spilled or the glass
tube breaks then the trial is not valid and has to be repeated.
3. The observations and repetitions of the experiment are done in a
relatively short time.
4. They still can be performed today, almost 300 years later with the same
results. Replications of this experiment are done in numerous schools and
universities around the world every day with the same outcome.
In social sciences, as far as they are experimental, trials in experiments are
either complex interventions (in the case of a counseling or educational
program), tasks to be solved by a subject (a repeated perception task), or the
subjects themselves are taken as trials of the experiment (e.g., in a sample 50
subjects gave response X, 10 did not give response X). Klein, Zitrin, Woerner,
and Ross (1983), for example, compared three different treatments in three
groups of phobic clients. The first group received behavior therapy together
with chemotherapy (impiramine). The second group was treated with
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behavior therapy and placebo medication. The third group received
supportive therapy and medication. No differences were found between the
three groups of clients. No superiority of behavioral and supportive therapies
was shown.
Clearly, in this study, a complex intervention in the form of a therapy was
offered and the subjects served as trials within the different groups. Each of
them either improved or did not improve. The individual subject's outcome is
an individual trial for each form of therapy leading to the conclusion that
therapy as a whole was effective or was not effective.
The important features of such experiments are:
1. Repeated individual trials (i.e., subjects) with 3 different groups of
subjects under the same conditions with the same apparatus and the
same procedure.
2. Each individual trial must not be a valid trial. Some subjects may
have no motivation to participate and are, if motivation is not
controlled for, invalid trials.
3. The individual trials cannot be varied systematically. There is no way
to add some more motivation to some subjects and then see how their
behavior is changing.
4. The individual trials cannot be repeated because the therapeutic
process is not reversible. A subject is not the same after the treatment
as before insofar as the treatment had some effects.
5. The individual repeated trials are of no interest in terms of the result
of the study. Therapeutic effects are overall effects of the groups as a
whole. Only a replication of such an experiment as a whole could be
regarded as a second trial in the sense of the natural sciences.
The difference between the two sorts of experiments can hardly be over-
estimated, as Table 7.2 shows. Looking first at Table 7.2 in general, we
observe that none of the characteristics of the replicated experiment listed in
the table are a threat to validity in the natural sciences as long as conditions
are equal. The only possible bias is with a change of the experimenter in the
whole approach of an experimental set up, as Mitroff (1974a, 1974b) has
shown some time ago. The experimenter, it is argued, is not an emotionally
free observer of natural phenomena but constructs his observations. There-
fore, an experimenter influence must be assumed in natural sciences as well.
Generally, however, as long as experimental set ups are identical they will
produce identical data (provided that researchers are wearing the same
theoretical glasses).
Now consider replications of experiments in social sciences. All the factors
listed in the table are possible threats to validity.
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Table 7.2 Different experimental features' possible contribution to threats of
validity in natural and social sciences
possibility of threat to internal
and/or external validity
exp. features natural sciences social sciences
identical procedures no yes
identical apparatus no yes
idem observations no yet
different
experimenter no yes
different location
with equal
conditions no yes
Let me go through the entries in the table one by one. Consider first the
identity of procedures. Taking part in a first study may train therapists to
follow certain rules in the procedure. The training effect of the first study is a
growth in experience of the therapists. This might have an effect on the
outcome of the second study, as shown, for example, by Haccoun and
Lavigueur (1979). Therefore, the procedure might, with good reason, not be
the same a second time because of the changing experimenters, therapists,
and subjects. This is equally the case in experimental psychology. Asking
subjects a second time the same question is not the same as asking them the
first time. Experience, familiarity with procedures, learning to conform to
experimenter expectations are all vital parts in experiments in social sciences
and may change outcomes, even if the experimenter considers these changes
to be irrelevant.
Inspecting Table 7.2 again the identity of the apparatus used in social
scientific experiments shows a similar result. In a replication of the famous
Middletown study, Bahr et al. (1983) dealt extensively with the problem of
updating questionnaires and interview items. The original study was done in
the years 1924-1925 and some of the questions used at that time obviously
could not be used anymore in 1977. Yet, to change items may lead to different
outcomes and violates the principle of replication in the strict sense (Aller-
beck & Hoag, 1984). In another recent replication of Furnham (in press) a
questionnaire devised in 1945 was reapplied again in 1988. Results show a
clear shift in beliefs in many instances. The statement Most children are born
good in 1945 was answered by 68 of 141 students in the affirmative whereas
in 1988 the same question given to 98 students was answered positively by
only 11 students. These examples clearly show some of the problems of
replications in social sciences. Problems with questionnaires do not only
manifest themselves after such lenghty intervals between replication as in the
two mentioned studies, but have to be considered equally for shorter periods.
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Again, experimental psychology does not make an exception here. Even if
the experimental setup is exactly the same in one and another experiment,
subjects will differ which makes them not comparable to a trial in the Boyle
experiments earlier. Human subjects have different life histories, represent
different communities, times, and so on. All this makes trials (equal to a
subject's response) in social sciences' experiments much more subject to the
arbitrary (Smedslund, 1979) and to historical changes (Gergen, 1973; Sjöberg,
1982; Valsiner, 1985; White & Pesner, 1983) than in natural sciences.
Validity, as indicated in Table 7.2, is threatened again by repeated obser-
vations on subjects. Problems of measurement dependency, rater reliability
over time (a measure rarely reported in scientific investigations), and irre-
versible developments or changes within subjects (see Chapter 8) are just a
few examples. Such factors are crucial especially in AB designs with replica-
tion (Harris & Jenson, 1985) and hard to control.
Going back to the table, a different researcher will have, unlike in natural
sciences, a much bigger influence on the outcome of the research. It can be
shown that researchers in the majority of virtual replications change some
part of the procedure (see later), because they do not agree fully with the
categorizations made in the earlier research experiment.
Finally in Table 7.2, the difference of location is mentioned. Cross-cultural
research has shown that the location of research in social science is most
important, dass differences, differences in education, differences in language
categories (Kagan, 1984) as part and parcel of shifting the location of research
from one area to another affect validity of research data (Milgram, 1974).
TWO NON-FEASIBLE METHODS TO CONTROL FOR VALIDITY
OF REPLICATIONS
All the factors mentioned earlier may, therefore, threaten validity of replica-
tions in experimental and—to a much greater extent—nonexperimental
social scientific research. An immediate counterargument to these possible
threats of validity may be that the nature of a control group allows for control
over these possible threats of validity. Unfortunately, social science is not in a
position to have something like an absolute freezing point. A control group
controls only within the structure of a study and within a particular society at
a particular time. It does not control for effects outside a system. Time
differences, social and developmental changes are affecting both control and
experimental groups alike and may be responsible for positive and negative
effects. Control groups, therefore, are not absolutely at zero and do not
constitute an absolute and lasting baseline. Two different control groups, one
in a replication and one in the original study, do not control for the validity of
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the replication but only for experimental effects in each of the two studies.
Therefore, control groups do not control for threats of validity of replications.
Piaget (1970), on the other hand, forwards a theoretical perspective
claiming that not more threats of validity have to be considered in psychology
than in the natural sciences. Piaget replicates his findings with what he calls
an epistemicsubject. An epistemic subject is a universal subject, a generalized
human knower (Wozniak, 1983, p. 328) who is vital to the constructive
process of a theory. The outcome of a replicated task with a subject, con-
ceived of as a generalized knower, is valid at both times even if the outcome
is different—because a universal subject is studied. It is not the specific
characteristics of the particular subject that is of interest. Therefore, it is
assumed that reliable repeated observations, if they are contradictory, are an
indication of a different underlying process and are not an indication of a
factor threatening validity.
Validity is not, or is hardly ever, considered an issue in repeated epistemic
observations. Differences in replications of tasks or observations lead to the
construction of new fields in the theory. There is no question of validity of
repeated observations because the observations are assumed to be epistemic
and therefore unquestioned by nature. Validity is a characteristic of a veri-
fying strategy, epistemic observations are characteristic of a constructive
strategy. It therefore is misleading to claim that a trial with an epistemic
subject validates a previous trial of another epistemic subject. After briefly
having looked at the nature of replications and their validity, let me now
proceed with the different types of replications. Because 1 am interested here
in true validating strategies of psychological knowledge, 1 do not deal further
with replications in epistemic observations but proceed directly to classes of
replications in validating strategies.
CLASSES OF REPLICATIONS
The question of replication is dealt with much more frequently in sociology
than in psychology. One of the reasons may be that many programs designed
by sociologists are very costly and time consuming. For example a program
of health education in a country may involve a huge body of personnel in
order to reach the target community. It may be for this reason that the need
and the strategies of replication have drawn considerable attention in sociol-
ogy. I basically follow the classification of replications offered by Finifter
(1972), but will extend it at various points.
Virtual Replications
Reseach is virtually replicated if an original study is repeated after some time
by another research group at a different place (the characteristics of the other
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research group and other place were not included by Finifter, 1972) with no
or only minor changes in the design. The purpose of conducting it is to
confirm or refute a previously obtained result. It can also be performed in
order to assess the contribution of the research procedure to the findings of
the original study. In order to demonstrate this, a condition of the original
study is altered on purpose.
A hypothetical example of a virtual replication is offered by White and
Pesner (1983). Although their analysis is restricted to what they call nonex-
perimental research, I think it is valid for most of the research in social sciences.
In both the original study and replication there exists a positive correlation
between trait A and trait B. If we assume that the two trials are two draws of
one population, the question of virtual replication is now, whether the second
draw of a sample of a population can reasonably be assumed to belong to the
same population or to a different one. Given a positive correlation in both
trials and the marginal totals it can be calculated that 554, 400 ways of
drawing the observations in the replication from the population in the
original study [(n - m)! m! for each cell to cell comparison. For further details
see White & Pesuer, 1983, p. 29.] are possible. Only four different 4-cell
samples with the same marginal totals and a positive correlation as in the
replication shown above are possible. Calculating the probability of occur-
rence for each of the four 4-cell samples leaves a probability alp = .33 for the
replication sample shown in Table 7.3. The probability of the observed
distribution or ones that are equally of less likely to occur by chance is .42.
This is the nondirectional cumulative probability. The higher it is the more
likely is replication from the same population. With a probability of .42 it must
be assumed that the replication sample is not very likely a replication of the
original study, but rather a sample from a different population (for details of
the calculation of this generalization of Fisher's exact test see White & Pesner,
1983, p. 29).
Systematic Replication
Another class of replications can be called systematic replications (Finifter,
1972). The aim of such studies is to extend the original studies and to test
further hypotheses that can be thought of on the basis of the original studies.
Replication and extension, therefore, is the main feature of such studies.
Considering the method aspect of systematic replications, it is obvious that
systematic changes in designs and tasks or procedures may enhance the
credibility in the underlying theory or the effects found in the original study
(Hunt, 1975). However, from a methodological point of view they are not
replications. Rather, systematic replications follow the logic of theory con-
struction outlined above. They are not replications in the methodological
sense. It is important, however, to distinguish systematic replications from
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Table 7.3. A hypothetical example of results of an original and a replicated study
Trait A
ORIGINAL STUDY
Trait
B
REPLICATION
Trait
B
present
absent
present
absent
absent
3
11
absent
1
7
present
8
5
Trait A
present
S
2
other forms of replication because of their close link to an original study and
their aim to generate confidence in the findings.
Pseudoreplications
The most common form of replications are pseudoreplications. In order to
understand pseudoreplications, a special interpretation of significance tests is
needed. Finifter (1972) asserts that significance testing relies "on mathemat-
ically derived probability values rather than empirical events. The hypothet-
ical nature of significance tests is manifested in the imaginary status of the
repeated studies as simulations of identical replication and substitutes for
virtual replication" (p. 162). The procedure of pseudoreplication repeats a
study on certain subsets of an available total body of real data; it may repeat
real data on artificial data sets which are intended to simulate the real data;
and it may generate repeatedly completely artificial data sets according to an
experimental prescription (p. 124).
A short hypothetical example of pseudoreplication can be the following:
Assume in an epidemiologie study that the presence of schizophrenia in a
community (for example, mental clinics in a certain area) is to be assessed.
Three groups of researchers go to different places and count the number of
schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics in these places.
Table 7.4 shows that the total number of schizophrenics in this hypothetical
population of, for example, three mental clinics is assumed to be 78%. We
want to know how reliable such an estimation based on three samples is. The
Table 7.4. Hypothetical example of repeated measurement in subsamples of a population
Croup t Croup 2 Group 3 Total
(a)number of schizophrenics and non-schizophrenics 34 3 14 51
(b)number of schizophrenics 30 2 8 40
/=(b/a) .88 .66 .57 .78
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estimated standard error for f = (40/51) can be computed with the formula
(Finifter, 1972, p. 145):
f =
0.88 - 0.57
0.10
where the numerator is the difference between the maximum and the
minimum subsample estimate and k is the number of subsamples,
In this example the pseudoreplication in the three random subsamples
allows for an estimate of the presence of schizophrenia for the whole com-
munity on which the research was performed. One random sample in a
community is studied. Another random sample—a replication of the first
sample of the same community is then studied again, and so on until an
estimate of the whole community on the studied variables can be made. This
method, therefore, pseudoreplicates the observations in one subsample in a
second one at the same time in order to estimate the whole community on the
observed variables.
Comparisons between control groups and experimental groups belong to
pseudoreplications as well, because there again the question of whether the
experimental group is a replication of the control group, according to a
hypothetically assumed distribution, is crucial for statistical comparisons.
Here we find, however, a complication: Most of the time we have a system of
variables that accounts for possible differences between experimental and
control groups. Methods to deal with systems of variables in comparative
pseudoreplications are again offered by White and Pesner (1983) and cannot
be elaborated here.
So far I have mentioned 3 classes or replications: virtual, systematic, and
pseudoreplications. Of these three classes only virtual and systematic repli-
cations confirm or disconfirm the conclusions of a study conducted at an
earlier time. In the remainder of the chapter I proceed to a review of
replications of experiments or studies done in psychology and make an
attempt to reformulate the question of enhancing confidence in results of
psychology. Pseudoreplications will not be included in this review. What we
are interested in is virtual and systematic replications as they are done
frequently in natural sciences.
REVIEW OF REPLICATIONS OVER THE YEARS 1983-1988
For this review 277 virtual and systematic replication studies, published in the
major psychological journals, were retrieved from the database Psyclit,
covering a time range between January 1983 to June 1988. Similar to the
procedure of Bahr et al. (1983), the studies were selected on the basis of the
word replication in the title of the study. It was assumed that dose replications
of original studies would make a reference to this procedure in the title.
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Random inspections of the database without any key word at all showed that
95% of what safely can be called a replication could be obtained in this way.
Bahr et ai. (1983) found over 300 replicative studies for the years
1973-1981. He offered a typology of replications based on time, place,
method, and subject difference, which I do not follow here. The reason is that
in order to assess the amount of virtual replications as defined above the study
must be done by another research group. This category, however, was not
included in the typology of Bahr et al..
The 277 virtual and systematic replications were distributed as shown in
Table 7.5.
According to our criteria, only a little over 10 virtual and systematic
replications can be expected in experimental and clinical psychology in one
year (77 and 67 studies respectively, divided by 6 years). In child psychology,
the expectation rate drops to about 5 per year, and about 7 out of the 8,000
tests in active use (Shelley & Cohen, 1986, p. 7) may be expected to be
reevaluated per year.
In clinical psychology, according to estimations by Grawe, Siegfried, Do-
nati, and Bernauer (in preparation), Grawe, Siegfried, Donati, and Bernauer
(1986), Grawe, Siegfried, Bernauer, Donau, and Louis (1987), and Siegfried
(1985a, 1985b, 1986), about 400 controlled psychotherapy studies per year
are published. The chances of a replication, therefore, are about 3% for each
study per year according to our data. It is safe to say that even without
discrimination of different classes of replication procedures virtual and sys-
tematic replications are very rare in psychology.
Dividing replications in clinical psychology further into different diagnostic
categories leads to the distribution shown in Table 7.6.
Table 7.5. Frequency of replications in different areas of psychology
Psychological field N
Expérimentât psychology 67
(includes perception, memory, communication,
IQ, attitude, identity, perception of others)
Clinical psychology 77
treatment 17
disorders 32
mental retardation 5
other 23
(survey, predictors, cross-cultural comparisons, reviews)
Child psychology 29
Validation of measurements 39
other 58
(politics, education, medical studies, parapsychology,
animal research)
unclassified 7
TOTAL 277
Table 7.6. Breakdown of replicated clinical studies according to diagnostic categories
Disorder and author N and replicated finding
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Family
Families with high expression of emotions
express more emotionally negative statements.
Expression of excessive critique and emotional
over-involvement lead more likely to relapse.
Relapse best predicted by family members' expressed emotion.
Increased vulnerability for offsprings of schizophrenics.
life events
More life events in schizop benies.
Basic issues
Measurement of habitation in schizophrenics.
Schizophrenics fail to utilize gestalt grouping principles.
Discrimination between brain-injured and
chronic schizophrenic patients.
Strachan et al. (1986)
Vaughn et al. (1982)
Vaughn et al. (1984)
Marcus et al. (1985)
Caton & Fraccon (1985)
Levinson et al. (1985)
Wells & Leventhal (1984)
Shelly & Goldstein (1983)
ALCOHOL
treatment
Acceptance of illness nature of alcoholism
greater after treatment.
Ambivalence to treat alcoholic patients.
relapse
Determinants of relapse (impulsiveness, adjustment
of personal opinions, somatization).
personality
Steer, McElroy. & Beck (1982) Inlrapunitive Self-Attitudes characterize alcoholics.
OBSESSIVE-COMPULSION 2
Bell, Walsh. & Barnes (1985)
Duxbury (1983)
Sandahl (1984)
Grayson et al. (1986)
Salkovskis & Harrison (1984)
Exposure to most feared contaminant leads to
heart rate reduction and subjective anxiety.
Characteristics of intruisive cognitions.
INSOMNIA
Mauri et al. (1982) Two different forms of feedback benefited for
tense and relaxed insomniacs.
Haynes et al. (1985) Stress is a mediator of latency for return to sleep.
77CS 2
Miltenberger et al. (1985)
Finney et al. (1983)
Successful application of two habit reversal programs.
Habit reversal is an effective treatment.
MARITAL CONFLICTS
Scabini (1983)
El wood & Jacobson (1982)
Classifying couples is done on three dimensions:
task leadership, conflict, and affect.
Confirmation of low reliability of spouse observation.
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Excluded from this table were categories with only one replication per
disorder (firesetting, violent offenders, panic attacks, agoraphobia, headache,
epilepsy, erectile dysfunction, suicide, neurology, delinquency, autism, test
anxiety, depression, and behavior disorders). The categories of disorders
were not inspected for their definition by the authors of the studies.
Table 7.6 shows that all together, 20 studies replicate research findings in
various clinically relevant disorders more than once in the past 5 years. It can
safely be concluded, therefore, that research data in clinical psychology are
hardly ever replicated. Originality and novelty are still a major demand for
publication of the research and replications are therefore scarce.
Dividing replications now into virtual and systematic replications and
analyzing them for their outcome shows how little virtual replication is done
in psychology in general.
In Table 7.7, it is analyzed how many replications were conducted sup-
porting scientific theories on human beings, treatments, and disorders. Ex-
cluded from this analysis, therefore, were replications on measurements,
animals, cross-cultural differences, parapsychology, metaanalysis, reviews,
and studies in which it was unclear whether they confirm or not confirm
original studies.
Table 7.7 shows that almost half of the analyzed studies are done by the
same authors or research group. Systematic replication of previous research
h'ndings closely replicates studies done on the same hypothesis. In this way
confidence in the finding of the original study is enhanced. Confidence in the
findings of the original study is not enhanced by doing different experiments
based on the same hypothesis, as Hunt (1975) tried to argue. Replications
serve to enhance confidence in the research finding in the same way as
replications in the natural sciences (Table 7.1). Validity, on the other hand, is
tested by doing different experiments based on the same hypothesis in order
to see how far the hypothesis can be generalized and what conditions have to
be satisfied for a confirmation of the hypothesis.
Virtual replications in Table 7.7 are differentiated between identical, iden-
tical and different, and different outcome. This differentiation is not made in
systematic replication. It proved that almost all systematic replications led to
Table 7.7. Number of studies in systematic and virtual replications
SYSTEMATIC REPLICATION N
Same authors (often extensions of original studies) 63
VIRTUAL REPLICATION N
Different authors, identical outcome in replication 39
Different authors, different outcome in replication 23
Different authors, identical and different outcome in replication 4
STUDIES ANALYZED 129
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a confirmation of the previous findings. Systematic replications are also mostly
done by at least one author who was also involved in the original study.
The frequencies in virtual replications reveal about a 30% chance of a
replication to have a completely different result than the original study.
Compared to natural sciences (Schlenker, 1974), social sciences make virtu-
ally replicated observations as Boyle and all his followers have made them
under each condition in only about a little more than 50% of the repeated
trials. 1 wonder whether Boyle would have been able to arrive at a law about
the resistance of air with such a small amount of few repeated observations.
The review of replications from 1983-1988 should have shown that virtual
replication in psychology is almost totally absent. Secondly, it should have
shown that analyzing an area of psychology like clinical psychology, and
further subdividing it according to the various research areas, narrows the
number of systematic and virtual replications again to a minimal amount.
Even when replications are done, they are conducted in an unsystematic way
(i.e., testing parts of a theory here and there). The result is highly contradic-
tory and inconsistent research findings. Thirdly, our analysis should have
shown that most replications are done as comparisons to a hypothetically
existing population and are pseudoreplications.
The concluding part of this chapter is devoted to the causes of the scarcity
of virtual replications. What causes can there be for the scarcity of virtual
replications in psychology?
The questions of whether there have been enough (Hunt, 1975) or too few
(Bahr et al., 1983) replications in psychology covers the more important
question of whether replication at all is a goal in psychology, and why it is
done after all. I argue that two rather unarticulated motives may prove to be
key questions in future replication research.
One such unarticulated motive in psychological research is that research is
not a kind of a natural science and, therefore, replications function not in the
same way as in natural sciences. I have dealt with the problems of replications
in natural and social sciences rather extensively earlier. In social sciences the
meaning of replication is different from the natural sciences.
I think that many researchers and publishers in the social sciences may
have implicitly admitted that fact by stressing originality and nonrepeti-
tiveness of research. If this fact is accepted, it would make good sense to
refrain from virtually replicating research in psychology.
A second motive of not replicating research in psychology is again a not
outspoken knowledge of the hypostatic nature of much of psychology's
theories and terms. This point needs clarification. Hyman and Wright (1967)
have been concerned with the "deceptive" nature of the term program in
sociology for a long time. All too often, the authors assert, a program is
"simply a statement on paper of what the planners in an agency hoped to do
that has never been hilly translated into action by the field staff" (p. 744).
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Without a careful evaluation, a program is deemed to remain a well sounding
exaggeration of a possibility of action that never materialized. That is what is
meant by the German term hypostatisch (hypostatic): The term promises too
much and an idea of a really existing thing is formed on the basis of this term,
whereas in reality not much is there. The same exaggeration of promising
terms may be found in psychology. There are plenty of terms in psychology
that seem to promise explanations or topics of interest in research. Looking,
however, at the operationalization of these terms in each piece of research,
more than often they represent rather raw clusters of everyday prejudices. A
nice-sounding term like "behavior therapy" may mean anything from giving
tokens up to teaching problem-solving skills to a patient. Such terms as
behavior therapy are only a hypostatic object of research. In fact, what we
should be interested in is which exact form of treatment with which patient
under which circumstances leads to which outcomes (Kiesler, 1971). The con-
tribution of research on behavior therapy, on self-assertiveness, on learned
helplessness, on stages of moral judgment, and on anxiety can be judged only
on the level of operationalization. It is only there that it is possible to see what
actually has been done. Treatment of anxiety, for example, makes sense if and
only if the anxieties involved are specified and the treatment for the specific
anxieties is described. An intervention program must be described exactly,
lest it will remain a hypostatic idea. A questionnaire assessing anxiety is im-
portant in the treatment of anxiety. Statements such as I can't go out at night,
lam afraid to speak up. lam afraid of bridges, and f am afraid of elevators will
make a difference in the treatment of anxiety and the methods chosen to treat
it, even if all these treatments are labeled behavior therapy. Research on
hypostaticly labeled action or treatment programs, and replications of such
programs confirming or disproving hypostatic labels, will necessarily lead to
much contradiction because a wide variety of definitions, leading to different
operationalizations and different outcomes are subsumed under such labels.
Knowing this danger, researchers decide not to replicate research in order to
avoid contradiction. When investigations are described exactly, however,
many contradictions in research results may be explained. But detailed ex-
planation, taking into account much of the possible conditions and relevant
factors, open such a wide variety of influences which differ in each study that
virtual replication in the sense of the natural sciences (holding relevant con-
ditions constant) is impossible.
TOWARD THEORETICALLY GUIDED SYSTEMATIC
REPLICATION
Summarizing the results of this investigation of replication research in psy-
chology, two conclusions can be drawn:
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1. There are good reasons in psychology for not doing replications more
frequently. Psychology has to acknowledge differences in its scientific en-
deavor with the natural sciences. More stress should be given to exact
descriptions of operationalization procedures instead of inventing new,
rather general, labels in order to describe and explain findings.
2. The enhancement of confidence in research results in psychology is not
likely to be achieved by replications of studies and experiments (as it is done
in natural sciences). Natural sciences' replications—holding conditions, con-
texts, procedures, independent and dependent measures constant—appear
not to be possible in social sciences. How then can confidence be enhanced in
social sciences? One route often taken in social sciences is enhancement of
confidence by eloquent rhetorics. However, a well forwarded argument may
set the assumptions such that it cannot be criticised or falsified. Science has
adopted the principle of falsification as a core concept for its advancement.
Rhetorics often do not adopt this principle and are, therefore, not a feasible
way of enhancing confidence in the results of social sciences.
How then can we formulate a verification technique for the social sciences?
It appears that confidence in research results in psychology can be achieved
by conducting well described studies or experiments with as much as possible
identical methods and assessment strategies under different conditions, in
different populations and different circumstances. This would imply choosing
methods in a way that they can be applied in different settings without losing
any of their validity. However, without carefully theorizing at the same time
the construction of experiments and their applications under different condi-
tions will remain highly speculative.
What I am trying to suggest here is the view of theoretically guided
systematic replication as the only nonpseudoverification technique in social
sciences. However, systematic replications have to f u l f i l l two conditions in
order to be replications: (a) Method and assessment strategy must remain as
constant as possible, and (b) Application of as much as possible identical
methods and assessments in different circumstances and different conditions
must theoretically be justified. If method and assessment are not identical in
the replication, then the "replicated" study is, in fact, just another study
hardly related to the original experiment.
If applications of identical methods and assessments in different circum-
stances or in different conditions are theoretically unjustified, there cannot be
a clear hypothesis about the outcome of the replicated finding. The replicated
finding may then either be due to the difference in circumstances of condi-
tions, or due to changes in the procedure of the experiment. It is only on
theoretical grounds that a clear formulation of expectations of outcome can
be formulated.
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An experimenter, for example, may want to replicate a study of a suc-
cessful treatment A for phobic clients. Repeating the study in exactly the
same way on a different sample of phobies leaves the result of the replication
compared to the original study in any case unexplained. The result, if similar
to the original study, can be due to identical or different conditions, leading to
exactly the same outcome. If the replicated rinding is different from the
original study, only provisional suggestions accounting for the difference can
be given.
If the replicated study leads to different results than the original study, and
the replicated study is performed on a different group or in different circum-
stances, the differences of group or circumstances must be accounted for in a
theory, leading to a specific hypothesis prior to the replication. Replicating
the study of phobies for example with agoraphobics alone, therefore, requires
first a theory of differences and similarities in phobies and the subgroup of
agoraphobics which in its turn leads to a specific hypothesis about the effects
of the replicated study on agoraphobics alone. This hypothesis is formulated
on the basis of the first study and leads to a prediction of the replication
outcome. Only with this theoretically formulated hypothesis can confidence
in the result of the replicated outcome be enhanced.
If I am correct with my claims, a difference between virtual and systematic
replication in social sciences can now be formulated as follows:
In virtual replications the interfering factors are hardly known. In fact it
would need a theory of situation, contexts, and social changes in order to
explain similarities or differences of repeated observations in social sciences.
Because we do not have such a theory at this time, virtual replication is hard
to do. If it can be done at all, at least statistical procedures as suggested above
should be performed. The mere hypothesis that the repeated observation will
be the same as the original one does not help here. On which grounds would
such a claim be made? How could it be justified?
As outlined earlier, in theoretically guided systematic replications, keeping
methods and assessment strategies as identical as possible, conducting the
replication in different circumstances or different conditions and predicting
the outcome of the replication on theoretical grounds, is like first introducing
an artificial difference between the original study and the replicated study.
This artificial difference (for example, studying population A in the original
study versus population B in the replicated study) allows for a theoretical
formulation of a specific hypothesis for the outcome of the replicated study. If
this hypothesis is confirmed, confidence in the result of the original, as well as
the replicated study, is enhanced.
In a systematic replication in social sciences, in my view, therefore, first the
theoretical level (the rationale of the experiment or study and the rationale of
replicating the earlier finding on a different population or in different circum
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stances), second, the relation of theory to operationalization of its concepts,
and third, its experimental reapplication in a specific setting must be consid-
ered. Replications in social sciences—different from natural sciences—have
to be embedded in the whole frame of experimental construction because
unlike repetitions of trials in natural sciences, social sciences repetitions are
part of an irreversible ongoing process of social interaction and change.
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PART III
Replication In Practice:
The Interdependence Of
Theories And Empirical
Context
Part III of this volume includes particular efforts of replication of specific
studies that are of crucial relevance for contemporary research on human
development. Three content domains were selected to be included here; (a)
the "activity theory" focus on memory organization of children, (b) the
"cultural-historical theory" and its focus on the use of external mediating
devices in internalization of higher psychological functions, and (c) the
"attachment theory" in its efforts to predict the future outcomes of child
development.
Chapters 8-10 are devoted to the replication of the work of Zinaida
Istomina on children's mnemonic functions. Her study is a rare empirically
sophisticated work in the history of Soviet "activity theoretic" research, with
recording and reporting of relevant descriptive details of the experimental
setting that was meant to show the emergence of memory functions in the
context of meaningful activity. In Chapter 8, Jaan Valsiner provides a back-
ground description of Istomina's original study. This overview is followed by
Wolfgang Schneider and Markus Hasselhorn (Chapter 9) who outline the
results of their systematic research program in which they have attempted to
replicate Istomina's experiment in a careful, well-controlled manner. As the
readers can see, their efforts have resulted in both partial replication and
nonreplication of Istomina's results. Trisha Folds-Bennett (Chapter 10) ana-
lyzes the issue of comparability of the experimental methods that all existing
efforts to replicate Istomina's work have used. Her final conclusions should
lead us to a new way of looking at replicability—given the cultural (personal-
experiential) differences between the children in USSR, Germany, and the
United States (where Istomina's work, and its replication efforts have taken
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place), exact reconstruction of functionally similar experimental settings may
be an impossible task for any experimenter. Where would that realization
take our discussion of replicability as a desired state of affairs (and a canon of
scientific validity)? Some answers to that difficult questions will be reflected in
the Epilogue to this volume.
The replication efforts in the domain of "cultural-historical theory" of Lev
S. Vygotsky are represented here by the efforts of René van der Veer (Chapter
11) to replicate the empirical work of Alexei N. Leontiev from the times when
the latter was still a disciple of Vygotsky's. The "Forbidden Colors Game" was
one of the experimental methods that was used in late 1920s to demonstrate
the use of external "stimulus means" (mediating devices) in the internaliza-
tion process. However, the replication efforts described in Chapter 11 make it
doubtful that this basic tenet of the "cultural-historical theory" is actually
verified by the particular experimental method.
Finally, in Chapter 12, Frans Hubbar d and Rien van IJzendoorn report an
effort to replicate a study by Bell and Amsworth (1972) on the linkages
between infant crying and maternal responsiveness, and the predictions from
these. In the present-day emphasis on "responsive parenting" in most affluent
First World societies, the realm of "attachment theory" that propagates the
relevance of secure emotional ties with the children, has gained ground. The
original findings of Bell and Ainsworth have become a convenient "myth-
truth" in contemporary child psychology. It is therefore quite important that
replication efforts be performed on that study, as the relevance of these
efforts (especially if some inadequacies of the "target study" are overcome) is
substantial. All in all. Part III should elaborate the general ideas discussed
previously among the wealth of empirical detail.
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CHAPTERS
Replicability In Context:
The Problem of Generalization
Jaan Valsmer
Department of Psychology
Uniuersity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
The coverage in this book from now on moves from the general issues of
replicability and its methods to the analyses of examples of replication efforts.
In these efforts, the meaning of "replicability" in science begins to acquire
some—indeed paradoxical—specificity. When the question of replicability is
asked with respect to a particular empirical study that has been available in
the literature, the general imperatives shared by scientists in their collective
culture show the need for clarification—what is it exactly that we try to
replicate, and how can replication of whatever we try to replicate be possible
under conditions that vary from the original study? Finally, the issue of
whether any result (success or lack of it) of our efforts to replicate has any
substantial impact upon our scientific knowledge remains luring us on the
horizons of our "scientific visions."
THE ISSUE OF REPLICABILITY AS TRANSFER
1 argue here that the problem of replicability in science has the same
underlying epistemological structure that the question of transfer (of skills or
knowledge) has within human development. In the latter domain, novel
psychological capabilities that emerge in a specific context need to be trans-
ferred to other (novel) settings, if these capabilities are of serious conse-
quences for development. The issue of replicability in science is similar-
certain findings obtained in a specific context (experimental setting) reflect
knowledge about the causal mechanisms of the phenomena under investiga-
173
174 VALSINER
tion. The adequacy of that knowledge is to be tested in contexts other than
the original one, thus implying transfer.
Similarly to the issues reflected in the case of transfer, the question of
replication can be addressed at either the "horizontal" or "vertical" plane. In
the former, the issues of "virtual" or "exact" replication are made to be of
central importance—a particular empirical finding of a "target study" is
attempted to be replicated by trying to repeat the exact conditions under
which the first finding was obtained. As should be obvious from the previous
chapters in this volume, the framing of the issue of replicability in its "hori-
zontal plane" leads to practical difficulties on the one hand, and to devalua-
tion of science as an enterprise of general knowledge, on the other.
Given the unfeasibility to view replication as a "horizontal" transfer, we
are lelt with the possibility of viewing replicability in science in ways analog-
uous to "vertical" transfer. A certain finding obtained in the "target study"
allowed the scientists to posit the existence of an explanatory model
(=generalization), the adequacy of which needs to be tested in other empir-
ical contexts (=particularization). These other contexts may be created to be
similar to those of the "target study," but can also differ substantially (since it
is the generalized model, and not the particular findings, that is being
replicated). As will become clear from the next chapters, the virtual recon-
struction of the setting of the "target study" may turn out to be an impossible
task for psychological research where the meaning of the settings in which
subjects are in is co-determined by the subjects. Hence, even the most
meticulous format effort to repeat the "target study" in detail may fail to do
so—all the more if the replication efforts take place in other countries and
historical time periods than the original.
RE-VIEWING ISTOMINA: A CROSS-NATIONAL EXPERIMENT IN
REPLICATIONS
The next two chapters are devoted to the issue of replicability in a very
concrete sense—that of replication of the results of a particular study on
children's memory (Istomina, 1948). It would look like a rather ordinary effort
to replicate a study of children's memory, were it not the case that these
replication efforts cross the boundaries of historical time (i.e., replicating a
study published in 1948 in the 1980s) and countries. All the presently existing
replication attempts have been made in Western Europe and North America,
while the "target" of replication originated from the Soviet Union. This
creates an additional complication for all the replicators, who have to tran-
scend their time and scientific socialization in order to be able to address the
replicability issue.
The "target" of the replications—the work of Istomina (1948,1977)—is not
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a "random choice" from the vast existing literature on children's memory
development. Its main focus—that of the context-embeddedness of devel-
oping psychological functions—is very "modern" in the child psychologies of
the 1980s. The bifurcation of approaches to memory development that would
result from either replication of Istomina's work, or from consistent failure to
replicate it, is of fundamental nature. In case Istomina is proven unreplicable,
research on children's memory development can continue along the tradi-
tions of the rest of memory research, in which the phenomenon (mnemonic
functions) is separated from its wider context (motivation of subjects and the
meanings of the experimental situation for them), and then subjected to
experimental study. The results of such study should be interprétable purely
in terms of any theory of memory and its development—without any worries
about "other factors" (of the context) interfering with the purity of the
experimental data.
In contrast, if Istomina's work is replicated, then most of the research on
children's memory development has to be reoriented in its methodology. No
longer would the "purity of the experiment" be usable as interprétable in
terms of theories of memory per se, because the "contextual factors" would
be the main agents that guide the development of memory. In this case, the
object of investigation would have to be transposed from studying memory in
itself to the research on the ways in which the "context" interacts with the
mnemonic processes. That transposition would require a major change in
methodology ("classically pure" application of the experimental method
becomes highly complicated), and an equally complicated breakthrough in
the theoretical sphere ("theories of memory" will become "theories of child-
environment relationships" that are explicated on the basis of the study of
mnemonic functions). Thus, Istomina's work constitutes an experimentum
cruets for a vital tradition in our contemporary developmental psychology of
memory.
WHAT DID ISTOMINA SET OUT TO ACCOMPLISH?
The particular memory study conducted by Istomina (1948) stands at the
crossroads of different perspectives on memory development that emerged
in Soviet psychology from the late 1920s onwards. On the one hand, the
"cultural-historical approach" of Lev Vygotsky emphasized the relevance of
the emergence of "higher" (voluntary) forms of psychological functions that
were seen as qualitatively new forms emerging from the "lower" (involun-
tary) functions. On the other hand, the "Kharkov school" of Soviet psy-
chology (A.N. Leontiev, P.I. Zinchenko, and others) followed the line of the
general Zeitgeist of the 1930s and built their psychological theories around
the idea of activity of persons in their environmental settings. In that focus,
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the "Kharkov school" continued the long tradition of emphasizing the role of
active person-in-environtnent in Russian psychology (Lazurskii, 1916; Basov,
1929).
By emphasizing the role of activity in the development of psychological
functions, the research orientations emerging from the "Kharkov school"
needed to include the context in which that activity took place. In line with
the traditions of experimental psychology, the first step towards "taking
context into account" was to vary it by some manipulation by the experi-
menter, and then demonstrate that this manipulation has an effect on the
psychological functions under study. This "effect" can be conceptualized in
two different ways. First, it can be demonstrated on the basis of the outcomes
of the psychological functions in question, without any reference to the
processes that led to these (affected) outcomes. Secondly, it can be demon-
strated by looking at the ways in which the processes (that generate out-
comes) change themselves, when the context of their functioning is changed.
Obviously, the change in the functioning of processes is more basic than a
mere change in the outcomes.
Istomina's experiment was set up explicitly under the general ethos of the
"Kharkov school," especially in continuation of the line of thought that
emerged in the work of P.I. Zinchenko on involuntary memory (Istomina,
1948, p. 52, 1977, p. 102). Summarizing the focus of her predecessors,
Istomina set up the theoretical background of her study:
It was demonstrated that involuntary memory is a process mediated ("obuslov-
lennyi" in Russian] in a complex manner by the content and structure of the
particular, always meaningful ["osmyslennyi" in Russian] activity into which it
is included and on the development of which it depends. Its difference from
voluntary memory is not constituted by its own nature, but determined by the
task to which it corresponds. If retention becomes subservient [Russian: "sta-
novitsia podchinennym"] to the special task "to remember," and does not
emerge in the process that corresponds to some other task, then it becomes
voluntary retention. In that process it becomes a special kind of internal act, i.e.,
being oriented towards a definite goal that is in some way motivated and can be
attained with the help of definite means-operations ["sposoby-operatsii" in
Russian). Istomina, 1948, p. 52; see also Istomina, 1977, p. 102)
Following this line of reasoning about task relatedness of the development
of voluntary memory, Istomina proceeded to set up her specific "working
hypothesis" for the investigation of the emergence of voluntary memory:
We assumed that at first, in the earliest and the pre-preschool age, the processes
of memory (memorizing ["zapominanie"), recall ["pripominanie"] are non-
independent (merely belonging to the structure of one or another activity) and
involuntary processes. Later, specifically in the middle-preschool age, these
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processes transform into special internal acts, that is—they become consciously
goal-oriented and voluntary. In other words, we assumed that the child's
transition to voluntary memory constitutes a result of differentiation of a special
kind of acts in his activity—the goal of which is "to remember" or "to recall."
Consequently, this transition presumes, first, the presence of motives that can
make these "mnemonic" goals meaningful for the child. Secondly, it presumes
that the distinguishing of these goals emerges in reality, i.e., that there exists the
process of formation of conscious mnemonic intention, and [the process of
formation] of the acts of remembering and recalling. Thirdly, and finally—it is
necessary that the child also mastered some means of execution of voluntary
acts of remembering and recalling. These acts, of course, do not emerge in the
child immediately in their developed forms, but are formed gradually, by
emergence of different forms that depend upon the factors described above.
(Istomina, 1948, p. 53; see also Istomina, 1977, pp. 102-103)
Thus, it becomes evident that Istomina's "working hypothesis" was one of
developmental differentiation of the memory functions, the emergence of
differentiated "mnemonic goals" from the less differentiated embeddedness
of memory in activity context, and the emergence of conscious control over
the "mnemonic goals" and "mnemonic means" (acts that lead to the attain-
ment of these goals) that have become internalized. Istomina's reference
frame was explicitly developmental in the more restricted sense of this
term—it dealt with the processes of emergence of novel psychological func-
tions on the basis (and assistance) of earlier ones. In harmony with this
reference frame, Istomina set herself two specific goals for her experimental
study: (a) to find out the conditions under which the child differentiates the
goals of "to remember" and "to recall" for the first time, and (b) to reveal the
forms in which the acts of remembering and recalling first emerge, and to find
out how they at first function (i.e., to reveal the nature of memory operations).
The comparison of different contexts in which remembering and recalling
take place was thus a means to the end of understanding of the development
of novel mnemonic functions for Istomina, rather than a goal in itself.
HOW DID ISTOMINA STUDY THE MNEMONIC PROCESSES?
Istomina (like the majority of investigators before and after her) could not
escape the methodological peril of developmental psychology—that of the
necessity to study development through a cross-sectional design. Although
her "working hypothesis" of differentiation of the structure of activity and
mnemonic processes calls for the use of a longitudinal design, the age range
covered (3 to 7 years) was sufficiently large to render the use of longitudinal
design practically impossible. Furthermore, it could be assumed that the need
for a longitudinal design was not dearly recognized by Istomina, since most of
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the research on child development that was close to hers (e.g., Piaget, the
"Kharkov School") did not emphasize nor use the longitudinal design either.
Instead, the emphasis on the differences between contexts of activity begins
to dominate Istomina's reasoning as she proceeds to the empirical setup of the
study (Istomina, 1948, p. 53, 1977, pp. 103-104). In fact, the ontogenetic
framework of the "working hypothesis" became translated into a microge-
netic framework of the empirical study settings, in which the emergence of
novel psychological organization was hoped to be triggered and followed:
With that goal in mind, in addition to the series of experiments that were carried
out along the customary lines of laboratory experiment on remembering and
recalling of meaningful words (we carried those out with children as special
kinds of "lessons" ["zaniatia"]), a special game of the type of ordinary role-play
was organized. That game entailed a specific meaningful ["soderzhatel'nyi"]
situation that created the motive for remembering and recalling., i.e., created
the conditions for the distinguishing and conscious focusing on the goal of
remembering and recalling by the child. For the main series of experiments we
took two similar to each other simplest scripts of games that frequently occur in
ordinary games of preschoolers: the play of "store" and the play of "kindergar-
ten." We connected these two into one united, general script.
For playing "store" we gave the children the following play materials: a toy
cash register and scales, sticks, sand, clay, small thematic toys, paper, etc. For
the play of "kindergarten"—a toy stove, dishes, dolls, etc. Besides, we also
prepared beforehand the "admission slips" ["propuska") to the "store" with the
names of "buys" for reasons that will become clear later.
Six children were engaged in the play at the same time. Three of them were
given the roles of the employees of the "store" ("salesperson," "cashier,"
"doorman" [Russian: "shveitsar", or "guard"—as translated in Istomina, 1977]),
the other three—the roles of the employees of the kindergarten ("teacher,"
"cook," "supplies' manager" ["zavhoz"]). The experimenter and her assistant
obligatorily participated in the play. One of them took upon her the role of the
"store manager", the other—that of the "director of the kindergarten."
The game was played in two adjoining rooms. In one of the rooms the setting
of the "kindergarten" game was organized. In the beginning of the game the
experimenter turned to her subjects with the suggestion "Children, let us play
together. We will have a kindergarten." This was followed by the distribution of
roles between the participants and explanation of what each of them will be
doing. The children arranged the dolls and their belongings, set up the stove,
reorganized the dishes etc. The life of a kindergarten began. The "teacher" was
planning to take "children" for a walk, the "cook" was busy preparing the meal,
the "supplies manager" carried out the orders of the "director," giving out
groceries and bringing in firewood on a truck.
At the same time in the other room the game of "store" was being created.
The experimenter's assistant, who took upon her the role of "store manager,"
discussed with the children who of them will be the "salesperson," who—the
"cashier," and who—the "doorman" ["guard"]. The duties of each of the
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participants were clarified, and the set-up of the "store" started. Some goods
were displayed on the counter, others were distributed behind it. The scales
with weights, bags, and wrapping paper were placed on the counter. The
"cashier" prepared the "receipts" and "money". Finally, everything was ready.
The "manager" sent the "doorman" to the "kindergarten" to announce that the
"store" is open.
In response to that announcement, the "director" of the "kindergarten"
called upon a child who was participating in the game and gave the task of going
to the store to buy things for the kindergarten. The task was always phrased
identically: "Here is the propusk to the store, go and buy.. ." (the "director"
slowly and clearly named a number of objects). After that, the child-subject was
given the "propusk," "money," and a basket for the purchases.
In the "store," the subject showed his "propusk" by the demand of the
"doorman," and turned to the "manager." The "manager," taking the "pro-
pusk" away from the buyer, asked "What have you been ordered to buy?" The
"manager" then listened to what the buyer told her and at the same time
checked off the named objects on the "propusk," marked their recall order by
numbers, and added items that the child mentioned although these were not
included in the list of words-items. If the child forgot any of the items, he was
asked an additional question "But what else do you need to buy?" After that, the
buyer paid the "money" to the "cashier", received the "receipt," went to the
"salesperson" who gave him the goods, and then returned to the "kindergar-
ten." The "propusk" to the "store" was handed back to the experimenter-
"director."
The game continued until all the children in the "kindergarten" had been to
the "store." Then the "store manager" announced that all goods were sold out
and the "store" is closing. That was the end of the game. (Istomina, 1948, pp.
53-55; see also Istomina, 1977, pp. 104-106)
The recording of the data took place in two parallel forms. First, the
propusk (admission slip) constituted the list of words that the experimenter
read to the child, that the child took to the experimenter's assistant who
recorded the recall of the words on the slip. Secondly, both the experimenter
and the assistant (separately) recorded their observations of the child's ac-
tions in the process of performing the tasks. If the data from the admission
slips constituted the basis for the quantitative analyses, then the recordings of
the actual actions were the bases for the qualitative analyses that Istomina
reported.
The second setting of the experiment was made as close to the "lesson" as
possible:
The child was called by the experimenter to her "for a teaching/learning
session" ["dlia zaniatii"), and the experimenter set up the task for the child to
attentively listen to the words, try to remember them, in order to later tell which
words were read to him. The words—analogical in their meanings to the ones
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used in the game instruction-task—were named at about 3-second intervals.
After a short pause (60-90 seconds) the child was to recall, if possible, the whole
list of words; if the subject did not name all words in the list, the experimenter
asked him: "And what else did you have to remember, which other words?" The
records of the data were kept in a standard way.
In one respect these experiments were sharply different from the experi-
ments with game-based task: the remembering in these was very differently
motivated. The goal of remembering was given to the child by the experi-
menter, whereas in the game-based task instruction the child had to distinguish
that goal by himself. In all other respects both kinds of experiments were
balanced with one another, in both cases the task consisted of voluntary
remembering and recalling. The materials to be remembered were similar both
qualitatively and quantitatively (lists of 5, or in a second series 8, items were
given in both conditions), in a similar vein additional questions were given if
necessary, and, finally, the time distribution of the whole process—the interval
between the named words, and that between the last word and the beginning of
the recalling, were the same. (Istomina, 1948, pp. 55-56; see also Istomina,
1977, p. 107)
Thus, Istomina created a contrast between externally (contextually) given
conditions for differentiating the mnemonic task from the ongoing activities.
This contrast could be expected to demonstrate the process of differentiation
of the mnemonic task (in the social—"kindergarten" play—setting), while in
the "lesson" setting the memorization goals were purposefully set up in the
extreme of experimenter-dominated "demands" that could not have linked at
all with the child's own understanding of the need for memorization and
recall. Thus, we could view Istomina's experiment as including an "experi-
mental condition" (the game-setting) that is being viewed on the background
of the "lesson setting" (which serves as a "control condition"). This asym-
metric distribution of the "roles" of these settings seems to follow from the
theoretical underpinnings of Istomina's study (it should be remembered that
Istomina herself was first and foremost an experimenter, rather than a
theoretician). As we will see in the next two chapters, the particular focus of
theoretical interests that different users of settings similar to Istomina's have
used, flavors the process and outcomes of the replications efforts.
FROM ISTOMINA'S STUDY TO ITS REPLICATIONS
The next two chapters will provide an in-depth elaboration of all the replica-
tion efforts of Istomina's study that are known in international research
literature so far (mid-1989). First, the chapter by Schneider and Hasselhorn
guides the readers systematically through the replication efforts that the
authors and the existing literature have reported before. Their chapter
T
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includes also empirical data on their new replication efforts that have not
been published previously. In a systematic manner, Schneider and Hassel-
horn sieve through the experimental details of different replications, control
a number of previously uncontrolled factors, and move towards finding an
answer to the replicability issue by a carefully designed set of steps. The
chapter by Folds turns the Istomina-replications issue from the focus on
outcome data to the analyses of the procedural aspects of the replication
efforts. She shows that all the replication efforts differ in procedural details
(sometimes intentionally, but often unintentionally) from the original proce-
dure, which—in an interesting conjecture that is of relevance for our theoret-
ical understanding of replicability—might-be in principle not repeatable
because of its cultural and historically unique everyday life settings in the
Soviet Union prior to 1948. These chapters will elaborate the "vertical
transfer" notion of replicability as I have outlined here.
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CHAPTER 9
Situational Context
Features And Early
Memory Development:
Insights From Replications
Of Istomina's Experiment
Wolfgang Schneider and Marcus Hasselhorn
Although the need for replication of empirical studies has been emphasized
by numerous researchers in various fields, the total number of true replica-
tion studies seems comparably small, at least in the case of experimental
studies conducted in the social sciences. How can we account for this obvious
discrepancy? In our view, several factors contribute to this unsatisfactory
situation. First, conducting a true replication study does not seem very
attractive to many because the benefit is small at least. If the replication study
confirms the findings of the original study, this result gives further credit to
the author of the original study. As the author of a replication study usually
does not invest much of his or her creativity in the study but simply tries to
follow the original design as closely as possible, the successful replication
does not enhance the researcher's reputation other than illustrating that he or
she is principally able to carry out experimental research properly. If a
replication is unsuccessful, the case is even worse: Given the fact that in most
cases it is impossible to exactly reconstruct the conditions of the original
experiment, the author of the replication study may have a very difficult time
convincing colleagues or reviewers that the deviating findings of the replica-
tion study do indeed point to flaws in the original study and cannot be
explained by deviations in the experimental procedure of the replication
study or by differences in the recruitment of subjects, and so on.
As a consequence, it appears that authors of replication studies should try
to reconstruct the experimental conditions of the original study as closely as
possible. In most cases, this may lead to additional problems because the
detailed information needed for such a purpose is usually not provided in
published materials. From our experience, getting access to more detailed
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information means a considerable investment of both time and energy, going
far beyond the amount of effort typically invested in experimental studies.
A third and even more important problem is that such an effort is usually
not well-received by editors of scientific journals. It appears to us that
demonstrations of replicability do not rank particularly high on journal
editors' priority lists. Again, the situation seems even worse in the case of
failure to replicate because this generally implies nonsignificant results, a
finding regarded as uninteresting and of little scientific value by general
journal policy (cf. later a recontinuation of this point).
Given these problems, it is not surprising that the number of published
replication studies is that small. In our view, this is really unfortunate. As
many experimental studies are based on relatively small sample sizes, it is by
no means obvious that their findings represent stable and easily replicable
effects. Even if facts seem established at a specific point in time, they may only
have transient validity in a rapidly changing society.
It is the major purpose of this chapter to demonstrate how our under-
standing of young children's memory development can be improved by way
of replication efforts of classical studies. The example chosen concerns the
impact of situational context on young children's memory performance, a
topic first systematically addressed in an important study conducted by Z. M.
Istomina in 1948. During the past 40 years the results of this study have
considerably influenced our view of the impact of motivational and social
variables on preschool and kindergarten children's memory development. It
is interesting to note that, at least to our knowledge, no replication study was
conducted before the mid-1980s. In the remainder of this chapter, we want to
address this issue in more detail. After a short description of Istomina's study,
we first focus on the question of why there were no replications of Istomina's
experiment for almost 40 years. Next, the results of two recent replication
studies are discussed in detail, with an emphasis on the reasons provided by
the authors for conducting these studies. Although the results of these two
studies differ in several aspects, they suggest the conclusion that Istomina's
findings cannot be replicated. However, although these two studies told us a
lot about possible methodological problems of Istomina's study, findings of a
more recent replication study indicate that this may not be the whole story.
This replication study, consisting of two related experiments, will be dealt
with in more detail in the final part of this chapter. Interestingly enough, the
first of these experiments indeed replicated Istomina's findings, although it "
improved over the methodological weaknesses of the original study. A closer
inspection of procedural details revealed that specific problems associated
with the context manipulation and not explicitly considered in the former
replication studies could have contributed to this outcome. This possibility
was systematically explored in a second replication experiment which pro-
vided a more complete picture of potential problems with replicating the
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Istomina experiment. The results of this study serve as a basis for the
discussion of possible implications and for concluding comments on this topic.
ISTOMINA'S THEORETICAL APPROACH
Istomina was primarily interested in the question of when and under which
circumstances voluntary, deliberate memorization first emerges. Her
working hypothesis was based on Soviet theories about the development of
voluntary memory in children (cf. Leontjev, 1928, cited by Leontjev, 1977).
According to this theoretical approach, memory processes are not indepen-
dent but integrated into some other activity during the preschool age period
and are thus involuntary. Later in development, these processes are trans-
formed into internal acts, thereby becoming purposeful and voluntary. Isto-
mina assumed that the following preconditions are required for such a
transformation: First, there should be motives and/or motivational incen-
tives making mnemonic goals meaningful; second, these mnemonic goals
should have some concrete reality; and third, the child should have means
(strategies) available supporting voluntary memorization. The aims of Isto-
mina's study were (a) to explore the conditions under which a young child is
able to deliberately remember information, and (b) to determine the forms in
which the acts of memorization first occur, with a focus on the memory
operations by which they are affected.
DESIGN AND RESULTS OF THE ISTOMINA EXPERIMENT
Istomina created two settings—a game and a lesson—for children to re-
member words. Both conditions of the experiment were similar in form but
differed functionally. In the lesson condition, the mnemonic goal was explic-
itly stated by the experimenter and was the only goal of the task. In the game
condition, the children had to set goals by themselves (for details of the
procedure, see Part III, Introduction). Istomina's hypothesis was that the
game situation would be more familiar and also more motivating, and thus,
young children would remember more in the game condition compared to
the lesson condition.
Istomina tested a total of 60 children of the four ages 3-4,4-5,5-6, and 6-7.
The same children participated in both conditions. As Istomina expected,
recall improved notably with age, and children's recall in the game condition
was superior to lesson recall at every age level. See Table 9.1 for an overview
of these findings. Particularly poor memory was observed in the 3-year-olds.
Informal and qualitative observations of the children's behavior led Isto-
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Table 9. l. Mean number of items recalled by preschoolers and kindergartners
as a function ol age and activity (Lesson vs. Game)*
Age (yr)
3-4
4-5
5-6
6-7
Activity
Lesson
0.6
1.5
2.0
2.3
Came
1
3
3.2
3.8
•Reconstructed from "The Development of Voluntary Memory in Preschool-age
Children," by 7.M. Istomina, 1977, Soviet developmental psychology (fl. Cole, Ed.).
pp. 109, 111, New York: Sharpe. Reprinted by permission.
mina to conclude that the youngest age group did not understand the goal of
remembering the items to buy. The major behavioral difference between 3-
and 4-year-olds was that the latter group seemed to make an effort to
remember. Regarding the two oldest age groups (5-6 and 6-7 years), Isto-
mina assumed that these children already were aware of the mnemonic goal,
and that they were capable of achieving that goal by selecting the strategy of
rehearsal. However, although these children behaved similarly in the two
experimental conditions, they performed less well in the lesson condition. It
should be noted that no statistical tests of the data were provided.
ISTOMINA'S INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
Istomina assumed that the consistent recall differences favoring the game
over the lesson condition were due to differential motivational incentives for
the children. Remembering presumably was an intrinsically important goal
and had real meaning for the children in the game situation, especially in
comparison to the lesson situation. Consequently, they probably showed
greater interest in the task. In Istomina's view, differences in motivation could
also account for the finding that even for the two oldest age groups better
performance was obtained for the game condition as compared to the tesson
condition, although attempts to deliberately memorize the items were simi-
larly observed in both conditions. Her explanation was that
the first awareness of remembering and recall as an explicit goal occurs much
more readily if the sense of such a goal follows naturally from the motivating
factor intrinsic in the overall situation . . . rather than lying in a more compli-
cated and indirect relationship between goal and incentive, as was the case in
the laboratory test experiment. (1975, p. 40)
For the following 40 years, this study has been cited widely as evidence that
(a) deliberate remembering is not evident before 4 or 5 years of age, and (b)
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preschoolers remember more in the context of play activities carried out in
familiar settings where memory is not an explicitly stated goal than they do in
situations involving deliberate retention (cf. Weissberg & Paris, 1986).
REPLICATIONS OF ISTOMINA'S EXPERIMENT
Before focusing on those three studies that we conceive of as close replica-
tions of Istomina's study, we wish to speculate about possible reasons it took
so long before replications of Istomina's experiment were carried out. One
obvious reason is that Istomina's study was not known to researchers from
Western countries until its English translation was published in 1975. In our
view, another important reason is that nobody seriously questioned Isto-
mina's results because they were intuitively appealing. Neisser (1982), in his
commentary regarding Istomina's experiment, gives a probably representa-
tive characterization in that he found the study to be both charming and
convincing. Reviews of Soviet investigations of memory and cognition pro-
vided particularly in the seventies by Michael Cole, John Meacham, and
James Wertsch (e.g., Cole, 1978; Meacham, 1977; Wertsch, 1981) lead to an
increasing popularity of Soviet conceptions of cognitive development among
American and European researchers. In particular, the reception of Soviet
theories of cognitive development has stimulated new interest in issues like
the influence of context on development (e.g., Ceci, Bronfenbrenner, &
Baker, 1988), arid the importance of ecological validity for our proper under-
standing of memory phenomena (cf. Perlmutter, 1988). Undoubtedly, the
focus on issues like environmental context and ecological validity apparent in
many recent studies on memory development has increased our knowledge
about memory phenomena considerably (cf. for a review Schneider & Press-
ley, 1989). Accordingly, there seemed to be no reason to question Istomina's
finding that young children's memory processes are influenced by contextual
factors.
Given that Istomina's findings square very well with contemporary views
of memory development, it seems surprising that replicadon studies were
carried out at all. It is indeed difficult to explain why two research groups in
the United States and Germany (Weissberg & Paris, 1986; Schneider & Brun,
1987) independently decided to replicate Istomina's study at about the same
time. It was probably more or less by accident that both groups discovered
possible methodological problems with Istomina's experiment that seemed
serious enough to warrant a replication study.
Before discussing these problems in more detail, we want to make one
important point clear: The goal of all replication studies reviewed in the
remainder of this chapter was to explore the value of Istomina's findings for
current memory research. In our view, it is impossible to replicate Istomina's
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experiment in a strict sense, mainly because possible influences of cohort and
cultural setting cannot be dealt with adequately in contemporary replication
studies. For example, running an errand to a grocery store in order to buy
food and other things for the kindergarten group probably had a different
meaning for the Soviet children in 1948, than for American and German
youngsters of the mid-1980s. Given that access to food was restricted shortly
after World War Two (note that children were given "admission slips"), it
appears that the shopping task was of great personal value and probably
resulted in a feeling of responsibility in the Soviet children that could not be
equally induced in American and German children participating in the repli-
cation experiments (cf. Folds-Bennett, chapter 10). Thus we should keep in
mind that the outcomes of the various replication studies do not tell us much
about whether Istomina was right or wrong; they only give information about
the value of Istomina's findings for current memory research.
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS WITH ISTOMINA'S STUDY
Both Weissberg and Paris (1986) and Schneider and Brun (1987) emphasized
that Istomina's study contains several methodological problems. Although
Istomina provided a very detailed description of her study, including a
number of highly interesting analyses of individual cases, it is very difficult to
reconstruct her study exactly because the procedures were specified vaguely.
Weissberg and Paris (1986) inferred that the order of activities was not
counterbalanced. This is probably right, since we know from the literature
that the need for counterbalancing the order of activities was typically not
realized in Soviet studies of memory development conducted in the 1940s
and 1950s (cf. Schneider & Pressley, 1989, for a review). However, this cannot
be decided on the basis of Istomina's description of the procedure, because
the only information about this point is that the two experiments were carried
out "simultaneously."
Another methodological problem was that different word lists were used in
the two conditions, and that the word lists varied in unspecified ways between
subjects. Further, a closer look at the reports of individual subjects clearly
shows that the procedure was not strictly standardized. The experimenter
occasionally repeated the names of the objects in the game condition but did
not do so in the lesson condition. Thus one is inclined to assume that the
generally superior recall found for the game condition can at least partly be
explained by methodological flaws systematically biased against the lesson
condition.
The results from a few experiments not closely replicating Istomina's study
seemed to confirm this suspicion. By using a performance prediction para-
digm, Wippich (1981) found that the game condition did not yield superior
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recall in preschool children, as compared to the lesson condition. In a more
recent investigation also based on the performance prediction paradigm,
Arbinger and Kubsda (1987) basically replicated Wippich's findings. Further,
Wippich (1985) contrasted laboratory with game conditions for various
memory paradigms. In general, older children always performed better than
younger children in these studies, but most critically, memory context never
affected performance. Given these findings, it seemed to make sense to carry
out close replications of Istomina's study, mainly because of the influence it
has had on current claims concerning young children's memory.
REPLICATION STUDY 1: THE WEISSBERG
AND PARIS (1986) EXPERIMENT
The primary goal of this study was to replicate Istomina's experiment and to
correct the methodological shortcomings mentioned above. That is, the order
of activities was counterbalanced, the same words were used for all children,
and lists of items were counterbalanced across game and lesson conditions. A
total of 96 children participated in the study. There were four age groups,
each with 12 boys and 12 girls. Subjects ranged in age from 3 to 7 years.
Weissberg and Paris' (1986) study differed from the original experiment in
that two different game settings and two lesson activities were used. Word
lists were presented either as part of shopping or party games or as part of
corresponding deliberate lessons. Thus, each child participated in four
memory tasks—remembering food items or names as part of a game or a
lesson activity—in a 4(age) x 2(sex) x 2(activity) x 2(mnemonic object) design.
The experiment was well-controlled: The presentation orders of the four
situations were counterbalanced within age groups, and the sequences of
mnemonic objects were counterbalanced within activities for each group.
The procedure concerning the shopping situation was modeled closely
after Istomina s description (see above, and Chapter 10). However, the sce-
nario differed in several aspects. First, the social component of the original
study was missing. That is, while the game was played in two adjoining rooms
(a "kindergarten" and a "store") in the Istomina study, children in the
Weissberg and Paris study were tested individually in one empty room.
Children were instructed to buy a list of items from the play grocery store, but
were not told that they should buy items for the kindergarten (as were the
subjects in Istomina's study). Second, Paris and Weissberg used a list of six
items (as compared to the five items used by Istomina), which was read twice
in the case of Weissberg and Paris and once in Istomina's experiment.
In the "party" situation, children were shown seven stuffed animals in a
circle. Children were asked to pick the animal they liked the most, which was
usually given the subject's first name (e.g., Johnny). Children were then told
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that the six remaining animals were having a party, and that Johnny would
also like to be at that party. Children were then told that Johnny's problem
was that he did not know the names of the other animals. They were then
given the names of the animals at the party twice, and were asked to
introduce the six animals to Johnny after 60-90 seconds had elapsed.
The lesson counterparts to both games required subjects to recall the same
words after equivalent delays for the sole purpose of remembering. Instruc-
tions were closely modeled after those of Istomina's study.
As a major result concerning the 2-item lists, Weissberg and Parts reported
that children recalled more food items than animal names. In the following, we
focus on the food items which represent the replication part of the Weissberg
and Paris study. Data from the replication study are shown in Table 9.2. As
Weissberg and Paris pointed out, the different patterns of results are apparent
immediately. While children in Istomina's experiment recalled more items in
the game condition than in the lesson condition, the opposite was true in
Weissberg and Paris' study in that recall turned out to be consistently better in
the lesson condition. The sex-by-activity interaction was significant in the
Weissberg and Paris experiment, indicating that while both boys and girls
recalled more in the lesson activities than in the game, boys remembered more
than girls in game activities and less in lesson activities.
A surprising finding of Weissberg and Paris' study was the large number of
subjects who showed signs of rehearsal. Regarding the food items, more
children (about 63%) rehearsed in the lesson condition than in the game
condition (24%). Although older children rehearsed more often than the
younger subjects, it seems remarkable that nearly half of the 3-year-olds
rehearsed words spontaneously in the lesson activity. Weissberg and Paris
concluded from their findings that children's recall does vary in different
contexts, but that the underlying reasons may reflect task-relevant knowl-
Table 9.2. Comparison of the Weinberg and Paris data with Istomina's data: Mean numbers of
words recalled by age and activity
Istomina's Data
Age
3-4
4-5
5-6
6-7
Mean total
Lesson
.6
1.5
2.0
2.3
1.6
Play
1.0
3.0
3.2
3.8
2.8
Ratio'
1.7
2.0
1.6
17
1.8
Sex
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Lesson
3.0
2.5
3.4
3.5
3.9
4.3
4.4
3.8
3.7
Food
Play
2.4
2.3
2.8
2.7
3.5
2.8
4.1
3.8
3.1
KalKi
.8
.9
.8
.8
.9
.7
1.0
1.0
.9
'The ratio is calculated by dividing the words recalled in play by the number recalled in the
lesion condition.
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edge and memory skills elicited in appropriate settings rather than global
motivational dispositions.
REPLICATION STUDY 2: THE SCHNEIDER AND BRUN (1987)
EXPERIMENTS
As noted earlier, Schneider and Brun shared Weissberg and Paris' view that
methodological problems could be responsible for the context effect found in
Istomi na's study. In order to clarify this point, Schneider and Brun first tried to
contact Z. M. Istomina directly at the Pedagogical Institute of Moscow Uni-
versity. Unfortunately, there was no reply. Consequently, Schneider and
Brun decided to carry out research to replicate Istomina's experiment and to
improve on her experimental methods. Although Weissberg and Paris were
convinced that there was no counterbalancing in Istomina's study, Schneider
and Brun were not equally confident, mainly because Istomina's description
of the experimental design was so vague.
Thus they decided to first carry out an experiment which was aimed at
reconstructing the experimental conditions presumably used by Istomina
including the methodological shortcomings as they perceived them. The
expectation was that it would be possible to replicate Istomina's findings
under these circumstances. The second experiment was designed to correct
shortcomings of the original procedure. That is, the order of play and lesson
conditions was counterbalanced, lists of items were counterbalanced across
the two experimental conditions, and precautions were taken to provide
identical, standardized instructional settings in the two experimental condi-
tions. Accordingly, the second experiment was thought to represent a more
appropriate test of the context hypothesis.
Experiment 1. A total of 60 children participated in the experiment.
Children were recruited from four kindergartens in the Munich area. There
were only two age groups in this experiment, with 15 boys and 15 girls in
each. The mean ages of the younger and older groups were about 4 years and
6 years, respectively.
The procedure was closely modeled after that used by Istomina and
described above. However, there were deviations from Istomina's design
similar to those already noted for the Weissberg and Paris study. That is, the
social ("Play kindergarten") component was missing; all children were tested
individually in one single room. Further, the two word lists included 8 items
each, as compared to the 5-item word lists used by Istomina. Eight items were
given in order to avoid ceiling effects; a pilot study with 6-year-olds had
shown that shorter lists do not yield much variance in this age group.
In short, the results revealed that Schneider and Brun were able to replicate
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Istomina's findings. On average, 6-year-olds recalled more than 4-year-olds,
and memory performance in the game condition was significantly better than
performance in the lesson condition for both age groups. No further main
effects or interactions were found. The liberal instructional setting, that is, the
possibility of returning to the experimenter and asking her to repeat the
items, appeared to have different impact in the two experimental conditions:
While in the lesson condition children did not lind it necessary to ask for a
repetition, the latter was more common in the game condition. Not surpris-
ingly, those who asked the experimenter to repeat the items also recalled
more than those who listened to the stimulus list only once. When initial recall
(i.e., prior to any repetition by the experimenter) was used as the dependent
variable, the effect of experimental condition was negligible. Schneider and
Brun concluded from Experiment 1 that a major weakness of Istomina's
experiment concerned the instructional setting: Better recall in the game
condition may have been related to additional repetitions of the stimulus list
in that condition.
Experiment 2. The only difference between Experiment 1 and Experi-
ment 2 concerned the instructions given to the children. In both conditions of
Experiment 2, children were told that they had to remember a list of items
which the experimenter would read to them only once. In addition to the
instruction given in Experiment 1, the experimenter explicitly informed the
subjects that the word lists would not be repeated. Again, a total of 60 children
was recruited. Half were about 4 years old, and half of them about 6 years of
age. There were equal numbers of boys and girls in each group.
The results showed that only the main effect of age was significant. On
average, 6-year-olds recalled more items than 4-year-olds. Although perfor-
mance tended to be better in the game condition, there was no significant
effect of activity. A significant interaction between order of activities and
number of items recalled in the two experimental conditions indicated that,
regardless of age, better recall was obtained for the experimental task that
was presented first.
The data from Experiments 1 and 2 as well as Istomina's data are depicted
in Table 9.3. It seems obvious that the strictly standardized instruction used in
Experiment 2 affected memory performance particularly in the game condi-
tion. As a consequence, the game recall/lesson recall ratios in Experiment 2
were substantially lower than those obtained in Experiment 1 and in Isto-
mina's study. Schneider and Brun (1987) concluded from this that Istomina's
findings could not be replicated when stricter experimental controls were
introduced. Thus the hypothesis that Istomina's findings were due in part to
methodological shortcomings (which was already supported by the outcome
of the Weissberg and Paris experiment) was also confirmed by the results of
Schneider and Brun's second experiment.
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Table 9.3. Comparison of the Schneider and Brun data with Istomina's data: Mean number of
words recalled by age and activity
Istomina's data Experiment] Experiment 2
Age Lesson Game Ratio Lesson Game Ratio Lesson Game Ratio
4 1.05 2.00 1.8 1.63 3.56 2.2 1.59 2.08 1.3
6 2.15 3.50 1.7 3.06 5.46 1.8 2.53 2.79 1.1
'Data were collapsed across the 3-4- and 5-year-olds on the one hand and the 5-6- and
6-7-year-old» on the other hand.
A COMPARISON OF THE WEISSBERG AND PARIS (1986) AND
SCHNEIDER AND BRUN (1987) EXPERIMENTS
At first glance, the experiments carried out by Weissberg and Paris (1986) and
Schneider and Brun (1987) seem to convey the same message, namely, that
Istomina's findings obtained in the 1940s are obscured by methodological
flaws and at least cannot be generalized for children raised in the 1980s.
However, a closer comparison of the two replication studies reveals that their
results differed in several aspects. First, Weissberg and Paris found that their
subjects generally recalled more items in the lesson condition, as compared to
the game condition, whereas no significant difference between conditions
was obtained by Schneider and Brun when stricter experimental controls
were introduced in Experiment 2. A second difference concerned the fre-
quency of rehearsal. In the Weissberg and Paris study, a surprising finding
was the large number of children who rehearsed. On the other hand, only a
few children in the Schneider and Brun study showed spontaneous verbal
rehearsal. Possibly related to this, the children in the Weissberg and Paris
study recalled considerably more than the children in the Schneider and Brun
study, regardless of age and condition. This finding seems particularly sur-
prising given that more items per set were used in the Schneider and Brun
study.
How can we account for these differences? We can only speculate about
the underlying causes. One possibility is that the repeated presentation of the
word lists in the Weissberg and Paris study may have contributed to the high
frequency of rehearsal observed in their sample. As those children who
rehearsed words recalled significantly more words than those who did not
rehearse, regardless of age, the overall higher recall observed in the Weiss-
berg and Paris study could be due to the comparably higher incidence of
rehearsal. If this holds true, the question remains why Weissberg and Paris's
subjects rehearsed more in the lesson condition than they did in the game
condition. In Weissberg and Paris's view, this finding can be attributed to the
fact that there were more distractions involved in the game condition.
Although this explanation seems to make sense, it does not account for
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Schneider and Brun's finding that their subjects tended to recall more in the
game condition than in the lesson condition.
Taken together, a systematic comparison of the two replication studies
reveals a number of differences in findings that are very difficult to explain
given the information at hand. While in both studies an attempt was made to
replicate Istomina's design, a closer inspection of the procedural details shows
that not only did the procedures and materials used in the two replication
studies differ from each other but they also differed in several aspects from
the original study. As noted above, the social component inherent in Isto-
mina's study (i.e., Playing Kindergarten) was not included in the replications.
Although we do not think that the failure to replicate Istomina's results is due
to this aspect—in fact it could have increased the number of distractions
involved in the game condition—it is certainly unfortunate that the implica-
tions of this aspect were not assessed. We are thus left with a dilemma:
Although the results from the two replication studies indicate that several
methodological problems could have biased Istomina's findings, the extent to
which deviations from the original procedures and materials affected the
outcomes of the replication studies is impossible to assess.
Given these problems, we decided to conduct another replication study just
to explore the significance of other variables that had not been systematically
controlled in the two previous replications.
REPLICATION STUDY 3: HASSELHORN
AND SCHNEIDER (1990)
A closer inspection of Schneider and Brun's (1987) data reveals that repro-
duction probabilities for single items varied considerably in both experi-
ments. We were led to the conclusion that this extreme variability could be
due to effects of attractiveness or salience of the item materials. Apparently,
children remembered the more attractive objects much better. We decided to
carry out another replication experiment to explore more systematically the
effects of attractiveness of item materials on recall. The question of specific
interest was whether Schneider and Brun's (1987; Experiment 2) results (i.e.,
the failure to replicate Istomina's findings) could be replicated for both
attractive and unattractive stimulus materials.
Experiment 1. To assess the attractiveness of item materials, a pilot
study was carried out with 40 4- and 6-year-old children, with 20 subjects in
each age group. Children were presented with a total of 40 photographs
showing various objects. According to our judgment, 20 of these objects were
probably attractive for most subjects, whereas the remaining objects were
perceived of as rather unattractive. Children were given four sets of 10 items.
Each set included five items rated as attractive and five items rated as
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unattractive. The subjects were told to first choose those three items (out of
10) that they considered most attractive f'show me the three pictures that you
like most"), and then to select those three items out of the remaining seven
that they found least attractive ("show me the three pictures that you like
least"). Attractiveness judgments were analyzed separately for the two age
groups. The list of unattractive items chosen for Experiment 1 consisted of 8
items that were similarly classified as unattractive by 4- and 6-year-olds. The
following items were considered unattractive by most children: toothpaste,
vase, handkerchiefs, rock, screw driver, bulb, sponge, and cigarettes (Zahn-
pasta, Vase, Taschentuch, Stein, Schraubenzieher, Glühbirne, Schwamm,
Zigaretten).
The list of attractive items chosen for Experiment 1 included 8 items
selected as attractive by the majority of children in both age groups. The
following objects were rated as attractive: Toy car, crayons, balloon, teddy
bear, chocolate egg, engine, licorice, and sailboat (Spielzeugauto, Malstift,
Luftballon, Teddybär, Schokoladene!, Eisenbahn, Lakritze, Segelboot).
A total of 128 children participated in Experiment 1. There were two age
groups of children, with 64 children in each. The mean ages of the younger
and older groups were about 4 and 6 years, respectively. While there were
equal numbers of boys and girls in the younger group, the older group
consisted of 24 boys and 40 girls. Children were recruited from kindergartens
in the Göttingen West Germany area. With each age group, subjects were
randomly assigned to the two activity (game vs. lesson) and attractiveness
conditions. The procedure of this experiment differed from that used by
Schneider and Brun in that items were not only read to the children but also
presented visually at the same time. Another difference concerned the fact
that items were given twice in this experiment but only once in the Schneider
and Brun study.
Preliminary analyses revealed that there were no effects of sex. Thus data
were collapsed across the sex variable. Figure 9.1 shows the mean number of
items recalled as a function of age, item attractiveness, and activity. Analyses
of variance revealed a significant effect of age (F(l,120) = 22.2, p <.001).
Six-year-olds recalled more items than 4-year-olds. There were also main
effects of attractiveness (F(l,120) = 11.0, p < .001) and activity (F(l,120) =
13.4, p < .001). However, these effects were qualified by a significant activity
by attractiveness interaction (f(l,120) = 6.0, p < .05). Post-hoc comparisons
revealed that better recall in the game condition was restricted to the
attractive item materials, regardless of age.
In addition to children's recall, signs of rehearsal were also recorded as a
simple dichotomous variable. Children who either showed lip movements or
verbally repeated the words were classified as active rehearsers. Based on
these selection criteria, about 47 percent of the older children and about 41
percent of the younger children were classified as active rehearsers. There
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Figure 9.1. Mean number of items recalled as a function of age, item attractiveness, and
activity (data from Hasselhorn & Schneider, 1990; Experiment 1).
were slightly more boys than girls among active rehearsers (50% vs. 38%),
and less children rehearsed in the lesson condition than in the game condi-
tion. However, these differences did not prove statistically significant. The
only effect approaching significance was observed for item attractiveness (F
(1,120) = 3.2.P <. 10): Although about 52% of the children presented with
attractive items actively rehearsed the stimuli, only 36 percent of the children
presented with unattractive items did so. Point-biserial correlations between
rehearsal and recall were nonsignificant for both younger and older children
(r's = .04 and - .06, respectively), indicating that the systematic relationship
between rehearsal and recall reported by Weissberg and Paris was not found
in this experiment.
Taken together, the results of this experiment seem to indicate that the
context effect in favor of the game condition reported by Istomina can be
replicated even after methodological problems of Istomina's study have been
removed. However, the effect may not be as general as originally assumed,
that is, restricted to learning materials that seem particularly attractive for
young children. Thus the results of Experiment 1 suggest that it does not
make much sense to talk about general effects of the context because
different features of the situational context may turn out to be relevant in
memory studies with young children. It seems that not only objective envi-
ronmental features of the learning situation (game vs. lesson) but also subjec
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live features like the perceived attractiveness of stimulus materials contribute
to this effect. Apparently, different context features interact in influencing
young children's memory performance.
If this is so, a reasonable next step seems to explore other features of
situational context possibly relevant for memory performance. In order to
find out about additional context features, we decided to interview our
experimenters of Experiment 1, asking them to reconstruct the procedural
details as closely as possible. Further, we analyzed some tape recordings of
experimental sessions which originally were produced as instructional mate-
rials in developmental psychology classes at the University of Göttingen.
Both the discussions with the experimenters and the inspections of tape
recordings confirmed our suspicion that the game and lesson conditions
differed in several ways. In addition to the environmental context features,
the experimenters' behavior also varied across activities. It appeared that the
game condition seduced the experimenters to communicate in a more
friendly, motivating, and empathie way with the children than they did in the
more sterile lesson condition.
There were several signs supporting the assumption that the type of
activity influenced the experimenters' behavior. First, it seemed that the
experimenters established a more personal contact with the subjects in the
game condition, as compared to the lesson condition. For example, in the
lesson condition the experimenter would start with instruction such as "Let's
play a game together" and then explain the procedural details to the child. In
the game condition, the experimenter would typically begin with "Let's play
doing an errand in a grocery store. You probably have done that before with
your mother, haven't you?" In most cases, this question led to a short
conversation between child and experimenter, with the child informing the
experimenter about his or her experiences in a shopping situation. Such
conversations did not take place in the lesson condition.
Further, the tape recordings revealed that the pitch of the experimenters'
voices differed between the two conditions. That is, the experimenter's voice
tended to be lower and more monotone in the lesson condition, as compared
to the game condition. Moreover, there seemed to be systematic differences
regarding the way the experimenter verbally reinforced children's responses
in the two conditions. These differences were not quantitative but qualitative
in nature. For example, in the lesson condition, the experimenter's usual
comment on correct responses was "right" (ja), as compared to a "great" (sehr
gut) following a correct response in the game condition. Finally, our interview
with the experimenters revealed that they tended to nonverbally encourage
children to persist and to try recall of items (e.g., via gestures) in the game
condition but not in the lesson condition.
Experiment 2. Given these specific problems, we decided to conduct
another replication experiment. The major goal of this experiment was to
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explore whether the context effect found in Experiment 1 with attractive
stimulus materials could be replicated with experimenters being informed
about the possible influences of environmental context on their behavior in
the experimental session. A second aim of Experiment 2 was to explore the
impact of item presentation mode (visual vs. acoustic) on memory perfor-
mance.
Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in two ways. First, the experi-
ments were informed about the influence of the game situation on their
behavior and were instructed to behave similarly in the two activity condi-
tions. Second, item attractiveness was varied intraindividualty and was based
on individual attractiveness judgments.
A total of 112 4- and 6-year-old children participated in Experiment 2, with
56 subjects in each age group. There were the same number of boys and girls
in each group. Subjects were recruited from 5 kindergartens in the Göttingen
and Munich areas. Children were presented with a list of 10 items (5 attractive
and 5 unattractive items). In the visual presentation mode condition, children
were shown the photographs of the to-be-recalled objects, whereas items were
read to the children in the acoustic presentation mode condition.
Again, preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects of sex on recall.
Thus, recall data were collapsed across this variable and analyzed separately
for attractive and unattractive items (cf. Figure 9.2). Accordingly, a two (age
groups) by two (presentation modes) by two (activities) by two (attractiveness
levels) design was used, with the last factor repeated within subjects. With the
exception of presentation mode, all main effects were significant. Analyses of
variance revealed a main effect of activity (F(l, 104) = 7.7, p < .01), indicating
that children recalled more in the lesson condition than in the game condition.
The main effectsof age (F(l, 104) = 19.3, p <.001) and item attractiveness (F
(1,104) = 26.8.P <. 001) were qualified by a significant age by attractiveness
interaction (F(l,104) = 12.3,p <.01). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the
age effect was restricted to attractive items, and that the attractiveness effect
held only for the 6-year-olds. Undoubtedly, the most interesting finding of
Experiment 2 concerned the reversed context effect: It was not in the game
condition but in the lesson condition that children recalled more objects, re-
gardless of age. However, this context effect was qualified by a significant
three-way interaction between activity, age, and presentation mode (fl[l,104)
= 6.0, p < .05), indicating that older children's better recall in the lesson
setting was restricted to the unattractive items. Thus the results of Experiment
2 replicated those obtained by Weissberg and Paris (1986).
As in Experiment 1 children were classified as active rehearsers versus
nonrehearsers. While about 48% of the total sample showed signs of re-
hearsal, a two (age groups) by two (presentation modes) by two (activities) by
two (sexes) analysis of variance only revealed a marginal age by sex interac-
tion, indicating that there were more boys among the older rehearsers.
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Figure 9.2. Mean number of items recalled as a function of age, item attractiveness, and
activity (data from Hasselhorn & Schneider, 1990; Experiment 2).
How can we account for the findings concerning the recall data? As noted
earlier, one explanation offered by Weissberg and Paris is that the mnemonic
goal of the task can be obscured by several task-irrelevant aspects of the
game condition. Our observations of children's behavior in the game condi-
tion support such an assumption. For example it appeared that several
children did not pay as much attention to the items read or shown to them
than to details of the play grocery store ("What kind of stuff do you have in the
grocery store?"). Similarly, signs of distractions became also apparent in the
retrieval phase of the game condition ("I think some of the things I should buy
were not at the grocery store"). Given the limited attentional capacity of these
young children, it does not seem surprising that their recall was consistently
low in the game condition.
How can we account for the fact that a (restricted) context effect was found
in Experiment 1? We think that the problems related to the confounding
noted above produced the findings to a considerable extent. Apparently, the
experimenters' extremely friendly, motivating, and supportive behavior in
the game condition helped to establish the mnemonic goal and more than
compensated for the distractions, at least in the case of the attractive items.
On the other hand, the findings of Experiment 2 indicate that the more
neutral behavior shown by the experimenters had a different effect: Children
seemed to distribute their cognitive resources across several goals and activ-
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explore whether the context effect found in Experiment 1 with attractive
stimulus materials could be replicated with experimenters being informed
about the possible influences of environmental context on their behavior in
the experimental session. A second aim of Experiment 2 was to explore the
impact of item presentation mode (visual vs. acoustic) on memory perfor-
mance.
Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in two ways. First, the experi-
ments were informed about the influence of the game situation on their
behavior and were instructed to behave similarly in the two activity condi-
tions. Second, item attractiveness was varied intraindividually and was based
on individual attractiveness judgments.
A total of 112 4- and 6-year-old children participated in Experiment 2, with
56 subjects in each age group. There were the same number of boys and girls
in each group. Subjects were recruited from 5 kindergartens in the Göttingen
and Munich areas. Children were presented with a list of 10 items (5 attractive
and 5 unattractive items). In the visual presentation mode condition, children
were shown the photographs of the to-be-recalled objects, whereas items were
read to the children in the acoustic presentation mode condition.
Again, preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects of sex on recall.
Thus, recall data were collapsed across this variable and analyzed separately
for attractive and unattractive items (cf. Figure 9.2). Accordingly, a two (age
groups) by two (presentation modes) by two (activities) by two (attractiveness
levels) design was used, with the last factor repeated within subjects. With the
exception of presentation mode, all main effects were significant. Analyses of
variance revealedamain effect of activity (F(l, 104) = 7.7, p <. 01), indicating
that children recalled more in the lesson condition than in the game condition.
The main effects of age (F(l ,104) = 19.3, p < .001) and item attractiveness (F
(1,104) = 26.8.P <. 001) were qualified by a significant age by attractiveness
interaction (/"(1,104) = 12.3,p <.01). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the
age effect was restricted to attractive items, and that the attractiveness effect
held only for the 6-year-olds. Undoubtedly, the most interesting h'nding of
Experiment 2 concerned the reversed context effect: It was not in the game
condition but in the lesson condition that children recalled more objects, re-
gardless of age. However, this context effect was qualified by a significant
three-way interaction between activity, age, and presentation mode (F(\ ,104)
= 6.0, p < .05), indicating that older children's better recall in the lesson
setting was restricted to the unattractive items. Thus the results of Experiment
2 replicated those obtained by Weissberg and Paris (1986).
As in Experiment 1 children were classified as active rehearsers versus
nonrehearsers. While about 48% of the total sample showed signs of re-
hearsal, a two (age groups) by two (presentation modes) by two (activities) by
two (sexes) analysis of variance only revealed a marginal age by sex interac-
tion, indicating that there were more boys among the older rehearsers.
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Figure 9.2. Mean number of items recalled as a Junction of age, item attractiveness, and
activity (data from Hasselhorn & Schneider. 1990; Experiment 2).
How can we account for the findings concerning the recall data? As noted
earlier, one explanation offered by Weissberg and Paris is that the mnemonic
goal of the task can be obscured by several task-irrelevant aspects of the
game condition. Our observations of children's behavior in the game condi-
tion support such an assumption. For example it appeared that several
children did not pay as much attention to the items read or shown to them
than to details of the play grocery store ("What kind of stuff do you have in the
grocery store?"). Similarly, signs of distractions became also apparent in the
retrieval phase of the game condition ("I think some of the things I should buy
were not at the grocery store"). Given the limited attentional capacity of these
young children, it does not seem surprising that their recall was consistently
low in the game condition.
How can we account for the fact that a (restricted) context effect was found
in Experiment 1? We think that the problems related to the confounding
noted above produced the findings to a considerable extent. Apparently, the
experimenters' extremely friendly, motivating, and supportive behavior in
the game condition helped to establish the mnemonic goal and more than
compensated for the distractions, at least in the case of the attractive items.
On the other hand, the findings of Experiment 2 indicate that the more
neutral behavior shown by the experimenters had a different effect: Children
seemed to distribute their cognitive resources across several goals and activ-
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ities, with only one of them being the mnemonic goal implemented by the
experimenter. In comparison, children have no problem using most of their
cognitive capacity to recall items in the lesson condition, mainly because no
secondary goals are available in this situation. Thus, we assume that the
information processing capacity interpretation suggested by Weissberg and
Paris is the most parsimonious in explaining the reversed context effects
found in Experiment 2.
Alternatively, one could argue that it is not the difference between condi-
tions but the structure within each of them that either gives or not the
expective sample differences. So, by way of altering instruction style and
triggering individual attractiveness to given objects in children, one can make
the lesson condition more effective than the game condition. Likewise, by
changing the friendliness of the game partner and giving different objects to
remember, one can make the game condition ineffective. All these experi-
mental variations concern the second structure, making the comparisons
between settings quite unpredictable from study to study.'
GENERAL DISCUSSION
At the very beginning of this chapter we discussed several problems replica-
tion studies have to deal with. We noted that experimenters failing to
replicate a classic study almost certainly will experience difficulties with
convincing the scientific community that the old study was indeed wrong. We
think that the description of the three replications of Istomina's study exper-
iment given in this chapter is well suited to illustrate the various problems that
can be experienced in such a case.
To summarize, it appeared that the first two replication studies (Weissberg
& Paris, 1986; Schneider & Brun, 1987) built a strong case against Istomina's
original findings in that both studies were not able to replicate Istomina's
results. This was all the more impressive as both studies improved Istomina's
methodology and were conducted in different cultural contexts. However, a
closer look at the outcomes of the two replication studies revealed that their
findings differed in several aspects. Probably most important, Weissberg and
Paris found a reversed context effect, indicating that American youngsters
performed better in the lesson condition than they did in the game condition,
whereas Schneider and Brun's German children still tended to be better
(although not significantly) in the game condition than in the lesson condition
after strict methodological controls were established. Another major differ-
ence between the two replications was that most children in the Weissberg
and Paris study used verbal rehearsal, particularly in the lesson condition,
'This is the interpretation preferred by Jaan Valsiner. We are grateful for his suggestion.
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which helped in improving recall, whereas Schneider and Brun's subjects
rarely used this mnemonic strategy.
The third replication study (Hasselhorn & Schneider, 1990) was carried out
in order to explore the importance of additional context features not system-
atically considered in the two previous replications. The h'rst experiment
investigated the relevance of item attractiveness for memory performance,
yielding the interesting as well as puzzling finding that Istomina's results
could be replicated in the case of particularly attractive item materials.
However, a closer inspection of procedural details revealed that not physical
content per se, but different behavior of the experimenter in the two activity
conditions seems to be responsible for the results. This suspicion was con-
firmed in a subsequent replication study that took care of the experimenter
problem: In this experiment, the reversed context effect of Weissberg and
Paris could be replicated, whereas the effect of item attractiveness was found
to be restricted to the older children, positively affecting performance in both
activity conditions.
What did we learn from all these replications?
First of all, it seems that even minimal differences in the experimental
design and/or procedure can have dramatic effects on experimental out-
comes. Our description of the replication studies revealed that they were not
replications in the strict sense, but conceptual replications (see Finifter, 1975,
for a more detailed discussion of this terminological distinction). That is, the
major goal of the studies was to replicate Istomina's findings but not to
reconstruct the design of the original study in detail. For example, we already
referred to the fact that the social component ("Playing kindergarten") of
Istomina's experiment was not included in the replications. This is also true
for Experiment 1 of Schneider and Brun (1987), which came closest to a
replication in the strict sense.
Why has no one tried to carry out a replication in the strict sense? There are
several reasons. First, the information concerning procedural details given in
Istomina's study are too vague to allow for a replication which matches every
detail of the original study. Schneider and Brun's attempts to get more
detailed information from Istomina were unsuccessful. Thus it appears that
the ideal replication in the strict sense is impossible in the case of Istomina's
study. But even if it were possible to exactly reconstruct Istomina's design, the
inclusion of the social component would probably cause considerable prob-
lems. That is, the inclusion of a "Playing Kindergarten" setting would almost
certainly add to the methodological problems because it is probably impos-
sible to carry out a standardized experimental procedure using such a setting.
Thus our conclusion is that a replication study in the strict sense is neither
possible nor does it make much sense in the case of Istomina's experiment.
We think that there is sufficient empirical evidence demonstrating the impact
of methodological flaws on the outcomes of Istomina's study. Therefore, it
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seems much more important to explore the possibility of conceptual replica-
tions.
By and large, the conceptual replications reviewed in this chapter suggest
the conclusion that Istomina's findings cannot be generalized to current
memory research. That is, those replication experiments which methodolog-
ically improved over Istomina's experimental design did not find any evi-
dence for the context effect reported by Istomina. The context effect could
only be demonstrated in those two experiments that either intentionally
included the methodological flaws observed in Istomina's study (Schneider &
Brun, Experiment 1) or that were shown to (unintentionally) include addi-
tional methodological problems at least from a strict experimental point of
view (Hasselhorn & Schneider, 1990, Experiment 1). The results of these two
experiments suggest that the induction of particularly motivating experi-
mental conditions in the game situation (e.g., a strong personal commitment
of the experimenters) was responsible for the effect in favor of the game
context. These findings are due to the fact that the experimenters behaved
differently in the two conditions, and must be interpreted as artifacts from a
methodological point of view.
As indicated by the results of the Weissberg and Paris (1986) and Hasselhorn
and Schneider (1990, Experiment 2) replications, it is more reasonable to ex-
pect a reversed context effect in strictly controlled experiments conducted in
the eighties. It seems that there are at least two possible explanations for the
fact that better memory can be observed in the lesson condition, as compared
to the game condition. First, there is no doubt that the educational environ-
ments available to American and German children in the 1980s dearly differ
from those typically experienced by Soviet children in the 1940s. Probably due
to effects of preschool education, television, and parental influences, even 3-
to 4-year-olds are capable of voluntary memory (cf. Baker-Ward, Ornstein, &
Holden, 1984; Sodian, Schneider, & Perlmutter, 1986). American and German
preschoolers are no longer bewildered by requests to remember lists of words.
As indicated by the findings of Weissberg and Paris, they may even know how
to use mnemonic strategies efficiently at a very early age.
The second explanation offered by Weissberg and Paris concerns the
negative impact of task-irrelevant aspects of the game. That is, several
distractors embedded in the game situation (e.g., attractive objects in the
grocery store) may obscure the mnemonic goal of the task and instead
generate new goals (tike playing with those objects) that are detrimental to-
il not incompatible with—the mnemonic goal implemented by the experi-
menter. Our observations (cf. Hasselhorn & Schneider, 1990, Experiment 2)
do confirm the conclusion that young children can make more use of their
limited information processing capacity in the lesson condition than in the
game condition, mainly because there are no secondary goals competing in
the lesson condition.
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AU in all, the conceptual replications of Istomina's study clearly show that
young children are better at remembering lists of words in sterile lesson
conditions than in more stimulating game conditions, provided that adequate
methodological controls are implemented in the experiment. Does this imply
that more sterile and—at least to a certain extent—boring learning situations
guarantee better memory performance in young children? Is this the message
to convey to contemporary memory researchers? We actually do not think
so. Let's play the devil's advocate for a moment. We think that the lesson we
learned from Istomina's experiment and those replications which corrected
its methodological flaws is that the game situation can have enormous
motivational effects which in turn seem to facilitate remembering in young
children. Apparently, the measures taken to eliminate the experimenter's
behavioral differences in the two experimental conditions caused these
motivational impacts to disappear. Please note, for example, that in the
Hasselhorn and Schneider (Experiment 2) study we did not ask the experi-
menters to act as enthusiastically in the lesson condition as they already did in
the game condition, but instead asked them to slow down and act more
neutral in the game condition than they did before. The reason is that we do
not know how to elicit the same kind of motivation and a similarly stimulating
atmosphere in the lesson condition than is possible in the game condition. We
thus cannot exclude the possibility that social context may have a much more
tremendous impact on young children's memory than suggested by the
replication studies. However, we are left with the dilemma that it is probably
impossible to test such an assumption without violating methodological
standards typically referred to as internal validity.
In this regard, we would like to note that our inspection of the various
replication studies revealed that it is important to distinguish among different
groups of context features that may influence remembering. In addition to
the environmental features of the context (e.g., game vs. lesson) typically
referred to by most researchers discussing the issue of context, it makes sense
to include at least two other features, namely features of the learning material
(e.g., item attractiveness), and characteristics of the experimenter's behavior
as situational features. There is little doubt that these features may influence
the outcomes of experimental studies exploring the impact of context in
different ways.
In our view, the detailed description of the three replications of Istomina's
experiment has revealed that attempts to replicate and validate experimental
findings are indeed very important. Given the lack of consistency in findings
concerning the effect of context on children's memory, we are afraid that
similar problems could arise in replication attempts focusing on other classic
developmental studies. Researchers thus are encouraged to try to replicate
findings from experimental research. It probably needs several independent
replication attempts to get a feeling for the true state-of-the-art concerning
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the conceptual issue at stake and to distinguish between obviously solid and
more shaky effects. In our case, for example, one of the most solid findings
was that the age by activity interaction postulated by Istomina was not
obtained in any of the replication experiments. That is, the expectation that
recall differences between the game and lesson conditions should be larger
for the 4-year-olds than for the 6-year-olds could not be confirmed. Thus the
original assumption that a major qualitative change in memory occurs be-
tween the ages of 4 and 6 has not been validated by subsequent research.
We think that this is just one illustrative example emphasizing the need for
as well as the utility of replication studies in experimental research. We do
hope that more researchers and editors of scientific journals will accept the
importance of this issue and get more interested in replication studies than
they were before. There is no doubt for us that such a revised policy will not
cause a delay in scientific progress but instead will not only make possible a
faster scientific development but also will add considerably to our knowledge
(and not to our prejudices) in various domains.
'We would like to thank Beth Kurtz for her comments on an earlier version of this
chapter.
REFERENCES
Arbinger. R., & Kubsda, J. (1987). Situativer Kontext und Verarbeitungstiefe als Bedingungen für
BehaJtensleistungen im Vorschulalter. Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht, 34. 196-204.
Baker-Ward, L., Ornstein, P. A., & Holden. D. J. (1984). The expression of memorization in early
childhood. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 37, 555-575.
Ceci, S. J., Bronfenbrenner, U., & Baker, J. (1988). Memory development and ecological
complexity: The case of prospective remembering. In F. E. Weinert A M. Perlmutter (Eds.),
Memory Deuelopment: Universal Changes and Individual Differences (pp. 243-256). Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Cole, M. (Ed.). (1978). The Selected Writings of A. R. Luria. New York: Sharp*.
Finifter, B. M. (1975). Replication and extension of social research through secondary analysis.
Social Science Information, 14,119-153.
Hasselhorn, M., & Schneider, W. (1990). External and internal mediators of young children's
memory performance. Unpublished paper. Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research,
Munich.
Istomina, Z. M. (1975). The development of voluntary memory in preschool-age children. Soviel
Psychology, 13, 5-64.
Istomina, Z. M. (1977). The development of voluntary memory in preschool-age children. In M.
Cole (Ed.), Sower developmental psychology (pp. 100-159). New York: Sharpe.
Leontjev, A. N. (1977). Probleme der Entwicklung des Psychischen. Kronberg, Germany: Athe-
näum.
Meacham, J. A. (1977). Soviet investigations of memory development. In R. V. Kail & J. W. Hagen
(Eds.), Perspectives on the Development of Memory and Cognition (pp. 273-295). Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Neisser, U. (1982). Memory observed—Remembering in Natural Contexts. San Francisco: Free-
SITUATIONS CONTEXT FEATURES AND EARLY MEMORY DEVELOPMENT 205
Perlmutter, M. (1988). Research on memory and its development: Past, present, and future. In F.
E. Weiner I & M. Perlmutter (Eds.), Memory Development: Universal Changes and Individual
Differences Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Schneider, W , & Brun, H. (1987). The role of context in young children's memory performance:
Utomina revisited. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 5, 333-341.
Schneider, W., & Pressley, M. (1989). Memory Development between 2 and 20. New York:
Springer-Verlag.
Sodian, B., Schneider, W., & Perlmutter, M. (1986). Recall, clustering, and metamemory in young
children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 41, 395-410.
Weissberg, J. A., & Paris, S. G. (1986). Young children's remembering in different contexts: A
reimerpretation of Istominas study. Child Development, 57, 1123-1129.
Wertsch, J. V. (1981). The Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology. New York: Sharpe
Wippich, W. (1981). Verbessert eine Einkaufssituation die Vorhersage der eigenen Behaltens-
leistungen im Vorschulalter? Zeitschrift für Entmcklungspsychologie und Pädagogische
Psychologie, 8,280-290.
Wippich, W. (1985). Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des Meta-Gedächtnisses in verschiedenen
Kontexten. In L. Montada (Ed.), Bericht über die 7. Tagung Entwicklungspsychologie. Trier,
Germany: Universitätsdruck.
CHAPTER 10
Replication:
What's The Angle?
Trisha H. Folds-Bennett
Department of Psychology
College of Charleston
Charleston, Sc
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, a primary aim in the study of psychology has been to produce
results that are repeatable given the same research methods. This goal is
critical to psychological researchers because one of their central objectives is
to understand events that are internal to the individual. Obviously, one
cannot directly observe an internal event. Therefore, it is incumbent on the
psychological researcher to devise methods of study that are thought to
reflect internal activity and then to endeavor to validate these methods. An
important step in the validation process is to show that results achieved with
a certain method can be reproduced on a new, but similar, sample of
individuals. It is typically assumed that the replication carried out must be an
exact or algorithmic replication (see Chapter 3), involving a step-by-step
precise reproduction of the original method. If, under these circumstances, it
is shown that a set of results is not repeatable, then it would be fair to conclude
that the original results were unreliable. The lack of repeatability would
suggest that the original set of results were limited to a specific sample, in a
specific place, and at a specific time, and that the results cannot be general-
ized to the extent of providing any theoretical insight. This point is critical
because a psychological researcher's most explicit goal is to increase under-
standing about specified phenomena. Given this goal, therefore, it is abso-
lutely necessary that the researcher employ methods that will reliably test
hypotheses that he or she has made.
Unfortunately, psychological researchers tend to pay more lip service to
the importance of replication than they do to careful execution of replication
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studies. This paucity of replications means that the field of psychology often
relies on findings that are perhaps less reliable than they are assumed to be,
making the understanding of certain psychological phenomena highly method-
and sample-bound. One reason for the low number of replications is profes-
sional; if a hypothesis has been supported and published using a certain
method, the likelihood of publishing an exact replication of the original study
is fairly low. Because the professional pay-off for exact replication is de-
creased, the importance of conducting the replication is obscured. This
perceived nonchalant attitude about replication is especially discouraging to
young researchers who are still trying to establish a professional reputation.
Indeed, they are often persuaded instead to conduct original work rather than
to simply imitate an already-published method, even if it is their own.
Another reason for the lack of pure methodological replication (in the
sense that an original method is applied directly and exactly) is a pragmatic
one; rarely does a researcher document his or her methods to the extent that
they can be carried out to the letter by another person. Even if two people
who have worked in the same lab and who have used the same methods
attempt to produce a replication of some finding, it is nearly impossible to
duplicate the original setting. Different laboratory settings, in different loca-
tions, with different equipment, different experimenters, and different data
coders all can lead to variations in the results of seemingly identical experi-
ments.
Because of the low pay-off for and difficulty in executing exact replication
studies, it is often the case that replication studies are carried out in a more
indirect manner. Rather than applying the exact methods used by the original
author(s), methodological flaws are identified up front and improvements are
made when the "replication" is carried out. While this process has higher
payoffs both personally and scientifically, if the methods of the original
experimenter are not applied directly, it is difficult to compare the original
study and the follow-up. If the follow-up study contradicts the original, the
tendency is to call into question the original findings. However, because the
methods are somewhat different, it is impossible to conclude outright that an
already accepted finding has been refuted. Discrepancies between an original
set of findings and an attempted replication of the findings could be due to
methodological differences in the two studies, or they could speak to more
global theoretical issues. As readers of such work, one is often left wondering
how the improvements of the replication authors might have changed the
whole nature of the experiment. It is nearly impossible in such a case to reach
conclusions regarding the methodological implications versus the theoretical
implications of a set of findings.
In this chapter, I argue that we need to think through our goals more
thoroughly before we pursue replication. If one is more interested in meth-
odological purity, then it obviously makes sense to focus on methodological
 j
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flaws of an original work. If this is the stated goal of a replication, then the
authors should be cautious about the extent to which they comment on the
theoretical implications of their work, especially if their findings contradict
the original results. However, if one is more interested in clarifying under-
lying theoretical assumptions, then it is imperative to give more careful
consideration to and analysis of the rationale for designing a study in a
particular manner.
It is very easy to slip into an "outcome-oriented stance" when attempting to
test a certain set of assumptions. In this case, the results of an original study
become more important than the processes underlying the results. 1 argue in
this chapter that there are circumstances when a researcher can produce a
more theoretically valid replication by not directly applying the previously
used method to a new set of subjects. I illustrate what 1 mean about the
importance of considering the underlying theoretical assumption by using the
original study by Istomina (described by Valsiner in his introductory re-
marks), and comparing it to recent replication attempts (see Chapter 9;
Schneider & Brun, 1987; Weissberg & Paris, 1986). I argue that often what we
may consider replication in the sense that identical methods are used may not
be replication in the broader, theoretical sense.
REPLICATION: A CASE STUDY
The replications of Istomina that have been carried out to date have tended
toward the "indirect" approach that I described previously. In one study,
conducted by Weissberg and Paris (1986), methodological flaws were identi-
fied and corrected, resulting in findings contrary to the originally published
findings. In a series of replication attempts by Schneider and colleagues
(Schneider & Brun, 1987; Chapter 9), similar and additional flaws were
identified and improved, resulting in some contradiction of and some support
for Istomina's original results.
What should be made of the Istomina replications or lack thereof? The
replication authors present their work as reliably calling into question Isto-
mina's original findings. But is this conclusion fair? If we accept the replica-
tions and the conclusions that the replication authors reached, are we not
likely to doubt the validity of Istomina's underlying theoretical assumptions?
In order to better answer these questions we should first explore the theory
on which Istomina's study was based and then consider differences and
similarities between the methods and results of her study and its replications.
A careful analysis of the discrepancies between the studies should shed light
on the difficulties of replication and will, perhaps, suggest more conceptually
sound replication procedures.
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Theoretical Background
Soviet theories of activity. The purpose of Istomina's original study,
conducted in 1948, was to provide an illustration of the concepts of activity,
prevalent in the work of Soviet psychologists (e.g., Gal'perin, 1968, Istomina,
1975, 1977; Leontiev, 1932, 1978; Zaporozhets, 1977, 1979-80; Zinchenko,
1983-1984). The different concepts of activity are focused primarily on the
relationship between the person and his/her environment and specific be-
haviors that link the two (Wertsch, 1981). The process and result of this
person-environment interaction is conceptualized basically as a feedback
loop. That is, a person performs a certain action or set of actions within a
specific social context. The impact of that action yields some sort of feedback
from the environment. The individual responds to this feedback, either
actively or passively, and integrates the new information into his or her
action system. Activity, specifically, is described in terms of motives that
guide an individual to behave in a certain manner and in terms of the object
towards which a behavior is directed. Therefore, activity is defined as func-
tional and goal-directed (Leontiev, 1978).
In theories of activity, the concern is not so much with the product of action
within a certain context, but instead with the process. In this sense, theories of
activity are inherently developmental. That is, the focus is on a microgenetic
analysis of how interactions between person and environment lead to certain
actions (Werner, 1937), rather than on the final results of the interaction. This
point is important when considering empirical support for a theory of activity
because often experimental situations are constructed with a certain outcome
in mind, rather than reflecting explicit consideration of any underlying
processes.
Concept of activity in the context of memory development research.
In Istomina's work, the concept of activity is embedded in a focus on memory
development. This focus is derived from the work of such Soviet psycholo-
gists as Leontiev (1932, 1978) and Zinchenko (1983/84), who described
memory development as a progression from involuntary to voluntary mem-
ory. The main distinction between these two types of memory is the amount
of overt, or deliberate, activity that each involves. Involuntary memory is
characterized as an essentially automatic by-product of engagement in a task
for which memory is an intrinsic goal. It does not require that the person
engaging in the task construct the motivation and the techniques necessary to
remember. It is determined by the content and structure of the particular task
with which it is linked, and therefore, is not mediated by some conscious
activity on the part of the individual. Instead, involuntary memory emerges
from the action system of the individual.
It is assumed that involuntary memory emerges first developmentally,
REPLICATION 211
since it involves memory of a mechanical, task-dependent nature (Istomina,
1975). In fact, it is suggested that involuntary memory may be present in a
rudimentary form in infancy, as evidenced by the imitation of language and
action. However, it is not until 3 or 4 years of age that the existence of
involuntary memory becomes obvious. At this point, if the child is engaged in
a task for which the goal to remember is so intrinsic to the task that the child
is almost "compelled" to remember, then the child should perform relatively
well, compared to situations where the goal to remember is extrinsically
linked to the task at hand. Leontiev (1978) contends that the child is not yet
the master of his or her behavior at this age, but is beginning to be able to
unconsciously utilize the task stimuli and context to motivate remembering.
The second type of memory that Soviet psychologists describe is voluntary
memory. Voluntary memory is defined as the product of intentional, goal-
directed behavior (Zinchenko, 1983-84). It is around the age of 5 or 6 that the
Soviet developmental psychologists believe that a child begins to exhibit
some form of voluntary memory (Istomina, 1975; Leontiev, 1932). They
contend that the emergence of deliberate activity directed at memory is a
product of interaction between the child and his or her social world. That is,
the child is at first highly dependent on the context in which memory is the
goal. The goal to remember is not internal to the child; it is guided by the
structure of the task setting. As a child gets older, he or she is exposed to
increasingly structured environments (e.g., a school setting), which often
require that the child make a deliberate attempt to remember information.
Because of interaction in these environments, the child's involuntary
memory processes are transformed into purposeful, conscious activity. At
first, the child achieves memory goals that are intrinsic to certain tasks. With
experience, he or she begins to generalize the goal and techniques for
remembering to less supportive contexts. Eventually, the goal to remember is
internalized by the child so that memory performance improves even in
situations that are relatively meaningless for the child. The child learns to
generate his or her own goal of remembering, and it is not necessarily
dependent upon task characteristics. Along with generating his or her own
memory goals, the child also begins to exhibit intentional activity (e.g.,
strategies) meant to improve memory.
Istomina's Classical Study of Memory
The design- m 'he 1940s, Istomina set out to provide empirical support
for the developmental transition from involuntary to voluntary memory.
Despite her theoretical interest in describing the ontogeny of that transition,
she curiously choose a cross-sectional, rather than a longitudinal, design. This
decision had critical implications for her interpretation because it limited the
extent to which she could draw conclusions about developmental improve-
"
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ments in memory performance. However, Istomina compensated somewhat
for the limitation by carefully documenting valuable descriptive data that
allow a glimpse into some of the microprocesses that operate in the develop-
ment of memory skill.
In order to test the hypothesis that memory first emerges in meaningful
contexts for which the goal to remember is intrinsic to the task and then
generalizes to less familiar contexts for which the goal to remember does not
naturally evolve from task activities, Istomina did a within-subject compar-
ison of performance in two task settings. In one task, the goal to remember
was intrinsic to the task, and in the other, the child was required to explicitly
adopt an experimenter-generated memory goal.
The first task revolved around a "game" setting, in which children were told
that they were to pretend to go the grocery store to buy some items requested
by the experimenter. Istomina wanted to assure that the game setting "in-
volved a specific, defined situation that created a motivation for remember-
ing" (Istomina, 1975, p. 9), so she strived to make the situation as realistic and
familiar to the children as possible. She accomplished this task in several ways.
First, she constructed the grocery store situation to be as ecologically valid
as possible (see Chapter 8). All of the features of the context were critical for
making the setting as similar as possible to grocery stores that the children
experienced in everyday life. The grocery store setting alone, however, did
not create a context for which memory was an intrinsic goal. Therefore,
Istomina combined the grocery store setting with a real-life kindergarten
setting. Children who were "sent" to the grocery store began the experiment
in a pretend kindergarten (see Chapter 8). In this setting, the children played
the roles of typical adults in a kindergarten (e.g., teacher, teacher's assistants,
cook), whereas dolls "played" the roles of kindergarten students. An adult
experimenter played the role of kindergarten director, who sent children
from the kindergarten one at a time to buy 5 items at the grocery store. Each
child was told that the purpose for buying the items was because they were
needed for the children (i.e., dolls) in the kindergarten. For example, some of
the items were needed for snacktime, while others were necessary for
activities, such as drawing and painting, that were typical in a kindergarten
classroom. The list of items contained simple, familiar words that could not be
readily categorized into groups based on "similarity or habitual association"
(Istomina, 1975, p. 11). Unfortunately, from Istomina's documentation of the
procedure, it is unclear whether each child received the same words or
whether the words varied between children. The latter seems the most likely
because Istomina reports a list of 19 sample items (see Table 10.1) from which,
she states, the target items were selected.
The creation of a context that provided a reason for the children to buy
items at the grocery store was a critical feature of the game situation. By
placing the memory goal in a context of meaningful activity, even young
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Table 10.1. Stimulus Items used in Islomina's Study and Replications
Study Pool o f Hems
Istomina candy, ball, cereal, toys, carrot, milk, socks, paints, cucumber, knife .
macaroni, suit, pencils, flowers, cabbage, book, roll, slippers, butter
Schneider & Brun List 1 : apples, pretzels, cheese, salt, toothpaste, pencil, handkerchief,
candy
List 2: carrots, chocolate, bread, sausage, sugar, eraser, laundry soap,
cotton balls
Schneider & List 1: unattractive items: handkerchief, rock, screwdriver, bulb,
Hasselhorn sponge, cigarette, toothpaste, vase
List 2: attractive items: teddy bear, chocolate egg, engine, licorice,
sailboat, toy car, crayons, balloon
Weissberg & Paris List 1 : Grocery setting-, apples, bread, cookies, lettuce, chicken, eggs
List 2: Grocery setting-, crackers, pretzels, carrots, fish, milk, grapes
List 3: Party setting: Norman. Edna, Gus, Bess, Justin, Claire
List 4: Party setting: Dora, Louis, Meg, Walt, Abbey, Hal
children, who were theoretically not yet able to differentiate the memory
goal from the task structure itself, were given an opportunity to demonstrate
initial stages of memory skill development. Rather than the burden of goal
recognition and maintenance being placed on the child, the situation was
structured so that it created and sustained the memory goal.
When the children arrived at the store, attempts to maintain the realistic
nature of the setting were continued. Each child presented a permission slip
to the guard at the door to the store, as a child would be required to do if
entering an actual grocery store in Russia of the early 1900s. In the store, the
child told the manager what he or she needed to buy, whereupon the grocer
gathered the items, the child paid the cashier, and the salesclerk presented
the bag of items to the child, who then returned to the classroom. Although
not explicitly stated in the procedure section of Istomina's paper, it is ap-
parent from Istomina's description of individual subjects that children were
allowed to return to the experimenter for repetition of the items if they could
not remember them all (e.g., see Istomina, 1975). The game continued until
all the children had participated in the grocery store portion.
Following participation in the game setting, Istomina had each child re-
member information in the context of a "traditional laboratory setting." Each
child sat at a table with the experimenter and was presented with words
similar to those in the game setting. (For more detail, see Chapter 8.) The child
was simply instructed to remember the words. A critical incongruity between
the laboratory setting and the game setting is that children in the lab setting
were apparently not given the opportunity to have the words repeated as
they were allowed to do in the grocery store setting. Since it was assumed that
children would perform less well in the lab situation, this difference could
have forced the results in the desired direction.
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Beyond this critical methodological difference in the two settings, there still
remains Istomina's hypothesized conceptual difference in the two settings.
Because the laboratory context was less familiar to the younger children and
because it required that the child maintain a focus on the memory goal, rather
than the goal being embedded in the task, it was expected that younger
children would not perform as well in this setting as in the game setting. In
accord with the supposed developmental progression from involuntary to
voluntary memory, however, it was expected that older children (5 to 7 years
old) would begin to show some understanding of the goal to remember, even
in the less meaningful laboratory situation. Therefore, the older children
were expected to recall more information than the younger children in the
laboratory setting.
The résulta. Istomina's findings paralleled her predictions. In the game
setting 3- and 4-year-olds recalled slightly more items than in the laboratory
setting (see Table 10.2). The real differences, however, came with children 4
to 5 years old and above. In both settings, these children recalled more than
the younger children. Most importantly, recall scores were higher in the
game setting in comparison to the laboratory setting.
If the predominate emphasis in this study were the absolute value of the
outcome measures, then one could take issue with the minimal difference
between the 1.0 and 0.6 items recalled by the 3-4-year-olds in the game
setting and the lesson setting, respectively. In fact, it could be (and has been,
Weissberg & Paris, 1986) argued that there was a possible floor effect. That is,
the 3- to 4-year-olds recalled so few (or no) items that it is possible that they
were not remembering anything in either setting. However, the theory of
involuntary/voluntary memory assumes that involuntary memory is just
beginning to emerge at around 3 years old. Therefore, it would be predicted
that the absolute value of recall still may be quite low at this age. However, it
would be assumed that other behaviors may indicate different levels of
engagement and understanding depending on the meaningfulness of the
context. It would be predicted that because of younger children's better
understanding of more meaningful contexts, their overall memory perfor-
mance should improve incidentally in the game setting. In contrast, in the
laboratory setting, it would be predicted that young children should appear
almost confused; an indication that they do not explicitly understand the goal
of remembering in that context. These predicted differences in the two
settings were apparent in the rich observational data that Istomina presented.
It is these data that provide the best indication of the processes that mediate
performance in each of the settings.
In descriptions of individual children's verbal and physical behavior in the
two settings, Istomina was able to demonstrate that while young children
seem to have not yet internalized the goal of remembering, the game setting
provided a meaningful context from which memory emerged as a result of
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Table 10.2. Comparison of results from Istomina and replications
Istomina
Age of Subject »ofSs
4' 30
6' 30
Weissberg and Paris
Age of Subject 'ofSs
4 48
6 48
Schneider and Brun: Ex. 1
Age ol Subject • < > ( . < *
4 30
6 30
Schneider and Bran: Ex. 2
Age of Subject * of Ss
4 30
£ 30
Hasselhorn and Schneider: Ex. 1
Age of Subject * ol Ss
4 64
6 64
Hasselhorn and Schneider: Ex. 2
Age ol Subject * of Ss
4 80
6 80
Lab Recall
1.05
2.15
Lab Recall
Food Names
3.10 1.40
4.10 2.80
Lab Recall
1.63
3.06
Lab Recall
1.59
2.53
Lab Recall
3.48
4.63
Lab Recall
1.68
2.10
Game Recall
2.0
3.5
Game Recall
Food Names
2.55 1.03
3.55 2.30
Game Recall
3.56
5.46
Game Recall
2.08
2.79
Game Recall
4.45
5.03
Game Recall
1.40
1.73
Ratio
1.9
1.6
Ratio
Food Names
0.8 0.7
0.9 0.8
Ratio
2.2
1.8
Ratio
1.3
1.1
Ratio
1.3
1.1
Ratio
0.9
0.8
•The means for 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds have been collapsed into one group and the means
for the 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds have been collapsed into one group in order to make the
Istomina and the Weissberg and Paris results comparable to those from Schneider's lab, which
were reported as two age groups rather than four.
participation in the task. In the game setting, 3-year-olds were extremely
motivated to "play the game." For example, Istomina reports that one child
got so excited about being told that it was his turn to go to the store, that he
ran off to the store without hearing the items to be bought (Istomina, 1975).
Another child told the experimenter that she wanted to go to the store to buy
ice cream. When she arrived at the store, she "remembered" only ice cream,
even though it was not one of the target words. However, many of the
3-year-olds did manage to remember a minimal number of items. This success
seemed to be influenced merely by participation in the task, and not because
the 3-year-olds were able to generate an internalized memory goal. This
interpretation is based on the fact that 3-year-olds seemed fairly clear about
the purpose of the task, but could not, when asked, provide an explanation for
why or how they remembered. Furthermore, no obvious strategies to aid
memory (e.g., rehearsal of the items) were observed. The children were more
focused on the mechanics of the task, and from that, a modest level of recall
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resulted. Istomina concluded (understandably!) that the youngest children in
her study were more focused on being shoppers than on the real purpose for
the errand. However, she pointed out that the goal to remember was an
internal aspect of the task, rather than an externally prescribed goal. There-
fore, mere participation in the task led to a minimal level of recall.
In contrast to the game setting, 3-year-olds appeared unable to understand
and adopt the experimenter-articulated memory goal in the lab situation.
Possibly, this stemmed from their developmental inability to differentiate a
task goal from a task setting. Because the goal was not embedded in the task
structure, in which case achievement of that goal would have been a natural
result of engagement in the task, young children were unable to make the link
between the goal and task activities. Since the memory goal in the laboratory
setting was an externally imposed goal, Istomina had predicted that the
youngest children would not be able to adopt the goal. This lack of under-
standing was evident in the case of one 3-year-old who, when asked to
remember the items in the lab situation, said, "Where are they?" (p. 36).
Another 3-year-old in the lab setting did not even attempt to remember the
items, but talked instead about his cat at home. These responses within the lab
setting suggest that the younger children did not understand the goal of the
task at all. Although many of the 3-year-olds did not display higher levels of
recall in the game setting than in the lab setting, they at least demonstrated
more understanding about what was expected of them in the game setting
than in the lab setting.
Older children (4 to 7 years old) displayed a different pattern of results. As
a whole, these children remembered more than the younger children in both
settings. However, the 4- to 5-year-olds were differentiated from the 5- to
7-year-olds on the basis of the descriptive data. That is, the older children
exhibited behaviors in both settings indicating that they were very deliberate
in their attempts to remember the information. Specifically, 5-year-olds and
above tended to use overt verbal rehearsal of to-be-remembered items in
both settings. This behavior indicated a clear understanding of the goal to
remember and techniques subordinate to that goal.
Observed behaviors in the 4-year-old group were less consistent, sug-
gesting that this age group represented a transitional period in the progres-
sion from involuntary to voluntary memory processes. Some of the 4-year-
olds displayed verbal rehearsal in the game setting, but it was rare in the
laboratory setting. In the game setting, it was very evident that the 4-year-
olds understood that the primary goal of the task was to remember. Istomina
reports that most of the 4-year-olds listened intently until all of the items had
been read and were impatient with any attempts to interrupt them between
the kindergarten room and the grocery store. Istomina concluded that these
children were able to explicitly adopt a memory goal, but only when it was
embedded in a meaningful task setting. In the laboratory situation, the
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4-year-olds seemed to realize the importance of listening to the items, but
when it was time to remember them, they were for the most part unsuccess-
ful. They understood that the task was a memory task because the experi-
menter had told them that, but they were unable to explicitly set the goal for
themselves and to pursue activities relevant to that goal.
In conclusion, Istomina suggested that her results supported the hypothesis
that younger children first demonstrate the ability to remember in contexts
for which the goal to remember is intrinsic to the task at hand. She stated that
younger children understand what it means to remember, but only insofar as
they experience that goal as a by-product of their motivation to engage in a
task. The goal must be internally rather than externally linked to the task, as
was the case in the game setting. In the laboratory situation, the only link
between the goal and the task was the experimenter. For younger children,
who did not yet have the skills to utilize this externally directed goal, the task
was nearly impossible. For older children, however, who had begun to
understand externally set goals, it was possible to observe intentional be-
havior directed toward the memory goal.
Weissberg and Paris' Replication (1986)
The design. Although Weissberg and Paris conducted their study more
than 40 years after Istomina completed hers, it was their objective to adopt
her basic design and to test the replicability of her results. While the basic
design as far as the game versus laboratory situation comparison was re-
tained, Weissberg and Paris identified some design and procedural flaws in
Istomina's work and, in their replication, corrected those problems.
The subjects included in the Weissberg and Paris study were similar to
those in Istomina's study as far as age (3-6-year-olds). However, the subjects
differed in terms of their cultural backgrounds as the Weissberg and Paris
study was conducted in the United States. The two experimental situations
that Istomina used were basically retained. There was a grocery store setting,
complete with store counter and cash register, toy food items, and other items
relevant to a grocery store. As in Istomina's study, each child went to the store
to "buy" the to-be-remembered items. However, unlike Istomina, Weissberg
and Paris did not include the kindergarten aspect of the grocery store setting;
instead, children were brought one at a time to an empty room at the school
where testing took place and were told that they would be playing some
games. For the grocery store setting, each child was told to "go" to the
grocery store to buy some items. For the lab setting, the child sat at a table
with the experimenter and listened to and then recalled the items.
From that point, Weissberg and Paris's study deviated somewhat from
Istomina's. They identified two critical design flaws that they corrected in
their replication. First, they were concerned that Istomina did not counter-
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balance the order of the two settings. Therefore, half of their subjects
participated in the grocery store setting followed by the lab setting, and the
other half received the reverse order of the activities. Second, they did not
feel that Istomina had sufficiently controlled the items presented to the
children for remembering. Thus, rather than allowing the items to vary
across subjects, they constructed two word lists, which were counterbalanced
across setting, and which all children received. In contrast to Istomina, Paris
and Weissberg's lists contained all food items, therefore presenting the
children with sets of items that were more semantically related to each other
than the words used by Istomina (see Table 10.1). Although it is unclear which
items Istomina presented to her subjects, she states that the lists were
constructed so that no two words on the list could be grouped into semantic
categories. In the list of possible words she reports, there are food, clothes,
and school supply items. Therefore, it is feasible that the items presented to
Istomina's subjects did not belong to similar semantic categories. Memory
development research in the past 10 years has demonstrated that children,
especially very young children, show recall improvements when presented
with semantically related to-be-remembered items (e.g., Best & Ornstein,
1986; Corsale, 1978; Folds, Ornstein, & Bjorklund, 1988), in contrast to sets of
unrelated items. Therefore, because Istomina purportedly used unrelated
items, while Paris and Weissberg used more related items, it would be
expected that the absolute value of the recall by Paris and Weissberg's
subjects would be higher than that of Istomina's participants.
Beyond these specific differences between the original and the replication,
Weissberg and Paris seemed to have more general control over the experi-
ences of their subjects. For example, in both settings, the words were read
twice to the children and in neither setting did an experimenter repeat the
items after recall was attempted. In Istomina's description of the game setting,
it is apparent that if a child forgot some items he or she was free to return to
the kindergarten to hear the list again. This, of course, represents a very
critical difference between the game and laboratory settings in Istomina's
study, which most assuredly resulted in an unbalanced effect on recall.
In addition to the two settings used by Istomina, Weissberg and Paris had
their subjects participate in a third setting, a party setting that involved the
recall of the "names" of stuffed animals who were at a birthday party
together. The rationale behind including this setting was to record perfor-
mance in a situation which was perhaps a little more familiar to the children.
In this setting, each child was shown stuffed animals sitting in a circle and told
that an animal he or she was holding could not join the party until he or she
could remember all the animals' names. The child was told the names and
then asked to introduce the animal he or she was holding to the animals at the
party. To parallel the party situation, children also were asked to recall names
.
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in a laboratory setting so that a direct comparison of the party setting to a lab
setting could be made.
The results. While the differences in the methodologies of the Weissberg
and Paris and Istomina studies seem fairly subtle, the differences in the results
are quite compelling. In fact, they completely contradict each other. In the
Weissberg and Paris study, it is the laboratory settings rather than the grocery
store or party setting that yield the highest levels of recall (see Table 10.2).
This difference is true for both the older and the younger children. Further-
more, Weissberg and Paris's subjects displayed higher overall recall than
Istomina's, regardless of the setting. Interestingly, some rehearsal data that
Weissberg and Paris report also contradict Istomina's, indicating that children
in all age groups tended to rehearse aloud significantly more in the lab setting
than in the game setting.
These results suggest that perhaps the lab setting meant something entirely
different to the American children than it did to the Soviet children. Weiss-
berg and Paris concluded that cultural differences may have affected their
ability to replicate Istomina's results. They suggested that American children
may be more comfortable in situations for which recall is explicitly organized
by some externally set goal rather than situations in which recall is simply
driven by some motivational disposition engendered by the task at hand. This
conclusion, of course, calls into question the generalizability of Istomina's
beliefs about the emergence and development of memory. The question that
we consider later in the chapter is whether Weissberg and Paris are justified
in making this strong conceptual statement based on the study that they
conducted. Before we do that though, we consider the set of replication
attempts conducted by Wolfgang Schneider and his colleagues.
Schneider and Brun's Replications (1987)
Design. Schneider and Brun designed two experiments that were in-
tended to serve the purpose of replicating Istomina's original study. As did
Weissberg and Paris, they identified major design flaws and corrected them.
However, in Experiment 1, like Istomina, they allowed their subjects to return
to the experimenter for repetition of the to-be-remembered items. Their
purpose in retaining this flaw was to allow a more direct comparison between
their results (derived from a more sound experimental design than Istomina's)
and those obtained by Istomina.
Therefore, in Experiment 1, a group of 4-year-olds and a group of 6-year-
olds participated in two memory tasks; one that was part of a grocery store
setting and one that was part of a laboratory setting (see Chapter 9). Although
the objective was to completely retain the features of Istomina's original
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study, like Weissberg and Paris, Schneider and Brun did not provide a
kindergarten context as the reason for each participating child to "buy" items
at the grocery store. The utilized word lists seemed to be more similar to
Istomina's than were Weissberg and Paris'« because they contained items
other than food. However, while Istomina was unclear about the items with
which her subjects were presented, Schneider and Brun opted to have two
standard lists, which were counterbalanced across the two settings.
In both the grocery store and lab setting, the children were told that they
would only hear the words once, although, as in Istomina's study, children
were permitted to return to the experimenter for repetition of the to-
be-remembered items if they could not recall them all. Unlike Istomina,
children could ask for repetition in both the grocery store and the lab setting.
However, Schneider and Brun reported that more children asked for repeti-
tion in the game setting than in the lab setting.
The result of this study was a replication of Istomina's findings (see Table
10.2). In fact, even the ratios between recall in the game and the lab setting
were almost identical to Istomina's. Therefore, in contrast to Weissberg and
Paris who did not allow repetition of the items, Schneider and Bran were able
to repeat Istomina's original findings. Although Schneider and Brun were
certainly pleased that they successfully replicated Istomina, they were skep-
tical about the validity of their findings for testing performance differences in
more and less meaningful settings since the children asked for repetition of
the items far less in the lab setting than in the grocery store setting.
In order to explore the possibility that the repetition of items in the grocery
store setting created a critical incongruity between it and the lab setting,
Schneider and Brun pursued a second experiment in which more of Isto-
mina's design flaws were corrected. As in Weissberg and Paris, the game and
lab setting were counterbalanced within subjects and the word lists were
counterbalanced across settings. In contrast to Weissberg and Paris, how-
ever, children in the game setting were told to listen carefully to the words
because they would not be read again and, unlike Experiment 1, even if the
child returned to the experimenter the words were not repeated. The results
from this experiment indicated the same trend in the means as Istomina
achieved; however, the means in the game setting were deflated making the
differences between recall in the two settings nonsignificant.
Schneider and Brun concluded that the children recalled more in the game
setting than in the lab setting in Experiment 1 because they heard the words
more in the game setting. Their failure to replicate Istomina's results in
Experiment 2 led them to suggest that Istomina's conclusions about the
importance of a motivating context for early memory success are not valid.
They argued instead that the most important determinants of memory per-
formance are technical aspects of the memory context, such as the avail-
ability of auditory and pictorial cues and the length of exposure to to-
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be-remembered information. This condusion seems somewhat ironic,
however. Schneider and Brun argued that by altering the "technical" aspects
of the experiment, they demonstrated deviations from the original findings.
Their claim was that they cast doubt on the theory that children's memory
emerges first in meaningful contexts. However, their design variations, in
fact, altered not only specific aspects of the context, but also the more general
context and its meaningfulness for the child. Therefore, they may have
indirectly supported Istomina's contention that the more meaningful the
context, the more likely younger children will be able to recall information
presented in the context. To clarify, Schneider and Brun made the game
setting more stilted by telling the children specifically that they would hear
the items only once. In the real world, one would rarely be told, "Now, listen
carefully; I am not going to tell you items you need to buy more than once."
By placing this limit on the child, some of the meaning of the setting was
removed. Schneider and Brun's results in Experiment 2 may have emerged
because of this alteration in the meaning of the game context. They did not
find that recall in the lab setting was better than in previous experiments; they
found that recall in the game setting was depressed. Istomina might argue
that by stripping the game setting of some of its meaning, Schneider and Brun
have produced a negative effect on recall, and thus have to an extent
demonstrated the importance of a meaningful context.
Hasselhorn and Schneider's Replication
After perusing and comparing the results of the replication attempts from their
own lab and those produced by Weissberg and Paris, Schneider and his col-
leagues concluded that the validity of Istomina's theoretical notions had not
yet been fully determined. Understandably, they were concerned that not only
did the results of their two replication attempts, once methodological correc-
tions had been made, seem unclear in terms of Istomina's results, but also that
their findings differed so dramatically from Weissberg and Paris's. In order to
clarify the differences, Schneider and his colleague, Marcus Hasselhorn, pro-
ceeded to extend Schneider's earlier replication attempts. They were espe-
cially concerned about possible methodological differences (e.g., the items
used, the number of times the items were presented) in the previous replication
attempts, and the impact of these differences on the results. Accordingly, they
designed two experiments to address some of their concerns.
Experiment I: Design. In this experiment, Hasselhorn and Schneider
were concerned with an observation from the first set of studies out of their
lab; that is, children tended to recall words that appeared to be more
attractive to them. Therefore, in Experiment 1, Hasselhorn and Schneider set
about to explore the effects of item attractiveness by systematically pre-
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seating subjects with items judged by children to be either attractive or
unattractive. The procedure used in this experiment was basically identical to
the earlier studies (see Chapter 9); however, the design differed in that
remembering in different settings was manipulated on a between subjects
rather than a within subjects basis.
Kesults. The results of this experiment followed the same pattern as the
earlier Schneider studies; children remembered more in the game setting
than in the lab setting. However, this difference was limited to the attractive
items. Furthermore, rehearsal was more likely with the attractive items than
with the unattractive items.
Hasselhorn and Schneider concluded that despite improvements in the
Istomina design, they were able to replicate her findings. They suggested that
the context is important, but that we must be careful to identify specific
features of the context which influence memory rather than talking about the
context in global terms. They suggested further that the game versus lesson
nature of the context is an "objective environmental feature" (see Chapter 9)
rather than a subjective feature such as the perceived attractiveness of the
items. This conclusion seems to contradict Istomina's premise that the effec-
tiveness of the game setting rests in the fact that as children are engaged in
that setting they become personally involved in and motivated by aspects of
that setting. It is this episodic subjective experience that drives cognitive
success in the setting. This point will be elaborated further, but first let us
explore the final replication attempt and its implications.
Experiment 2: Design. In this experiment, an attempt was made to
further standardize the children's experiences in the two settings. Hasselhorn
and Schneider had observed on videotape and from interviews with experi-
menters that the interpersonal features of their study varied across settings.
Therefore, in their second experiment, Hasselhorn and Schneider instructed
the experimenters to interact with the children in the same manner in the
game setting as they did in the lab setting.
Kesults. The results from this experiment were exactly opposite those of
earlier Schneider studies. Children recalled more in the lab setting than in the
game setting. Also in contrast to Experiment 1, the attractiveness by setting
interaction did not convey. Instead, the effect of item attractiveness was
qualified only by an age effect; older children recalled more attractive items
than younger children.
INTERPRETING INCONGRUITIES
Obviously, there are many differences not only between Istomina's original
study and the replications, but also between the replications themselves. How
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are we, then, to interpret these discrepancies? If we do a very simple
meta-analysis (see Chapter 3 and 9) and take a tally of the "pro-game setting"
versus "pro-lab setting" findings, we discover that the game setting wins, at
least if we are speaking in terms of mean trends (see Table 10.2). Does that
mean that we should accept Istomina's findings as the "correct" ones? Ac-
cording to the conclusions of Weissberg and Paris and Schneider and his
colleagues, we should not. Both sets of researchers suggest that by instituting
methodological improvements in Istomina's design they have successfully
cast doubt on her conclusions regarding the development of memory in
young children. The question is do we feel comfortable with and justified in
making this conclusion? In order to guide a more informed answer to this
question and to enlighten us about the process of replication and its implica-
tions, I will now analyze in detail important methodological and conceptual
considerations in the original Istomina study and follow-up replications.
Methodological Difference«
As was discussed previously, both Weissberg and Paris and Schneider and
colleagues independently identified critical methodological flaws in Isto-
mina's original study which could have had direct effects on the results
obtained. I do not deny the importance of their methodological improve-
ments. It is obvious that Istomina failed to use some design manipulations that
are typically employed for the purpose of increasing the internal validity of a
study's experimental conditions. Given these improvements by the replica-
tion authors, though, we still do not get a clear picture of the influence of
context on memory performance. In Table 10.3,1 organized a summary of the
Istomina-type studies and all of the different design features that have been
used.
The confusion that one might experience when trying to decipher this table
is quite illustrative of the difficulty in piecing together the implications of
Istomina's original study and the various replicadons. A mere glance at this
table makes evident the many subtle design differences between Istomina's
study and its replications. Consideration of these differences and the similar-
ities between the studies brings to light possible explanations for the dis-
crepant results that were obtained.
Since Schneider and colleagues were for the most part successful in repli-
cating Istomina, let us first consider their research efforts and results. If we
examine the results for their lab setting, we see that in all but one of the
Schneider studies, that is, Hasselhorn and Schneider, the recall data in the lab
setting are very close to what Istomina obtained. These similarities occurred
in spite of some critical design differences, for example, counterbalancing of
the setting and lists. In Experiment 1 of Hasselhorn and Schneider's study,
recall in the lab situation was higher than that obtained by Istomina and in
Schneider's other studies. A possible explanation for this increase in recall is
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Table 10.3. Comparison of Methodologies
Weiss. Schnei. Schnei. Hasset. Massel.
& & & & A
Istomina
No Counterbalancing X
Counterbalanced Setting
Completely Within Subject X
Setting Between Subject
Word lists varied systematically X
Used same word lists across
subjects
Counterbalanced lists across
setting
Word Lists contained items X
other than food
Repeated items if subject X
requested (esp. in game setting)
Told specifically that words
would only be read one time
Repeated items two times
for all subjects
Presented items visually as
well as auditorial^
Paris Brun:I
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
X
X
Brun:2
X
X
X
X
X
X
Schnei: l
X
X
X
X
X
X
Sdtnei:2
X
X
X
X
X
X
that items were presented both visually and auditorially. This explanation
makes sense because we see the same increase in recall in the game setting.
Therefore, it seems that the "double exposure" in Experiment 1 was possibly
responsible for the increased recall. In spite of this one instance of increased
recall, though, it is apparent that the methodologically different methods
used by Schneider and his colleagues did not affect performance in the
laboratory situation.
For the game setting, however, Schneider and his colleagues' methodolog-
ical changes produced marked differences in recall. The level of recall in
Experiment 2 of Schneider and Brun's replications was closest to the level of
recall in Istomina's study. However, the ratios between recall in the lab and
the game setting were most similar in the Istomina study and Experiment 1 of
Schneider and Brun's study. This similarity is, of course, understandable
because it is Schneider and Brun's first experiment that most resembles
Istomina's original study. Specifically, it was in this study that subjects were
allowed to return to the experimenter for repetition of the to-be-remembered
items. Although this advantage was allowed in both the lab and the game
setting (possibly in contrast to Istomina's only allowing it in the game setting),
Schneider and Brun report that children rarely asked for repetition in the lab
setting. Therefore, it is probable that recall in the game setting, as in Isto-
mina's study, was enhanced (in fact, even more than in Istomina's study) by
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repeated exposure to the items. In Schneider and Bran's second experiment,
in which repetition was not allowed, recall in the game setting was depressed
relative to Experiment 1. However, the mean trend still suggests that the
game setting was a better situation for remembering.
Because Schneider and his colleagues' patterns of findings generally mir-
rored Istomina's, it is puzzling why Hasselhorn and Schneider's second
experiment did not produce the same pattern of results. Instead, in this study
the lab setting resulted in superior recall over the game setting. This study
was almost identical to Experiment 1 of Hasselhorn and Schneider in terms of
its method, except that visual versus auditory presentation was treated as a
between subjects rather than a within subjects variable. Furthermore, the
experimenters were instructed to equate their behavior across the two
settings by being less engaging and interactive in the game setting. It was
believed that with this control social interaction in the game setting would
more closely resemble that in the lab setting.
Hence, rather than observing a change in recall in the lab setting, Hassel-
horn and Schneider demonstrated a significant depression in recall in the
game setting to the extent that recall level was lower than in the lab setting.
One reason that the effect may have been so extreme is that by including in
the game setting an experimenter who was not engaging and with whom the
children did not enjoy interacting, that setting was essentially stripped of
some of the motivating features that Istomina had predicted would support
more successful recall. By making the game setting more like the lab setting,
it was less likely that the participating children were actively involved in the
"fun" of the game. Therefore, to some extent they had to set their own
memory goals rather than experiencing memory as a more natural result of
participation in the task. If this is truly the case, then even to a larger extent
than the Schneider and Brun replications, Hasselhorn and Schneider's second
experiment indirectly demonstrated the importance of a meaningful context
for which memory is intrinsic to the designated task.
In spite of the relatively consistent pattern of findings in the set of studies by
Schneider and his colleagues, we are still left with the reversal in the pattern
of findings in the Weissberg and Paris study. This reverse pattern was true,
even though the methods in this study resembled closely the methods in
Schneider and Brim-Experiment 2. That is, in both studies the setting was
counterbalanced across subjects and the lists were standardized across set-
ting and subjects. One difference was that Weissberg and Paris presented
each item two times, in comparison to Schneider and Brun's one time each.
Also, they used word lists containing only food items, whereas both Istomina
and the Schneider lab used lists containing items other than food. Both of
these factors could have contributed to the higher levels of recall in the
Weissberg and Paris study. First, more exposure to to-be-remembered items
has been shown to enhance recall (e.g., Naus, Ornstein, & Aivano, 1977).
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Second, since Weissberg and Paris constructed their word lists of only food
items they probably were more semantically related in comparison to the
Istomina and Schneider lists. This high semanticality could have led to
enhanced recall in their study. Research on memory in children supports this
contention as it has been shown that young children will display higher levels
of recall if they are presented with to-be-remembered items that are highly
associated with each other and which belong to obvious semantic categories
(e.g., Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982; Folds, Ornstein, & Bjorklund, 1988). How-
ever, these factors do not explain the difference in the pattern of findings
produced by Weissberg and Paris in comparison to Schneider and Brun and
Istomina; they only speak to differences in the level of recall.
What, then, caused the significantly enhanced recall in Weissberg and
Paris's lab setting? One possible explanation is that the subjects who partici-
pated in the various studies came from different cultural backgrounds. Weiss-
berg and Paris suggest that the American children who participated in their
study were exposed at an early age to situations involving more rote-like
memory (e.g., watching Sesame Street), making it probable that the lab
setting as opposed to the game setting was more familiar, understandable,
and perhaps, motivating. This explanation seems even more likely when you
consider the unfamiliarity of the game setting for the American children. In
the United States, it would be rare for a child to have the experience of going
to a small grocery store where the buyer does not have the freedom to move
around the store and pick up to-be-bought items on his or her own. In most
cases, the shopper interacts very little with the shopkeeper; usually only
briefly when paying for the items. Therefore, not only does the lab setting
possibly have more meaning for the American children, the grocery store
setting has a lot less meaning.
In contrast, for the Russian children in the Istomina study, it was quite
common during the 1940s to go to the market with their mothers, where the
two would be greeted by a guard at the door. The guard would direct them to
give the grocer their list of needed items, which he would gather and bag for
them. Likewise, for the German children, who participated in the Schneider
studies, trips to a small grocery store where a grocer (or butcher or baker, as
the case may be) is told the items that are to be bought is much more common
than in the United States. However, it is also true that German children come
from a culture that puts a great deal of emphasis on academic achievement;
therefore, the more rotelike memory situation was certainly not unfamiliar to
them. Unlike Americans, though, Germans view kindergarten as a time for
children to develop good social skills; therefore, kindergarten-aged children
spend more time playing than they do in structured group activity. If these
cultural differences are real, then it is possible that American children do first
experience successful remembering in situations where memory goals are set
more explicitly. In contrast, Russian and German children may benefit more
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from situations in which a memory goal is intrinsic to the task in which they
are engaged. Assuming these conclusions are valid, then it would make sense
to question the universality of the Soviet theory of memory development.
While this cultural explanation seems plausible, in many ways it is unsa-
tisfying. First of all, the cultural differences between the United States and
modern-day Germany are not that distinct. The philosophies of kindergarten
may be different, but Germans put a great deal of emphasis on their children's
academic achievement. In fact, German and American children are exposed
to many of the same games and television shows. Cross-cultural research
(e.g., Schneider, Borkowski, Kurtz, & Kerwin. 1986) has shown that in terms
of memory performance, it is German children who first display more spon-
taneous use of memory strategies in laboratory-like settings compared to
American children. Furthermore, although Schneider and his colleagues
generally produced the same patterns of results as Istomina, the differences
between their game and lab settings were small even when methodological
flaws were corrected. Therefore, the question still stands. In what type of
context do children first begin to display evidence of developing memory
skill?
One critical difference in the original study and the replications makes it
nearly impossible in my estimation to come to any conclusions about the
effect of context on memory development. The difference lies in the intrinsic
features of the two experimental situations as constructed by Istomina and
the replication authors. In Istomina's experiment, the grocery store situation
was set up so that the situationally intrinsic motivation to perform the goal
was optimized. The children started the experiment in a classroom (kinder-
garten) with other children. Each participant was told when it was time for a
snack and that he/she would be responsible for "buying" the snack from the
store. Neither the Paris nor the Schneider replications used the kindergarten
setting. Instead, one child at a time was taken to a room with an experimenter
and told that they were going to play a grocery store game. Subsequently, the
child was sent to the "store" where he or she was supposed to "purchase" the
targeted items. Presenting the grocery store situation in such a manner
makes it more like a laboratory setting. The goal may be more interesting to
the children, but it is only superficially intrinsic to the situation.
To give Weissberg and Paris credit, by using the party setting they did
attempt to create a new context that they judged to be more meaningful for
the American children. However, while emphasizing the meaningfulness of
the context they failed to consider the intrinsic nature of the task itself to the
context. Yes, American children are very likely to have had a good deal of
experience with birthday parties. However, how often do all the children at a
party sit in chairs and try to remember everyone's names? Furthermore,
although remembering names at parties may be a typical expectation, the
process of remembering is usually carried out in a much more enriched
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context. That is, there are personalities and past associations attached to most
of the names. Even if two children meet for the first time at a party, they
immediately begin sizing each other up and interpreting each other's behav-
ior. As such, the name "Tommy" or "Susie" means something. Thus, if a child
needed to remember Tommy and Susie, he or she may be able to because
Tommy and Susie are salient to him or her and there is a reason for recalling
their names. A group of stuffed animals sitting in chairs does not have the
same saliency to a child. Therefore, they are in essence remembering a group
of essentially random names. Such a task requires a great deal of concentra-
tion which is more likely to occur in a structured laboratory situation rather
than a more relaxed game setting.
The implications of these conceptual differences are critical to the out-
comes of the studies in question and impact considerably on interpretation of
the discrepant findings. Istomina's conceptualization of the research question
is dependent on the embeddedness of the memory task in the context created
for the participating subjects. This means that the memory goal must be
intrinsic to the task at hand and should not require that the subject explicitly
recognize and accept the goal. The motivation to perform the memory task
should not be provided by an external source, but rather should be generated
by involvement in the task.
In the replications of Istomina, not only was the game setting possibly
unfamiliar to the participating children, but the unfamiliarity may have led to
some confusion about expectations for the task. If the memory tasks in the
game settings had been better grounded in general task activity, that is, the
children were given a concrete context-based reason for remembering infor-
mation, it is possible that the replication results would have turned out
differently. As it stands, the only conclusion we can make is that Paris and
Weissberg have demonstrated that American children may be accelerated in
their memory development in comparison with Russian children. That is,
American children show evidence of memory ability in settings where the
memory goal is less embedded in the context at a younger age than Russian
children. Since American children are familiar with structured memory
situations, it is possible that the lab setting was a meaningful and motivating
context for the American children. However, this finding does not suggest
that these children would not first demonstrate memory ability in contexts for
which memory is intrinsic to the task. That question is not answered by the
replications, because they did not provide such a context for their partici-
pants.
SUMMARY
After our analysis of these five replication attempts of Istomina's work, what
do we conclude? I have pointed out numerous methodological and outcome
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inconsistencies. The two sets of replication authors conclude that they have
successfully cast doubt on Istomina's original premises, but the evidence does
not seem so clear. In fact, we should not feel comfortable at all about reaching
any conclusions concerning the validity and reliability of Istomina's study as
a foundation for understanding the development of children's memory based
on the replication results.
When pursuing replication, there are two general levels of analysis that
should be taken into account. First, an original piece should be considered
from a methodological perspective. In order that real technical comparisons
can be made, any replication should involve as closely as possible a repro-
duction of every documented aspect of the original study. The replication
should obviously also involve a group of subjects who are exposed to an
"improved" design (without the original flaws). This group, of course, may be
broken into several groups in order to explore different flaws in the original.
Unfortunately, none of the replication attempts considered here provided a
direct comparison of Istomina's work. Therefore, putting all theoretical ques-
tions aside, it is impossible to make any statements about the methodological
problems that plagued Istomina's study. Schneider and Brun in their first
experiment came the closest to generating a direct comparison, but because
they failed to include the kindergarten setting and because they counterbal-
anced and standardized the word lists in this study, it is d i f f icu l t to estimate the
features of the design that had the largest effect on their success in replicating
Istomina's findings.
Beyond the more technical nature of a methodological analysis of a study,
a second level of analysis is theoretical. If a replication author wants to
comment on the overall theoretical implications of a work, it is important that
he or she consider the theoretical justification for the original design and
adjust his or her design to reflect that framework.
In any study, design features are critical to the outcome of the study.
Manipulation of design features could yield changes in behavior that might
suggest that performance is rather fragile and seemingly superficial. How-
ever, every design feature is an integral part of the context that is created in
the study. For Istomina, this context was absolutely critical to her theoretical
framework. She created a context that in her estimation was highly mean-
ingful for the children in her study and one that she judged as less meaningful.
In the replications of her work the authors have voiced concern, and rightly
so, over some blatant methodological flaws that plagued Istomina's work. In
correcting those flaws, however, they have removed their studies from the
conceptual framework that guided the original work. In doing so, they may
have created superh'cial changes in behavior that confuse rather than clarify
the concept of activity and intrinsic motivation in memory development.
This confusion speaks very loudly to the issue of how we go about concep-
tualizing replication. Both Weissberg and Paris and Schneider and colleagues
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failed to create the rich context that Istomina created with the kindergarten
setting. They choose instead to assert more control over the game setting,
thus sterilizing it to the point that it possibly lost its meaning. In this case, then,
although methodological improvements were certainly made, the essence of
the experiment was obscured. If our goal in psychological investigations is to
more thoroughly understand psychological principles, then we should give
more careful consideration to the theoretical notions underlying our meth-
ods. My point is not to harshly criticize Weissberg and Paris and Schneider
and his colleagues, however. Both groups of researchers executed commend-
able studies. Instead, I am suggesting that beyond purely methodological
considerations in replications, we should also contemplate intrinsic features
of experimental settings that may influence individuals' behaviors. If cultural,
interpersonal, or contextual variables are judged to be central components
affecting behavior in a certain study, then those pursuing replications of the
work should not hesitate to alter the original methodology to test the impor-
tance of these factors on new samples of individuals. By including in any
replication both methodological and theoretical levels of analysis, one could
more validly reach specific conclusions about the reliablity of the methods of
study and more general conclusions about their theoretical implications.
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CHAPTER 11
The Forbidden Colors Game:
An Argument in Favor of
Internalization?
René van der Veer
University of Leiden
Leiden, The Netherlands
Cognition rests on the flexible use of mental (meta)-skUls that have been
mastered in various task settings. One way of looking at these skills is to
conceive of them as resting on the intemalization of specific tools and
instruments that cultures provide. Such a view was defended by the Soviet
psychologist Lev Vygotsky, whose ideas have earned him the reputation of a
"classic" thinker in selected circles of Western psychology and pedagogics
(Brunei-, 1984; Wertsch, 1985). More specifically, he argued that children will
first make use of the external instruments available in their culture and then
shift to internal ones based on speech (e.g., Vygotsky, 1928, 1929a, 1930b,
1931). His collaborator Leont'ev (1932) attempted to corroborate this view in
experimental practice through the so-called forbidden colors game. In this
chapter Leont'ev's experiment, its replications, and their theoretical implica-
tions are discussed.
EXTERNAL MEDIATION
That external instruments or tools are crucial in problem solving is an ancient
idea that got new impetus in the beginning of this century through Köhler s
(1921) famous chimpanzee research. Köhler's idea was to provide his chim-
panzees with various tools (e.g., sticks, boxes, etc.) and to see whether and how
they would use them in order to solve relatively complex problems, usually
obtaining an object that was attractive, but difficult to reach. For various rea-
sons—for example, its relevance for the comparison of human and animal
cognition—Könler's research greatly impressed the scientific community and
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many researchere attempted to replicate his findings with different samples
(e.g., the study of chimpanzees and other apes by Guillaume and Meyerson,
1930, 1931; the study of human children by Brainard, 1930; Bühler, 1919).
Among the researchers who were fascinated by Köhlers findings and who
used his setup for the study of human subjects we find the Soviet research
collective headed by Vygotsky, Luria, and Leont'ev (e.g., Vygotsky, 1929b,
1930a; Vygotsky & Luria, 1930). Inspired by Köhler they presented children
of various age groups and mental ability with tasks that could not readily be
solved without making use of some tools, or instruments that "happened to be
present." Subjects were, for instance, presented a series of pictures once and
then asked to reproduce them. The length of the series was chosen so as to
make this task too difficult for most children. They were then suggested to
make use of the "tools" (or means, or instruments) that were present. Practi-
cally anything could serve as a tool: pieces of paper, screws, shot, and so on.
The interesting thing was that children were indeed able to use these means
to improve their performance: They copied, for instance, the shape of the
picture to be remembered with pieces of paper, or "wrote down" the first
letter of its name. In doing so they proved they were able to reproduce
considerably more pictures of a series than without the use of external means.
It is one thing to demonstrate that children can make use of external aids or
tools to improve their performance on some task, but it is quite another thing
to show the purported ontogenetic transition from problem solving based on
external mediation to problem solving based on internal mediation. In Vy-
gotsky's view such a process of internalization, or "ingrowing," indeed takes
place in ontogenesis and various stages in mediation can be established. He
claimed—following in the footsteps of a long tradition (e.g., Dewey, 1910)—
that speech was the primary internal mediator in problem solving. But how
should we conceive the transition from performance primarily based on the
use of external means to performance primarily based on internal speech?
Can the "ingrowing" of external mediators be experimentally demonstrated?
And can different forms of mediation be shown to exist in different stages of
ontogeny? It was these and similar questions that Leont'ev's (1931, 1932)
experimental research tried to address.
LEONTEVS EXPERIMENT
Leont'ev conducted a series of experiments that were meant to demonstrate
the use of external means and their consequent internalization. The method
he used was that of double stimulation discussed above and his main topics
were that of memory and attention. In a series of experiments with hundreds
of subjects of varying age and background he attempted to show that young
children—up to age 7—were unable to make use of (external) mediators. In
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this sense of the word their behavior was "natural." Somewhat older chil-
dren—age 8 and 13—could make successful use of external means and their
mediated performance was, consequently, better than their unmediated, or
"natural" performance. Finally, adults refrained from using external medi-
ating devices turning to internal mediators instead. At least, this was what
Leont'ev—following Vygotsky—concluded in the book summarizing his ex-
periments (Leont'ev, 1931; see also Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991).
The Forbidden Colors Task
One of Leont'ev's experiments was published in the Journal of Genetic Psy-
chology and is known as the "forbidden colors game." In this experiment
Leont'ev (1932) presented his subjects with three or four series of 18 questions,
out of which seven concerned the color of things. In each series the 2nd, 4th,
8th, 9th, 12th, 15th, and 17th question required a color answer. The other
questions were either arbitrary (e.g. "Do you like reading?"), or in some way
prepared the next color question. Thus, one of Leont'ev's questions was "Have
you seen the sea?", which was immediately followed by the next question
"What color is the sea?" The subjects were instructed that they should answer
each question promptly and in one word, especially in the case of colors. The
first series of 18 questions was presented without any additional limitations,
that is, the subjects were free to answer whatever they liked. In the second
series the actual rules of the game were explained: The subject should (a) not
repeat the name of one and the same color within one series, and (b) avoid
mentioning two specified "forbidden" colors. The third series differed from the
second one insofar as the subject was now given a set of nine colored cards and
suggested that these might help him to accomplish the task ("they must help
you to win"; Leont'ev, 1932, p. 64). A fourth series was only presented in cases
where the subject did not show evidence of having found out how to use the
cards, or did so only towards the end of the experiment. Apparently, before
this fourth series the subjects were told explicitly how to make use of the cards.
Before and after each series Leont'ev ascertained by means of special ques-
tions to what extent the subject had mastered and remembered the instruc-
tions. Before the beginning of the whole experiment the subjects were
checked for color blindness and/or knowledge of color names using the set of
colored cards mentioned above. From Leont'ev's account it becomes clear that
for the subjects the whole setting was that of a "game" where they could either
lose or win. The experimenter tried to introduce a relaxed atmosphere and
linked the questions together—by means of phrases such as "Tell me!" or
"What do you think?"—to stimulate a normal conversation-like situation. Also
because the experimental situation was very much like a traditional game
played in Russian (and Dutch) families it may be assumed that the subjects felt
"at home" during the "game" and "played" at an optimal level.
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The Nature of the Questions
Most of Leont'ev's questions were very simple and well within comprehen-
sion of his subjects. Examples of his questions were: "Can you draw?"; "Did
you ever listen to music?"; "What color is the sea?"; "Do you like dogs?"; "Do
you want to be big?", "What colors can leaves be?", and so forth. It should be
remarked, however, that not all of the questions could be answered equally
easily. To illustrate this, let us look at Leont'ev's second series where the
forbidden colors were green and yellow. His seven color questions were,
respectively: (2) "What color is your shirt?"; (4) "What color are the railway-
carriages?"; (8) "What color is the Hoor (generally)?"; (9) "and the walls?"; (12)
"What color are lilacs?"; (15) "What color can leaves be?"; (17) "What is your
favorite color?"
It is clear that some of these questions—for example, 17 and, maybe, 15—
leave considerable freedom to the subject, while others—for example 2 and
12—permit only one possible answer, unless the subject is prepared to give an
untruthful, arbitrary answer (e.g., "Lilacs are red"). The rules of the game
allow for such arbitrary answers, but it is quite likely that young subjects will
find it very hard to give them (see later). Unfortunately, Leont'ev said
virtually nothing of this varying level of difficulty, mentioning only (Leont'ev,
1932, p. 65) that some questions were more "provocative of error" than
others. We also do not know whether in the list given above the second
question was meant to provoke an error or not; that is, we do not know
whether the experimenter deliberately selected some detail of the subject's
clothes that has a "forbidden" color. In the following, however, we have
assumed that this was not the case. We may conclude, then, that some
questions were more difficult than others in the sense that they—if answered
truthfully—required one of the forbidden colors. For other questions there
were more degrees of freedom.
Naturally, several of Leont'ev's questions were also highly culture-bound.
Thus, we would not readily ask a contemporary American child what color a
streetcar has, nor whould we ask a non-Soviet child whether it ever had been
at a (political) meeting. Colors of walls, floors, and exercise books also tend to
vary across cultures. Consequently, as will be seen below, both Adams et al.
(1987) and ourselves had to adjust some of the questions. The four series of
questions were presented to the subjects in varying order (counter-balanced)
to control for possible differences in difficulty.
The Colored Card«
Leont'ev provided his subjects with nine colored cards of unknown size. His
colors were black, white, red, blue, yellow, green, purple (lilac), brown, and
gray. The "forbidden" colors he used were green, yellow (in the second
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series), blue, red (third series), black, and white (fourth series). The fact that
each color was represented only once and that nine cards were available is of
great significance for the strategies of card use that may be followed. Thus,
quite a few children follow the simple strategy of turning upside down first the
two forbidden colors and then, following each color question, successively
mention one of the remaining color cards and turn it over. In this way they
avoid mentioning both the forbidden colors and the repetition of any color.
Having nine cards at one's disposal this strategy can always be employed as
there are exactly seven color questions in each series. Unfortunately, Adams,
Sciortino-Brudzynski, Björn, and Tharp (1987) in their replication of Leon-
t'ev's study used only eight colored cards, which would seem to discourage
the strategy just mentioned.
The fact that each color is represented only once in the set of colored cards
as well as the fact that it contains all "forbidden" colors is, of course, also of
significance. Interesting variations of the game and possibly other forms of
card use would arise if this were not the case.
Form* of Card Use
Leont'ev (1932, p. 70) claimed that the various methods of using the cards
could be reduced to two different forms. One strategy was to put the for-
bidden colors out of the range of vision, to exhibit the remainder, and—as the
subject was answering the questions—to place the already named cards on
one side. This approach was very similar to the one mentioned above, but
there is one essential difference. In the strategy we described the subject can
"mechanically" read off the remaining colors, which puts virtually no de-
mands on either memory or attention processes. The only thing the subject
has to do properly is to turn over the colored cards after their use. In no way,
thus, does he or she have to keep track of the colors already mentioned or
even to remember the forbidden colors. In the first strategy mentioned by
Leont'ev the cards are not turned over—are merely put out of sight—which
makes this strategy presumably slightly more difficult to follow. Leont'ev
(1932, p. 70) regarded this method as "the least perfect" one, reasoning that
the subjects often did not use the colored cards as a real mediating device, and
only put the card aside after having given their answer. Putting aside the
cards, then, was little more than the registering of the spontaneously given
answers. Leont'ev (1932, p. 74) was inclined to interpret this strategy as a
temporary phenomenon caused by the subjects's enchantment by the
method: They are so impressed by the magic power of the cards that they use
them irrespective of the questions asked. Such a "formalist" phase in the use
of mediating devices is characteristic for both ontogeny and phytogeny
Leont'ev (1932, p. 74) speculated:
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Probably it is just this phase of the domination of external psychological
mediums, through which the development of the higher instrumented, "signif-
icative" acts of behavior pass, that reveals itself in the history of the cultural
development of humanity, in those numerous and extremely worked-out sys-
tems of external methods of behavior which compose a typical feature of
primitive society.
Some pages before Leont'ev (1932, pp. 69-70) had compared the same
behavior—putting the forbidden colors out of sight—to the "way ... an
Australian or African savage might act in freeing himself from a dangerous
man by destroying his image or symbol." Thus, the fascination with a specific
elaborate method and the inability to see its limitations and real value would
be characteristic of both children in a certain age period and of humanity in its
"primitive" or "magic" period.
In the second strategy discerned by Leont'ev the cards remain in sight—the
child may separate them into two rows or columns, for instance—and before
each answer the child consults the available cards. In this case, then, the cards
are used before the answer is given and the subjects' behavior can be called
mediated in the real sense of the word. Undoubtedly, the second method is
more difficult to follow as now the cards used so far are not simply ignored,
but consulted. It is only after this consultation of both the forbidden color
cards, the cards used, and the remaining cards that the subjects can give their
answer. To Leont'ev this meant that the second strategy reflected a higher
form of (mediated) thinking typical of a later stage of mental development.
The Subjects
Thirty subjects participated in Leont'ev's experiment of whom seven of
preschool age (5 to 6 years old), fifteen of school age (seven children of 8 to 9
years old and eight children of 10 to 13 years old), and eight adults. No further
information (e.g., SES, sex, ethnic background) about these subjects was
provided.
The Number of Mistake« and their Interpretation
The most important quantitative results of Leont'ev's experiment were
formed by the number of incorrect answers to the color questions in the
various age groups. Table 11.1 summarizes his data.
Two things seem immediately evident from Table 11.1. First, the number of
incorrect answers (with or without cards) seems to diminish with age. Second,
performance with colored cards (series Ill/TV) seems better than performance
without (series II). It was the second fact that was theoretically the most in-
teresting to Leont'ev and a substantial part of his paper was devoted to its
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Table 11.1. The average number of incorrect answers (after Leont'ev, 1932, p. 69)
Age
5-6
8-9
10-13
22-27
H
7
7
8
8
series //
(no cards)
3.9
3.3
3.1
1.4
Mean number of errors
series III/IV
(cards)
3.6
1.S
0.3
06
Differences
ii-m/rv
0.3
1.8
2.8
0.8
interpretation. As can be seen, the youngest children made virtually the same
number of mistakes (3.9 versus 3.6 out of 7 possible mistakes) in both card
(series III/IV) and non-card (II) series. For older children, however, the results
were decidedly better for the card series (differences between series II and
III/IV of, respectively, 1.8 and 2.8). Finally, for adults the results were still in
favor of the card series, but the advantage was considerably smaller (a differ-
ence between series II and III/IV of only 0.8). Combining these results with his
qualitative observations of the subjects' behavior and the answers they gave
to his questions Leont'ev came to the following interpretation of his findings.
The youngest children (5-6 years old) gave incorrect answers to slightly
more than half of the color questions and the difference between the series
with and without cards was very small. Leont'ev explained that these chil-
dren were very easily distracted from the task and did not discover by
themselves how to use the cards. Even after the explicit instruction how to
use them that preceeded series IV—sometimes, also, the children were
allowed to watch the card use of more able peers—the children remained
unable to handle the cards (Leont'ev, 1932, p. 68). At best they superficially
imitated the card use of others, but their whole behavior as well as their
answers to questions asked by the experimenter demonstrated a complete
lack of understanding of their function. In fact, Leont'ev several times ob-
served that the color cards actually hindered the correct performance of
children as they were drawn to some cards and kept repeating their attractive
colors. In general, then, the youngest children were unable to detect and/or
understand the instrumental function of the colored cards. It can be con-
cluded, therefore, that their answers were not mediated by the external
stimuli provided, but formed an immediate reaction to the question or to
some accidental part of the environment.
Quite another picture can be observed in the case of the older children.
These children showed a considerably better result in the series with cards
(series III/IV) than in that without (series II). As can be seen in Table 11.1 the
differences were, respectively, 1.8 and 2.8. Leont'ev suggested that this
improvement form series II to series II/IV was due to the children's better
understanding of the functions of the card. The children were now increas-
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ingly capable of using the cards, often detecting their correct use spontane-
ously, that is, not needing the additional instruction or modeling and the extra
series IV. Leont'ev concluded that these children understood the instrumental
function of the colored cards and that their thinking, thus, was mediated
through external means.
The results of the adults were at first sight rather puzzling: Although their
number of mistakes was quite low, there was virtually no difference between
the card and noncard series. At any rate, the difference between the perfor-
mance in series II and IH/IV was considerably smaller (0.8) than the corre-
sponding difference (1.8 or 2.8) for school children. In fact, the magnitude of
the difference was rather similar to that of the preschool children. Moreover,
observation pointed out that the adult subjects manipulated the colored cards
far less than the school children. It would seem, then, that the behavior of
adults was a unmediated or "natural" as that of these youngest children. Leon-
t'ev, however, did not at all believe in such a peculiar form of mental regres-
sion. In stead, he argued that "the second series of stimulation (that is, the
colored cards; RvdV) gets emancipated from primary external forms. What
takes place is what we here call the process of 'ingrowing' of the external
means: the external sign turns into an internal one" (Leont'ev, 1932, p. 76).
Leont'ev argued, thus, that the behavior of adult subjects remains medi-
ated, but that the mediation process shifts from external to internal means. He
provided two arguments to substantiate his claim. First, he pointed out that
the phenomenon of internalization of external means is a very general one as
in the case of children who learn to do calculations by heart only after
extensive training with paper-and-pencil calculations. It, therefore, seemed
unlikely that the adults in the present task would suddenly relapse into
"natural," unmediated behavior. Second, several of the adults did make use of
the cards, but without manipulating them. Having spread out the cards—
usually with the forbidden colors in a special position—they would fixate
them after each color question and then give the correct answer. To Leont'ev
this strategy formed a perfect illustration of the shift to internal means: While
younger children have to physically remove the forbidden colors the adults
can carry out this operation "in their heads" using the cards only as a sort of
reminder. The observed cases, therefore, demonstrated a mental operation
that is halfway its internalization process.
Some Problems of Interpretation
Leont'ev's explanation of his data is consistent, but is not without its moot
points. In the first place he claimed that older children made more use of the
colored cards provided, but did not substantiate this claim with any data. We
do not know, therefore, to what extent the older children actually made more
use of the cards and how their use correlated with performance as measured
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by the number of mistakes. In other words, it is unclear whether the perfor-
mance in the series with cards was superior because of the card use. It might
be argued, for instance that the performance in the series with cards was
superior because these were always presented after the noncard series. The
better performance would then simply reflect a training effect. This possi-
bility is all the more critical as the scores of an unknown fraction of the
children reflected their performance in series IV. These children, then, had
one more series to get used to the experimental situation and the nature of the
task. In this reasoning combining the scores in series III with those in series IV
would inflate the difference between card and noncard performance. We
have to leave open, then, the possibility that card use is simply irrelevant for
performance in the forbidden color task. In fact, it can be argued that such a
possibility would be completely consistent with a Vygotskian understanding
of mental development (see later). How, then, would a possible alternative
explanation of Leont'ev's set of data look like? First, the differences between
card and noncard series within one age group would be explained by
increasing familiarity with the nature of the task and the experimental
situation. Second, the differences between age groups would be explained by
the increasing availability of cognitive strategies that enable correct perfor-
mance of the task. Third, the small difference between the performance in
card and noncard series in the adult group would be due to a "ceiling-effect":
Performance is already that high in the noncard series that it can hardly be
improved. Fourth, the small difference between the performance in noncard
and card series in the group of youngest children would be due to their
general lack of understanding of the task (which can be improved by no
amount of training).
Summarizing, it would seem that there are several debatable points in
Leont'ev's interpretation of his data and not a few shortcomings in the design
of his study. Several of these shortcomings have been pointed out by Adams
et al. (1987), who attempted to replicate Leont'ev's study making use of
contemporary methods of data analysis and abiding contemporary standards
of scientific rigor. It is to this study that we will now turn.
THE ADAMS ET AL. (1987) REPLICATION
Adams et al. (1987)' voiced serious doubts concerning the design and method
of Leont'ev's experiment. First, they objected to the retesting of subjects who
'Adams et al. consistently refer to Vygotsky (1932), or Luria and Vygotsky (1932), when
referring to Leont'ev's investigation. This mistake is probably due to the fact that Luria and
Vygotsky were mentioned in the Journal at Genetic Psychology as guest editors of a series of
publications conducted in the Krupskaja Academy of Communist Education. There is no doubt,
however, that Leont'ev was the main experimenter in this and several other experiments.
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had difficulty mastering the use of the cards—in series IV—and to the combi-
nation of data from series III and IV. Even more unsettling they found the fact
that sometimes before this fourth series the children were allowed to watch
the card use of more successful children. Second, they found fault with the
small and unequal number of subjects that precluded the possibility of proper
subject assignment and counterbalancing of conditions (Adams et al., 1987, p.
5). Third, Adams et al. criticized the unclear presentation of the structure of
the sentence sets.
In order to correct for these methodological problems they used substan-
tially greater numbers of subjects (counterbalanced by gender), parallel forms
of the task stressing either the repetition or forbidden color rules, equivalent
test procedures for all subjects on all four series of the test, and sentence sets
revised to be structurally equivalent and culturally appropriate for their
sample.
The Method Used by Adam« et al. (1987)
Subjects Ninety-six subjects, 24 (12 male and 12 female) from each of the
four age groups used in Leont'ev's study participated in the experiment: 5-6
years (range 4;10-6;11, M = 5;10), 8-9 years (range 8;01-9;09, M = 8;11),
10-13 years (range 10;0-I2;4, M = 10;11), and 22-27 years (range
22;0-27;05, M - 23;08). Subjects represented the ethnically divers popula-
tion of Hawaii.
Procedure The same as in Leont'ev (1932), with the exception that all
subjects were administered the fourth series. Before the third series the
subjects were given the colored cards and "the option of using them" (Adams
et al., 1987). Thus, no explicit instruction as to their possible use was given.
Observable use of the cards was recorded.
Materials. Eight 4"x6" index cards covered with colored instruction
paper were used. The colors were red, blue, yellow, green, brown, white,
black, and orange. The question sets given by Leont'ev (1932) were modified
so as to ensure parallel structure and culturally appropriate content. Thus,
each sentence set consisted of 18 questions, seven of which were appropri-
ately answered with a color term. The structure of each sentence set was as
follows: questions 2,4, and 15 required a forbidden color; question 8 was most
likely to elicit a nonforbidden color, while question 9 provoked its repetition;
question 12 was again most likely to elicit a nonforbidden color; finally,
question 17 was open-ended and, therefore, did not necessarily evoke an
error (e.g., "What color can a car be?"). All in all, then, questions 2,4, 9, and
15 were "difficult," questions 8 and 12 "easy," whereas question 17 was of
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intermediate difficulty. A total of four to five errors, therefore, could be
expected in case the child did not grasp the nature of the task.
The Results of Adams et al. (1987)
Error» Table 11.2 presents the mean number of errors found by Adams
et al. in the same format as Leont'ev's original report.
It can be seen in Table 11.2 that Adams et al., contrary to expectation,
found rather small differences between the card (III and IV) and noncard
series (II). In fact, only one of the differences (between series III and IV for
8-9-year-old children) proved significant. Because the reduction in the mean
number of errors was generally smaller than in Leont'ev's sample (and
because the results were not statistically significant) Adams et al. (1987, p. 8)
concluded that "this pattern of data clearly indicates a failure to replicate the
major findings of the forbidden color experiment." It should be remarked,
however, that the general pattern of Leont'ev's findings—no improvement
whatsoever from noncard to card series for very young children and adults,
plus improvement for the two groups of school children—was found again in
the Adams et al. sample.
A remarkable difference between Leont'ev's and Adams et al.'s findings
was that the contemporary subjects—except for the youngest age group-
performed rather better in the noncard series. According to the authors this
initial advantage was lost during the subsequent card series, because most
subjects made little if any use of the cards.
Statistical analysis confirmed what seemed obvious from the simple visual
inspection of Table 11.2. A six-way ANOVA with three between-subjects
variables (age, sex, form) and three within-subjects variables (series 2,3, and
4) found no significant effects of sex, or test form, but did reveal significant
effects of age F (I, 3) = 45.55, p <.001, and task series, F (I, 2) = 6.33, p
< .05. A subsequent four-way ANOVA with one between-subjects variable
(age) and three within-subjects variables (series 2, 3, and 4) found only one
Table 11.2. The average number of incorrect answers (after Adams et al., 1987. p. 21)
Mean number of errors
Age
5-6
8-9
10-13
N
24
24
24
serie» O
(no cards)
4.2
2.6
1.7
series m
(cards 1)
4.2
2.1
1.2
serieslV
(cards 2)
4.2
1.2
1.1
Differences
IHII III-/V
0
.4
.5
0
.9'
.1
22-27 24 1.0 .8 1.2 .2 -.4
• p < .001
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statistically significant contrast, for 8 and 9-year-olds between the third and
fourth series, F(1,95) = 15.50, p <.001.
Card tue Leont'ev argued that the subjects' improved performance in
series III/IV was due to their performance becoming mediated by the colored
cards. Unfortunately, he gave no numbers to indicate to what extent the
subjects actually made use of the cards. To remedy for this shortcoming
Adams et al. registered card use, distinguishing "consistent," "inconsistent,"
and no card use. The card use was called consistent when the subjects were
observed to or reported to use the cards six or seven of the seven possible
times within one series. It was called inconsistent when the cards were used
from one to five times within a series. Table 11.3 summarizes Adams et al.'s
findings.
The set of results in Table 11.3 partially confirms Leont'ev's rather vague
account. Thus, it can be seen that the youngest children hardly made use of
the cards, while card use increased with age. It is true that the rather high
percentage of card use by adults forms a problem. Adams et al. take this card
use as contradicting Leont'ev's theoretical argument, but this is not altogether
clear. According to Leont'ev the manipulation of cards would be clearly
lower for adult subjects, but he did allow for card use in the form of visual
fixation of the (forbidden) color cards (see earlier). As Adams et al. (1987, p. 9)
in Table 11.3 combined both observations of card use (presumably mostly
manipulations) and self-reports by subjects (which might include use by visual
fixation) it is unclear what the percentages for card use exactly mean: It might
be argued that adults consistently relied more on visual fixation, while
younger children relied on manipulation. This would clearly be compatible
with Leont'ev's line of reasoning. The data obtained for school children also
Table 11.3. Percentage of subjects using cards (after Adams et al. 1987, p. 22)
Pattern of card use
Age None Inconsistent Consistent
5-6
series III
series IV
8-9
series 111
series rv
10-13
series III
series IV
22-27
series 111
series IV
83.3
83.3
45.8
25
58.3
50
58.3
58.3
12.5
8.3
232
29.2
16.7
16.7
33.3
37.5
4.2
8.3
25
45.8
25
33.3
8.3
4.2
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partially confirmed Leont'ev's findings: both 8-9-year-olds and 10-13-year-
olds made ample use of the colored cards. However, this card use was not
clearly related with the number of errors made. Thus, combining the findings
of Table 11.2 and 11.3 one finds that the substantial card use found for
8-9-year-olds in series HI does not lead to an improvement of performance (as
compared with series II) in terms of the mean number of errors. Neither was
this the case for 10-13-year-olds. Only the increasing card use from series III
to rv for 8-9-year-olds corresponded with a statistically significant decrease
of the number of errors.
It would seem, then, the pattern of card use found in Adams et al.'s
replication partially confirmed Leont'ev's findings, but that it remained far
from proven that the use of cards actually contributed to the improvement of
performance. Alternative explanations of the set of data, such as the one we
provided earlier, cannot be ruled out.
Verbal strategie» One reason—other than increased card use—older
children may do better than younger ones is that they can circumvent the
forbidden color names making use of various sorts of verbal strategies. In
order to investigate this possibility Adams et al. (1987) classified the subjects'
answers into various categories. Responses were categorized as "acceptable"
when they were truthful and stereotypie, and did not violate either of the
rules (e.g., "What color is the sea?" "Blue"). An answer was coded "possible"
if the color was theoretically possible, but deviated from the accepted cliché
(e.g., "What color is the sea?" "Green"). "Arbitrary" answers were answers
that did not violate the rules, but were not truthful (e.g., "What color is the
sea? "Red"). "Compound" answers were those in which the subject used a
modifier such as "light-" in "light-blue" to give a truthful answer. "Related"
answers were those in which the subject offered the name of a color related to
the truthful response (often a seldom used synonym, such as "azure" for
"blue"). Using this classification Adams et al. (1987) found that older subjects
make increasing use of the categories other than "acceptable." Consequently,
they suggested that age-related improvements in the number of correct
answers rest on the subjects' willingness to give patently false ("arbitrary"), or
somewhat dubious ("possible") answers, and on the growth of their color
vocabulary ("compound" and "related" answers). Adams et al. (1987) did not
find any relation between card use and the use of the various response
categories.
Adams et al. (1987) concluded that Leont'ev's claims regarding the effec-
tiveness of the colored cards were not supported by their data. It is true that
school children made increasing use of the cards, but this use did not
demonstrably cause the improved performance. The authors suggested that
exposition of the subjects to a model of effective card use (which occasionally
took place in the original investigation, see Leont'ev, 1932, p. 68) could
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possibly lead to more effective card use and a replication of Leont'ev's results.
Adams et al. (1987, p. 15) suggested that a literal notion of "ingrowing," or
internalization of auxiliary means is not very fruitful. Instead, they argued
that subjects leave the external mediating devices such as cards for subtle
verbal strategies such as giving "false" (arbitrary, possible) answers that do
not strictly violate the rules of the game and/or making use of words that
circumvent the naming of forbidden colors (compound and related answers).
THE PRESENT REPLICATION
Adams et al. (1987) introduced a number of notions and methodological
refinements that have proved valuable for the present replication. At the
same time it seems clear that their investigation suffered from a number of
shortcomings. First, as they themselves have pointed out, the role of explicit
instruction or modeling of possible card use was not taken into account. Thus,
while Leont'ev (1932) sometimes—in case of inadequate performance—pro-
vided explicit instruction or modeling before series IV, Adams et al. (1987)
only handed the cards to the subjects with the remark that they might help.
The fact that the difference between card and noncard series was less in their
sample might be due to this factor. Second, Adams et al. (1987) made no
distinction between different forms of card use—such as manipulation and
visual fixation—and, consequently could not check Leont'ev's claims re-
garding age-related changes in this respect. Third, the authors—like Leont'ev
(1932)—did not control for or even discuss the possibility that superior
performance in later series was due a to a simple training effect (rather than
increased card use or superior verbal strategies). While this may be due to the
fact that they generally found little or no improvement over series it seems
necessary to discount a simple training effect. Fourth, the authors provided
no more than eight color cards, which may have influenced their results (see
above). In order to clarify these issues the present author conducted a new
replication of Leont'ev's experiment.
Method
Subjects Eighty subjects, twenty (10 male and 10 female) from each age
group participated in the experiment: 5-6 years (range 5;0-6;10, M = 5;09),
8-9 years (range 8;02-9;10, M = 9;0), 10-13 years (range 10;03-12;0, M =
11;02), and 21-30 years (range 21;07-30;08, M = 25;09). Subjects repre-
sented the ethnically homogeneous population of the Netherlands.
Procedure. The procedure was basically similar to that followed by
Leont'ev (1932) and Adams et al. (1987), but the number of series and the
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instruction differed. Each subject participated in six series of questions.
Before the third series the colored cards were introduced with the remark
that "these might help in winning the game." Before the fifth series the
children were explicitly told how they might use the colored cards and two
ways of using them were shown (the experimenter explained that the subject
might put the forbidden and/or already used cards to one side or turn them
over and illustrated this). In addition, the subjects were told that it was
allowed to give "funny" answers, like saying that the sun is blue. In this way,
the instruction both demonstrated ways of using the cards and hinted at the
use of a verbal strategy. Thus, each subject participated in the following series
(see Table 11.4).
Ideally, the results of our series 2 (the noncard series) for each age group
should roughly coincide with the corresponding series of Leont'ev (1932) and
Adams et al. (1987). Also, the results of series 3 and 4 should be roughly
equivalent to those of the corresponding series of Adams et al. (1987), as they
simply introduced the colored cards without further instruction or modeling.
Finally, series 5 and 6 were added to investigate whether explicit instruction
or modeling makes a difference in performance and to check whether this
factor might explain the differences between the results found by Leont'ev
(1932) and Adams et al. (1987). Thus, the results of our series 5 and 6 should be
more similar to the data found by Leont'ev (1932) as he gave some subjects
explicit instruction and others not. Of course, in general one would expect a
diminishing number of errors over series due to the influence of training.
Materials
The structure of the sentence sets was identical with those of Adams et al.
(1987). Nine (instead of eight) colored cards were used (see above).
Table 11.4. The six series of the experiment with the type
of intervention by the experimenter
Series 1 (no rules)
INTRODUCTION OF RULES OF THE GAME
Series 2
INTRODUCTION OF CARDS
Series 3
Series«
EXPLICIT INSTRUCTION
Series 5
Series 6
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Results
Enron. The quantative results of the experiment concern the number of
errors in the different series, the incidence and frequency of card use, and the
distribution of the various response categories. Table 11.5 presents the mean
number of errors found in the present replication.
These results are also depicted in Figure 11.1 One sees how the number of
errors decreased gradually (virtually linearly for the first three series) with
age. A clear gap separates the scores for series 2,3, and 4 from those of series
5 and 6, at least for the younger age groups. The gap diminishes due to a
ceiling effect for 11- to 13-year-olds and adults.
A first visual inspection of Table 11.5 and Figure 11.1 gives rise to the
following simple and obvious interpretations. First, in this sample the age
effect observed by both Leont'ev (1932) and Adams et al. (1987) is found
again: In all but the very last series the mean number of errors diminishes
over age. Second, there seems to be only a slight effect of the introduction of
the colored cards per se. This would confirm the result found by Adams et al.
(1987). Third, the explicit instruction caused a dramatic decrease of the
number of errors. This finding most probably corroborates Leont'ev's (1932)
results.
Statistical analysis confirmed these first impressions. A MANOVA for re-
peated measurements found significant effects for both series, f(73;4) = 14.7
andp <.000, and the interaction between series and age groups, F(193; 12) =
2.0 and p = .03 (see Table 11.6). On further univariate analysis (mixed model)
it was found that the contrast between series 2 and all other series was
significant for all age groups. The contrast between series 3 and 4 versus
series 5 and 6 was significant for all age groups, but the 10- to 13-year-olds.
This contrast was most pronounced for 8- and 9-year-olds, and smallest for
adults.
Card ate Following Adams et al. (1987) we observed the card use of
subjects and distinguished between consistent and inconsistent card use. It
was found—in particular for the lower age groups—that the introduction of
Table 11.5. The average number of incorrect answers for different series and age groups
Mean number of errors
Age
5-6
8-9
10-13
21-30
CARDS
N
20
20
20
20
INSTRUCTION
n
3.4
2.6
2.2
1.6
m
3.2
2.4
1.6
1.1
IV
3.4
2.1
1.4
.9
V
1.9
.9
.7
.7
VI
1.7
.3
.5
.6
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Figure 11.1. The number of errors in the five series for all age groups
the colored cards as such did not lead to their frequent use. The explicit
instruction, however, proved highly effective in promoting the use of the
cards enhancing the percentage of children using them from practically zero
in the lower age groups to a percentage of 50 or more and even raising the
percentage of adults using the cards from approximately 40 to 55. Table 11.7
summarizes the results.
Table 11.7 demonstrates that explicit instruction was very effective in
enhancing card use: In all age groups there was a dramatic increase in either
inconsistent or consistent card use. The effect was smallest for adults as they
already before the instruction tended to make use of the cards. It would thus
seem that the decreased number of errors is due to the increased frequency of
card use. Unlike Adams et al. (1987), we decided to check whether consistent
card use was actually related to the number of errors made. The frequency of
card use was measured in two ways. Two observers scored either (a) "card
manipulation," when subjects touched or manipulated the colored cards, or
(b) "card reference" when subjects either looked at the colored cards, or
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Table 116. Results of MANOVA for present replication
Source
Between Subjects
Error
Age groups
Within subjects
Series
Series x Groups
SS
290
168
.42
.73
a
76
3
73;4
193:12
27
MS
4
56
F
14.7
25.2
20
P
<000
<.ooo
03
touched and manipulated them. The latter variable, thus, measured a
broader concept of card use and included the first. These variables were
correlated with the variable "error change," which was computed by
substracting the number of errors made in series 5 plus 6 from those made in
series 3 plus 4. This variable, thus, reflected the effect of instruction on the
error rate. It was found that the correlations between "error change" and
either "card manipulation" or "card reference" were extremely low and
nonsignificant for the group of subjects as a whole. Thus, for the group of all
subjects the increasing card use is not related to the decreasing number of
errors. Computing these same correlations for each age group separately it
was found that only for the group of 8- and 9-year-olds "error change" and
the two forms of card use were correlated significantly (card reference, r
= .42, p = .03; card manipulation, r = .40, p = .04). This finding suggests that,
at least for the other age groups, factors other than card use—such as the
subjects' use of various verbal strategies—are responsible for the increased
performance after instruction.
Type of responses. Looking at the different response categories intro-
duced by Adams et al. (1987) we found that the frequency of arbitrary
answers increased remarkably after instruction. Other types of responses—
except for simple "acceptable" answers—were relatively infrequent. Com-
puting the correlation between "error change" and the frequency of arbitrary
answers it was found that this variable correlated negatively with the number
of arbitrary answers given in the preinstruction series (r = -.39, p = .000) and
positively with those given in the postinstruction series (r = .33, p = .002).
This pattern was found in every age group with the exception of adults where
the number of arbitrary answers given in the pre-instruction series was not
(negatively) related to "error change," presumably because adults already
gave a substantial number of arbitrary answers before instruction. Thus, in
general there is a strong relation between instruction and the frequency of
arbitrary answers: after instruction there is a marked (and statistically signif-
icant) increase in arbitrary answers.
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Table 11.7. Percentage of subjects using cards before and after instruction
251
Pattern of card use
Age None Inconsistent Consistent
5-6
Series HI
Series rv
INSTRUCTION
SeriesV
Series VI
8-9
Series III
Series IV
INSTRUCTION
SeriesV
Series VI
10-13
Series 111
Series IV
INSTRUCTION
SeriesV
Series VI
21-30
Series III
Series IV
INSTRUCTION
SeriesV
Series VI
90
70
10
10
75
60
_
—
45
45
_
-
25
20
5
5
10
30
40
40
25
35
25
15
40
20
40
15
35
35
30
40
—
—
50
50
_
5
75
85
15
35
60
85
40
45
65
55
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The most remarkable finding of our replication study is, we think, that card
use is probably not very effective in diminishing the number of errors made.
More important seems the use of various verbal strategies, such as the idea of
giving arbitrary answers. At any rate, when the instruction involves both the
explanation of possible ways of card use and the idea of giving arbitrary
answers then the children and adults pick up both elements, but the strategy
of giving arbitrary answers is far more effective in diminishing the number of
errors. The one exception is the age group of 8-9-year-olds were increased
card use is associated with improved performance. This finding is consistent
with the results obtained by Adams et al. (1987) and contradicts the expecta-
tions of Vygotsky and Leont'ev. In contradiction to Vygotsky and Leont'ev we
had to conclude that in the experimental setting card use did not substantially
improve performance and that adults did not refrain from using the cards.
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Thus, the results of the forbidden color game constituted no proof for the idea
that children as they grow older internalize external means, such as colored
cards.
The fact that the age group of 8-9-year-olds forms somewhat of an excep-
tion confirms Leont'ev's (1932) results. These children after instruction exten-
sively used the colored cards and this use seemed associated with improved
performance. We might say, then, following Leont'ev, that children of this
age group are particularly fascinated by the use of external means and that
their performance tends to be dominated by them.
Adequate performance in the forbidden color game does seems to be
related to the ability to make use of various verbal strategies such as the
willingness to give "odd," or arbitrary answers. Of course, the possibility of
giving arbitrary answers was pointed out to the children—as were two ways
of using the colored cards—in the explicit instruction before the fifth series.
But the fact, that virtually all children proved able to make use of this strategy
points our that children of this age can use various internal means and do not
have to rely on external mediating devices.
The original findings of Leont'ev (1932) proved very little. The number of
subjects was very low and the design and analysis of his study was not in
accordance with contemporary standards of scientific rigor. As a result his
findings can easily be interpreted in different ways. The fact, for example,
that for adults performance with cards is hardly better than performance
without cards can be interpreted as a ceiling effect and does not constitute
proof for the internalization hypothesis. A similar ceiling effect was found in
our own replication study.
The forbidden colors game formed too crude a test of the internalization
hypothesis. It is probably not a very fruitful idea to think that all internal
mediating devices necessarily go through an external material phase. That is,
one may posit that all internal means originate in the external world, but this
does not necessarily imply that they originate as material objects, such as
colored cards. The design of the forbidden colors game followed the model of
the "Marxist" idea of internalization of material tools, whereas a "Baldwi-
nian" idea of internalization of social conduct and social relations seems more
fruitful (Valsiner & Van der Veer, 1988; Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1988).
Moreover, the use of a cross-sectional design for the study of a developmental
process is unfortunate and made any conclusion about ontogenetical shifts in
type of mediation stand on rather weak grounds. Finally, the increase of
internal mediation was inferred by Leont'ev on the grounds that external
mediation decreased rather than proven by any positive data.
The forbidden colors game was also unfortunate in so far as it suggested
that for each specific task one can discern periods of, respectively, no
mediation, external mediation, and internal mediation. In reality, it would
seem that children confront each new task armed with a whole repertoire of
l
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internal mediating devices that proved effective in solving other tasks. At any
rate, it seems a little naive to aspect that children of up to 13 years old had to
rely on the external mediating device of colored cards.
It would thus seem that there were good theoretical grounds to doubt
Leont'ev's interpretation of his data. The empirical replications by Adams et
al. (1987) and ourselves have strengthened these doubts by suggesting that
for most subjects the use of colored cards is not effective in task performance
and, consequently, Leont'ev was not even studying external mediation. If we
accept this empirical finding, then Leont'ev's whole argument about the
decrease of external mediation—even if we neglect its theoretical inade-
quacy—becomes simply irrelevant.
We may conclude, then, that Leont'ev's (1932) original study formed no
proof or argument for the internalization hypothesis in any form. The subse-
quent replication studies by Adams et al. (1987) and ourselves suggest that for
the majority of subjects the colored cards did not mediate performance at all
and that other, internal, mediating devices play a decisive role in solving the
forbidden colors task. It still remains to be seen in what way these internal
mediating devices are mastered by the child.
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CHAPTER 12
Does Maternal Responsiveness
Increase Infant Crying?*
Replication of the Baltimore Study
Frans 0. A. Hubbard and Marinus H. Van IJzendoorn
Center for Child and Family Studies
Leiden University
The Netherlands
Viewed from the perspective of attachment theory, crying is attributed the
function of maintaining the baby's proximity to protective caregivers.
Bowlby (1971) assumed that crying belonged to the class of preattachment
behaviors, such as sucking and smiling, that served the human species in its
evolutionary struggle for life. In this cybernetic model of attachment theory it
is plausible to consider that crying is decreased by a prompt response from
the caregiver, rather than being reinforced (Ainsworth & Bell, 1977; Bell &
Ainsworth, 1972). If crying is considered as directed toward the goal of
maintaining proximity to the protective caregiver, reaching that goal should
be sufficient "reason" to terminate the crying behavior {Ainsworth, Blehar,
Waters, & Wall, 1978). Infants are seen as gradually deriving a feeling of
competence and mastery over the environment as a result of their perception
of a prompt reaction to their crying. If infants really experience danger they
anticipate short latencies in the caregiver's response. In mild distress they do
not feel urged to alarm the environment instantly by crying (Bell & Ains-
worth, 1972); therefore, during the last quarters of the first year of life crying
'Parts of this chapter were presented at the International Conference on Infant Studies,
Washington, DC. April 1988. and at the Third International Workshop on Infant Cry Research.
July 13-18, 1989. Hanasaari, Espoo. Finland. The research was supported by a grant from the
National Foundation for Preventive Studies (Praeventie Fonds, Grant No. 28-859) to Marinus H.
van IJzendoorn and Louis W. C. Tavecchio. We would like to thank Louis Tavecchio for his kind
support and Agnes van Busschbach. Annet Foortse, Karin Haak, Gidia Jacobs, Ester Kloppers,
Johan van Mill, Ina van den Oever, Letty van pyen, Hansje Planjer, Inge Ruhaak, Marianne
Thomeer, Nico Vesseur, Yvonne ten Wolde, André Wortelboer, Jeroen Zomerplaag, for their
assistance in collecting, coding, and analyzing data.
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behavior would decrease because of the responsive reactions of the care-
giver.
The Original Study
Bell and Ainsworth's (1972) ecologically impressive and unique longitudinal
study was intended to explore the idea that crying behavior was reduced by
prompt reactions from the caregiver. Twenty-six middle-class mother-infant
dyads were visited at home for about four hours every three weeks, during
the first year of the baby's life. Although observing the mother-infant inter-
actions, observers took notes which were later written out as a narrative
account. In the narrative accounts, frequency and duration of all cry events
during the home visit were coded, as were the maternal interventions. The
frequency and duration measures for crying behavior contained fussing as
well as long and intense crying. All measures were aggregated over three
monthly intervals. Bell and Ainsworth (1972) concluded that the main results
confirmed the hypothesized relation between maternal unresponsiveness
and infant crying. First, crying behavior in the first half-year appeared much
less stable than maternal unresponsiveness. This would exclude a purely
constitutional explanation (e.g., irritability) for the differences in crying
behavior at the end of the first year. Second, within-quarter correlations
between crying and unresponsiveness indicated a tendency to more frequent
and longer periods of crying by infants whose mothers were less responsive.
Third, across-quarter correlations indicated that less responsive reactions to
crying in the first quarter corresponded with more crying in a later quarter.
Controversies about the Original Study
Although the study seemed to have produced clear-cut results, it has also
been criticized sharply on technical grounds, especially by Gewirtz and Boyd
(1977a, 1977b). They stated, for example, that in computing the correlations
across quarters, important concurrent and antecedent variables were not
controlled. In their opinion it was necessary to control for unresponsiveness
in the same quarter and infant crying in an earlier quarter in computing the
correlations between crying in a later quarter and unresponsiveness in an
earlier quarter. Data would allow the use of parametric methods, and thus for
partializing variables. Ainsworth and Bell (1977), however, considered their
sample too small to allow for parametric analyses such as cross-lag panel
analysis or regression techniques. Furthermore, Gewirtz and Boyd (1977a)
stated that there was an artificial dependence between infant and mother
variables. A mother could neither respond nor ignore her infant's crying until
the infant actually cried. Ainsworth and Bell (1977) agreed that within-quarter
correlations between crying and unresponsiveness inevitably would be in-
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dated because of confounded measures. Gewirtz and Boyd (1977a) also
showed that separate analyses on inherently correlated frequency and dura-
tion measures for crying and unresponsiveness must have inflated in an
unknown way the type I error probabilities. Later findings led Ainsworth and
Bell (1977) to attach much more importance to the du rational measures than
to the frequency measures, because anxiously and securely attached dyads
appeared to differ significantly only in the former measures. Lastly, Gewirtz
and Boyd (1977a) pointed out that maternal responsiveness is not necessarily
the inverse of maternal unresponsiveness as operationalized by Bell and
Ainsworth (1972), although their conclusions appeared to imply this inverse
relation. Ainsworth and Bell (1977) conceded that Gewirtz and Boyd (1977a)
were technically correct, but they emphasized the psychological validity of
considering maternal responsiveness the inverse of unresponsiveness. Ains-
worth and Bell (1977) stated that the criticisms by Gewirtz and Boyd (1977)
could be reduced to a claim of "not proven." They were confident that their
conclusions would find confirmation in future research.
Existing Replication Effects
Because of the absence of a strong replication tradition in attachment re-
search in general (van Uzendoorn & Tavecchio, 1987), and because of the
very time-consuming nature of the data collection and coding involved in this
specific study, few studies have been carried out to replicate even part of Bell
and Ainsworth's provocative findings. First, Belsky, Rovine, and Taylor
(1984), observing 60 mother-infant dyads for 45-minute periods in the first,
third, and ninth month after birth, found that mothers engaging more in
reciprocal interaction had babies who cried less later on in their first year of
life. Maternal (un-)responsiveness to infant crying, however, was not implied
in the reciprocal interaction measure. Second, Crockenberg and Smith's
(1982) study involving 54 mother-infant dyads and covering the first three
months showed that first-born children and children whose mothers were less
responsive in their expressed attitudes fussed and cried more at three
months. Maternal responsive behavior, however, did not predict infant cry-
ing. In a follow-up study, Crockenberg and McCluskey (1986) found a signifi-
cantly positive relation between maternal responsiveness at three months
and separation crying during the Strange Situation at 12 months, indicating
that babies whose mothers had responded less quickly cried longer. It is not
clear, however, whether crying during the 3-min separation episodes of the
Strange Situation is a valid indicator of crying at home. Finally, Grossmann,
Grossmann, Spangler, Suess, and Unzner (1985) observing 49 families for
about 1 hour in the second, sixth, and tenth month after the birth of the baby,
rated the mothers on a responsiveness scale and found that the more respon-
sive the mothers were, the less their babies cried. This relation, however, is
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based only upon tenth-month observations, and interquarter correlations to
determine the influence of maternal responsiveness in an earlier quarter on
crying behavior later on, were not reported.
Rationale for the Present Replication
We must, therefore, conclude that satisfactory empirical evidence in support
of the hypothesized relation between maternal unresponsiveness and infant
crying has still to be provided. We report here on a replication study in which
some of the technical criticisms raised against the original study were taken
into account. First, we present data on a larger sample (N - 50) and demon-
strate the applicability of parametric analyses to control for antecedent and
concurrent variables (Gewirtz & Boyd, 1977a). Second, we only analyze
durational measures of infant crying and maternal unresponsiveness, thereby
preventing inflation of type 1 error probabilities (Gewirtz & Boyd, 1977a).
Third, because maternal responsiveness indeed is not necessarily inversely
related to the durational measure of unresponsiveness (Gewirtz & Boyd,
1977a), we interpret the outcome of this measure only in terms of unrespon-
siveness. We also use a proportional measure of unresponsiveness, which is a
priori the inverse of responsiveness. Lastly, we introduce a new measure for
infant crying—"development of infant crying"—which appears not only to be
a more valid indicator of the process Bell and Ainsworth (1972) tried to
describe but also leads to much less inflated concurrent correlations with
unresponsiveness. We leave aside, however, Gewirtz and Boyd's (1977a)
criticisms that are based on theoretical considerations from a conditioning
perspective. We do not think that studies carried out under an ethological
attachment paradigm could be relevant to operant-learning theory (Gewirtz
& Boyd, 1977a, 1977b). Bell and Ainsworth's (1972) design, as well as this
report of our critical replication, are not intended to demonstrate presence or
absence of conditioning contingencies between maternal unresponsiveness
and infant crying, because data summarized in rather molar variables pre-
clude functional analyses required by the experimental conditioning para-
METHOD
Subjects
Given the limitations imposed by the restricted availability of four technical
equipment sets (event recorder/F.A. audio registration unit) we were obliged
to collect data from late summer 1983 to late summer 1984 for the first part of
the sample (n = 28; a preliminary report on the first part of the study can be
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found in Hubbard and Van Uzendoorn, 1987) and from fall 1986 to fall 1987
for the second part of the sample (n = 25). Due to the malfunctioning of
technical equipment, three dyads had to be removed from our sample (N =
50). The sample consisted of original Dutch (i.e. nonimmigrant) families living
either in, or in the neighborhood of, two Dutch cities, The Hague and Leiden.
Eighty percent of the families were located through midwives (private prac-
tice), and 20 percent through municipal birth records. All infants were
normal, healthy, full-term deliveries (with the exception of one caesarian
delivery). The age of the babies ranged from 3 weeks (first observation) to 36
weeks (last observation). Twenty-six of the babies were boys; 24 were girls.
The mean educational level for the mothers was 5.3 (SD = 2.4) on a scale
ranging from 1 (six years of schooling) to 9 (16 years of schooling). The mean
educational level of the fathers was 5.7 (SD = 2.5). The sample could be
described as representative of young lower to middle-class families with two
parents in which parental roles were traditionally allocated between spouses.
Procedure
All subjects were visited 12 times at home at 3-week intervals during the first
nine months. The hypotheses of the study were not revealed. Visits were
scheduled at the mother's convenience, the only restriction being that morn-
ing, afternoon, and evening observations were needed (unfixed order) to get
a representative sample of the baby's crying behavior. Mother-infant pairs
were visited regularly by one female observer, except for an occasional joint
visit made by two observers for reliability checks. The last five visits on seven
families were made by the first author. Visits lasted for 2 hours (first quarter)
to 4 hours or more (third quarter). Observers planned to arrive given the
latest expectation of the mother half an hour before the baby awoke, to install
the technical equipment in a standby operating mode. Usually there was
ample opportunity for interviews after the observation period. The observa-
tion period started when the baby awoke and finished when the baby fell
asleep (or after 3 hours if the baby was longer awake). During the observation
period the observer was obliged to play a low profile, semiparticipant role so
as to be able to attend continuously to the ongoing stream of behavior
recorded on the event recorder. For each quarter data of four successive
observation periods was used to compute measures. The mean total observa-
tion period for the first quarter was 5.8 hours (SD = 1.6); second quarter: 7.1
(SD = 1.9); third quarter: 8.8 (SD = 2.1).
In order to cope adequately with the complex observational situation, the
use of technical equipment was necessary. An event recorder (Epson HX 20
portable mini-computer operating on batteries) was used to code the mother-
infant interactions continuously. The coding scheme of the event recorder
consisted of three coding types: contextual codes (three digits); behavioral
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codes (six digits), and system codes (one or two digits). An example of a typical
relevant sequence is shown here in Table 12.1. The sequence starts with a
contextual code A4E: the baby is actively awake; no caretaking situation,
mother is in another room and can hear the baby cry. Interaction episode 1
(El) indicates that the baby starts to cry, while mother is busy in the kitchen
(icSmbc); the next episode starts when mother enters the room and the baby
still cries (meric3); E4: mother picks up/holds the baby, who is still crying; the
next code is contextual, indicating the same behavioral state of the baby and
close proximity; E5: the baby initiates this episode by looking at the mother
(crying stops), and the mother vocalizes positively. In this way the observa-
tion session was segmented into interaction episodes dictated by behavioral
changes either on the part of the mother or the baby (or both). The time table
shows the start of the interaction episodes. The contextual code does not
affect the time table. The task of the observer was reduced to accurately
coding behavioral changes using a letter-coding scheme (see for a detailed
description of the coding system Hubbard, 1989). In this chapter the focus is
on the onset of maternal interventions, and not on the type of intervention.
During the observation period vocalizations of the baby and the mother (if
she was in the same room) were recorded with an audio registration unit. This
unit contained three components: (a) a wireless FM-transmitter/microphone
combination (type Sennheiser SK 1012 (MKE 2012); (b) an Uher report 4400
portable stereo tape recorder; (c) a FM receiver (type Sennheiser/Telefunken
EM 1008). In order to synchronize the event recorder and the audio-
registration unit on a time-reference axis, a time-code generator was used to
write the time (coded by tone pulses) on track one of the tape recorder. The
vocalizations of the baby and the mother were recorded on track two. At the
beginning of the visit, the time-code generator was connected up to the event
recorder in order to match the two internal clocks. The audio-registration unit
was placed in the living room, out of sight of the mother. The FM transmitter/
microphone combination was always placed in the room where the baby was.
The observer could check in the living room if the baby was awake via her
earphones. When the baby awoke, the unit was started up, and could operate
Table 12.1. An example of coding interactional sequences
Code type Timetable Code Behavioral episode
hrs:min:sec
context 11:15:00 A4E -
interact. 11:15:00 ic3mbc El
11:17:30 meric3 E2
11:18:00 mcpic3 E3
11:20:00 mphicS E4
context 11:21:00 ACF -
interact 11:21:00 illmvp E5
,
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for 90 minutes before the tape needed changing. In the meantime the
observer was able to code the interactions of mother and baby by means of
the portable event recorder.
The technical equipment was chosen to enhance the reliability and the
validity of the data. Under all circumstances it could register the infant crying
without being intrusive. If the baby was crying out of earshot of the observer
(and often of the mother too) it was recorded. If the mother wanted the baby
to sleep in the baby's room as usual during the observation session, this was
possible. The observer would remain in the living room, checking unobtru-
sively from time to time through the earphones out of earshot of the mother,
to hear if the baby was still awake. The registration of infant crying did not
interfere with the mother's perceptions and consequently not with possible
interventions. The job of the observer was easier than in the Baltimore study,
because of the fact that the timing of relevant events was done by the event
recorder and the time-code generator. Bell and Ainsworth (1972, p, 1174)
remarked: "observers in their participant roles sometimes found it impossible
to time accurately and hence resorted to estimates."
Infant Crying
Bell and Ainsworth (1972) had defined the central unit measure, that is, the
crying episode, as any instance of a vocal distress signal (protest, fuss, or
full-blown cries) not too brief to be timed (on the spot) and separated by more
than a momentary pause from another instance. We took over this definition,
except for the rather vague and not replicable value of the two parameters
involved, minimal duration and time lag between subsequent crying. Every
cry signal separated by a pause of 2 seconds from the next crying instance
was coded as a crying episode.
Tape recordings were analyzed with a time decoder which displayed the
timetable recorded during the observation. Given that there was synchroni-
zation between the timetable of behavioral episodes (event recorder) and the
timetable of corresponding tape recordings, it was possible for the coders to
make an accurate quantitative analysis of infant crying and the interventions
of the mother, using the observers' coded observations as a guideline. Six
coders analyzed the vocalizations of the baby either in a couple in the
beginning or alone (after some 25 analyses). They were initially trained, using
a record of infant crying (Wasz-Höckert, Lind, Vuorenkoski, Partanen, &
Valanné, 1968) and our own tape recordings of crying. Vocalizations were
analyzed twice before being coded as crying or noncrying. In fact, the
analysis of one coder was independently checked by another coder. Dis-
agreements between coders were coded as noncrying. After the check by the
second coder the onset and finish of every crying episode was noted.
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The onset and end of every intervention or intervention sequence was noted
with respect to every crying episode. Because we used a sensitive wireless
microphone the vocalizations of the mother were also available on track two
of the taperecording. Given the time table recorded on track one, the onset of
verbal interventions was noted from the taperecording. Furthermore, coders
regularly inspected the accuracy of the observers with respect to the timing of
maternal interventions. These checks revealed that observers were accurate
by means of the event recorder (the coding of onset time took a one-button
press) and that the average delay was about two seconds. In the rare case that
there was a large discrepancy this was corrected by the coders using cues of
tape recordings. For example the observer might be less accurate for the
intervention "enters room," if a mother rushes to the baby upstairs. The onset
of this nonverbal intervention was also available on tape recording because
the microphone was in the baby's room. The duration of Unresponsiveness
equaled the time the baby cried without an intervention of the mother
(mother's delay), and equaled the duration of crying if an intervention started
later than two seconds after the crying episode stopped. The two-seconds
criterion is only relevant for nonverbal interventions and is only a matter of
precision. In fact, we adopted the Bell and Ainsworth definition of Unrespon-
siveness. Maternal interventions were, for example, picking baby up, hold-
ing; vocalizing; changing position; offering pacifier or toy; removing noxious
stimulus; entering room. The focus of this chapter is on the delay of maternal
interventions, not on the type of intervention (Bell & Ainsworth, 1972).
Reliability
Intercoder reliability. The time-tabled tape recording of infant crying
and maternal vocalizations made it possible to calculate duration of crying
and the delay of maternal verbal interventions post hoc in such a way that
intraobserver and interobserver error variance due to measurement on the
spot (Bell & Ainsworth, 1972) were eliminated. The distinction between
crying and noncrying was made by consensus (i.e., if there was disagreement
among coders about crying, then vocalizations were excluded from the data).
For vocalizations of the baby with a minimal duration of five seconds,
agreement percentage for crying was 95 percent for a random sample of 60
visits out of a total of 600 visits. Given the method of consensus reliability of
duration of crying is reduced to the reading of onset and finish on a time
reference axis. The mean agreement among coders for duration of Unrespon-
siveness verbal interventions was 98.4 percent for a sample of 60 visits. For
nonverbal interventions mean agreement percentage was 95 percent (from a
sample of 14 visits done by two observers).
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Data Analysis
Several different operationalizations of crying episode were computed with a
computer program (based on Fortran) by specifying the two parameters:
minimal duration of a crying episode and pause between two crying instances
(see Hubbard, 1989; Hubbard & Van Uzendoorn, 1987, 1991). In this chapter
we focus on duration measures (Ainsworth & Bell, 1977), based on the
following definition of a crying episode: a distress signal with a minimal
duration of five seconds, separated by four seconds or more from another
instance. For each quarter maternal and infant measures were summarized
for four successive observations. These measures are supposed to be compa-
rable to Bell and Ainsworth's (1972) measures.
First, univariate descriptive statistics for infant crying behavior and ma-
ternal unresponsiveness are described. Second, in order to replicate the
results of the original study, interquarter correlations between infant crying
and maternal unresponsiveness are presented. Third, cross-lag panel analysis
and a partial correlation approach are applied to control for contaminating
variables. Last, using a development of duration of infant crying variable,
hierarchical multiple regression analyses are carried out to compute stan-
dardized regression weights between maternal unresponsiveness and devel-
opment of infant crying in subsequent quarters. Sample size did not allow for
inferential causal modeling by means of L1SREL (Boomsma, 1982; Tanaka,
1987).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Developmental Changes In Infant Crying and Maternal
Unresponsiveness
First we discuss changes in duration of infant crying and maternal unrespon-
siveness throughout the first 9 months. We found the same overall reduction
in duration of crying as was found in the Baltimore study (see also Wolff, 1987,
p. 80 ff.). The median of 5.9 minutes crying per hour in the first quarter is
reduced to a median of 2.9 minutes per hour in the third quarter, bell and
Ainsworth (1972) reported a median of 7.7 minutes crying per hour in the first
quarter and 4.4 minutes per hour in the last quarter, and observed the same
wide range of more than 15 minutes per hour to almost no crying at all, with
a narrowing of the range toward the end of the first year. Wolff (1987) found
crying and fussing about 10% of the time he observed the infants during the
first quarter of their life.
The duration of maternal unresponsiveness also decreased in the first nine
months from a median of 4.0 minutes per hour (Bell & Ainsworth, 1972; 3.8
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minutes per hour) to 1.9 minutes per hour in the third quarter (Bell &
Ainsworth, 1972, reported the same median for the fourth quarter). The
medians for all measures were close to the means, indicating that the distri-
bution are approximately normal. A repeated measures analysis of variance
with age as factor confirmed the trend of decreasing duration of infant crying
and maternal unresponsiveness during the first 9 months. For each quarter,
analyses of variance with parity and sex as factors and duration of unrespon-
siveness and crying as dependent variables were computed. These analyses
yielded no significant results.
Stability of infant crying and maternal unresponsiveness. A signifi-
cant (auto-) correlation for duration of crying was found only between the first
and second quarter (r = .64; p < .001). Bell and Ainsworth (1972) reported a
significant correlation between the third and fourth quarter. In our case,
results pointed toward instability of individual differences in duration of
crying after the second quarter. Duration of maternal unresponsiveness
showed about the same pattern. Bell and Ainsworth's (1972) data showed
stability for the whole year.
Relation between infant crying and maternal unresponsiveness.
We also found significant positive interquarter correlations between earlier
maternal unresponsiveness and later infant crying. If these correlations were
not spurious, they would indicate that babies who cried longer had mothers
who were more unresponsive to their infants' crying in earlier quarters. Only
the correlation between the first and second quarter (r = .53), and the first and
third quarter (r = .28), appeared to be significant, whereas Bell and Ainsworth
(1972) reported also significant figures for the last two interquarter correla-
tions. On the basis of this correlational pattern Bell and Ainsworth (1972)
concluded that those mothers who tended to delay response in one quarter
would see their baby cry longer in the next one. In our study, this conclusion
would certainly apply for the first half year, with the same tendency in the
third quarter.
Controlling for antecedent and concurrent variables. Because intra-
quarter (synchronous) correlations between crying and unresponsiveness
were very high, and the autocorrelations for crying and unresponsiveness
were also considerable, statistical control for contaminating variables had to
be made (Gewirtz & Boyd, 1977a). First, a cross-lag panel analysis was carried
out. Our data allowed for cross-lag panel analysis because synchronous (or
intraquarter) correlations did not differ significantly, and because a stable
difference existed between parallel autocorrelations, indicating a stationary
process (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Kenny, 1975). The reliability of synchro-
nous panels was also comparable, because the same procedures were used to
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measure unresponsiveness and crying. The largest difference between the
three cross-lag correlation pairs was small (.06) and not significant, indicating
that the alleged causal relation between unresponsiveness in an earlier
quarter and crying in a later quarter is spurious.
Second, crying in an earlier quarter was partialled from the association
between crying in a later quarter and unresponsiveness in an earlier quarter,
to confirm our cross-lag panel analysis using a different statistical approach.
For the first two quarters the partial correlation between unresponsiveness
and crying was .03 (n.s.), and for the last two quarters this partial correlation
was -.19 (n.s.). The significantly positive bivariate correlations between
earlier unresponsiveness and later crying disappeared after controlling for
duration of crying in the earlier quarters. Partialing unresponsiveness in the
second quarter and in the third quarter also yielded nonsignificant partial
correlations between earlier unresponsiveness and later crying. We have to
conclude, that Bell and Ainsworth's (1972) hypothesis about the relation
between unresponsiveness and crying is not supported by the partial corre-
lations, nor by the results of the cross-lag panel analysis.
Development of crying. Because Bell and A ins worth's (1972) measure
for duration of infant crying did not take into account individual differences in
development of crying, we computed a variable "development of duration of
infant crying," defined as the log-transformed proportional decrease or in-
crease of crying for two successive quarters.1 This measure was used as a
criterion variable to answer the question whether infants with more unre-
sponsive mothers decrease their crying faster or slower than infants with less
unresponsive mothers. In fact, it was this developmental question that Bell
and Ainsworth (1972) tried to address in their Baltimore study, because they
already had registered how infants in general decreased their crying during
'The development measure a not a difference score, but a log-transformation of the quotient
of crying during the second quarter divided by crying during the first quarter, and so forth.
Change scores have been criticized because of their lesser reliability, their inability to take initial
differences into account, and their artificially high negative corrélation with initial scores (Lord,
1963; O'Connor. 1970; Visser, 1982). Rogosa, Brandt, and Zimovski (1982; see also Zimmerman
& Williams, 1982) snowed, however, that under certain conditions this criticism is unwarranted.
In our case, the reliability of the original variables is very high, because they were registered in
a purely mechanical way on four different occasions per quarter. Statistical regression to the
mean would, therefore, occur within those four different times of measurement. Furthermore,
the developmental measure constitutes a change score based upon a quotient that takes initial
differences into account, and through the log transformation the measure is symmetrically
distributed. The correlations between the developmental measure and the initial score were in
our sample - .31 ip < .05) for the first two quarters, and - .07 (n.s.) for the last two quarters (cf.
Zimmerman & Williams, 1982). These correlations are quite modest, they can be considered
"facts of life" (Rogosa et al., 1982), and in a multiple regression approach the significant
correlation can be controlled for.
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the first year. Besides representing the developmental changes more ade-
quately, our developmental measure has the advantage to be correlated less
strongly with concurrent maternal unresponsiveness (.43 and .69 for the
second and third quarter respectively), thereby avoiding the muracollinearity
problem. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis on development of
crying in the first half year was carried out. Unresponsiveness in the second
quarter and crying in the first quarter were entered into the equation first,
and unresponsiveness in the first quarter was entered thereafter.
From this regression it can be derived that controlling for earlier quarter
crying and concurrent unresponsiveness (Gewirtz & Boyd, 1977a), resulted in
a significantly negative standardized beta weight for the relation between
first quarter unresponsiveness and development of crying in the first half
year. This result did not support Bell and Ainsworth's (1972) hypothesis:
Mothers who tended to be more unresponsive in the h'rst quarter had babies
who decreased their crying relatively more in the first half year. To test
whether this outcome was due to the subgroup of infants who cried relatively
short (cf. Ainsworth, personal communication; Landau, 1982), the sample was
divided in two groups using the median for duration of crying as criterion. In
the subgroup of infants crying relatively short (n = 25), the beta weight for
unresponsiveness in the second quarter was .69 (p < .001), for crying in the
first quarter - .46 (p < .01), and for unresponsiveness in the first quarter
- .35 (p < .05). In the subgroup of infants who cried relatively long (n = 25),
bèta weights were .92 {p < .001), - .28 (n.s.); and - .39 (p < .05) respectively.
In both subgroups, therefore, essentially the same relation between first
quarter unresponsiveness and development of crying in the first half year was
found as in the total group.
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was also carried out on devel-
opment of infant crying in the last two quarters. Unresponsiveness in the third
quarter, development of crying in the first two quarters, and infant crying in
the first quarter were entered into the regression equation first, unrespon-
siveness in the second quarter was entered thereafter, and unresponsiveness
in the first quarter was entered last. Maternal unresponsiveness in the second
quarter and the first quarter was not significantly related to development of
infant crying during the last two quarters. This result does not support Bell
and Ainworth's (1972) hypothesis, but also does not confirm the reverse
relation between unresponsiveness and development of crying that appeared
to exist in the first half year. Multiple regressions in the two subgroups of
infants who cried short or long yielded the same result.
To address the question, raised by Gewirtz and Boyd (1977a), whether
responsiveness is inversely related to unresponsiveness, the same analyses
were carried out with a proportional measure for unresponsiveness. The
percentage duration of crying ignored—which is, of course, the the inverse of
the percentage of duration of crying responded to—did not correlate with first
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quarter duration of crying (r = -.01). Outcomes of multiple regression
analyses with this proportional measure for unresponsiveness were parallel
to the results we reported upon above: a significantly negative bèta weight
(-.28; p <.05) was found for the relation between first quarter maternal
unresponsiveness and development of infant crying during the first half year,
indicating that mothers who tended to respond more promptly, had infants
who decreased their crying relatively less in the first half year of life. No such
relation could be established for the development of infant crying after the
second quarter.
CONCLUSIONS
According to Ainsworth and Bell (1977) an independent replication, preserv-
ing the intensive naturalistic longitudinal aspects of their exploratory study,
was necessary before the dispute with their critics could be settled. The present
study is such an effort. The same design has been used in which the mean total
duration of the observations in every family is about seven to eight hours per
quarter. Furthermore, more reliable and refined methods of observing, cod-
ing, and analyzing data in a larger sample have been applied. It is, therefore,
interesting to see how far our descriptions of development in infant crying and
maternal unresponsiveness converge with those of the original study, in view
of the fact that our study has been carried out in another country more than
fifteen years after the original one. Although Bell and Ainsworth (1972) col-
lected data via the method of narrative accounts, for which reliability figures
were lacking (Lamb, Thompson, Gardner, & Charnov, 1985), descriptive re-
sults did not differ markedly from those of our study. It is also evident that our
bivariate interquarter correlations between infant crying and maternal unre-
sponsiveness are consistent with the main conclusion of the original study:
those mothers who tend to delay their response in one quarter, will see their
babies cry longer in the next one (Bell & Ainsworth, 1972).
A cross-lag panel analysis, however, indicated that the correlations be-
tween unresponsiveness in an earlier quarter, and crying in a later quarter
have to be considered as spurious. Partialling crying in an earlier quarter
from the association between crying in a later quarter and unresponsiveness
in an earlier quarter also resulted in nonsignificant interquarter correlations.
Therefore, we have to conclude that Bell and Ainsworth's (1972) outcome is
not replicated in our study. Although Ainsworth and Bell (1972, 1977) inter-
preted infant crying as a developmental phenomenon, differences in duration
of crying at a certain point in time do not appear to reflect adequately
differences in development of crying. Therefore, a new measure for develop-
ment of infant crying was introduced operationalizing differences in indi-
vidual "growth" of crying behavior. Using this new measure as criterion
variable in multiple regression analyses we found a negative relation be-
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tween earlier unresponsiveness and later development of crying in the first
half year. Antecedent infant crying and concurrent maternal unresponsive-
ness were simultaneously controlled for. For the development of crying from
the second to the third quarter we did not find a relation with earlier
unresponsiveness. The data for the first half-year indicate that mothers who
tend to delay their response relatively longer in the first quarter have infants
who decrease their crying relatively more in the next quarter. This outcome
was replicated in the two subgroups of infants who cry relatively long or
short. Results were also the same if a somewhat more "precise" measure of
crying episodes was used (i.e., every instance of a distress signal separated by
two seconds or more from another).
The outcome of our critical replication study makes dear that the relation
between maternal unresponsiveness and infant crying is somewhat more
complex than originally was suggested. The technical critisms of Gewirtz and
Boyd (1977a) on the Baltimore study appear to be supported. The critical
replication study does of course not imply a refutation of attachment theory
as a research program (Van Uzendoorn & Tavecchio, 1987), but indicates the
necessity of adapting the theory to our unexpected outcome. Maybe current
attachment theory should take Bowlby's (1971, p. 374) contention more
seriously into account that mothers may condition certain infant behaviors.
The conditioning paradigm has demonstrated experimentally that mothers
are able to reinforce certain infant crying behaviors (Pelrovich & Gewirtz,
1985). We propose, therefore, that in future studies the model of "differential
responsiveness" should be tested. This model implies that only severe distress
vocalizations (e.g., the pain cry) should be conceptualized as evolutionary
"biased" attachment behavior, requiring a prompt response. The develop-
ment of mild distress vocalizations ("opérant" or "instrumental" cries) may
solely be explained by proximate causes, or in terms of conditioning. Bowlby
(1971, p. 347) already considered crying as a graded signal (Murray, 1979),
carrying different information depending upon context, intensity, and
rhythm (Thompson & Lamb, 1984), and he did not think it necessary for
mothers to react promptly to all crying behaviors (cf. Ainsworth, 1973). A
delayed response to mild distress may enable the infant to learn to cope with
the kind of situations in which mild distress arises (Landau, 1982). Further-
more, simultaneously ignoring fussing behavior but being responsive to other
behaviors such as exploratory play might diminish mild distress vocalizations
(Lester, 1985). Only a minor percentage of infant crying behavior consists of
pain or panic cries (Wolff, 1987) and might be considered attachment behav-
ior. The model of differential responsiveness may, therefore, explain why in
our study mothers who delayed their response to infant crying had children
who tended to cry less later in the first half year of life. This model, however,
can only be tested thoroughly in experimental studies discriminating be-
tween different types of infant distress vocalizations.
Our replication of the Baltimore study is, of course, not an exact replication
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(see Chapter 3). Our study has been carried out in another culture some
decades after the original study. Nevertheless, the raw data of the replication
study did converge with those of the Baltimore study. It appears that a.
secondary analysis of the original study would have resulted in the same
conclusions. A replication in another culture at a different point in time,
however, also shows the remarkable robustness of the development of infant
crying and its relation to maternal unresponsiveness. In this respect, the
behavioral sciences do not always have to deal with phenomena that are
more elusive than those studied in the natural sciences (see Chapter 5).
Although our replication produced an unexpected outcome, it confirms at
least the possibility of replicating social phenomena across a considerable
cultural and historical span.
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Epilogue
;
We have reached the end of our book; a book that was meant to investigate
one of the canons of traditional research methodology: that experimenters in
both the natural and social sciences should strive for replication or replicabil-
ity. In the course of the book it has become clear—we believe—that the
traditional belief that replication involves isomorphic copying of the original
studies is ill-founded. The introduction to this book and the chapters in the
first section prepared the ground for this conclusion. The contributors to Part
I dealt with questions concerning the nature, function, and possibility of
replication. It was argued that there are no ahistorical or cross-cultural rules
about what constitutes replication and that exact replication is impossible.
Rather, researchers should strive for theoretically interesting conceptual
replications. Such replications provide the fuel for the never-ending debate
about the validity of conclusions drawn on the basis of research data. In Part
II the problem of method effects formed a major topic of discussion. It was
argued that studies may not be replicable as the results are not method-
invariant. Several suggestions for the prevention of method effects were
given and a major new instrument to detect method effects—meta-analysis—
was described in great detail. The authors agree that exact replication is
either impossible or fruitless and that replication efforts should be theory-
driven. In Part III several attempts to replicate interesting original studies
have been described. The main conclusion of the careful replications of the
Istomina study was that it may well be an impossible task for any experi-
menter to exactly reconstruct functionally similar experimental settings
across cultures or historical periods. The replication studies related in the
other chapters deliberately introduced variations in the original research
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design and called into question the tenability of the conclusions drawn in the
original studies. In general this section abundantly demonstrated the difficult
problems one has to meet when actually attempting to replicate an experi-
ment.
Several times in this book it was suggested that there may be a fundamental
difference between the natural and the social sciences that makes replication
more difficult in the latter. Although replication in the natural sciences
appears to be far from easy several factors that may differ between the
original experiment and its replication logically cannot play a role in the
natural sciences and may do so in the social ones. These include factors such
as the personality of the experimenter, the subjects studied, the sociohisto-
rical background of the study, and so on (see the General Introduction of this
book for a list of possibly contaminating factors). Consequently, it seems
indeed easier to replicate the results of the anatomist than to replicate those
of the psychologist, educationalist, or anthropologist. It is the impossibility of
perfectly reconstructing the historical, cultural, or personal circumstances
that lead to a certain type of conduct that determines the boundaries of our
efforts to reconstruct the phenomena of the human mind.
All this leads to a major issue that has to be addressed at the end of this
volume. There remains a great need to make sense of the concept of
replicability, rather than merely reiterate its fundamental importance for
science. That constitutes a paradox in scientists' treatment of replicability
(which almost all of the contributions in this volume reflected): On the one
hand, the canon of replicability as a norm for science is repeatedly empha-
sized, while on the other hand the realistic applicability of that canon turns
out to be highly complicated or even fin many cases) impossible. So we have
to demonstrate replicability while at best we can replicate any study in its
conceptual rather than exact (or virtual) details. But conceptual replication
often leads to the use of new empirical strategies that have little in common
with the procedures of the previous investigations. Hence, the difficult ques-
tion: how can one distinguish the cases of "conceptual replications" from new
empirical efforts that use new procedures for testing previous conceptual
models?
It seems that this latter question has no possible answer, and that the
boundary between "conceptual replicability" of previous studies and "empir-
ical extendability" of previous conceptual models is (and remains) a rather
fuzzy one in a scientific discipline that claims to develop new knowledge
about the particular class of phenomena. In other terms, science itself is a
constantly developing (but not automatically progressing) knowledge con-
struction process for which replicability is a means to the end of developing
further, rather than merely documenting that some research tradition of the
past had "right" results. The notion of replicability acquires a new meaning
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when put into a context of a constructivist perspective on knowledge (see also
Chapter 3 by Van Uzendoorn).
The issue of replicability is thus complicated by the developmental nature
of knowledge construction in science. However, a similar complication
awaits scientists on the side of the object of their investigation in any research
on human development (be it psychological, sociological, or anthropologi-
cal)—the developmental nature of biological, psychological, or social systems
renders it in principle impossible to succeed in any effort of virtual replication
of previous findings.
DEVELOPMENTAL PHENOMENA IN THE MIRROR OF
REPLICATION EFFORTS
We should reemphasize that the present volume concentrated on issues of
replicability as it is of relevance to research on human development rather
than to social sciences as a whole. The majority of the contributions dealt with
one or another issue of development. It must be noted that the developmental
perspective in human sciences has not been very clearly emphasized in most
of contemporary psychology. Hence it is possible to see an interesting fusion
between theoretical perspectives of nondevelopmental kind and some scat-
tered ideas reflecting development in present-day scientific discourse. It is as
if the canons of science remain to be accepted as those fitting the assumption
of the "true" or "stable" world, while the experience with phenomena reveals
that that very world is not stable in any but a very abstract sense. The latter
is evident at all levels represented in the present volume: microgenetic (e.g.,
human beings solving problems in research situations), ontogenetic (chil-
dren's construction of novel ways of handling life- or experimental situations
over time), culture-genetic (societies or cultures changing over the course of
history, see Chapter 2), and—last but not least—science-genetic (i.e., the level
at which scientific knowledge construction proceeds within the web of con-
stantly changing society).
In the most general form, the developmental nature of phenomena makes
it in principle impossible to arrive at any virtual replication in our studies. If
procedure X is carried out with a subject (in a general sense; the subject here
may be a person, social group, society, or scientific paradigm) at a certain
time moment (TJ, and is attempted to be replicated at a later time moment
(Tj), the developmental history of the subject between the time moments T0
and T, makes it impossible to use exactly the same procedure and, thus, to
find exactly the same results. This impossibility is further enhanced if we
consider the inescapable possibility (which is true for all open systems, that is,
developing phenomena) that the first application of X at time T0 necessarily
.
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participates in the very same developmental process that leads the subject to
give us different results (to X) at the next time T,. Virtual replicability is thus
an idea that is antithetical to the notion of all research efforts being simulta-
neously "interventions" into the developmental processes that provide "in-
put" for the further change of the subject.
Of course, most of contemporary psychology is not based on empirical
studies of individual subjects over time (i.e., longitudinally), but on samples of
subjects with the use of cross-sectional designs. Often the question of replica-
bility becomes thus an issue of sampling comparable groups of subjects from
the "general population," and thus creating the possibility of a "re-run" of the
"effects" of a particular procedure. Here the problem described earlier is
simply transposed to the level of a conglomerate of individuals (population) in
which the particular subjects in the samples merely reflect some presumably
stable characteristics of the "population." The "samples" become "compara-
ble" because of their similar ways of "drawing them from the population'" and
hence replicability of procedure X (first used on Sample A) on a Sample B
from the same population should allow for virtual replication. However,
again it is the axiomatic assumptions of the investigator that may mislead our
replication efforts—the "population" from which both samples (A and B) are
"drawn" can be believed to be homogeneous by the investigator (in which
case the samples A and B can be comparable), but not proven to be so. In fact,
all statements about "general population" in psychological research are
abstract statements that themselves cannot be proven (or disproven) other
than deductively. In the deductive proof, the dangers of starting with an
inadequate axiom (e.g., "the general population is homogeneous") may lead
to acceptance of particular statements (e.g., "samples A and B, given their
random sampling, are comparable") that can be undermined by alternative
axioms (e.g., "all populations are heterogeneous" and "the particular form of
heterogeneity cannot be determined"). If the assumption of heterogeneity of
"general population" is accepted by an investigator, the comparison of
samples A and B becomes inconsequential—even the same random sampling
procedure does not guarantee their comparability, and hence the replication
of the results of A in case of B again cannot indicate virtual replication.'
'Note that the problem of heterogeneity of a developing population cannot be solved also by
way of parallel sampling of A and B from the "same" (at that moment) general population. This
practice should overcome the problem of temporal changes in the assumed population, but will
not be able to guarantee lack of uncontrollable (and unknowable) heterogeneity in it. The
"randomly sampling" investigator is in no position to detect the structural organization of the
population from which the random sampling takes place, and therefore the equality of the
resulting samples remains in the head of the sampler, rather than in the groups of the sampled.
The application of the same procedure in parallel to both samples may thus avoid any "sequential
testing effects." but still is likely to fail to reach a state of exact replication of the results of the
procedure obtained in sample A in the case of B.
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Finally, from the developmental point of view it is reasonable to consider
the possibility that the "general population" (however indeterminate our
knowledge of it may be) is itself undergoing development. Hence if samples A
and B are "drawn" from it at successive times, these samples reflect different
"developmental cohorts" within the "general population". In this case, the
problem becomes exactly parallel to the single case example described
earlier. Namely, the application of X to sample A at time T,, can participate in
the change that takes place in the "general population" between T0 and T „
and when sample B is drawn at T, the application of X again cannot result in
a virtual replication. The example given by Kloos (see Chapter 2, about
Mead's and Holmes's restudy of adolescence in Samoa indicates part of the
issue: The population (here taking the form of Samoan society) had under-
gone major changes between the two times the two investigators did their
fieldwork, and hence it is not surprising that the anthropological accounts
turned out to be different. Interestingly—a good example of the nondevelop-
mental orientation in cultural anthropology—Kloos considers the long time
between the two studies of Samoa a "flaw" (rather than reflection of cultural
development). In a similar vein, over historical time (reflecting cultural
transformation) certain aspects of the experimental setting may change their
shared meanings between members of the sample—for example, the replica-
tion of Istomina's experiment decades later lacks both the special meaning of
collectivity of a kindergarten play (which is not even introduced in the
replication experiments; see Chapter 10). The historical transformation of a
society underlies the changes in the "general population" that happens to
inhabit the given society. Therefore the samples of subjects (as well as
individual cases) demonstrate changes due to their cohorts' life experiences,
and hence most virtual replication efforts reflect these changes.
The role of the cultural and historical context in developmental phe-
nomena is not always the same and, therefore, the possibility of replicating
the outcome of developmental studies may vary greatly. The replication of
Ainsworth's Baltimore study by Hubbard and Van Uzendoorn (see Chapter
12) is a case in point. Although the original study on maternal responsiveness
and infant crying was carried out in the United States in the late 1960s, and
the replication effort took place almost two decades later in the Netherlands,
the development of infants' crying behavior in the first year of life proved to
be describable by the same parameters. Even though different methods of
data collection were used (paper and pencil versus electronic registration) the
same crying curve could be drawn on the basis of the descriptive results of
both studies. This remarkable converge may be explained in two ways: First,
in the case of crying the time period necessary for essential changes in crying
behavior to take place may be considerably larger than two decades. Depen-
dent upon the specific developmental area, sociocultural changes may take a
larger or shorter time to become effective. Second, crying behavior may be
1
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somewhat more resistant to sociocultural changes as compared to other
developmental phenomena. Being determined by both physiological and
contextual processes it can be situated towards the lower end of the con-
tinuum of higher and lower psychological processes. As such it is probably
more resistant to change than phenomena that are highly contextualty
determined. In some developmental areas replication efforts may indeed be
considered particularly convincing if these yield similar results while sepa-
rated from the original study in time and geographically (Rosenthal's maxim;
see the General Introduction). In other developmental areas, however, a
failure to replicate the outcome of the original study may demonstrate the
role of the sociocultural context in developmental phenomena and stimulate
a scientific discourse on the precise nature of this role. Relative stability of
developmental phenomena should not be taken for granted—as seems to be
the case in the traditional idea of replication as exact repetition of process and
outcome of the original study—but has to be demonstrated through a series of
carefully varied replications.
REPLICATIONS AND REORIENTATIONS IN SCIENCE:
KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION
Similar developments of the phenomena can be observed at the level of
science itself—the perspective from which investigators of human develop-
ment approach issues of replication has vastly changed over the present
century. From the time of the controversies about replication that were on
the minds of scientists at the turn of the century (i.e., the Wundt vs. "Wurz-
burg School" and Baldwin vs. Titchener oppositions - see Chapter 1) psy-
chology has changed towards a very different emphasis on sample-based
research and its meta-analyses (as was discussed in Chapter 3, Chapter 6,
Chapter 7). That change of perspective leads the issue of replicability itself
being set up for investigators in terms of conceptual development. What that
concept itself meant at different periods of the history of psychology guaran-
tees that the meaning of replicability has become extended. The wide range
of approaches presently subsumed under the focus of this volume on replica-
bility (refer to Figure 3.1) can be seen as differentiations of the themes used in
the beginning of this Century, rather than their substitutions.
We now reach a major conclusion about the issue of replicability: The
developmental nature of the phenomena under study (and that is the case
with all aspects of human or animal development) can be replicable only in
the conceptual sense, but never virtually. Thus, the prevailing "diagnosis" of
the problematic nature of virtual replications that echoes from all the contri-
butions to this volume is an experiential reflection of a basic general principle
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(that of development) which deductively assumes the presence of constant
and never-ending generation of novelty on behalf of the developing systems.
Having put to rest the vain hopes for achieving virtual replicability in the
case of developmental sciences (i.e., any discipline—psychology, anthropol-
ogy, sociology—that may take a developmental perspective), we need to
reach some reasonable understanding of the notion of "conceptual replica-
tion." If the developmental nature of the phenomena rules out virtual repli-
cation possibilities, then the issue of conceptual replicability is complicated by
the developmental nature of the scientific understanding itself. The strong
emphasis on the "conceptual" notion here looks rather appealing, but has an
inherent complication in it. Namely, if our scientific knowledge is a con-
structed entity that emerges from the scientific discourse (see Chapter 3), then
the developing mind of the investigator that targets a developing phenom-
enon as an object of investigation can come up with a variety of conceptual
models of the phenomena and may persevere in the ways in which a
particular conceptual model is linked with empirical work (=is replicated).
For example, one can create one's own "rules of thumb" of replicability on
the basis of the variety of perspectives. One investigator may accept only the
results of a secondary analysis of an existing data set or specimen of phe-
nomena as convincing replications; another may concentrate on the accumu-
lation of data from various studies by way of meta-analyses (see Chapters 6
and 7, respectively). Likewise, investigators may decide that replication of the
original study using novel inference methodologies may be of relevance (see
Chapter 12). Likewise, the whole "mindscape" of replicability procedures
provides a wide range of opportunities for rejection of some. One can reject
the use of meta-analysis, for example, because of its inductive inferential
nature and lack of explicit linkages with theoretical underpinnings of the
different studies that "produce" the data. Likewise, the use of secondary
analysis can be rejected on the grounds of theoretical incompatability (e.g., a
"cognitivist" who has collected samples of 3-5-year-old children's behavior in
"theories of mind" type experiments may consider any re-analysis that a
"behaviorist" is likely to provide for the same specimens, as inconsequential
for replication of one's original results).
Taken all together, the ways in which scientists define their norms of
replicability of particular results retain a flavor of all of the subjectivity
inherently involved in our knowledge construction. In Chapter 7, Siegfried
illustrated the subjective insistence of so-called "hard scientists" upon the
rules by which to keep up their formed understanding of the constructed
knowledge. The rules by which concepts and empirical study practices are
related are often consensually made and kept up in the community of
scientists. In science, subjectivity is an inevitable facet of researchers' slow
and complicated move toward greater objectivity in our constructed under-
standing of the world. In other terms, no method in science guarantees
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objectivity in any automatic way, but objectivity can be constructed with the
help of the human mind that critically investigates both the phenomena and
the previous investigations of those phenomena. Thus, Lytton's exposure of
the sequence of decisions that the user of a meta-analysis technique has to
make (see Chapter 6) demonstrates convincingly that no meta-analytic pro-
cedure in and by itself can give us an objective summary of the data, but
instead the investigator's thoughtful sequence of decisions while performing
meta-analysis and equally thoughtful interpretation of its results may lead us
towards greater objectivity. That focus is resonated also by Siegfried (Chapter
7) who emphasized the relevance of theorizing in conjunction with any
meta-analytic adventure.
CAN VIRTUAL NONREPUCAT1ON BE A SPECIAL CASE OF
CONCEPTUAL REPLICATION?
At first glance, this question seems to be highly paradoxical. Indeed, our focus
so far has been on replicability as a highly desired state of affairs. This,
however, need not automatically mean that explicit failure to replicate a
particular study in its exact form is necessarily tantamount to proving the
conceptual level of that study "wrong." Since the conceptual and empirical
levels of research can be linked in a multiplicity of ways (due to the develop-
mental nature of the phenomena, or due to selective focus of an empirical
study on some part of the phenomenon, rather than its entirety), it is possible
to look for examples of how virtual nonreplications of a study might consti-
tute conceptual replications.
Once More on Istomina: What Actually Was Replicated?
The case of replications of the "Istomina-experiment" that is covered in great
detail in the present volume can provide a good example. As the different
versions of that experiment provided varied results (see details in Chapter 9
by Schneider and Hasselhorn) in the sample-level summaries of the "lesson"
versus "activity" conditions, one can be sure to recognize in these results all
the difficulties of virtual (exact) replication that most of the contributors
discussed in this volume. Furthermore, the exact procedures of Istomina
were proven to be not repeatable (see also Chapter 10). Thus, Istomina's
experiment at the level of exact replications turns out to be either inconsis-
tently replicated or in principle nonreplicable—dependent upon the empiri-
cist or theoretical analytic focus one or another investigator uses to look at
the Istomina case.
However, the limited success in virtual replication efforts need not indicate
that Istomina's study was not replicated at its conceptual level. Indeed, the
.EPILOGUE 279
main conceptual focus of the study was the relevance of activity context in its
motivating of the mnemonic task solutions. When Istomina built that activity
"pull" into her task by way of unreplicated (and nonreplicable) "Kindergarten
play" that relied heavily on the children's socioeconomic and symbolic
worlds of the time, the same conceptual focus can be encoded in the empirical
procedures differently in other places and at other time. Thus, for instance, if
the "lesson" setting becomes highly motivating in some (schooled) children, it
may take over the role of the most motivating activity setting in another
context. Hence, if investigators compare "lesson" and "play" settings in an
effort to replicate Istomina at her conceptual level, then the higher results in
mnemonic tasks in "lesson" contexts (in comparison with "play") can be seen
exactly as conceptual replication of Istomina, while in terms of exact replica-
tion these results amount to a nonreplication. Furthermore, any experimental
setting can be structured in ways that either enhance or suppress children's
fragile motivation (see discussion of that point in Chapter 9), hence, the mere
labeling of a memory-task setting into "lesson" or "game" (or by any other
label) does not reveal the whole texture of the setting that actually constitutes
the children's environment in working on the given tasks.
Finally, the Istomina replications that were brought together in this volume
indicate also the historical shift in what has become the target of replication.
In Istomina's own study, the data on individual subjects' handling of the
setting are given in exact narrative detail. These data are the main data that
allow for direct test of Istomina's theoretical propositions. However, all the
replication efforts have concentrated at the sample-level summary data of
comparing the different conditions. If we were to try to replicate Istomina's
work at its direct conceptual level, we would have to study single cases of
children who are moved through a series of memorization-demanding tasks
with varied activities, and look for the process data (on how the child
proceeds to memorize) in each of those settings. For example, one child in the
"Kindergarten" play setting might show high rehearsal strategies and suc-
ceed in memorizing many more items than in the "lesson" setting. If another
child demonstrates a vastly different pattern of handling these two settings-
is little involved in Kindergarten play and does not rehearse the items, plus
ends up not remembering them—although that child may be actively fol-
lowing the teacher's demands in the "lesson" setting by rehearsing the word
list (and showing superior performance), then for that child the two activity
contexts are functionally reversed: The "lesson" context is that of activity-
embedded learning context, whereas the "Kindergarten play" happens to be
a context of little personal involvement. For the two children the data show
opposite outcomes in their memory performance, but similar processes (only
in different contexts) in involvement in the different activity contexts. Hence,
although the second child can be seen as nonreplicating Istomina's study in its
exact/virtual sense, conceptually that nonreplication equals replication. In a
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more general sense—as long as children are active co-constructors of their
life-worlds, the structure of their life-worlds may be varied from case to case,
and seemingly standardized external situation ("lesson" versus "play") is
interpreted in accordance with one's own personal experiences by the given
child him- or herself.
REPLICATION EFFORTS AND THEIR THEORETICAL
BACKGROUNDS: ONCE MORE ABOUT "NATURE" AND
"NURTURE"
Another issue in the realm of replicability is the diversity of investigators'
perspectives from which they attempt to replicate other studies. If an inves-
tigator takes a perspective that is divergent with that of an established
alternative "classic" view, then one possibility to discredit the opposing view
is to undermine its empirical basis. This introduces a strategic quality to
scientists' discourse about replicability: If by demonstrating nonreplicability
of one's opponent's experiment it is possible to promote one's own perspec-
tive, then the function of replicability ceases to be that of "check" of the
adequacy of the scientific knowledge. Instead, it becomes a rhetoric device in
the duel of opposing general ideas or ideologies. Very often, these duels are
fought out from one party taking one (partially adequate) side of the issue, and
the other the other side (equally partially adequate). However, the resulting
"fight" may be quite counterproductive for our knowledge construction,
since in their opposition the two parties fail to recognize that they overlook
the essential unity of their opposing ideas. Still, claims of nonreplicability of
the other side's studies may be heard loud in the scientific discourse.
A good example of the ways in which different "replication efforts" that
start from different conceptual perspectives lead to nonreplicability is the
supposed nature of adolescence on Samoa (see Chapter 2). The contrasting of
"nature" (i.e., the belief that adolescence is a stage determined by biological
maturation) and "nurture" (i.e., that culture "molds" or "shapes" the ways in
which adolescents proceed through their becoming-adults phase) is an old
ideological dualism that prevails in psychology and anthropology. By setting
up one's research question here in either-or terms, the investigators guar-
antee that different researchers will find each other's "data" nonreplicable.
Thus, the role of both biological and cultural facets in adolescents is neces-
sarily plausible. However, a given investigator may want to explain adoles-
cence conceptually by making a choice between the two equally plausible
explanations (let A = "maturation" and B = "social expectations"). Based on
his or her metatheory, one investigator is eager to view most of the phenom-
enon as a reflection of A, and selectively picks up empirical evidence that
corroborates that perspective. Another investigator may try to "replicate"
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the first one's study, but starting from a different conceptual basis (B). Not
surprisingly, this leads to the failure of replication, as this other investigator
selects exactly those aspects of the phenomenon to which the previous
investigator did not pay attention. The result is seemingly a nonreplication,
but its roots are in the conceptually opposite perspectives the two investiga-
tors have taken.
Interestingly, both of the investigators overlook the possibility that the
nature of the phenomenon can be generated by the systemic linkedness of A
and B. This of course implies another metatheoretical starting point—that of
a systems theory and its characteristic focus on linkages between parts of the
system—in contrast to verifying the relevance of one of its parts over the
others. From that perspective, the failure to replicate the studies of the
opposite "camp" indicates that both opposing perspectives are in a state of
theoretical impasse from which there is no empirical exit possible. Hence the
whole issue of nonreplication and its problems (as those look from the side of
empirical investigation) may turn out to be misleading—both investigators
have turned a partial explanation into an absolute one, and have failed to put
together a more appropriate explanation of another (systemic) kind (e.g., one
that takes the form "A linked to B" and specifies the particulars of the
assumed links). Indications that the controversy about replicability of Mar-
garet Mead's description of Samoan adolescence is of that kind are given by
Kloos (see Chapter 2). When the claims that adolescents' psychological state
"is related to culture" and "is not the outcome o f . . . psycnobiological
changes" are viewed as irreconcilable opposites, the above-mentioned con-
troversy would remain in its fighting force. However, the meaning of "related
to culture" can be seen in systemic terms, and the "psychobiological changes"
in adolescence can be linked with the functioning of culture (rather than its
"effects" upon the adolescents). This way the issue of nonreplicability at the
level of mutually opposed partial pictures of the phenomena can become
integrated at another conceptual (systemic) level. If that happens, examples
of nonreplicability have participated in the reconstruction of scientific knowl-
edge.
If seen from this angle, blatant failures of conceptual replication may be of
good use for science. These failures are not failures of one of the previously
accepted conceptual models in the sense of its replacement by an opposite
model, but are rather diagnostic of the need for reconstructing the whole
search for better conceptual models that could fit the phenomena. A similar
function of replication difficulties may be viewed to be present in case of
inconclusive results of meta-analyses, or of secondary analyses. In those
cases, the discrepancy between replication efforts can be interpreted as
co-presence of different interpretations within the dynamically changing
developing system. When meta-analyses or secondary analyses give contra-
dictory, or inconclusive summaries of the empirical data, it is useful to
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contemplate whether the theoretical questions underlying the empirical data
accumulation efforts are phrased in an adequate manner.
To summarize, the developing nature of the understanding by science
( = by scientists) is itself constructive in ways that involve both selection of
different aspects of the phenomena and their transformation into data by way
of some metatheoretic schema. The emergence of replication difficulties may
indicate a fruitful, but incomplete construction effort of the conceptual per-
spectives involved, rather than cast doubt on the "rightness" of the previously
substantiated conceptual model.
REPLICABIUTY AND MULTILEVEL CONSTRUCTION OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
We hope that this book has provided a new look at the old problem of
replicability. Indeed, from the merely empirical question of "can one repli-
cate study X" and a general authoritative rule "all empirical results must in
principle be replicable," we have moved toward a general investigation of
how scientific construction of knowledge operates. Because this volume
primarily focused on the issues of the developmental perspective in science,
it brought into focus a number of issues that other methodologists of replica-
tion (e.g., Robert Rosenthal's "maxim or replicability" described earlier) have
overlooked, due to their lack of emphasis on development.
We reach the understanding that the issue of replicability is but a tip of an
iceberg, of the whole process by which science constructs its knowledge.
Only part of that process is empirical, and much of it takes place at the
methodological, theoretical, and metatheoretical levels. It can be argued that
the whole issue of replicability also belongs to the methodological level and
cannot be analyzed if we only look at the empirical level of scientific
activities. Instead, the question of replicability is closely linked with the issue
of methodological innovation (at the same, methodological, level), and
closely guided by the next higher level (that of theory). Because of that latter
guidance it becomes possible to find "camps" of opposing theories pointing to
the difficulties to replicate their opponents' studies. That finger pointing is, of
course, in itself a futile rhetoric device used in scientific discourse. However,
it can be also fruitful as it can lead to the necessity to rethink whether the
opposing theoretical perspectives are so much in opposition as they claim to
be, and whether in their "fight" they have overlooked some more relevant
focus on the phenomena. If the question of replicability leads to the need of
general reformulation of our reconstructions about our world then its rele-
vance transcends the limited function of "checking the empirical data" for
their consensually defined "goodness" or "flaws." Rather, the issue of repli-
cability leads us to a better picture of the functioning of the scientific process
at all levels with all of its contradictions, inconsistencies, misunderstandings,
j
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jealousies, and journalistically advertised "breakthroughs." In the middle of
that polyphony of the drama of science is the birthplace of new knowledge,
and the personal lives of the scientists who are determined to live through the
difficult road to the rare moments of discovery. The general issue of replica-
bility is thus an important, but episodic theme in our endless striving for better
knowledge.
J
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